A most impressive and welcome collection of original, historically informative, and theoretically compelling contributions to understanding the nature, dynamics, and tribulations of national identities in East-Central Europe. Focusing on issues related to nation-building, minorities and majorities, and regional identities in Romania and Hungary, the essays collected in this path-breaking volume should be read by all those who want to explore the complexities of national and political memories, symbols, and aspirations in the region. The authors, young scholars driven by the desire to overcome stereotypes and dogmas, have succeeded wonderfully in their ambitious and timely endeavor.

Vladimir Tismaneanu
Professor of Government and Politics, University of Maryland
Editor, East European Politics and Societies

An enriching collection of case studies on the modern and contemporary history of Hungary and Romania. The authors young historians and social scientists from those countries and their fresh, non-ideological approaches to nation-building and national identities are a sign that the post-communist transition is under way. The bibliography of the last decade of Hungarian and Romanian works on relations between the two countries is invaluable for specialists.

Irina Livezeanu
Associate Professor of History
at the University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
NATION-BUILDING
AND CONTESTED IDENTITIES:
ROMANIAN AND HUNGARIAN CASE STUDIES

Edited by:

Balázs Trenscényi, Dragos Petrescu,
Cristina Petrescu, Constantin Iordachi
and Zoltán Kántor

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“Identity is a Moving Target.” Cover illustration by Adam POX
after a photograph in the Museum of the Romanian Peasant, Bucharest.

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CONTENTS

FOREWORD / LÁSZLÓ KONTLER/

INTRODUCTION
Searching for Common Grounds: National Identity and Intercultural Research in an East-Central European Context 3

PART 1. MODERNITY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY:
APPROACHES, DILEMMAS, LEGACIES

MÓNÍKA BAÁR
The Intellectual Horizons of Liberal Nationalism in Hungary: The Case of Mihály Horváth (1809–1878) 21

KINGA KORETTA SÁTA
The Idea of the “Nation” in Transylvanism 42

BALÁZS TRENCSÉNYI
The “Münchausenian Moment”: Modernity, Liberalism and Nationalism in the Thought of Ștefan Zeletin 61

MIHÁLY SZILÁGYI-GÁL
The Nationality of Reasoning: Autochthonist Understandings of Philosophy in Interwar Romania 81

RÃZVAN PÂRĂIANU
National Prejudices, Mass Media and History Textbooks: The Mitu Controversy 93

PART 2. NATION-BUILDING AND REGIONALISM
IN A MULTI-ETHNIC CONTEXT

CONSTANTIN IORDACHI
“The California of the Romanians”: The Integration of Northern Dobrogea into Romania, 1878–1913 121

CRISTINA PETRESCU
Contrasting/Conflicting Identities: Bessarabians, Romanians, Moldovans 153
CONTENTS

ZOLTÁN PÁLFY
The Dislocated Transylvanian Hungarian Student Body and the Process of Hungarian Nation-Building after 1918 179

MARIUS TURDA
Transylvania Revisited: Public Discourse and Historical Representation in Contemporary Romania 197

PART 3. NATIONALIZING MAJOREITIES AND MINORITIES

BARNÁ ÁBRAHÁM
The Idea of Independent Romanian National Economy in Transylvania at the Turn of the 20th Century 209

IRINA CULIC
Nationhood and Identity: Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania 227

ZOLTÁN KÁNTOR
Nationalizing Minorities and Homeland Politics: The Case of the Hungarians in Romania 249

DRAGOȘ PETRESCU
Can Democracy Work in Southeastern Europe? Ethnic Nationalism vs. Democratic Consolidation in Post-Communist Romania 275

AFTERWORD / SORIN ANTOHÍ/
More Than Just Neighbors: Romania and Hungary Under Critical Scrutiny 302

APPENDIX / NÁNDOR BÁRTDI – CONSTANTIN IORDACHI/
Selected Bibliography: The History of Romanian–Hungarian Interethnic, Cultural and Political Relations (1990-2000) 307

NOTES ON AUTHORS 373
FOREWORD

It is surely an understatement to say that understanding and empathy, let alone a meeting of minds and a common frame of reference, have featured rather poorly in exchanges between scholars of different national background concerning their mutual predicament in Central and Southeastern Europe; and perhaps nowhere has this been so conspicuously the case as among Hungarians and Romanians. Apart from a few remarkable exceptions, such exchanges have tended to be dialogues of the deaf. For the sake of drawing a contrast with the present undertaking, let me illustrate this with an example from the not too remote past.

Some of the authors of the papers collected in this volume may barely be old enough to recall the full span of the controversy launched by the publication of the three-volume History of Transylvania under the auspices of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1986. Undoubtedly a major scholarly undertaking, that work was at the same time also subtly intended to bring under control, by quelling and satisfying, a specific demand in the Hungarian public sphere to tackle the “national issue”, to which the Transylvanian heritage had much symbolic and factual relevance. The array of denigrating political pamphlets (that is what they largely were, although many of them emanating from the hand of leading Romanian historians) that responded to the History in the immediate aftermath of its publication were not answered in kind, but merely by citing some of the charges levelled in them against the team of authors – “there is no political issue here, comrades”, it was suggested by officialdom in languid and pragmatic, de-nationalized communism (of Hungary) in response to the outburst of communist nationalism (of Romania). After the fall of communism in both countries in 1989, the debate was indeed placed on a more scholarly plane. Evidence was countered by evidence, but in what was still a contest between one national phalanx and the other on issues that both of them regarded as crucial to national fate. They raised incompatible claims which they took, as it were, to adjudication by an impartial arbiter: the case was “tried” at a colloquium in Paris, in the presence of French historians in 1992. Ironically, upon return home both parties reported, rather condescendingly in regard of the opponent, their own “victory” as having been sealed by the arbiters.

This probably looks like a caricature, and there was surely a lot of goodwill and true scholarship involved in the process, but as all caricatures, I believe it contains more than a grain of a realistic portrait. Scholarship of this kind, even unwittingly, tends to assume a kind of negative
relevance, underpinning and potentially amplifying the prejudices and stigmatization already all too prevalent in the reciprocal perceptions of the parties concerned. Romanians and Hungarians have mutually remained “constitutive others” for one another throughout the 1990s, a situation which has not in the least been alleviated by academic discourse, and which has been awkwardly accompanied by ebbs and flows in the reconciliation of decision-making elites. The “basic treaty” of 1996 (an acknowledgement of existing borders and minority rights, also providing for future political partnership) had been preceded by a virtual non-existence of diplomatic relations and followed by the present strain over the law recently passed by the Hungarian Parliament granting a special status (in Hungarian labour relations, education etc.) to ethnic Hungarians from neighboring countries.

Against this background, it is particularly important and reassuring that there are several scholars at both sides of the putative frontier, some of them at the very beginning of their careers, who are making efforts to transcend the limitations imposed by traditional patterns of inquiry and communication. It is an especial pleasure to see that the History Department of Central European University, as it was intended from the very beginning of its existence, is developing as a natural home for such initiatives. Part of the CEU mission is to function as a laboratory in which the most up-to-date experience and achievement in the disciplines represented at CEU is tested against the particular predicament of the region and adjusted according to its needs, and to operate as a catalyst, through an active engagement with an increasing range of regional partners – such as, in this case, the Télèki Institute –, helps the region to integrate with more universal processes. The architects of this volume and the conference from which it arises, have been active for a few years now in creating networks for a new type of academic socialization while relying on a combination of solid theoretical training and broad empirical investigation. It is yet to be seen how successful the admirable ambition to turn all of this to making an impact “above” and “below” – by “policy recommendations on bilateral confidence-building”, as they suggest – will be. Their own independent initiatives as well as their astonishingly rapid integration with larger scale international schemes, such as the projects of the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe, certainly bid well for the enterprise. This volume is the first token of their commitment and a convincing proof of their qualifications to cope with a formidable task. I am sure the reader will join me in wishing them – us – all success in it.

June 2001

LÁSZLÓ KONTLER
After the breakdown of the communist regimes, Central and Southeast European countries were faced with two interrelated, but conflicting, processes. On the one hand, a process of political democratization and integration into Western economic and security institutions was initiated, stimulating a certain level of intra-regional collaboration as well. On the other hand, the difficulties of the transition to market economy and parliamentarism led to a radicalization of ethno-populist movements, creating a space for political groups who seek to exploit inter-ethnic tensions. Furthermore, in spite of the cultural-political reorientation, inter-ethnic relations and mutual perceptions have not been essentially modified: conflicting historical myths, prejudices, and negative stereotypes have survived unaltered and continue to characterize the collective identity discourses in the region.

The relationship between Romania and Hungary is illustrative in this respect. At the interstate level, their bilateral relationship has undergone a spectacular evolution in the last decade, from intense diplomatic conflict to diplomatic collaboration and politico-military partnership. The two countries have overcome their acute confrontation over the status of the Hungarian minority in Romania that reached its climax in the late 1980s, the inter-ethnic violence in Tîrgu Mureș in 1990, as well as the freezing of diplomatic contacts between 1990 and 1994, and have managed to build a more positive framework of cooperation. This process of reconciliation began with the signing, in September 1996, of the “basic treaty” between the two countries, stipulating the acceptance of the existing borders and the implementation of the European standard of the rights of ethnic minorities. Even if one can witness a certain setback in political collaboration in the late-1990s, there are indications that the political elites of the two countries have significantly restrained the nationalist side of their political agenda as far as foreign policy is concerned.
Nevertheless, promoted exclusively at the level of political elites under the decisive influence of the international community, the Romanian-Hungarian reconciliation has not been based on a real change of images at the level of cultural production and public opinion. Negative clichés and reciprocal stigmatization continue to pervade the public memory, the political and the cultural discourse, as well as the academic production of knowledge. In fact, while decision-makers in Romania and Hungary became somewhat more conciliatory, one can witness an upsurge of radical ethno-politics in both countries, triggering similar reactions in academia, among cultural elites and – rather unexpectedly – among the university youth, as well. This creates a vast playground for politicians relying on a nationalist symbolism to legitimize their political positions. What is more, throughout the 1990s, public opinion in both countries witnessed the return of virtual history (asserting various forms of national and territorial continuities, pedigrees, historical precedence, etc.) into the common stock of political debates and official representation of the nation.

One of the main reasons for the lack of symbolic resources necessary for a large-scale intercultural dialogue is doubtlessly the limited impact on public opinion of those scholarly discourses that are transgressing the traditional framework of the nation-state. At the academic level, the first post-communist decade was characterized by rather timorous attempts in the fields of historiography and social sciences, such as sociology and cultural anthropology, to reconsider the socio-political and intellectual history of Romania and Hungary from updated theoretical and methodological perspectives. However, the critical revision of hegemonic historiographical canons through an inter-cultural dialogue and an effective renegotiation of the prominent identity-discourses of these cultures is an issue that remains to be tackled in Hungary and Romania, and in the wider region as well.

As the Eastern European cultural space is marked by highly divergent nation-state centered narratives, most of the cooperative attempts in the last decade resulted in a pastiche that did not problematize the broader frameworks, but rather sought to accumulate various narratives and accentuate their mind-boggling plurality and seeming incompatibility. The only way out of this deadlock is to promote scholarly enterprises that transgress the traditional frameworks of cooperation and are based on common socialization. Throughout the region, there is an endemic lack of institutions where a common academic socialization could happen. Among the few, Central European University in Budapest, Hungary – where most of the contributors to the present volume have studied or continue their studies – features prominently. Having discussed and questioned for years the various mutually exclusive historical narratives, institutional-
ized in the educational and cultural systems in Eastern-Europe, the editors of the present volume believe that there is a real historical opportunity to overcome the prevalent ethnocentrism and parochialism of the “nationalized” cultures in the region and to propose new theoretical and methodological perspectives.

It is with this hindsight that the conference “Nation-Building, Regionalism and Democracy: Comparative Perspectives on Issues of Nationalism in Romania and Hungary” was organized in Budapest on 14-15 December 1999.* The conference created an opportunity to reconsider some of the key issues of the intertwining history of these countries. It was characteristic of the atmosphere of the conference that the major debate was not about the compatibility or incompatibility of the “Hungarian” and “Romanian” narratives of history, but about the methodological dilemmas of studying nationalism from the perspective of social or intellectual history. The essays included in the present volume concentrate on issues which were generally left out of the national historiographical canons for being potentially harmful to the carefully polished images of national excellence and of “demonic others.” In order to get a more balanced picture of the politics of national identity, the authors seek to transgress the framework of “national” narratives, and to enhance a dialogue between social and intellectual history, as well as between the present-centered sociological and politological perspectives and the diachronic perspective of historiography.

To this end, the first part of the volume, entitled Modernity and National Identity: Approaches, Dilemmas, Legacies, analyzes various modalities of the relationship of nationalism with other doctrines and value-systems such as liberalism, democracy, or moral universalism. This section documents a significant shift in this relationship during the last 150 years. The nineteenth century saw the parallel emergence of liberalism and nationalism; these two ideologies were not only compatible, but, in certain cases, mutually conditioned each other. In contrast, the twentieth century saw the collapse of this fragile harmony, with nationalism perceived as antagonistic to personal and institutional liberty. That is why it is instructive to begin the survey of these problems with an analysis of “liberal nationalism.”

Mónika Baár’s essay is a case study on the intellectual sources of East-Central European national-romantic historical writing. The author

* The conference was hosted by the Teleki László Institute. Besides the contributors of the present volume, the list of participants comprised Alexandru Zub (Director of “A. D. Xenopol” Institute of History, Iasi) and Gusztáv Molnár (senior researcher, Teleki László Institute) as keynote-speakers, as well as Viorel Anastasoaie, Liviu Chelcea, Margit Feischmidt, László Fosztó, Károly Grúber, József Lőrincz, Martin Mevius, Attila Z. Papp, Emil Perhinschi, Levente Salat, Mátyás Szabó and Botond Zákonyi.
devises a broad comparative framework, placing the work of the Hungarian politician and historian Mihály Horváth alongside similar intellectuals from the region. Breaking through the traditional narrative about the originality and uniqueness of the respective national historian, the author argues that Horváth’s ideas were derived from the German late-Enlightenment. Although focusing on the ouevre of a particular historian, the essay has much wider implications: on the one hand, it is a reconstruction of the mental map of nineteenth-century liberal nationalism, on the other hand, it is an attempt to explore the possible analytical strategies of tackling the historiographical canons of the region, while abandoning the traditional nation-centered narratives.

If the nineteenth century witnessed various modalities of the coexistence of liberal and nationalist value-systems, 1918 meant a radical rupture. The new situation, after World War I, was marked by the emergence of various discourses questioning the compatibility of the cause of liberty with the cause of the community, especially in the case of socio-political turmoils. Kinga Sata’s reconstruction of the emerging “national” discourse of the Hungarian minority elite in Transylvania focuses on the relationship of global and local normativities in the thinking of these intellectuals, who sought to reframe the identity of their community that shifted from being dominant to becoming the principal target of the homogenizing thrust of another people’s nation-building. Transylvanism, the ideology professed by these intellectuals, is occasionally seen as a regionalist mode of self-definition, or it is defined as a detailed plan of political action strictly designed for the Hungarian minority in Romania. The paper concentrates on the Transylvanists’ conception of simultaneous membership in the Hungarian nation and the Romanian state, and the life strategies they envisaged for their community. While the author points out the protean nature of Transylvanism in general, she also asserts that a contextual reconstruction of its origins as a political ideology for the Hungarian minority in the 1920s is rewarding.

In order to understand the process of cultural reorganization of the minority group in the context of a nationalizing state, one has to look into the shift of the ideological landscape that occurred after 1918, especially in view of the re-evaluation of the role of the state. Balázs Trencsényi’s analysis of Stefan Zeletin’s political thought is an attempt to grasp the specific nature of post-1918 Romanian liberalism. The author points out that Zeletin challenged the ideological traditions of his time. Repudiating the idea that liberalism was merely an intellectual fashion imported from the West, Zeletin attempted to localize its emergence in the cleavage between the boyars, utilizing quasi-Marxist analytical tools to document the class-basis of politics. According to the author, Zeletin touched upon the inherent ambivalence of the liberal discourse in post-World War I Romania, aiming at national
autarchy and modernization simultaneously. While the liberal political elite sought to retain the democratic surface, they envisaged a process of industrialization, financed from a brutal reallocation of capital to the detriment of the agrarian population and the minorities. Ultimately, the etatist logic of nation-building devoured its own instruments and opened the ground for a radically anti-modernist ethno-politics.

In Central and Southeast Europe, these dilemmas reached their climax in the 1930s, when the discursive space was effectively expropriated by autochthonist cultural discourses. Mihály Szilágyi-Gál’s essay is an overview of the philosophical roots of the autochthonist arguments, focusing on the various visions of a “national philosophy.” The author derives these attempts from the general political context in interwar Romania, marked by an all-encompassing homogenizing project of nation-building, which was supposed to inform intellectual production in the domain of history, as well as in philosophy, and even in arts. The outcome was an organicist, or even biologistic, conception of cultural unity, completely undermining the contractual and inclusivist model of nation-statehood. While reconsidering some of the major assumptions of this discourse, the paper gives a creative re-reading of these debates in view of the cultural embeddedness of philosophical inquiry and the – not negligible – intellectual challenge posed by radical anti-modernism.

The legacy of interwar discourses of integrist nationalism is tangible even today. Of course, one cannot speak of an uncontaminated continuity, rather of a curious interaction of national romanticism, the ideas originating in the interwar period, and the national communist synthesis emerging in the late 1960s. It is from this perspective that Răzvan Părăianu’s paper explores the recent scandal that occurred in Romania around the first post-communist generation of history textbooks. This scandal brought to light very deep cultural tensions, hidden by the current economic crisis and the problems of socio-economic transition. Evoking the arguments of some of the protagonists, the author suggests that a “thick description” may yield important insights concerning the status of public historical consciousness in Romania. The principal conclusion of the paper is that a radical reform of history teaching and, consequently, of the historical consciousness will be extremely painful and troublesome without a fundamental change in the broader cultural framework.

The second part of the book, Nation-Building and Regionalism in a Multi-Ethnic Context, analyzes specific instances of cultural and political interaction between different ethnic communities in the context of the projects of nation-statehood. Providing a case study with broad implications for the entire Romanian nation-building project, Constantin Iordachi’s paper focuses on the integration of Northern Dobrogea into
Romania, which was considered by Romanian historiography as the second stage of the creation of the unitary Romanian state, after the 1859 union of Wallachia and Moldavia. The author points out that the mechanisms of assimilation used in Dobrogea by the Romanian political elites prefigured the more complex and arduous process of administrative integration and cultural homogenization that took place in interwar Greater Romania. The paper argues that Northern Dobrogea served as a kind of “internal frontier” for Romania – a dynamic zone for expanding the national economy and ethnic boundaries. In order to foster the incorporation of the province, Romanian political elites designed a threefold mechanism composed of ethnic colonization, cultural homogenization and economic modernization. Consequently, Iordachi explores the peculiar process of implementing the “Romanian” legal and political system in the province, its impact on the nationalist imagery, and the effects of this legislation on the ethnic and social-political transformation of Dobrogea.

It is an intriguing question what made certain projects of nation-building and national homogenization more successful than others. Providing an instructive case study of this problem, Cristina Petrescu discusses some aspects of the national identity formation in the case of the Romanian-speaking population in the territory between the rivers Prut and Dnester. In the last two centuries, this region was continuously disputed by Russia – then the Soviet Union – and the Romanian nation-state in the making, and changed repeatedly its state affiliation, until it emerged in 1991 as an independent republic. From the Romanian point-of-view, it is often argued that the Moldavian national identity was forged by Soviet propaganda. However, the overwhelming majority of Moldavians assert today that they represent a different national community, based on specific cultural traditions. This essay seeks to cut through this dilemma, pointing out that the current Moldavian national identity has its roots in the interwar period, when the Romanian homogenizing state did not succeed in transforming the pre-modern regional identity of the Romanian-speaking population of Bessarabia into a modern, Romanian national identity.

The impact of nation-state building projects in the interwar period is also the subject of Zoltán Pálfy’s historical case study of the structure of Transylvanian Hungarian university student body migrating to Hungary in the 1920s. Leaving aside the apologetic tone of traditional interpretations, the paper elucidates specific aspects of the strategic migration of students from the University of Cluj/Kolozsvár to the already overcrowded academic market of “Trianon Hungary.” Though not significant in size, post-World War I migration of Magyar high status groups from the “successor states” into Hungary made a long-lasting impact on inter-war Hungarian society. Their presence further destabilized the job
market and justified cultural policies that substituted revanchist political goals for the traditional claims of cultural supremacy. This case study also intends to prove that, if duly contextualized, the social history of a well-circumscribed segment of a larger community can be extremely illustrative, creating a possibility for a professional dialogue that goes beyond the narrow, nationally exclusivist perspectives.

The precarious relationship of regional and national identity in the process of nation-building remains a crucial problem to the present. Marius Turda reconstructs the Romanian discursive landscape from the perspective of the “Transylvanian problem.” The author points out that, since Romania’s emergence as a distinctive cultural framework, Romanianness has been defined in opposition to – either external or internal – “otherness.” After 1989, debates on Romania’s place on the European map opened new registers of problems. To many Romanian intellectuals and political analysts, recent efforts to foster decentralization and local autonomy, promoted by some segments of the Romanian society – particularly Transylvanians – constitute an imminent threat to the territorial integrity of the country. Therefore, the aim of the essay is to assess the image of Transylvania in the Romanian public sphere. By identifying various conflicting public discourses, the author points out the existence of a salient conflictuality within the Romanian society, which might undermine the possibility of a coherent domestic discursive domain.

The third part of the volume, entitled Nationalizing Majorities and Minorities, assesses the complex interplay between the minority and majority nationalizing projects. Since the issue of minorities is crucial to the democratization of political communities in Eastern Europe, it is important to consider not only how minorities are perceived and become objects of ethno-political concern, but also the way they themselves become players of ethno-politics, turning ethnicity into a primary marker of political allegiance. Barna Ábrahám’s paper focuses on the mechanisms of social and economic community-building on the part of the minorities, in this case the Romanians living in Transylvania, after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867. It examines how Romanian elites outlined the idea of an independent Romanian national economy in Transylvania, taking over the patterns of modernization from their Saxon compatriots, seeking to maintain the least possible contact with the state machinery considered oppressive and “ethnic Hungarian.” It also refers to the contemporary press and scholarly literature that asserted the possibility of constructing a modern society even without the forces of manufacturing industry, through cooperation, ethnic solidarity (in matters such as credit institutions, agricultural cooperatives, practical knowledge taught in well-
equipped schools, individual and public foundations, etc.), and the re-invigoration of traditional craftsmanship.

In many ways, these issues have not lost their relevance. Turning to contemporary Transylvania, Irina Culic’s paper, based on a survey done in 1997 concerning the perceptions of identity, mental images, and the interethnic relations of Hungarians and Romanians, presents several aspects of the construction of national identity in the interplay of minorities and majorities. In general terms, the survey focused on the main dilemma that a member of a national minority is confronting, namely the duality of belonging. One is a formal, legal belonging, to the state whose citizen one was born, while the other is an eminently cultural, emotional belonging to the nation one “comes from,” which is constituting another nation-state. This duality generates ambiguities at less formal levels, such as group loyalties, inter-personal relations, attitudes and opinions. There are many situations when the two dimensions can be conflicting. In fact, any circumstance in which one of the elements of identity-building is relevant may generate a confrontation of the two faces of a person’s identity. Consequently, the author advocates a political framework that allows for functional compromises, ambivalent self-descriptions and avoiding the either/or questions of identification.

These contentions over membership within the larger political community based on ethnic criteria and the peculiar identity mechanisms induced by membership in a minority group need to be studied in view of the interaction of the minority and the respective “national homeland” as well. Zoltán Kántor’s paper proposes a broad interpretative framework for tackling these issues, focusing on the case of the Hungarian national minority in Romania. The author considers that one should use the concept of nationalizing minority instead of national minority, because the former captures the dynamics of the national minority and offers a better explanation of East-Central European nationalisms. Furthermore, he states that “nationalizing minority” is a concept of the same category as “nationalizing state,” and does not suppose different motivations for the titular nation and the national minority. Presenting some of the political conflicts characterizing the Hungarian minority in Romania, the author argues that since the nation will not loose its salience in the foreseeable future, the politics of nationalizing states and nationalizing minorities will continue to determine the political agenda in the region.

It remains an open question whether the spasms of unfinished nation-building on the part of the majorities and minorities will effectively block the way of certain post-communist countries towards full integration into the Euro-Atlantic political and economic structures. It is in view of this dilemma that Dragos Petrescu analyzes the relationship between ethnic
homogeneity and democratic consolidation in post-communist East-Central Europe. The author argues that in Romania, as compared with Hungary, Poland, or the Czech Republic, the post-communist transformation was delayed by an outburst of ethnic nationalism. In his view, it was a complex interplay of political and cultural-historical issues, involving the Romanian majority, the Hungarian minority in Romania and the Hungarian government, that created an environment less favorable for democratic transformation. In the early 1990s, the issues of national identity and loyalty towards a “unitary nation-state” received disproportionate attention in Romania, and often overshadowed the issue of democratic transformation of the country. Consequently, the country’s post-communist transformation has been longer and more traumatic than it was the case in most of the countries of East-Central Europe. The paper concludes that the process of democratic consolidation is conditioned not only by a triadic scheme of cooperation (of the nationalizing state, the national minority and the national homeland), but also by a fourth critical factor, i.e., the international community.

Surely, the intellectual references and methodological horizons of the authors are quite diverse, ranging from the Anglo-American tradition of social history and the “modernist” school of the study of nationalism to the “Cambridge school” of intellectual history, political philosophy, political sociology, and oral history. Nevertheless, apart from the already “traditional” references to classic works of Eugen Weber, Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, Anthony D. Smith, or Benedict Anderson, there are some scholars whose works on the region have been extremely influential and provided common references for most of the contributors. In this respect, one can mention Katherine Verdery’s analysis of the debates on national identity in communist Romania; Irina Livezeanu’s work on the process of nation-building and cultural homogenization in interwar Romania; Rogers Brubaker’s theoretical model based on the dynamic “triadic” interplay of nation-state, national minorities, and external national homelands in post-communist Eastern Europe; Vladimir Tismăneanu’s comparative analyses of East-Central European communist and post-communist political cultures; and Sorin Antohi’s writings on historical methodology, symbolic geography and post-1989 Romanian intellectual debates.

We can also observe the blurring of the borderline between social and intellectual history-writing. This is partly due to the re-emergence of the problem of collective identity as the focus of the research agenda that generated a greater emphasis on methodologies hitherto neglected by mainstream historians, such as oral history or historical anthropology. These new approaches naturally mediate between the social and intellectual perspectives, and also contribute to the formation of alternative institutional
frameworks and research projects that seek to analyze social conditions and cultural discourses simultaneously. From this perspective, these two directions of interpretation are not only compatible, but even inconceivable without each other: in order to understand “social conditions” we textualize them and study them in their discursive setting, while the discourses are contextualized in view of their social frameworks. By addressing the cultural and historical aspects in order to locate these discourses not only in their immediate political context, but also in a broader framework of the process of nation-state building in the entire region, this volume represents our first common attempt to reach common grounds of interpretation and mutually acceptable perspectives of research between Romanian and Hungarian scholars. Apart from its peculiar symbolic value, the volume is also meant to contribute to the formation of a broader framework of professional intellectual communication and interaction in East-Central Europe.

Since one of the major hindrances to the creation of lasting frameworks of intercultural dialogue in the region is the endemic lack of information about each other’s scientific production, our volume is supplemented with a selected bibliography of books and articles, published after 1989, on the history of Hungarian-Romanian ethnic, cultural and political relations. The bibliography documents the main directions of academic literature and seeks to provide “local” and “foreign” researchers with a useful guide to the problems of historiography, nationalism, nation-building, minorities, inter-ethnic relations, and cultural interchange.

This volume could not have been accomplished without the generous support of a long list of institutions and individuals. The organization of the conference and the publishing of the present volume were sponsored by the Department of History of the Central European University, The Rectorate of the Central European University, the Nationalism Studies Program of the Central European University, the Civic Education Project and the Teleki László Institute. We would like to thank especially Professors Yehuda Elkana, György Granasztói, László Kontler, Mária M. Kovács and Alexandru Zub for their care and support. Steven Green’s help in copy-editing the manuscript was invaluable. A special thanks is due to Sorin Antohi, whose extensive knowledge and irony in view of the national identity-discourses in Eastern Europe have been an inspiration for many of the contributors.
PART 1.

MODERNITY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY: APPROACHES, DILEMMAS, LEGACIES
The Intellectual Horizons of Liberal Nationalism in Hungary: The Case of Mihály Horváth (1809-1878)

MÓNIFA BAÁR

A historian from Central and Eastern Europe who accomplished his oeuvre in the 19th century might well be associated with irrational ideas, problems of ethnicity and national messianism. The historical thinking of Mihály Horváth, however, challenges these clichés. At the same time, it also raises more general questions about the nature and the variety of nationalist historiography in this region. In the following, some aspects of Horváth’s scholarly works are scrutinized, with special attention to themes that might throw light on the uncommon aspects of his historical writing as compared to his contemporaries.

Born in 1809, Horváth was the fourth child in a family of 17 children. Though the family once belonged to the lower nobility, by the time of his birth, they were rather poor. This fact affected Horváth’s future carrier. He pursued his studies in a seminary – a choice which was most likely not motivated by a strong vocation for the priesthood. Since this option provided the sole opportunity for higher education, it was probably a more decisive stimulus. Horváth’s interest in contemporary politics arose whilst in school (this was a time when the Hungarian counties started their resistance against the policies of the Habsburg government) and perhaps this interest inspired him to examine the historical aspects of that period. After Horváth was ordained, several poorly-paid positions followed. In the following seven years, he was alternately a private tutor and an assistant priest, neither position offering him the respect and independence he longed.

Horváth regularly devoted time to historical research, but this activity was often subordinated to the time and energy-consuming attempts to earn a living. Indeed, the motif of “self-support” appears not only in his life but also in his works. It is not a coincidence that one of his favorite personalities in Hungarian history was Cardinal Martinuzzi, a 16th century statesman with a career that was exceptional for those days. He was born as a serf and achieved a high political position due to his own talent and efforts (and as a member of the clergy). Also, in a later work, Horváth applied this theme to the political circumstances in Hungary between 1809-1849:
[That period] became, by the nation’s efforts and struggles, ... the most glorious period, a progress following the principles of liberalism. Such progress was even more admirable if we consider that the development was achieved entirely by the nation’s own initiative, unsupported from above, despite many constraints.¹

Similar to the efforts of foreign scholarly societies, the newly-founded Hungarian learned societies regularly announced competitions which allowed for talented but hitherto unknown historians to make their names familiar to the public. Horváth, a historian writing for his own pleasure, entered the academia through this channel and it is likely that, without these competitions, his chances to become a respected historian would have been much slighter.

The following question was posed in the competition, announced by the Marczibányi Institute, in 1835: “What was the difference between the social and moral development of the conquering Hungarians and the peoples of Europe?” This theme addressed developments of the 9-10th century, a turning point in Hungarian history: the foundation of the state and the adoption of Christianity. Nevertheless, its implications were not purely political, but also reflected the ongoing debate in contemporary politics regarding the nature of feudal society and the Hungarians’ place in European civilization. While Horváth considered this epoch at a later stage of his career as well, he remained uninterested in the study of the period prior to the adoption of Christianity. Unlike many of his Central and East European colleagues, who often devoted most of their attention to early history and expressed a special interest in the origins of their respective nation, Horváth did not attribute too much importance to that theme. Moreover, he asserted his abstinence from competing for “whose history is older,” stating that “culpable is the nation which is so much in need of laudation and glory that it considers the predecessors’ antiquity and fame its most significant merit.”²

This lack of interest is especially surprising if we take into account the topic’s popularity in contemporary debates. It was indeed a hotly disputed issue whether the Hungarians were related to the Finno-Ugrian tribes as their language proved, or they had a Turkic background as their physical look and customs suggested. Horváth expressed serious doubts about the reliability of sources related to this issue. It is also true, however, that the promising developments in the Reform Era, which opened a chance to participate in actual political debates, offered a pursuit which seemed more attractive to this generation than the involvement in nebulous academic debates. Thus, in his attitude to earlier history, Horváth’s position was similar to contemporary French, English or German themes in historiography, where the most signif-
icant issues under discussion (the Norman Conquest, Charlemagne’s empire, the rise of communes, feudalism, etc.) were the developments in early-medieval history, and not in pre-history, as it was the case in the lifework of many of his colleagues, such as Joachim Lelewel.

Horváth’s interest in the study of feudalism, which he saw as an opposite to freedom, was manifested in his essay submitted for the aforementioned competition. In his understanding, it was feudalism that determined the social and moral conditions in the successor-states of Charlemagne’s empire. The two components of feudal society were the nobility and the servants. Those who at a later stage became servants had originally enjoyed civil liberties. However, the unrestrained haughtiness of the nobility deprived them not only of their civil, but also of their natural rights: they were often treated not as human beings, but as property. As the feudal remnants had survived in Hungary until Horváth’s time, his historical discussion had a strong contemporary resonance. He reflected upon one of the most salient problems of his age, when declaring that the feudal system was lacking a powerful middle-class (since towns did not really fit in the feudal order). Where “a diligent middle-class is non-existent, where the overwhelming majority of the people belongs to a servant class, how can bourgeois civilization develop, how can the flowers of a nobler humanity blossom?”

According to Horváth, the Hungarians originally led a peaceful life of equality, simplicity and independence. In fact, there were few historians in this period who envisioned their nation’s beginnings in a different way. However, Horváth’s task was more difficult as the sources referring to the Hungarians in this period – mostly German chronicles – characterized them in a way which was far from flattering: “wild,” “bloodthirsty” and “abominable” were among the common adjectives. Horváth solved this problem by arguing that it was only in the period of “adventures” (tours of robbery around the neighboring territories, utilizing a military tactic unknown to other peoples) that selfishness and greed appeared. As an inevitable result of enrichment, the truth-loving and peaceful shepherds became wild, cruel robbers. War became the organizing principle of life. Domestic work was looked upon by the Hungarians as something servile, as they spent most of their day with dolce far niente. Thus, they recalled Caesar’s Gauls and Tacitus’s Germans: “They were disgusted by acquiring things by the sweat of their brow if it could be obtained by violence and blood.”

Somewhat surprising for a just-settled nomadic tribe, a positive feature of the Hungarians is found in their respect for women and monogamy. The example supporting this argument illustrates the charmingness of Horváth’s effort to present a critical, yet, on the whole, positive view of the Hungarians. Respect for women can be observed in their
behaviour in 938, when Prince Zoltán and his troops, after an unsuccessful adventure, angrily wreaked havoc in Saxony. Among other things, they also destroyed a nunnery, and true, all of the nuns were butchered, but their virtue did not suffer damage. In another place, Horváth also quoted Ludwig T. Spittler’s *Geschichte Europas*, which claimed that the history of humanity showed few precedents for such a “gradual refinement” as it happened in the case of the Hungarians.

In later parts of his presentation, Horváth argued that in Western Europe feudalism killed freedom, since its organizing principle was serfdom. The limits of power were not defined by laws derived from the social contract, but were dependent on the authoritative will of the ruler or the ruling class. Whereas in feudal Europe serfdom was the fundamental obstacle, in the case of the Hungarians unrestricted freedom was the main problem of society. Hungarians obeyed their prince without degrading into servility. The leaders (chieftains) of the nation invested the prince with authority and the limits of his power derived from rightful contracts. The legendary tradition of the blood contract of seven chieftains is interpreted as a primitive constitution and, in a similar manner, the legendary meeting of Pusztaszer as a primitive form of parliament. Whereas in feudal society the interests of a tiny ruling class contrasted with those of the vast mass of serfs, among the Hungarians everyone was a member of the nation.

In feudal Europe the juridical system was based on established laws, which were, however, formed arbitrarily. Among the Hungarians, legal institutions were not yet established, but customs and, to some extent, arbitrary (though patriarchal) laws organized the life of society. Therefore, concluded Horváth, jurisdiction was less rightful in the Western provinces than among the Hungarians, because in their case it was the people who elected the judges and they could also be deprived of their position. On the whole, the mere fact that the feudal system was more refined does not guarantee its superiority:

Because civilization (regarding the constitution) is not to be found where it is organized and established, but where the constitution fits its purpose, where social conditions are defined by rightful laws and where the prince has enough power to urge the fulfilment of these laws, where the contribution to public goods is proportional to the advantages drawn from them, and where the constitution serves not just a few privileged individuals, but the entire nation.

Yet again, this statement sounded more like a political manifesto, than a historical account. According to his interpretation, in feudal Europe the above-mentioned conditions were not fulfilled, since all burdens had to be
carried by the unprivileged classes. Among the Hungarians, the constitution was much simpler and less developed, but better suited to its purpose. Horváth’s argument is in line with the representatives of several other “marginal” nations: where it was impossible to assert the advanced nature of their people’s early civilization on the basis of written legal norms or other “concrete” documents, usually the importance and, in some cases, the superiority of the “natural” and “spontaneous” elements was stressed and opposed to established norms which were deemed “unnatural.”

Evidently, though discussing a topic that dates back to the 9th century, Horváth reflected on the pressing issues of contemporary Hungary. He criticized feudal Europe – which he depicted in view of early 19th century Hungary – on liberal grounds. His guiding principles were the ideas of the Enlightenment, such as the social contract and the limited power of the ruler. In Horváth’s model, primitive Hungarian society embodied these ideas. Nevertheless, Hungarian society at this stage did not appear to Horváth as a “paradise lost,” nor did he suggest that the return to that level of civilization would be desirable. He also stressed that unlimited freedom was as disadvantageous as serfdom; the ideal thus should be a limited freedom – limited, that is guaranteed, but not misused.

Horváth’s prize-winning work was followed by another, in 1836, when he was a runner-up in the competition announced by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. This time the topic was “The history of Hungarian industry and commerce in the Middle Ages.” This theme, alongside with the influence of towns in Hungarian civilization, was frequently debated in the mid-1830s and also reflected a general European interest. A similar work on the role of trade and commerce, albeit in antique societies, entitled “Reflections concerning the politics, intercourse and commerce of the leading nations of antiquity” was likewise written for a competition, by the Göttingen scholar, Arnold Hermann Ludwig Heeren (1760-1842), about whom H. E. Barnes, in his *A History of Historical Writing*, stated that “if Montesquieu had few disciples among professional historians, he had at least one of the highest order in Arnold Hermann Ludwig Heeren, one of that brilliant group of Göttingen professors of his period.” Author of the successful comparative work, *Handbook of the History of the European State Systems and their Colonies*, Heeren possibly exercised the greatest influence on Horváth’s historical thinking, and his works were generally popular among 19th century historians in Central and Eastern Europe.

Although, in his previous work, he opposed the circumstances of feudal Europe and those of the Hungarians, Horváth did not discuss the issue of religion from a comparative perspective. He claimed that the opposition of Paganism to Christianity made no sense. Therefore, an evident question that follows from the harsh criticism of feudalism, i.e., the
evaluation of Christianity (which actually brought about feudalism), remained unanswered. In his second work, Horváth tackled this problem as well. In Horváth’s view, Christianity opened the way for the Hungarians to adopt “Western” European civilization. It injected a more sober knowledge and gentler morals into this unlearned, simple people. It helped them to develop friendly relations with the Western powers, by whom they had been hated on account of their paganism.

Voicing an opinion shared by many of his contemporaries in Central and Eastern Europe, Horváth did not hold the adoption of Christianity (and thus feudalism) directly responsible for the deterioration of the people’s social status. He supposed that such a deterioration was a subsequent and gradual process which, indeed, was one of the main obstacles in the way of further development. Interestingly, while other historians, regardless of their nationality, often blamed foreign invaders (such as the German colonizing influence) for the loss of freedom, Horváth was not prone to this xenophobic attitude and, generally speaking, did not seek to find a negative counter-image of the Hungarians in other nations. Nevertheless, he asserted that the heterogeneity of peoples, representing different stages of moral and social development, was a fundamental hindrance in the way of development – a statement which seems to project Hungary’s ethnic heterogeneity, and the conflicts arising from it, into the Middle Ages.

In defining the phenomena that substantially contributed to the development of civilization, Horváth attributed the main role to Christianity, while the second place was given to industry and commerce. Horváth claimed that the sobering influence of industry and commerce initiated a longing for civil freedom, which was most apparent in Hungarian towns from the beginning of the 13th century. This happened because material well-being, a result of prospering industry and commerce, gradually awoke a demand for liberty and thereby morals came to be more polished.

A general objection to Horváth’s evaluation of commerce and industry is that he grossly overestimates their role in the development of the country. As in the Reform Era historians were expected to offer a pragmatic program for the future, one might suggest that Horváth did not want to show how influential commerce and industry in the Middle Ages actually were. Rather, he indicated how influential he wanted them to be in his own time. Also, when claiming that towns had been the hotbeds of freedom and the main weapon against feudalism in Hungary, he did not seem to reflect upon the fact that the majority of towns were inhabited by foreign (mostly German) dwellers.

The difficulty in the correct estimation of the historical influence of towns also shows that it was not always easy to apply conclusions drawn by foreign historians to the Hungarian circumstances. Furthermore, in the
absence of Hungarian publications, he could only rely on a limited range of sources and his statistical data was drawn on foreign books. Notwithstanding these shortcomings, Horváth’s account, especially when completed with a second part, entitled “The history of trade and industry in the last three centuries,” was a remarkable achievement. His Central and East European contemporaries also sought to tackle issues of commerce and industry. They managed to devise, even if they could not fully exploit the potential of the topic, a new framework of historiography, which sought to supersede the history of royal dynasties. However, most of them did not get as far in their analysis as Horváth.

Also, Horváth went further than his contemporaries in the application of foreign material on trade and commerce to the conditions of his own nation, for which he borrowed the ideological and intellectual framework of a handful of German historians of the late-Enlightenment. His main inspiration came, as mentioned above, from the works of Arnold Heeren, but he also drew on other representatives and transmitters of the late Enlightenment, particularly the German Aufklärung, such as Wilhelm Wachsmuth, Ludwig T. Spittler, or Karl D. Hüllmann. For Horváth, who thought that “the flowers of a more noble humanity” can only blossom where a powerful middle-class exists, the German historians’ understanding of the middle class as the main catalyst of societal development seemed especially relevant.

The works of the above-mentioned German historians, especially their reading of European history as a transition from a feudal to a modern and commercial social system, fit into the broader framework of Enlightenment historiography. This interpretation was developed by the histories of Voltaire, Hume, Robertson and Gibbon, whose main concern was to show how the medieval feudal-agricultural society, characterized by an absence of all but aristocratic liberties and by oppressive aristocratic jurisdiction, was eventually eroded by the incorporation of cities, the development of new technologies, the expansion of domestic and overseas market and the relative decline of aristocratic wealth. Besides the influence of the aforementioned German scholars, a close examination of Horváth’s ideas on trade and industry reveals similarities with the mentality of the Scottish Enlightenment, especially William Robertson. This is not accidental: although there is no direct evidence of Horváth’s familiarity with Robertson’s works, the preference of these German historians (especially the Göttingen school) for the representatives of the Scottish Enlightenment seems to have had an impact on Horváth’s work.

Montesquieu was another favorite thinker of the Aufklärung and his works enjoyed great popularity in Hungary in the Reform Era. Horváth was not only familiar with his writings, but also made a “contribution” to
the climate theory, one of the most frequently used causal explanations of the Aufklärers. Montesquieu’s famous claim was that mankind is influenced by various causes: climate, religion, the maxims of government, precedents, morals and customs. Horváth did not apply Montesquieu’s correlation between political liberty and climatic environment (colder climates produce vigorous, frank and courageous people, whereas warmer climates induce to sensuality, indolence and servility) for the case of Hungary. In fact, it would have been difficult to accommodate such a theory in Central Europe, where winters tend to be cold and summers tend to be warm. However, probably using an analogy of Montesquieu’s argument that the high suicide rate in England was due to a climate that continually put Englishmen in a state of distemper, Horváth established that climate influences national characteristics as well as physical ones, for instance in the case of language, where the quality of the air affects articulation. Thus, the quality of the air accounts for the abundance of “hissing sounds” in the Slovak language.

Horváth fully shared the Aufklärers’ belief in progress, and his optimism was manifested in many of his articles, which were written on the basis of the works of the aforementioned German historians. In some cases, he simply translated their work without necessarily identifying his original sources. In other cases, he interpreted the writings in a Hungarian framework. The article, “The development of democracy in our age” (1841) (in the title of which the word “democracy” was later substituted by “the interest of the people,” so that it would not provoke the censor) analyzed Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America*. Horváth established that Tocqueville’s main principle, that society was progressing towards equality, was applicable to Hungary as well. Another article, “The origins, development and influence of state theories in modern Europe, after Heeren” (1842) offered a more sophisticated, relativistic view of democracy. It followed Heeren’s and, generally speaking, the Aufklärers’ interpretation which was not only critical of absolute monarchies but also had reservations regarding the nature of democracy. Some of the Aufklärers went so far as to present democracy as the counterpart to absolutism sacrificing individual creativity to arbitrary and capricious rule, and leading to mediocrity. Horváth concluded with a middle-way statement, translating Heeren’s idea word by word:

Neither democracy, nor aristocracy, or absolute monarchy are preferable, and the key to political understanding lays in grasping the nature of the unique conjunction of spiritual, moral and structural elements that animated a specific historical entity at a specific time. ... To establish a form of state which includes the guarantees of its own permanence in
Horváth’s positive evaluation of the achievements of the French Revolution was expressed in the article “Europe’s internal conditions from the French Revolution onwards” (1839), which reflected the ideas of Wilhelm Wachsmuth. Horváth believed that the revolution significantly contributed to the development of civilization. Though not Europe-wide, certain phenomena, such as the limitation of Church influence, new laws regulating civil and criminal conditions, the emancipation of the Jews, the abolishment of serfdom, or the immense improvement of sciences were all relevant proofs of the obvious development. Interestingly, Horváth, who always sought to offer a balanced evaluation, did not find one remotely negative aspect which could have been associated with the revolution. Thus, he completely shared Wachsmuth’s evaluation who declared, in his *Geschichte Frankreichs im Revolutionzeitalter* (The History of France in a Revolutionary Age), that for Europe the French Revolution could only do good.

The two most influential German authors in this context were undoubtedly Wachsmuth and Heeren. Horváth occasionally translated their work, without referring to the original source. Yet, it would not be sensible to dismiss all these writings with the excuse that they lacked originality. It is more useful to examine the function of these articles. Mid-19th century academic scholarship in Hungary was not fully developed: the institutionalization and professionalization of the historical discipline was in an initial phase and this process could not be completed overnight. Naturally, the establishment of scholarly institutions, periodicals, and the framework of the discipline took considerable time. Thus, it was unrealistic to expect that within short time original Hungarian works, based on extensive study of sources, would appear. In the meantime, translations or summaries of foreign articles could fill the gap between desires and realities. This attempt was often undertaken in an institutional setting. For instance, in 1832, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences compiled a list of books to be translated, which also included Heeren’s and Wachsmuth’s works.

Horváth’s articles were written with the purpose to familiarize the learned public with contemporary Western developments, and informing them about academic scholarship elsewhere. In providing a summary of foreign achievements, there was no need to be particularly original. On the other hand, Horváth’s articles often adopted foreign ideas to the conditions of Hungary, thereby endowing the analyzed issues with local relevance. These writings offered an aspect of innovation, even though
they were lacking in originality: the fact that they were written in Hungarian seemed to overshadow the importance of the content.

A significant part of Horváth’s articles discussed historiographical topics. Horváth repeatedly stressed that historical science and life could not be separated. Since the task of history-writing was to offer guidance for the present, its cultivation could only be fruitful if the results filtered through life. History, if examined from a critical perspective, contains solutions for the problems of the present, as well as help to avoid the mistakes made by our predecessors. Horváth’s programmatic declaration, an article entitled “Reflections on the theory of historiography” (1839), was a word-by-word translation of the first chapter, “Die Aufgabe” from Wachsmuth’s five-volume Europäische Sittengeschichte (European History of Manners), which appeared in Leipzig between 1831 and 1837. The Wachsmuth-Horváth article advocated a program based on two fundamental principles. First, historiography should not exclusively discuss the deeds of the ruling elite, but should also examine the life of unprivileged people:

Those books which merely focus on the affairs of the royal court and governmental bodies in a given country, are similar to a traveller who is willing to visit the highest circles only, and who prefers to get bored in cool marble rooms instead of having a pleasant time in a cosy cottage.¹¹

This statement recalls Schlözer’s view that history should no longer consist of biographies of kings, chronological notes of war, battles, changes in rule, reports of alliances or revolutions. Similarly, Carlyle’s opinion was that Phoenician mariners, Italian masons and Saxon metallurgists were greater innovators in history than he, who first led his armies over the Alps. Second, Horváth declared that a descriptive historical method should be succeeded by a pragmatic/analytical approach, based on the principles of Hegelian dialectics. While these norms were fully observed in Horváth’s lifework, at a later stage he became disappointed with the Hegelian system, which is obvious from his remark that “some of our thinkers, having finished their studies at German universities, became the apostles of a hair-splitting speculative philosophy, especially of the extremely obscure system of Hegel.”¹²

In his inaugural lecture at the Kisfaludy Society, “Why is art so unfruitful in our days? Why is historiography abundant in masterpieces?” (1868), Horváth expressed a positive view of the historical writings of his age. He argued that historiography managed to discover a notion that is superior to all, i.e., the notion of humanity: “We do not simply write history any more, but attempt to examine the philosophy of history as well.
Art lacks ideals, history, however, discovered the notion which gives the historian as much ambition as inspiration does in the case of the artist. This is the notion of humanity."¹³ It is tempting to interpret this notion of humanity as an effort to overcome the narrow-mindedness of the rhetoric of nationalism. However, this attitude is more likely to represent the survival of an Enlightenment attitude towards the history of the human race. For the thinkers of the Enlightenment, just as for Horváth, history was believed to “open the mind, extend one’s knowledge, to acquaint one with the world in all dimension and dampen the fires of intolerant and dangerous patriotism. The study of history was the study of man; its final goal was seen as self-knowledge.”¹⁴

Historians in the 19th century often attempted to compose a complete national history, from the origins of their nation to their own lifetime, but only a few succeeded in this monumental venture. Sometimes censorship would not allow the publication of a work that was critical of a contemporary regime, or the historian was seriously engaged in political activities which did not leave time for the continuation of his work. In other cases, the scholar simply died before reaching the more recent period in the narrative. In fact, Horváth was not exempted from those problems. He had conflicts with censorship, his financial position did not allow for full-time historical research and, at certain stages of his life, he was also involved in politics. Thus, the explanation for his success to tackle basically every historical period until his lifetime must lay elsewhere: his lack of interest in earlier periods allowed him to “get over” with ancient history and dedicate his time to the examination of more recent periods. His massive History of Hungary (running up to the mid-1820s) consisted of eight volumes in its largest edition and, together with the Twenty-five years from the history of Hungary and the History of the Hungarian war of independence in 1848-1849, it covered the entirety of Hungarian history from the beginnings until 1849. He also prepared articles to address more specific issues, such as the “Sketches of the history of Hungarian peasantry,” and the “Sketch of the history of the Hungarian army and defense.”

Horváth’s favorite period in Hungarian history contradicts the expectations imposed by Romantic stereotypes. As discussed above, he was not interested in early history, neither was he willing to find a specific mission for the Hungarians. Instead, his special interest (apart from contemporary history) rested in the study of a paradoxical period, that of the 16th century, an era which was marked by tragedies and shame rather than glory in Hungarian history. This was a time when the Hungarian state ceased to exist and the country was partitioned. Instead of relying on a myth which defined Hungary’s role as the bastion of Christianity, manifested in its battles against the Turks, Horváth wished to discover who was
responsible for the tragedy which led to the country’s partition. He found the aristocracy responsible for the collapse, and declared that it was not the power of the Turks but the cowardice of the Hungarians which brought about these tragic developments.

Horváth’s other interest was not defined by a period but by an unprivileged class: the peasantry. In this pursuit, he again adhered to a pragmatic point of view and examined aspects of the history of peasantry with an eye on contemporary problems and looking for their possible solutions. By 1841, the time of the completion of these articles, it was obvious for the reformers that the miserable position of the peasantry was an obstacle in the way of the development of trade, agriculture and commerce. But how much liberty should be given to the peasantry without the danger of challenging the existing order? In examining these matters, Horváth again turned to history as a casebook. He stated, “in the history of mankind, there is hardly a more important issue than the relationship between the different social strata,” presuming that a state, where this relationship is based on the principles of natural law, will be prosperous, strong and peaceful. On the other hand, where the legal conditions of the people are unlawful, society declines. Horváth identified America as a model, where the enjoyment of civic liberties resulted in progress.

Apart from this practical concern, engaging in the history of the peasantry could also support Horváth’s desire to go beyond the discussion of dynastic history. Missing the documents which could have illustrated the everyday life of the people in the manner of “microhistory,” he chose to focus on one particular aspect, the legal situation of the peasantry throughout the centuries; as this had been documented in various state decrees readily available for him. Horváth was especially keen on the examination of the causes and consequences of the peasant uprising of 1514. The uprising broke out among a circle of peasants who had originally been recruited to fight against the Turks. Horváth wanted to find out why the peasants turned against their lords. After the suppression of the uprising, the Hungarian peasantry was deprived even of its limited civil liberties, such as the freedom of migration, the only means of the peasantry to protect itself from the lords’ abusive power. According to Horváth, this act was even more shameful than slavery in the ancient world, because deprivation of liberties in Rome, regardless of the size of the slave community, referred to individuals only, and not to a complete social stratum. Due to the inhuman nature of Hungarian legislation, an entire social layer was collectively deprived of its rights. According to Horváth, people deprived of their rights cannot form a real community and cannot constitute a nation. Hungarian legislation excluded the peasantry from enjoying any rights, but, in spite of such deprivation of liberties, it did not cease to consider the peasantry as a constituent of the
national community, because they were obliged to pay taxes. Horváth believed that slavery eradicated the spiritual development, and it was a serious violation of natural law that the neighboring states developed in science, industry and strength; whereas the Hungarians lagged behind.

Horváth acknowledged that the treatment of this “illness” demanded some sacrifices. However, the upper classes were not willing to resign their privileges and share them with the peasantry. Generally speaking, these writings championed the values of the liberal opposition, the “reformers,” and often corresponded with the program of Lajos Kossuth. In light of one of the fundamental liberal demands – i.e., that all should enjoy public benefits in the proportion he contributes to public burdens – he emphasized the paradoxical nature of the nobility’s situation in the 19th century in his “Sketch of the history of the Hungarian army and defense.” The nobility was exempted from taxation on the basis of an ancient law in return for defending the country against the enemy. Horváth pointed out that, by the 19th century, only the privilege survived, the obligation had lost its validity.

In 1847, Horváth became a parish priest, later a prelate, and in June 1848, in revolutionary Hungary, he was appointed a bishop (although never received confirmation from the Pope). In that capacity, he advocated a more secular, more civil church and the introduction of democratic principles in the ecclesiastical administration. The revolutionary events of 1848-1849 led him to a political career, and eventually he became Minister of Religion and Education in the short-lived Szemere government in 1849. After the suppression of the revolution, Horváth escaped the death penalty (his name was nailed on the gallows in his absence). He left the country at the last minute under adventurous circumstances and finally ended up in Paris. Later on, he moved to Brussels and, finally, to Geneva. In the meantime, he frequented the archives and libraries of the respective cities. He prepared a collection of documents related to Hungary, based on the materials he found in Brussels. Two of his aforementioned salient works were written in this period: Twenty-five years from the history of Hungary (1864), and the History of the Hungarian war of independence in 1848-1849 (1865). These were understood as the penultimate and ultimate parts of his History of Hungary.

Since Horváth was not a practising cleric in those days, he saw no obstacle in marrying a well-to-do woman from Geneva. However, being homesick ever since his departure, Horváth wanted to return to Hungary. In 1866, after the defeat of Königgrätz, which considerably weakened the position of the Habsburg dynasty, his clemency plea was accepted and he was finally granted amnesty. Upon his return, Horváth was elected vice-president of the Hungarian Historical Society and later became its president.
The Catholic Church did not acknowledge his civil marriage, thus he continued to be considered a cleric and received an honorary bishopric together with a yearly living allowance. In 1868, he became a member of Parliament on behalf of Ferenc Deák’s Liberal Party. He died in 1878.

Horváth’s original intention was to finish his History of Hungary with the year 1812 or 1815, claiming that everything which happened after that time was not history, but a part of an unfinished revolution which still continued in the 1860s. It was his friend, Ferenc Toldy, who convinced him to carry on with his history of constitutional Hungary until January 1848, because “it will be more useful for the nation than all the shining speeches of Lajos Kossuth at the meetings in America.” In fact, the book was a political statement as well as an academic history.

Horváth’s aims were twofold. First, to present a narrative from which the younger generation could understand what the main concerns of the period were and how the reforms evolved. Second, he wanted to inform the ignorant foreign public, who “understands the cries of Ireland, the complaints of Venice, and appreciates the heroic fights of the Poles, but is not sympathetic to the desires of our nation because it does not know its history in the past decades.”15 Lacking many of the sources he needed, Horváth’s aim could not have been to offer a history that embraced every single issue in the period under discussion. “Incomplete, surely, but perhaps better than nothing” was his modest remark on the book. Since he also presented the pre-1825 internal conditions of the country in a way that explicitly criticized the Habsburgs, he could not expect that the book would pass censorship in Hungary. It was finally published in Geneva.

The Twenty-five years is not a “history of the people” as envisaged by Horváth in his early years. Horváth’s intention in this case was to write a moral history, but again, “moral” here meant something similar to Heeren’s ideas: “a history, which is to include all social, intellectual and material movements..., aiming at a political reform.” The main corpus of the book is organized around the diets, and, generally speaking, political problems take priority over other issues. Horváth’s focused on the discussions of political parties, the government, and especially the relation of the two. In addition, Horváth shortly presented the most important figures of Hungarian intellectual, cultural and literary history. In order to support his argument, he made extensive use of parliamentary speeches, literary pieces, memoirs, etc., and successfully integrated them into the main body of the text. In the “Preface” of the book, Horváth complained that only the minutes of the diet had become available to the public, whereas the richest sources were hidden in the county archives, government offices and in the writ-
nings of some political journalists of the age. Among these, he had access only to published works.

The most amazing feature of Horváth’s work is that it retained those sets of ideas up to the 1860s that were characteristic of the Reform Era. He examined the age with the eyes of a devoted liberal. He described the spread of liberalism as something inevitable, as it belonged to the Zeitgeist:

[The Catholic clergy] did not want to realize that democratic freedom had become the guiding principle of the age, and not only those who were enthusiastic about this idea were progressing on that track but also those who defined themselves as the enemies of it. They were taken … in spite of their wish. Members of the clergy were incapable of realizing that they were also just blind tools in the hands of divine providence, and that the idea of equality and freedom was so general and lasting that it was overcoming the limits of human will, thus it must have been the will of divine providence itself.16

Horváth often supported his arguments by referring to the positive example of foreign countries: “the emancipation of Irish Catholics in Great Britain was greeted by every enlightened person and this gave the opportunity to some countries to urge their representatives to draft a proposal for extending the religious freedom of Protestants.”

Horváth showed how the most important liberal demands were gradually disseminated in the country. He mostly concentrated on the issues of imposition of taxes on the nobility, extension of civil rights to the common people, and reformation of the criminal law. As far as religion is concerned, Horváth advocated religious freedom. It was self-evident for him that Protestants should be given equal rights, the change of religions should not be hindered, in the case of mixed marriages children should not inevitably become Catholic, etc. Since the institution of civil marriage had not existed in Hungary in those days, some of these issues were even more pressing. His attitude towards the clergy was severely critical but not hostile. The way he praised Bishop József Lonovics is especially meaningful: “ultramontanist ideas were never uttered by him.”17

This statement, especially Horváth’s criticism of ultramontanism, makes him a late representative of Josephinism: this tolerant attitude to other denominations recalls the spirit of the Edict of Toleration of 1781. He believed in the regulation of the relations between the church and the state and, in this spirit, he even wrote a short biographical sketch of Roger Williams, the “creator and representative of the principle of free Church in a free State”; which he drew on J. F. Astie’s Histoire de la République des États-Unis. Following Williams, he argued that the aims and resources of
the state and the church were different: the state should secure the realm of order and justice, while the church has a spiritual vocation. These attitudes, combined with his adoration of the French revolution, suggest that Horváth’s relation to religion was rather peculiar. However, in Hungary, a considerable part of the liberal intellectuals of the Reform Era were educated in ecclesiastical schools and seminaries and, for many of them, the bounds of priesthood were just formal. Indeed, very often the first promoters of new ideas, such as Darwinism or even atheism, were clerics.

Horváth presented a vivid picture of how the ideas of reformers and conservatives conflicted. For instance, in the case of the emancipation of serfs, a reformer criticized the argument of the representative of Árva county who thought that “if the people have survived without this law for eight centuries, they will survive for a few more years.” But, and Horváth again cited one of the reformers, this was a strange argument, from which interesting conclusions could be drawn. Following this, one can claim that if this world could do without Christianity for a few thousand years, it would have survived without it in the following millennium. Our ancestors were pagans for centuries, but we do not condemn them for adopting Christianity. For eight centuries, the peasants lived without civil rights, but it was indeed useful to introduce those laws.18

The problem of nationalities, which arose from Hungary’s peculiar position – not only a nation subjected to Austria, but also one to which other nationalities were subjected – received considerable attention in Horváth’s work. It is widely held that the problem which arose from the conflicting interests of the Hungarians and other nationalities was underestimated by Hungarian politicians in the Reform Era. This certainly seems to be the case in Horváth’s writings. He did not tackle this issue in the 1830-1840s, and only some minor remarks in his later works, asserting that the heterogeneity of the people hindered the development of trade and industry in Medieval Hungary, show that he was aware of this problem. With hindsight, more emphasis is put on this matter:

The Hungarians, however, busied themselves with the questions of their own reform movement, and for a long while they did not even realize how quickly and successfully Panslavism had developed in Europe, especially among those nationalities who lived in the borderlands of Hungary under the protection of the Hungarian constitution.19

In the 1860s, Horváth’s stance towards the nationalities echoed Kos-suth’s principles professed in the Reform Era, i.e., that nationalities only had a chance of obtaining political freedom and material development under the protection of the Hungarian nationality. His explanation for
the difficulties arising with the nationalities was based on a “conspiracy theory.” The Viennese government, applying the old method of divide et impera, consciously provoked the sentiments of the nationalities against the Hungarians. However, and here Horváth ran against the opinion of many of his fellow-historians, the Viennese government only exploited those sentiments, but did not itself initiate or awaken them. The awakening of the Slav nationalities, as well as of other nationalities in Europe, was the consequence of the turmoil generated by the French revolution. Furthermore, according to Horváth, Russian propaganda was also a fundamental factor.

Though attributing a paternalistic and protective role to the Hungarians, Horváth tried to account for the complexity of the issue of nationalities:

The difficulty in finding a solution arose from the complex nature of this problem. Although in Hungary the interest in the national language had already awakened in 1790, as a reaction to the centralizing and Germanizing attempts of the Viennese government, this language could not become official until the very last years [before the revolution]. Thus, it was natural that the Hungarians, referring to their 1000 year-old historical rights, and relying on the constitution, aimed at the strengthening of the political nation. … But whereas they referred to historical rights in their endeavours, those national groups …, which demanded the recognition of their nationality, based their arguments on natural rights. As if in a state, where one constitution is valid for every territorial unit, no matter how many languages are spoken, there could be more than one political nation. Neither of the two parties was ready to compromise in this matter.\textsuperscript{20}

The Twenty-five years was very successful and became a cult-book. Although officially forbidden for a time, its readers were not prosecuted. The ultimate part of Horváth’s history of Hungary was the monumental History of the Hungarian war of independence in 1848-1849. The topic imposed on him writing political history once again and it proved even more difficult than in his previous book, as he discussed an event that was closer to his times. His friends even wanted to convince him that he should rather write his memoirs. In this book, Horváth devoted special attention to the leading personalities and their conflicting interests, in fact the role of the individual received more attention than the discussion of the internal and external political circumstances. The failure of the revolution is also attributed to the selfishness of individuals and the lack of solidarity in the first instance. Horváth also wrote about his own contribution, referring to himself as “Minister Horváth” in the third person.

37

The Intellectual Horizons of Liberal Nationalism in Hungary
Writing contemporary history is a delicate issue. Personal reminiscences may easily become a temptation for writing a piece which better suits the genre of memoirs than that of professional history. Horváth’s success can be explained (apart from his talent, of course) by his unique perspective: he presented those events which he witnessed and remembered, while the decades that had passed provided him with a certain distance as well. Emigration does not always have a positive effect on the work of a historian: the difficulties of adapting to the new circumstances in a foreign country and homesickness might cause a shock that can result in a radical shift in the historian’s world view. It can often lead to either the idealization or the complete refusal of the home country. Fortunately, in Horváth’s case, the experience of emigration did not lead to extremism. It affected him only on a material level: he lived far away from his sources and sometimes could not easily afford even to purchase a postage stamp.

While living outside of his home country, he remained a bystander in contemporary Hungarian political debates which could have distorted his line of argument. This is perhaps why he maintained his belief in the history-forming nature of civilization, almost in the sense it was understood in the Reform Era. His writings preserved the theoretical framework of political thinking of that age, and, upon his return to Hungary in 1867, he brought home those ideals. These thoughts did not become outdated in contemporary Hungary, on the contrary, they sounded more modern than Romantic historiography.

In appreciating Horváth’s lifework, a contemporary historian described him as the founding father of modern Hungarian historiography. Nevertheless, he is not considered a “national historian” the way František Palacký is for the Czechs or Joachim Lelewel for the Poles, and he has been given incomparably less attention than his two aforementioned colleagues. The reason for this might be found in the heterogeneous nature of Hungarian historiographical literature of the period, which prevented the emergence of “the historian of the nation,” but his abstinence from the mainstream romantic currents might have also been a factor. Nevertheless, his contribution to the professionalization and institutionalization of the discipline cannot be neglected. He made an impact on the public not only through his books, but also through his activities in various learned societies, such as the Hungarian Historical Society. In 1848, he suggested the organization of the National Archives and was engaged in source publishing. His works enjoyed a considerable popularity at home, and his *opus magnum* became available for the foreign academic community through translations to German and French.

In the seminary, Horváth was instructed on antiquity in numerous subjects, yet his interest laid in modern history. Uniquely, he found the
golden age of his nation in the recent past, the Reform Era. Given his training, he might have become an ultramontanist. Instead, he advocated religious tolerance and the separation of church and state. Transmitting the heritage of the Enlightenment, he was more interested in contract theories than finding his nation’s romantic mission. His historiographical perspective was pragmatic and reflected the very essence of Hungarian liberalism, characterized by the politico-historical credo that the direction of development is towards the achievement of bourgeois status. Like his masters, the Aufklärers, he equated the rise of Bürgertum with the destruction of the feudal system. Stressing the importance of industry and trade, he not only offered a novel approach to historical writing, but also advocated a program for the present. Concentrating on the history of the unprivileged classes, Horváth absorbed theoretical liberalism into his research and remained faithful to these liberal ideals throughout his life.

NOTES

2 Mihály Horváth, “Párhuzam az Európába költözködő magyar nemzet s az akkori Európa polgári és erkölcsi műveltsége között” (Parallel between the civil and moral state of the Hungarian nation moving to Europe and that of Europe in those times) (1835), in Horváth Mihály kisebb munkái (The smaller writings of Mihály Horváth), 4 vols. (Pest: 1886), cited by Ágnes Rávkonyi, Pozitivista szemlélet a magyar történetírásban (Positivist approach in Hungarian historiography), vol. II (Budapest: Akadémiai, 1973), p. 99.
3 Horváth, “Párhuzam az Európába költözködő magyar nemzet s az akkori Európa polgári és erkölcsi műveltsége között,” p. 57.
4 Horváth, “Párhuzam az Európába költözködő magyar nemzet s az akkori Európa polgári és erkölcsi műveltsége között,” p. 115.
5 Horváth, “Párhuzam az Európába költözködő magyar nemzet s az akkori Európa polgári és erkölcsi műveltsége között,” p. 113.
6 Horváth, “Párhuzam az Európába költözködő magyar nemzet s az akkori Európa polgári és erkölcsi műveltsége között,” p. 125.
10 Mihály Horváth, “Az országtani teóriák eredete, kifejlése és befolyása az újabb Európában, Heeren után” (The origins, development and influence of
state theories in modern Europe, after Heeren) (1842), in Ferenc Glatz, ed., 
Horváth Mihály: Polgárosodás, liberalizmus, függetlenségi harc. Válogatott írások 
(Mihály Horváth: Embourgeoisment, liberalism, war of independence. Select- 

11 Mihály Horváth, “Gondolatok a történetírás teóriájából” (Thoughts on the theory of historiography) (1839), in Ferenc Glatz, ed., Horváth Mihály: Pol- 
gárosodás, liberalizmus, függetlenségi harc, p. 20.

12 Mihály Horváth, Huszonöt év Magyarország történetéből (Twenty-five years 

13 Mihály Horváth, “Miért meddõ korunkban a mûvészet? S a történetírás miért 
termékenyebb remek mûvekben?” (Why is art so unfruitful in our days? Why 
is historiography abundant in masterpieces?), in A Kisfaludy Társaság Évlapjaí, 


15 Horváth, Huszonöt év Magyarország történetéből, vol. I, p. VI.


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The Idea of the “Nation” in Transylvanism

KINGA-KORETTA SATA

1. Introduction

The present study focuses on the post-World War I self-definition and identity of the Hungarians living in Transylvania, who, as a result of the Trianon Peace Treaty, became citizens of another state: Romania. Thus, the Transylvanian Hungarians, members of the dominant nation before 1918, suddenly became members of a national minority. The task of redefining Hungarians in Romania as a minority was mainly assumed by local intellectuals. Attempts were made to define the Hungarians in Romania as members of a more or less homogeneous and stable group, and various ideas and ideologies were set out to accommodate this new national minority in the newly shaped Greater Romania. The situation required new directions for action both for the community as a whole, and for individuals, as well. The Hungarian intelligentsia set out to find the principles that could be unanimously acceptable, and to define a life-strategy for the members of the minority.

My study proposes to investigate the early phase of ideology-construction, namely the early 1920s. The sources analyzed consist of the political essays and theoretical writings that were published in the journal Pásztorhúz in its first five volumes (1921-1925). The reason for restricting the study to this journal is that it was the only major journal publishing literature, theoretical essays and political writings that survived throughout the period. It was considered “conservative,” in contrast to what was called “progressive” in the same period (mainly the short-lived Zord Idõ, Keleti Újság, and Napkelet). However, these notions actually lost their sense in the case of the post-World War I Hungarian minority in Romania. It was a program of uniting all political views into a single framework that characterized this period. The rival journals were actually publishing by and large the same authors and, after the “progressive” journals ceased to exist, the Pásztorhúz incorporated their contributors.

Limiting the period of study to five years can be justified by acknowledging the date around 1925 as being a boundary. All of the authors writing on Transylvanism considered that there was a transition in Transylv-
vanism in the mid-twenties toward a more conforming type of ideology. With the foundation of the literary association Erdélyi Helikon in 1926 (and of their journal bearing the same name in 1928), the desired union of all views was achieved, at least in the case of a unitary Transylvanian Hungarian literature.

The most important authors to be studied are the poet Sándor Reményik, who was editor-in-chief of the Pásztortúz from its first issue until July 1923, the professor of theology Sándor Tavaszy, and the poet Gyula Walter, the editor of the journal until 1925. Reményik was undoubtedly the most popular Transylvanian Hungarian poet of the time, while Tavaszy was a well-known philosopher. The list of authors of the Pásztortúz comprised many types of intellectuals, such as former university professors, literary critics, jurists, different social scientists, as well as prominent churchmen. The journal attempted to cover the entire spectrum of the minority’s intellectual life.

The present essay is a part of a larger study involving various aspects of ideology-construction. This particular segment of the study concentrates on the central tenet of Transylvanism as an ideology: the idea of the “nation” as it was employed in the Transylvanist definition of the Hungarians in Transylvania as a “national minority.” For the Transylvanist authors, this perspective involved not only the definition of an abstract idea but also the specific delimitation of the Hungarian nation and the grasping of the specific relationship of the larger “nation” to the minority community. Moreover, in order to identify the exact place of the national minority in the conceptual framework of the nation, one also needs to account for the relationship to the “Other,” namely to the dominant Romanian nation.

2. Interpretations of the “Nation”: What is the Hungarian?

“... this is as much a literary issue as political one because it is an issue of spirituality”

2.1 NOT RACIALLY, BUT CULTURALLY INCLUSIVIST NATION

Most Transylvanist authors approached the issue of nationhood in their attempt to define the notion of the “Hungarian minority in Romania,” by arguing that the definition of a minority is possible even without first defining the nation. What Transylvanists understood on “nation” was generally a “supreme unit,” a cultural community, and a people sharing a common history. Nevertheless, according to this approach, it is the common soul that embodies all other characteristics, that is the quintessence of a nation. Race or blood-type are not appropriate to define a nation. The Hungarian nation, as the Transylvanists define it, is open to
everybody who is ready to adopt the cultural values seen as characteristic to it. As Reményik puts it:

Hungarianness is not only blood relation, not only race, not even only language; Hungarianness is more than all these: it is soul, life, mysterious and wonderful historical community, past, tradition, spirituality, mentality. This is Hungarianness. The one who can adapt himself to this is Hungarian, who cannot, is a stranger.4

The attributes of nationhood thus defined are conceived of as “the mystic and sublime furnace of history, which melted different races together into one nation, one mentality, one soul in the flames of common struggles and common sufferings.”5 When discussing the examples of historical figures who were not ethnic Hungarians, but who were assimilated to the Hungarian nation and became prominent Hungarians (such as Sándor Petőfi and Lajos Kossuth), Reményik declares that “the fact that the Hungarian race could attract foreign elements and turn them into Hungarians to such a degree, only proves its value, strength, and viability.”6

2.2 DUTIES DERIVING FROM BEING PART OF THE NATION

Another aspect of the definition of the nation is the emphasis put on the duties deriving from the belonging to a nation, in this specific case, from being a Hungarian. Reményik, for example, quotes the Calvinist churchman and theologian László Ravasz, who declared that: “To be Hungarian is neither shame, nor glory, but a task.”7 In his interpretation, this means that “it is not to be born a Hungarian that is a glory, but sharing in the Hungarian spirituality, being absorbed in it, developing it further, working on it, not in the spirit of subversion but in that of understanding, rescuing and organic building: this is the glory.”8 Reményik contrasts his interpretation of nationhood to the claim that being Hungarian is a “biological fact.” For him, belonging to the Hungarian nation (to any nation in fact) is a moral problem with basic implications to the individual life-strategies of its members.

It is important to note that the Transylvanian concept of the nation lacks connotations to the criteria of racial community. Instead, it assigned the most prominent place to cultural and historical attributes. Nevertheless, the attributes and differentiating elements of nationhood are not thoroughly defined; it is impossible to delimit a group on the basis of these criteria. The most Reményik can tell about what it is to be a Hungarian is that it is ultimately a matter of faith: if one does not feel it, there is no way to explain it. Speaking about one of his opponents who
asked him to define “national consciousness,” he blamed him for “wanting to know what he does not feel. There are things that cannot be explained to somebody who does not feel them.”9 It is the feelings that derive from the nationhood, understood as “duty,” that make the essential difference: “The message of my argument is that belonging to the ‘group’ for us is not a ‘biological fact,’ but instead, it is a task, that is, moral, spiritual meaning, which is made significant not only by interests, but by feelings independent of interests.”10

2.3 CULTURAL NATION – POLITICAL FRAMEWORK

The cultural definition of nation, untouched by state-borders or daily political realities, is by no means seen as self-sufficient. The attribution of a political framework to the cultural community is considered to be necessary. One of the journalists of the Pásztortúz (probably Reményik himself) notes:

The nation is the carrier of gigantic and deep spiritual values, their conscious mirror, the performer of extraordinary spiritual unity. The political framework is the external guarantee of these. It may be wrong; but a necessary wrong. Because, if the hard crust of the tree had been broken down, the living flesh and the blossoming moisture is also in danger.11

Again, the rhetoric device used in shaping the discourse is very important. The metaphor equating the nation with a tree has several implications on the concept of the nation itself. First of all, it presents the nation as a living natural entity. It stresses the necessity of its existence on the one hand, and that it is an identifiable unit, on the other. It also equates the “inside” of the tree, the essence, with what is central in the existence of a nation, the cultural community of shared values, the moisture that brings about the “blossoming.” The “political nation” or the state is equated to the crust of the tree, having the function of protecting the inside, living part from outside attacks. It is obvious that in this set of ideas the condition of the Hungarians in Romania can only be considered as vulnerable, sick, and lacking in the most elementary provisions for security, as a tree lacking its bark.

2.4 THE NATURE OF NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

There are not many attempts at assessing the specific nature of national consciousness. Most of the Transylvanist authors only discuss the relationship between individual, class and national identity. There are, however, two important stances with respect to the nature of national consciousness put forward by two prominent Transylvanist authors, Sándor Reményik and,
respectively, Sándor Makkai, a well-known writer and Calvinist bishop. Makkai’s account of the problem will be discussed later. In fact, Reményik’s texts preceded Makkai’s in time, and claimed to be a general account of the nature of nationhood, valid for all nations.

Reményik’s ideas on the nation were formulated on the occasion of his dispute with the editors of the rival, so-called “progressive” journal, Napkelet. On his opponent’s intervention that the notion of nationhood he professed had an offensive, belligerent character, he responded:

National consciousness, in my opinion, does have some sort of militant and combative character; this is a fact, but an unavoidable fact. Sometimes this manifests itself only in spiritual confrontation, sometimes in the physical, armed conflict of the different national consciousnesses. The latter is infinitely sad; but it derives from the laws of life, of nature. Where values are produced, there struggles originate around the values and among the values. In this fight the issue is simply that whoever tires out, lets himself go or proves to be weaker, will perish. The one who disarms physically will perish in his physical, let’s say, state existence; the one who abandons himself spiritually, whose ancestral roots of consciousness perish, loses his unique nation-specific colors and will be absorbed beyond recovery.¹²

This concept of the fighting nation as derived from the laws of the nature is very close to the set of ideas known as “social Darwinism,” though it claims at the same time to be Christian. This strange amalgam of the prominent social ideas of the late 19th century is conducive to the well-known paradigm of dividing the nations of the world into superior and inferior: “Due to this organization of existence, one party always must be inferior.”¹³

Reményik’s ideas are somewhat different from the usual 19th century definition of the nation, asserting the necessity of differentiation based on the criterion of development. What Reményik considers indicative of the stage of national development is cultural excellence. He speaks about cultural values both as conducive to struggles and as deciding the outcome of those struggles. He nevertheless introduces the element of power in this conflicting inter-relationship of national consciousness and claims that

from his own point-of-view every collective consciousness asks rightfully: why me, why us should be the defeated? … That is why this question is clearly the question of perspectives on the one hand, and of power on the other, and it cannot be elevated, for the time being, to the high sphere of some general moral or human truth.¹⁴
Thus, he acknowledges that the laws of nature are supplemented by laws of power and that every nation, from its own point-of-view, sees itself as having the right to be victorious and not subjugated by the others. Nevertheless, in the national consciousness, aggression towards others is regarded as complementing the cosmopolitan love of all, as actually being more sincere, and on a deeper level of humanity, than love:

I believe that this aggressiveness is just as much a human attribute as love is. One does not have to be ashamed of it. Love is deeper this way; what it loses in width, it gains in depth. To embrace the entire humanity with the same force is an increasingly difficult thing. Where the notion of everything appears, the notion of nothing is also very close.15

The notions of aggressiveness and love can also be regarded as metaphors constructing an image of a nation in the manner of a single human being. Thus, by this inherent animism, national consciousness is equated to individual human sentiments, as an amalgam of love and hatred, and the nation is seen as acting on the basis of these sentiments towards other nations identified as either loved or, on the contrary, hated.

2.5 Individual, National and Class Consciousness

All Transylvanian ideas about the relationship between national consciousness and class consciousness place the two on different levels. All of them agree on the priority of national consciousness over class consciousness, the latter being seen as of secondary order and importance. These ideas rest on a conceptual basis assessing the nature and proportion of individual consciousness, both on a general level and on the level of the actual existence of the Hungarian minority in Romania in the given historical situation. The conception of individual consciousness acknowledges the existence of a link between individuality and nationality mostly in the aspect of values, that is from an ethical perspective. The scale of ideas in view of the personality-nationality interlink is remarkably wide. Even with the same person, it ranges from declarations acknowledging the mere existence of this interlink to ranking nationality in the highest place among the factors shaping individual identity. Reményik, for example, wrote that “the value of the individual is also dependent on his relationship to the community.”16 Nevertheless, one can also encounter the most extreme formulations when speaking about the concrete existential situation of the Hungarians in Romania: “I believe and declare that today the most important, maybe the only existing content of our human sense is indeed the consciousness of our belonging to Hungariandom.”17 But we cannot speak about a clear differentiation between the gen-
eral, universal content of the personality-nationality relation and its diachronic, situation-specific understanding. The conception of nationality-based identity often enters the realm of universal “truths.” In one of his polemical articles, Reményik responded to the criticism of Imre Kádár with the following statement:

But we believe and declare that the largest part of human values is made up by belonging to the group, by adapting oneself faithfully to the developments of history, by the love of the historic soul and by the adherence to historic values. The individual value is also dependent on the degree of development of the social sense, isn’t it? I think we agree with Kádár on this matter. The difference is that by social sense Kádár and his circle understand some sort of class consciousness, while we understand higher scale consciousness, i.e., national consciousness, by it.18

In this case, sociability is understood as based on nationality, which, in its turn, is seen as a collection of the values of the past, but also as the “love of the soul” that manifests itself in those values. It is quite obvious, however, that both the “historical values” and the “historical soul” are notions with a content that is very difficult (if not impossible) to grasp or to delimit. Both are ideological, in the sense that both are dependent on one’s faith in their existence.

This ambiguity inherent in the notions that are central to an understanding of nationhood has its origins in the belief that national consciousness is in its essence mystical, most similar to the faith in some transcendental entity:

The national feeling is in its ancestral depth mystical. ... And because national consciousness is mystical consciousness, it is more complex and more subtle than any class consciousness. The latter depends on mere solidarity of interests, that is, on some concrete things with some appropriate sentimental coloring. National consciousness is something else, more universal, more gentle, more differentiated, that is, the result of more spiritual values. 19

The difference between material interests and spiritual values is seen as the root of the incompatibility of national consciousness with class consciousness, the two being on two separate levels of human experience. This difference creates a discrepancy between the two types of consciousness also because it presents them as the two extremes on a value-scale. On this scale, national consciousness is presented as both originating and resulting in supreme values of spirituality, while class consciousness is placed on the lowest level, orig-
inating in merely material interests, not having connotation to any value whatsoever. Thus, a world-view based on the thesis that class consciousness is shaping society is presented as ideological, while the Transylvanists’ own thesis that emphasized national consciousness is presented as being the only true one, based on the “existing” mystical set-up of the world.

Reményik also argues that failing to “hear the message of history” inherent in national consciousness results in historical mistakes, thus making direct reference to Béla Kun’s communist revolution, understood as being responsible for the ill-fate of the country and for the dissolution of historic Hungary. He regards this outcome as a direct result of placing class consciousness in front of national consciousness:

In the moment of the collapse of historic Hungary, the new Hungarian revolutionary leaders subordinated the interest of the nation to their class consciousness. … In the decisive moment, in the most inappropriate moment, the problem of “social transformation” was the most important for them.20

2.6 What is the Hungarian in Transylvania?

When narrowing their concepts of nationhood to the actual situation of the Hungarian minority in Romania, Transylvanist authors tended to become full of pathos, as if it was impossible to speak about their own situation without using poetic devices, emphasizing the drama of their condition. In a public conference, organized by the journal Pásztortûz, Lajos Bíró used a hyperbole even when speaking about exact historical data (the thousand years of Hungarian presence in the Carpathian basin), stating that: “It is for one thousand five hundred (sic!) years that the sonorous Hungarian words ring among these wonderful, exotic mountain crests.”21

In describing their own situation, Transylvanist writers emphasized its distinctness from other, more common historic experiences of other peoples. It is this distinctiveness that explains their separate treatment and the special tone. It also makes certain solutions rightful, which would be otherwise unacceptable. When speaking about the aggressive character of national consciousness, Reményik presented “seclusion” and “racial isolation” as necessary means for safeguarding the Hungarians in Romania:

The combativeness of the national consciousness does not necessarily mean “offensive” character. Can the consciousness of the Hungarians here in Transylvania be otherwise than defensive, apologetic? Even the most extremist chauvinism can only move within the boundaries of rightful self-defense. We do not expect, and we do not prepare for, “political convul-
Nevertheless, we do not want to disarm ourselves spiritually. It is perfectly true that we want to keep Hungarian racial characteristics by “isolation” and “seclusion.” We have the right to do this. But, inside the walls of seclusion, we perform a serious and conscious work of building.

The argument for presenting these strange solutions is metaphorically worded, emphasizing both a sense of extreme loss and the naturalness of the relation linking Hungarians in Romania to fellow Hungarians and separating them from any other “strangers:” “We are after a burial; and with a funeral disposition one stays with the relatives and does not go to strangers, isn’t it?”

Transylvanian Hungarians are commonly presented as in deep sorrow regarding their condition. Emil Grandpierre, for example, writing about the novelist Mór Jókai on his anniversary, praises him by saying, “what a great comfort, encouragement, what a blessed serenity is his sweet Hungarian humor! Especially for us, Transylvanians, anguishing in balladic dimness.” It is important to note the reference to ballads, connoting the statement with the common identification of Transylvania as the “land of ballads” (in the sense that it is an archaic region where one can still collect popular ballads), but also emphasizing that it is a unique cultural territory with ancient traditions. Moreover, the reference to ballads also implies that Transylvania is a tragic place (as ballads are a tragic genre). Gyula Walter characterizes Sándor Makkai in the same terms: “Basically, he is a Transylvanian personality. That is, a tragic character, a soul with dark tone. But the defending light of faith and art shines in him. He does not deny his being Transylvanian. That would, in any case, show out of him involuntarily.” Walter also emphasizes that this tragic “darkness” has at its very heart a shining light, the light equated with faith and art. This archetypal opposition is meant, in its turn, to show the ancestral and elementary nature of the Transylvanian character.

Even non-Transylvanians by origin can become Transylvanian by character in the above sense of the word, since it was the land that actually turned these people into genuine Transylvanians. Speaking about the woman-writer, Irén Gulácsy, Gyula Walter acknowledged her becoming truly part of Transylvanian literature by her own individual transformation, which, in turn, also led her to achieve a full life: “Irén Gulácsy is originally not from Transylvania. But under the mountains of Bihar her soul and personality has become totally Transylvanian, genuinely ours. We count her as ours with pride. … Her life and destiny has united here.”

Being a Transylvanian Hungarian does not question, however, one’s being a part of Hungariandom in general. The specificity of Transylvanian
soul and, of Transylvanian culture is not conducive to a separation from Hungarian culture or from Hungarianness. Most Transylvanist authors are keen on safeguarding the unity of Hungariandom and Hungarian culture against any views that would regard Transylvanians as a distinct nation, or the Transylvanian culture as being distinct from Hungarian culture. A contemporary literary history of Hungarians in Transylvania is described in the following manner: “The introductory chapter is a sound, exhorting word ... against that mistaken and dangerous concept which announced an independent Transylvanian literature, torn away from the body of unitary Hungarian culture.”

It is this claimed unity of Hungarian culture and nation that makes the literary historian, György Kristóf, advocate the idea that the term “Transylvanian” itself should be replaced by “from Romania” in order to avoid the possible connotation of the existence of Transylvania as a separate political or cultural unit:

Speaking about spiritual life, Kristóf changes the “Transylvanian” attribute to “from Romania.” From now on, we should speak of Hungarian literature in Romania instead of Transylvanian literature. Let’s not think about the fate of the Hungarian culture in Transylvania, but about organizing the Hungarian spiritual life in Romania.

Nevertheless, considering the Transylvanian identity as being distinct from the general Hungarian one was a common argument. What is disputed is actually the extent of the distinctiveness. It is hard to find authors voicing a belief in a separate and distinct Hungarian culture, but there is a great variety of ideas concerning the extent and the exact nature of separateness. Some distinctiveness is, nevertheless, always acknowledged. Statements, such as “it is not a specifically Transylvanian, but a generally Hungarian novel” (as Gyula Walter characterizes one of Gulácsy’s novels), are common and single out the belief that there is an identifiable degree of Transylvanian separateness and distinctiveness.

2.7 Romanians versus Hungarians
The general pattern of speaking about the Hungarian-Romanian relationship is shaped by the Hungarian viewpoint that often claimed that the conflict was not predetermined, but due to historic misgivings and injustices. This type of argument is based on the idea that Hungarians and Romanians were not historically related, but that their relationship and the necessity of confronting each other is the outcome of the change in power at the end of World War I. As István Pálos puts it:
Now that we have become the step-children of a stranger, we are floundering and trying to find our way ahead without the solicitousness of the love of a mother, as orphans pushed out and left alone. … They could take maternal love from us, but not that of the brother. Although we got a step-mother, we, brothers, love each other even more, even more staunchly.30

The metaphor used to describe the situation carries the essence of the meaning. Presenting national relations in terms of human relationships argues for the naturalness and the indivisibility of the Hungarian nation conceived as an entity. It also reflects the belief that the Transylvanian Hungarian minority is the same sort of entity as Hungariandom or Romaniandom, that is similar to a nation. Finally, it claims to be self-evident that Transylvanian Hungarians are in fraternal relationship with the Hungarians in Hungary and that they are “strangers” to Romanians, related to them only legally, without the “love” characterizing a proper relationship.

3. Conclusions

In the period following the collapse of the communist regime in Romania, the Hungarian minority turned to the interwar period for a model of attitudes, since that was a period in which it had experienced a similar status quo. Such elements of an interwar ideology as the attempt of uniting all Hungarians into a single world-view, a single representative organization, or the emphasis on moral revival and cultural excellence are still very powerful in the current minority political discourse. It is not by chance that the form of representation adopted by the Hungarian minority, a single alliance (the Hungarian Democratic Union in Romania), exhibits the functions characteristic of political parties as well.

It is not only the current prominence of ideas originating in interwar Transylvanism that makes the study of their origins meaningful. Their implications and their content matters even more than their mere prominence. An analysis of Transylvanism’s rejection of politics and of the legitimacy of creating, and voting for, different parties can actually reveal the implication of denying that there was any sense in the proportional representation of different views. This ultimately implies the rejection of the appropriateness of representative democracy, and implicitly of the parliamentary representation of the minority.

Such inherent implications help to provide a clearer picture of what sort of community is constructed by the given ideology. Transylvanism declares ethical and cultural values to be above any other, so-called “material,” values. Ethical and cultural values are considered to be the basis of the
ethical community, the nation. This situation implies, however, that all attempts that are not “spiritual” enough are regarded as almost meaningless, or, at least, of very little relevance. Thus, not only concrete political interests, but also economic ones, are declared to be false reflections, and useless to pursue. The actual goals of Transylvanism (as, for instance, the re-organization of the Hungarian university, or the establishing of cultural institutions, etc.) were all supposed to be achieved by the mere virtue of having a right to them, without any extra effort on the part of the minority, without negotiations or any other actions. The Transylvanist program was thus only declaring the claims of the minority, passively waiting for them to come true.

By transforming suffering into a positive asset, and a value-producing state of being, Transylvanism denied the appropriateness of a pleasant, comfortable way of life for the members of the minority, and set the general tone to melancholic and even to tragic. The image of the community provided by the Transylvanist discourse is that of a lonely (abandoned) suffering people, who, nevertheless, are even more valuable than their fellow-Hungarians, due exactly to their suffering. They appear as the “chosen people” because their suffering becomes meaningful as they are the ones who are going to “save” the world. For them, suffering is the prime meaning of their life, and collective redemption (of their own and of humanity) is their prime purpose. Redemption can be achieved by “staying alive,” by sticking to the land. The central figures of this imagined community are the intellectuals in general, and especially the poets, who are vested with the knowledge of the truth and the task of professing it to the ignorant people.

There are, however, more positive aspects of Transylvanism, as well. For instance, it does not limit membership in the national community. Anyone, who believes himself/herself to be a part of the minority, is also a member of the Hungarian nation. Of course, this essentially implies the acceptance of the values advocated by Transylvanism. Another positive aspect of Transylvanism would be its emphasis on the issue of inter-ethnic tolerance and the equal right of all nations in Transylvania to complete self-determination. One can realize that this is an important aspect of Transylvanism if one remembers that this intellectual trend experienced its climax in the 1920s and 1930s, a time when East-Central Europe came to be dominated by extreme nationalism.

Transylvanism was a strange amalgam of democratic ideas and of beliefs that are not in accordance with the democratic values. In its ideological system, it mixed “conservative” and “progressive” elements and its principles often contradicted each other. The ideology, however, proved to be successful. In Transylvania, the Hungarians organized themselves
much quicker than in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The Hungarian intellectuals in Transylvania became, in fact, models for the other minorities. Most importantly, the literature produced by Transylvanians proved to be a significant part of Hungarian culture of the time.

NOTES

1 The journal numbered its volumes as a continuation of another journal that had existed before, the *Erdélyi Szemle*, which it considered as its predecessor. Thus, the 1921 volume carried the number 7, and so on.

2 Sándor Reményik, “‘Biológiai tény’?” (“Biological fact”?), *Pásztortúz* 8 (26 February 1922) 8, p. 227.

3 Sándor Reményik, “‘Önmaga mértékével’” (“With one’s own measure”), *Pásztortúz* 7 (15 November 1921) 33, pp. 635-636.

4 Sándor Reményik, “Fajmagyarság” (Racial Hungarianness), *Pásztortúz* 8 (22 January 1922) 3, p. 87.


7 Reményik, “‘Biológiai tény’?” p. 226.

8 Reményik, “‘Biológiai tény’?” p. 226.

9 Reményik, “‘Biológiai tény’?” p. 226.

10 Reményik, “‘Biológiai tény’?” p. 227.


12 Sándor Reményik, “A nemzeti öntudat jellege” (The character of the national consciousness), *Pásztortúz* 8 (5 March 1922) 9, pp. 278-279.

13 Reményik, “A nemzeti öntudat jellege,” pp. 278-279. The idea that nations are not equal and that there are superior nations that have the right to dictate to and even assimilate the rest, the inferior nations, is common in the philosophical thought of the 19th century. In this respect, there is no essential difference between the two prominent 19th century Western political traditions: both liberal and socialist thinkers subscribe to the idea. John Stuart Mill, for example, sets up a hierarchy of nations, dividing them into “highly civilized and cultivated” peoples and the “half-savage relic(s) of past times, … an inferior and more backward portion of the human race.” He considers that the upper part of the hierarchy, the civilized nations, should assimilate the nations on the lower part of the scale. Marx has a very similar scale of nations, with only a minimal divergence as to the exact hierarchy of nations on the upper part of the scale. For him the basis for dividing the nations was the existence of centralized political and economic structures that made those on the upper part of the scale “the carriers of historical development.”


16 Reményik, “‘Biológiai tény’?” p. 227.
The Idea of the “Nation” in Transylvanism

17 Reményik, “Efiáltesek” (Efiálteses), Pásztorűz 7 (1 September 1921) 28, p. 313.
21 Lajos Bíró, “Megnyitó a Pásztorűz székelyudvarhelyi estélyén 1922. V. 6-án” (Opening discourse at the soirée of the Pásztorűz in Székelyudvarhely), Pásztorűz 8 (20 May 1922) 20, p. 512.
25 Gyula Walter, “Makkai Sándor új könyve: Zörgessetek és megnyitattik néktek” (Sándor Makkai’s new book: Knock and the door will be opened to you), Pásztorűz 11 (25 January 1925) 2, p. 39.
30 István Pálos, “Szakács Andor jubileumához” (On the jubilee of Andor Szakács), Pásztorűz 7 (1 September 1921) 28, p. 314.
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58
The Idea of the “Nation” in Transylvanism

“Apáczai Csere János az erdélyi magyar tudós eszményképe: Emlékezésül születésének háromszázadik évfordulójára” (János Apáczai Csere, the model of the Hungarian scientist in Transylvania: In his memory on the three hundredth anniversary of his birth). Pásztortűz 11 (14 June 1925) 12, pp. 254-255.

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II. Secondary Sources


One of the crucial features of East and Central European political cultures is the markedly strong tie between questions of *modernity* and questions of *identity*. The emergence of political modernity was rooted in a confrontation with “the other” (from the late Enlightenment on, modernity was spatialized as “the West”), and ideologies of modernization always emerged from a *crisis of identity* – caused by the personal experience of the contrast between “us” and “them.” Most of the cultural-political traditions of the region look back to these deep psychological (sometimes even psycho-pathological) crises of experiencing and conceptualizing the “difference.”¹ Let me just evoke the names of Chadayev, Széchenyi, or Eminescu, all characterized by a specific discursive ambivalence concerning the epistemological and even ontological status of East-European existence. Is it a derivative supplement to “Western modernity”? Does it have an authentic mode of existence? Is there a local canon which could narrate and legitimize the local experience? Finally, is this “mode of existence” likely to survive, does it have anything to add to the concert of humankind?

These questions were sharpened by the apparently destructive impact of the emerging modern life-structures upon the traditional frameworks of social existence. The signs of modernity thus became inter-connected with the symptoms of the dramatic dissolution of the patterns of archaic communities and “pre-modern” life-worlds. This process obviously meant a radical challenge to *traditional modes of self-description*, and could result in a general crisis of collective social identities, patterns of behavior, and ways of life.

Two processes can be discerned as crucial: the acceleration of urbanization (not only in quantitative-proportional terms, which proved to be a protracted process, but also in terms of social imagery, i.e., the appearance of an urban stratum in the social-political symbolic framework), and the political-institutional thrust of national differentiation. These processes were experienced by all sides of the political spectrum and created a common understanding of the “effects of modernity,” which might be
considered as the common denominator of different political options in nineteenth-century Eastern Europe: the conviction that the upsurge of political-institutional modernity goes together with the painful dissolution of pre-modern structures of life.

The archetypical canons of the nineteenth century, representing this juncture of identity and modernity, were the “Westernizers” and “Autochthonists.”2 The Westernizers took this process of dissolution as unavoidable and beneficial at the same time, opting for a vision of the gradual merging of parochial identities into a “cosmopolitan” harmony, and strongly supporting urbanization. From this point-of-view, the dissolution of pre-modern structures was perceived as a necessary price to pay for achieving “higher” forms of life, or was praised straightforwardly, without any reservation whatsoever, as the disappearance of something loathsome. In contrast, the Autochthonists – although sharing the vision about the powerful upsurge of modernity – considered this price too high to pay and chose to slow down and counteract the process of importing “foreign” patterns of civilization, marshalling the vision of the “uniqueness” of their national community, and advocating the interests of groups threatened by the forces of social-political modernity. They claimed that these pre-modern patterns of existence were the loci of “national peculiarity,” and their conservation was essential to the survival of the political community.3

In the interwar period, the structure of this discursive conflict became significantly modified. The case of the Romanian political thinker, philosopher and sociologist, ªtefan Zeletin, is interesting from this perspective: contrary to the ideal-typical model sketched above, the normative counter-positions were arranged differently and one faces a curious blurring of the two symbolic canons. My analysis of Zeletin’s chief works, Burghezia română (1925) and Neoliberalismul (1927), seeks to contextualize his ideas concerning the formation of a national bourgeoisie in view of the specific nature of Romanian liberalism.4 As Henry L. Roberts, one of the most perceptive witnesses of interwar Romania, observed, this tradition had some specific characteristics, which were rather unusual in the case of liberal movements in Europe (although not so unusual if we take Eastern-European liberal parties).5 According to Roberts, the liberalism of the Brâtianus fused ideological elements of nationalism, etatism, economic protectionism as well, and was generally characterized as falling short of becoming a classical middle-class party (i.e., the social stratum that was taken to be the social basis of liberalism in the West).

Otherwise, this ideology of “liberalism from above” might be considered as one of the specific phenomena of Eastern-European politics at the turn of the century. This was usually a transitional discourse. While the nationalist projects of the romantic period were usually rooted in a gen-
the nationalist movements had to face the challenge of power-politics, and this inherent conflict finally led to the discursive separation of nationalism and liberalism. The dissolution of this "liberal nationalist" canon was due to the simultaneous upsurge of two new discourses. First, there was the emergence of a new type of anti-liberal nationalism, connecting social protectionism with a nationalist (and often ethnocentric) rhetoric (following the Central-European examples, like Schönerer and Lueger). This transition marked a shift in the conservative political tradition, from an *elitist-aristocratic* conservative canon to a new *populist* one. At the same time, the liberal political elites changed their theoretical and practical attitude towards the state. Gradually, they abandoned their ambiguous position (rooted in the contrast of the – imported – propensity for decentralization and limitation of state-power, and the more etatist practical exigencies of "imposing structures of modernity" on the society), and rephrased their stance in much more etatist terms. This can be observed, for example, in the case of the second generation of post-1867 Hungarian liberalism, coming to power in the 1890s, where an emphatic secularism and social modernization matched a strongly etatist (and assimilatory) policy towards the nationalities and a cult of violence in internal affairs, envisioning an imaginary Hungarian Empire.

One of the most interesting (and least discussed) aspects of East-Central European intellectual history of the first three decades of the 20th century is exactly the emergence of “mutant” political discourses: both in terms of the “autochthonization” of international paradigms (liberalism, socialism, etc.), as in terms of the blurring of the traditional symbolic frameworks which organized the discourse before World War I. The originality of Zeletin was inherent in the way he sought to reformulate the ideological tenets of the Romanian *liberal tradition* in the 1920s. Contrary to the “more official” ideologue, I. G. Duca, who sought to grasp the essence of Romanian liberalism in terms of the trans-contextual commitment to the “values of individual liberty,” (i.e., avoiding the question of the specificity of the “local mutant,” anchoring the prestige of Romanian liberalism in the respectable pedigree of the political culture of the “Big Western Brothers”), Zeletin attempted to devise a genealogy, and, what is more, to legitimize the local modification of this ideology in Romania.

Repudiating the “idealist” trend, he sought to grasp the meaning of liberalism through its social message, opening two fronts against traditional interpretations. First, criticizing the common assumption that liberalism was merely an intellectual fashion imported from the West, he attempted to localize its emergence in the cleavage between the boyars, utilizing quasi-Marxist analytical tools to document the tangible
class-basis of politics. Second, in line with the strategic interests of the Romanian liberal political elite, he attempted to reconstruct a type of national liberalism, by fusing the nationalist symbolic canon with the liberal political agenda and repudiating the usual critique that liberalism is somehow the “lackey” of “alien forces” (and a cosmopolitan political canon). His central contention was that the liberal elite did in fact represent the true national interests.

The key weapon of his polemics is redescription: a rhetorical move, operating by the neutralization of the original normative connotations with a seemingly value-free (“realist”) tone of analysis (asserting that it is irrelevant to apply the categories of “good” and “bad” in describing the phenomena of emerging modernity). Second, he introduced a new set of normative judgments, blurring the traditional binary oppositions and rearranging the conceptual framework of the discussion. His analysis of the “social basis” of politics serves exactly these aims, making it possible for him to wear a mask of a value-free observer, when identifying the – otherwise not value-free – commitment to liberal tenets on the part of certain social groups. Thus, he managed to cut through the traditional conflict of liberals, who described themselves as impartial and idealist servants of the community, and anti-liberals, who accused their enemies of selfishness and refined hypocrisy.

It is obvious that this conflict was one of the crucial questions of Zeletin’s thought. Already in the bitter Gulliveresque pamphlet Din tara măgarilor (From the land of donkeys), published in 1916, he described the cultural life of his country in terms of the disparaging clash of “Westernizers” and “Autochthonists” (describing the inhabitants of this land as in-between “donkey-ness” and humanity). In his analysis, this cultural-civilizational in-betweenness led to the emergence of two mutually exclusive and equally self-deceiving ideologies. The “Modernists” claimed that, due to their refined cultural “surface” (material culture, conventions, polished communication), they actually achieved a total transformation of substance – turning donkeys into humans. But this is an illusion: “Their bodies are clean and nice, but their soul is just as filthy as in the ancient times.”9 The spheres of this deceptive civility are insular: “The one who lets himself to be deceived by his external humanity wakes up from his dream by the smashing kicks of hooves.”10 Against this “modernist camp,” there arises

with sounds of trumpets and drums, with deafening declamations, and the cries of hysterical animals, the Philo-Donkey nationalist camp, blaring to the world the idea of salvation, that is founding a new and miraculous culture which would resemble the donkey soul as two peas in a pot.11
This “patriotism” is “the most horrifying and the most murderous among all the plagues the unfortunate land of donkeys was ever hit with” – blocking the possibility of ever emerging from sub-human filth. “There is not a single work of culture that has any significance for them if it is not covered by heavy layers of their ancient mud.”

In this pamphlet, Zeletin ultimately assumed a radical Westernizer position (the climax of his pamphlet is an almost eschatological vision of the influx of modernity: “the fences will be broken through, and all the doors will be opened, and the foreign rivers can flow in freely, turning into purifying waters, richer and frothier than ever”), but this grotesque parody features some of the crucial elements of his mature analysis. First, in his depiction of Donkey-land, the attempts of “modernization” (change of substance, i.e., turning into humans) came first, and the “nationalist” ideology is the counter-reaction. This obviously contradicts the conventional 19th century picture, where the national community – and its ideological representation, i.e., nationalism – is something primordial, being radically challenged by the emergence of modernity.

Second, real civilizational achievement depends on the ability of the nation to understand its specific conditions, and to come to terms with the historical itinerary it has to accomplish in the future:

We admit in face of the Gods and humankind that the waters of culture washed off only our surface, but in the depth of our souls we still remained donkeys. And this is not a shame, since our nation is only at the starting-point, and all the others were like us at the dawn of their lives. It would become shameful only if we started to hide our donkey-ness, as the patriots of sad memory did in the past.

A decade later, when Zeletin wrote his analyses of the emergence of the Romanian bourgeoisie, he resumed the argument of this early pamphlet. Assimilating modernity is essential for the community (it makes the donkey human), but not in the way the 19th century elites conceived of it (a set of abstract values and cultural practices), rather in terms of the exposure of the country to the sweeping forces of socio-economic transformation. In this way, he circumvents the debate of “Westernizers” and “Autochthonists” – the question is not whether modernity should be assimilated or not (in this sense, he accepts the liberal agenda), rather whose ascendency will be the result of this process.

The key to Zeletin’s depiction of the emerging Romanian bourgeois ideology lies in the way he connects private vices to public virtues. He claims that liberalism is ultimately the expression of the exigencies of modernity, and modernity is something beyond “good” and “evil,” it sim-
ply happens. This means that liberalism has a derivative ontological status. It is rooted in the exigency of modernization, the concomitant expression of historical necessity. It is not hard to see that, from this perspective, the nineteenth-century debate between liberals and conservatives becomes meaningless. This also makes his use of the Marxist analytical tools of social transformation rather ambivalent: he keeps the model of the causal relationship between social structure and political superstructure, and goes so far as to accept the existence of class-politics, but repudiates the Marxist vision of class struggle (which would be the most natural implication of a class-based analysis). What he keeps, however, from the Marxist vision is mainly the idea of “historical inevitability,” the claim that the specific characteristics of Romanian liberalism are to be derived from the analysis of the socio-economic conditions of Romanian bourgeoisie.

According to Zeletin, liberalism is the natural expression of the situation of people dealing with “values of exchange,” since the structure of capitalist exchange per definitionem necessitates the establishment of institutions of liberty. In his narration, the advent of capitalist forms of exchange meant a dramatic shift in the structure of civil society: it destroyed the life-world of the pre-modern urban dwellers (Zeletin calls them “mica burghezie,” i.e., “petite bourgeoisie”); the overall function of the city changes, and, from the aggregation of corporate privileges and guilds (the pre-modern “island of the blessed”), it becomes the forum of capitalist exchange. The social-political changes are thus conditioned by the evolution of modern capitalism, and they can be arranged according to the three consequent phases of capitalist economy (commercial, industrial and financial). These phases ultimately result in three markedly different forms of social organization, with specific laws of functioning, and the corresponding ideological frameworks (mercantilism, liberalism and imperialism).

In Zeletin’s books, the concept of modernity is projected on this stadial scheme of development, stripped of its normative connotations, in a way that strongly resembled the perception of “democracy” in Tocqueville. It means the necessary replacement of one life-world with another, destruction and building at the same time. Zeletin accepts the main tenet of Romanian autochthonism, i.e., that the entrance of Romania into the world economy meant the annihilation of this pre-modern urban stratum, and he is far from claiming that modernity was equally beneficial to everyone concerned. Contrary to the mainstream of the Westernizer discourse, which was trying to depict modernization as a universal salvation-story, he witnesses the tragic overtones of the process as well.

On the other hand, however, he claims that these costs were unavoidable. The monetarization of the economy requires the involvement of mobile capital, which can only be attracted from agents outside of
the agriculture-centered indigenous economic framework, i.e., from “aliens.” Thus he is not debating the second tenet of the autochthonist criticism of modernity (blaming capitalism for the intrusion of non-autochthonous merchants into the country), but he rebuts the normative consequences of the analysis by referring to the inevitability of this transition. In this polemics, he makes an additional master-stroke by fusing Romanian conservative and Marxist positions (and thus discrediting them with each other), showing that Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea (the most important representative of Marxist agrarian populism at the beginning of the century) and the Junimist (anti-liberal, conservative) camp both appealed to the local tradition of pre-modern economical structures as a normative basis for fighting modern capitalism.

Zeletin describes the influx of foreigners as a necessary stage in the formation of the modern economy, attested by historical examples from all possible contexts (e.g., Flemish capitalism was created by Italian capital, the English one by Flemish capital, the German by Hugenotte refugees, etc.). However, by the force of the same law of unilinear historical development, the second step is always the “autochthonization” of capital, alongside the emergence of a “local” entrepreneurship. The dynamism of Romanian modernization follows the same pattern, and the political history of the country is the necessary consequence of this process. The appearance of social-political modernity in the Romanian principalities is the result of the opening of Romanian ports to English merchants, following the Adrianopol (Edirne) Peace Treaty of 1829. In Zeletin’s analysis, this had a twofold effect: the substantial increase of the external demand for agrarian products (as the Western market opened up for Romanian grain), and the collapse of the local industry (due to the competition of cheap imported goods).

Making use of the economic conjuncture, reforms were needed to facilitate the circulation of goods and money, and the development of infrastructure was demanded to facilitate transport. The bearers of this reform-program were the “agrarians conquered by the spirit of commerce,” the “commercialized boyars,” who felt “excluded by their more substantial peers,” and thus took up the rhetoric of liberty to break through the static social framework of the Romanian ancien régime, basing their social ascension on a new kind of power-relationship, that of economic forces. This interpretation undermines the Junimist criticism, the famous “forms without substance” (forme fără fond), since it becomes clear that it were not the imported ideas that created the Liberal Party, but the “local” realities. What is more, if there is a political movement in the country that is rooted in socio-economic realities – it is exactly the liberal one.

This makes it possible for Zeletin to turn the traditional nationalist semantic framework (where liberalism is equated with something ideologi-
cal – imposed on the society, while conservative autochthonism was fashioning itself as local/organic) upside down. In fact, this reconsideration is turned mainly against the conceptual framework of Junimist “criticism” (Titu Maiorescu, Mihai Eminescu, and P.P. Carp), a tradition emerging from the 1860s on, blaming the revolutionary generation of 1848 (pasopistii) for the slavish imitation of foreign models. If we accept Zeletin’s claim that the roots of liberalism are to be found in an unavoidable social transformation, the charge of “inorganicity” becomes irrelevant. In order to support his argument, he seeks to undermine the legitimacy of the discourse of anti-liberal autochthonism. The classical conservative discourse was a fusion of several crucial ideas and catchwords: nationalism, historical continuity, organicism, critique of capitalism and historicism. This perspective “constructed” the liberal enemy as diametrically opposed to these ideas (being cosmopolitan, advocating historical discontinuity, inorganic, pro-capitalist, and anti-historicist). Zeletin’s program was to destroy this counter-position; while he tried to expropriate some keywords of the autochthonist discourse (which had unambiguously positive connotations), he turned other concepts against their own canon, or simply tried to “explode” them.

The question of “historicism” is a good example for the strategy of discursive expropriation. Zeletin seeks to prove that Junimism was anachronistic, “lacking the sense of history,” because they were unaware of the universal historical laws of development that determine the nature of capitalist economy. Capitalism means the breach of historical continuity, therefore the anti-historical argumentation of the liberals was rooted in a “real sense” and a real understanding of the lessons of history. Furthermore, he seeks to separate historicity and continuity: Romanian liberalism was the “politics of discontinuity,” but this discontinuity was exactly the harbinger of success in a process which was rooted in a dramatic breach of continuity in socio-economic terms as well. This means the repudiation of the agrarian-autochthonist critique of capitalism: there is no alternative to modernity, the question is not whether we like it or not, but how to adjust to its effects. At the same time, he undermines the charges of “abstraction” and “import” as well. It is the autochthonist canon which falls into the trap of abstraction, projecting the norms of an “alien” society (the agrarian autarchy of the pre-modern world) on the present structures (“it is the weirdest claim to model the institutions of a capitalist state on the ways of the old agrarian world”). While liberalism “became a reality in its entirety, embodied in modern nation-states,” conservatism “remained always a theoretical principle, a simple abstraction.” Furthermore, exactly the autochthonist canon was the imported one, having no connection whatsoever to “local realities:” “the representatives of the reaction,” sons of the
aristocracy, or rootless intellectuals, “were educated abroad,” and “remained, for all of their lives, strangers [my emphasis] to the concrete needs of their country.”

All in all, Zeletin’s attempt was to fuse the nationalist symbolic language with a liberal political discourse – narrating and legitimizing the specific social characteristics of the politics of Romanian liberals. The most striking theoretical consequence of his redescription of the conflict of liberals and autochthonists is that some of the basic traits of the Romanian liberal praxis (phenomena, which were considered to be contradictory to the ideal-typical liberal doctrine and self-image) all of a sudden became compatible with the “trunk” of liberal ideology. To name a few: a state-oriented political economy (perfectly legitimate, if one accepts that modern statehood and political liberalism conditioned each other and emerged together), nationalism (liberals are redescribed as the “real representatives” of national interests), and the co-existence of the rhetoric of revolutionary transformation and the survival of the elite of the ancien régime (the liberal movement is the continuation of one side of the pre-modern elite: i.e., of those boyars who opted for the commercialization of the economy thanks to the unusually favorable conjuncture of the 1830-1840s).

The discursive trap of this reformulation of liberalism is obviously the question of “aliens.” Here the ideal-typical liberal canon dictates emancipation, a kind of “color-blind” attitude, and ultimately the welcoming of foreign capital in the country, while the autochthonists perceived the influx of foreigners as the principal threat to the nation. Since these perceptions are hardly compatible, to strike a balance here is difficult. This is complicated further by the actual political position of the Romanian liberal political elite (it is well-known that Romania was the last country in Europe to legislate the Jewish emancipation – this took place only after World War I), and these “imposed” measures, together with the minority treaties, were so much opposed by the liberal political class that Ionel Brâncianu used them as a pretext to resign, even though they were “packaged” together with a Western acknowledgement of Romania’s substantial territorial gains.

Zeletin’s answer was his analysis of the nature of the development of capitalism. As seen above, the march of capitalism in his vision started with a gesture of importation: capitalism, coming from outside to a society devoid of mobile capital, necessitates the utilization of external capital, therefore it is natural (and unavoidable) that “the invasion of capitalism” coincided with “the invasion of Jews.” This triggered a further coincidence: the necessary relationship between the “destructive” side of capitalism (i.e., the dissolution of the pre-modern structures of craftsmanship
and urban life), and the perception of “ethnic threat” (resulting in the reflex of xenophobic self-defense on the part of the Romanian society). Thus – in Zeletin’s conception – the aliens are not the cause, rather the tools of the destructiveness of capitalism, but their presence evokes a strong counter-effect. The solution to this problem lies in the “providential” pattern of economic development: the march of capitalism cannot be stopped, but it can be (as he shows us through abundant historical examples), moreover, it must be autochthonized. The phase of a purely commercialist economy is inevitably followed by a mercantilist period of transition towards the next – industrial – form. Mercantilism, an economic policy relying on state-intervention in allocating resources and protecting the internal market, aims at the “creation of a national industry,”25 reflecting the ultimate weakness of the indigenous class of entrepreneurship.

“The logic of development” necessitates a positive discrimination in favor of the local industry. Thus, Zeletin devises a de facto anti-Semitic political program on the basis of a social-political analysis, without an emotional-racist discourse (he does not blame the Jews for a sinister racial solidarity and secret plotting to ruin the Romanian nation), referring himself to the seemingly objective laws of economic development. These laws account for the merging of objective and subjective factors. The subjective thrust for economic gains on the part of Jewish merchants merges with the objective emergence of commercial capitalism; while the subjective thrust for ethnic self-defense on the part of the ruined urban and rural population merges with the program of a new pattern of mercantilist protectionism, objectively the next stage of economic modernization. According to the objective “laws of development,” Jewish capital should be replaced because it is too much linked to an antiquated phase of commercial (export-import) exchange. The second (predestined) stage, the creation of a national industry, simply cannot be financed by alien and fragmented commercial capital (operating with short-term investments and seeking immediate profit, mainly by buying and selling luxury items). In order to make this shift to heavy industry possible, the nation “needs to collect all its forces” to perform the great leap to industrial capitalism.

Using Tocqueville, Zeletin seeks to describe this mercantilist phase as a classical pattern of transition from ancien régime to modernity. The local bourgeoisie is too weak to establish a national industry from its own private strength, so it must rely on a centralizing absolutist power. In this symbiotic relationship, society turns the state into a weapon of self-protection, while indirectly contributing to the centralization of political power in the hand of the “Enlightened Absolutist” ruler. This “Enlightened Absolutist” pattern is encoded in the mercantilist stage of the socio-economic transition (from the ancien régime to the “age of the masses”).
From this perspective, the “Romanian chapter” of the history of mercantilism (ranging from the 1870s to the 1920s in Zeletin’s scheme) is a success-story, since it managed to keep at least the external forms of a democratic government instead of leading to a straightforward absolutist political superstructure, although the power remained in the hands of a well-defined “Enlightened” oligarchy, the functional equivalent of early-modern absolutism. This oligarchy is the personification of the identity of interests between “state and bourgeoisie,” reflecting the ultimate interrelationship of capitalism and political modernity.

These modifications in the political language of liberalism led Zeletin to a complete re-definition of the liberal canon. In his interpretation, Romanian liberalism becomes a synthesis of various ideological traits and key concepts. The most important are: centralization (“breaking regional separatism,” “unification of public institutions”); modernization, following a universal pattern; autocracy (“what we need, is an intelligent dictatorship”); economic autarky (tariff system, economic self-protection, and subsidized local industry); nationalism (“the national ideology is the direct articulation of interests of the bourgeoisie”); anti-ruralism (a program of forced industrialization, the chief victims of which are the peasants – ”the tragedy of the peasantry is the symptom of the transition”); and ethnic discrimination (distinguishing between the self-defense of the urban middle-class, which he incorporates into his version of liberalism, and peasant-xenophobia, which he describes as an irrational side-effect of the movements of rural discontent – doomed to fail, as all the Western peasant-wars “necessarily” failed in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries).

In general, Zeletin proposes a program that allows the Romanian liberal political tradition a compatibility with the vision of “creating a closed Romania” (following the intellectual tradition of socio-economic protectionism, originated in the works of the German conservative thinker, Friedrich List). This project of “neoliberalism” is the context of his analysis of the role of national bourgeoisie in terms of a quest for the “authentic city-dweller” as well. Predictably, he begins his analysis with a recapitulation of the socio-economic process. The origins of Romanian bureaucracy (the “new urban stratum” – the main target of autochthonist attacks) can be found in the upsurge of capitalism. The commercialization of the economy ruined the social class of urban craftsmen, who had to “abandon their old occupations and apply for state-protection.” The craftsmen, as the par excellence urban class, transformed themselves into functionaries of the emerging nation-state.

Zeletin accepts Eminescu’s famous depreciatory label, “proletarians of the pen,” for this “new class” of bureaucrats, but, with the usual refer-
ence to historical inevitability, he turns the Junimist critique upside down. “Bureaucratism” is not a moral fault, but a social result. “Romanians have turned themselves into bureaucrats neither out of sheer pleasure, nor because of the lack of diligence,” but because the pre-modern urban economical space, their natural life-world, collapsed.29 This emerging bureaucratic layer came to political power due to the relative numerical weakness of the boyar-class. In order to widen their social basis, the liberal boyars had to make a compromise with this newly-formed administrative class, thus merging into a “functionary-liberal elite,” creating possibilities of rapid social ascendance for the ablest, and “giving work to those urban groups who were expelled from the frameworks of national production.” This fusion was possible because both sides were rooted in the same nationalist dream about a Romanian nation-state, and, subsequently, their interests were identical in creating an “autochthonous industry” and supporting “autochthonous urbanization,” – an agenda for the transitional mercantilist political philosophy of socio-economic protectionism.

This means that the symbolic framework of this coalition is the nation itself, and the battlefield of the symbolic fight is the principal focus of modernity; i.e., the city. Attempts at autochthonous modernization coincide with “the fight against foreign domination,”30 since the “interests of the nation” (“independence,” “unity,” and “homogeneity”) converge with attempts at “ethnic self-defense” on the part of the administrative, bureaucratic elite. The thrust for the nationalization of economic power is the inevitable social reaction to the upsurge of modernity.

Thus, in a way, the “nationalization of cities” is a symbolic claim and one of the most important elements in Zeletin’s political program (alongside with the nationalization of schools – the subject of a 300 page-long manuscript from the 1920s). The conquest of urban space is simply unavoidable, since cities are the “real centers of life,” and “the cities in Romania have never been Romanian,” because of the massive influx of foreigners, the commercialization of economy and the – fairly cosmopolitan – imperial frameworks incorporating the “Romanian lands” before the emergence of the unified nation-state.

Since Zeletin was against the traditional populist perception of the city as inherently corrupted, his great dilemma was how to harmonize nationalization with urbanization, how to autochthonize without ruralization, i.e., without destroying the structures of modernity. This is the message of his emphatic distinction between the two models of “nationalization.” The agrarian xenophobia (the anti-Semitism of the declining and frustrated peasantry) culminates in “unsystematic” and blind violence, and in occasional attempts of chasing the aliens out of the country, thus ruining – in a futile attempt to reinstate an imagined pre-modern state of
social harmony – the entire commercial layer of the society without replacing it. The solution favored by Zeletin, however, is markedly different. It aims at the structural replacement of the non-Romanian commercial elite with an indigenous industrialism, through “positive discrimination,” “expropriation of capital,” and thus envisioning the “peaceful destruction” of the specific economic positions of the “aliens,” inducing them to leave the cities (by simply making them superfluous) when their social functions are already taken over by Romanians.

Zeletin was convinced that the necessary framework of social development is the city, but he separated the sociological aspect of urbanization from the normative canon of “urbanism” (which would entail some kind of “cosmopolitanism,” acceptance of ethnic plurality, etc.), as he separated his interpretation of liberalism from the doctrine of “civic liberties.” In his interpretation, institutional politics is only the superstructure of the (urban) conflict of equally hegemonic claims, and the democratic ideology is ultimately nothing but the weapon of “aliens” (“democratia” is connected to “străinism”; its individualist focus – ”atomism” – and the claim of “equal rights” are the tools of dissolving the ranks of ethnic self-defense on the part of the autochthonous population).

Thus the key concepts of “neoliberalism” (i.e., protectionism, etatism, and nationalism) are the necessary ingredients of an “honest” Romanian political platform, while democracy is at best a false illusion, but most probably a cunning attempt to “blur the difference between the aliens and the autochthonous,” as it always has a “precise ethnic coloring.” It is clear that this “transition to modernity” can only be successfully managed by a “modernizatory dictatorship,” protecting the “project” both against the “aliens” (accomplishing the shift in capital-relationships), and against the “disfavored social strata.” After all, somebody has to pay the price of forced industrialization: it is obvious that economic autarky and protectionism exclude cheaper imported goods from the internal market, making everyday life generally more expensive.

This repudiation of the democratic political canon is the final theoretical consequence of Zeletin’s analysis of the history of Romanian bourgeoisie: it is not by chance that the other champion of “neoliberalism” in the 1920s, Mihail Manoilescu (who lived longer than Zeletin), became the most influential, and internationally acknowledged, partisan of anti-liberal economic protectionism in the thirties, finally turning towards the extreme right, and popularizing an economic program strongly resembling Mussolini’s corporativist ideology. Zeletin was obviously aware of the fact that his theoretical conclusions were incompatible with the self-image of the National Liberal Party, and, tellingly enough, he joined another political organization, General Alexandru Averescu’s Popular Party. This party was,
in the long run, an unsuccessful attempt to fuse those political discourses which Zeletin himself was trying to harmonize. The former war-hero’s movement was built on the personal charisma of its leader, a strong populist and nationalist rhetoric, a program of economic protectionism, and some elements from the ideological canon of Romanian liberalism.

In the social-political storms of the twenties, the Popular Party was an experimental configuration, cutting through both the frameworks of pre-war political discourse (the conflict of conservatives and liberals) and the new discursive structure (liberals vs. agrarian populists and regionalists), much in line with Zeletin’s theoretical reconsideration of the political agenda. Therefore, it is understandable that the thinker, in search of an “intelligent dictatorship,” and “an iron hand” of political action, envisioned this party as a potential solution for the political paralysis of the country. There was a historical moment, in 1926-1927, when it seemed that, with the tacit consent of the liberal “oligarchy,” Averescu’s party might emerge as the triumphant third side from the conflict of liberals and tărâniști, and the violent and manipulated elections of 1926 gave the General an overwhelming parliamentary majority (57 percent of the seats). In government, however, he turned out to be less efficient, and consequently, in 1927, the party lost all its seats in parliament (falling below the parliamentary threshold of two percent). Zeletin entered the party and became a Senator, but it quickly turned out that they did not have a future. This debacle might be the explanation of Zeletin’s curious silence in actual political issues afterwards. The greatest theoretician of liberal oligarchy never reached a position of power, other than a rather belated nomination for a university chair in Iași.

In conclusion, there are three key features of Zeletin’s political theory. First, as a relative outsider, he was well-placed to point out the inherent ambivalence of the liberal discourse in Romania. While the liberal political elite was trying hard to keep the democratic surface of the system, Zeletin could freely transgress these limits of politeness, and, with his constant references to historical inevitability, he could depict the work of Leviathan in its natural brutality.

Second, he was the most outspoken analyst of the logic of Romanian modernization: an attempt at achieving national autarchy and “Westernization” simultaneously. This entailed a forced industrialization, financed from the brutal re-allocation of capital, to the detriment of the minorities and the agrarian population (leading, in fact, to the radical growth of the industrial production, and a tragic decrease in the living-standard of the peasantry, a process described as “self-destructive growth” by Roberts). Third, analyzing his conception leads to a deeper understanding of the roots of Romanian integrist nationalism. The traditional interpretations of this phenomenon concentrated on the thirties, and sought to
derive the totalitarian turn of the nationalist discourse from the reception of Western extreme right-wing ideologies. Recently, some authors, eminently Irina Livezeanu in her insightful *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania*, started to revise this canonical assertion and sought to identify the seeds of the integrist nationalist project in the centralizing discourse and efforts of the liberal elite, right after the creation of “Greater Romania.” If one reads Zeletin carefully, one finds Livezeanu’s argument very accurate. Far from being rooted in any kind of fashionable totalitarian ideology, it was the dynamics of his arguments which pushed him towards a political vision fusing etatism, nationalism, economic protectionism and “liberalism.”

Reading his clear scholarly prose, one is left with the gloomy dilemma concerning the nature of modernization in Eastern Europe. Was it encoded in the nature of the project that “imposing modernity” on these structures entailed violence? Did totalitarianism necessarily flow from an attempt at catching-up with Western modernity? Was there a way out? Was integrist nationalism encoded in the experiment of creating a nation-state in a multi-ethnic space? And what about the alternatives: was the fall of the regionalist or the peasantist movements inherent in the logic of history? In any case, the message of this “Münchausenian moment” of modernization – the emergence of an ideology seeking to pull the country out of the abyss by its own hair – is frightening enough.

NOTES


3 On the discourses of collective identity in Eastern-Europe, see Ivo Banac and Katherine Verdery, eds., *National Character and National Ideology in Interwar*

My analysis owes a lot to the extremely insightful interpretations of Zeletin’s works, proposed by Daniel Chirot, “Neoliberal and Social Democratic Theories of Development: The Zeletin-Voinea Debate Concerning Romania’s Prospects in the 1920’s and its Contemporary Importance,” in Kenneth Jowitt, ed., *Social Change in Romania, 1860-1940: A Debate on Development in a European Nation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 31-52; and Cristian Preda, “Zeletin nu a fost liberal, ci socialist” (Zeletin was not liberal, but socialist) – introduction to Ștefan Zeletin, *Burgezia română. Neoliberalismul* (Romanian Bourgeoisie. Neoliberalism) (Bucharest: Nemira, 1997), pp. 23-51. I tried to accentuate, however, certain aspects of Zeletin’s works which were not in the focus of these authors’ interest. Chirot sought to locate Zeletin – who, in his opinion, exemplified an unusually sophisticated formulation of the uniformitarian theory – in the debate concerning the nature of development in belatedly modernizing societies. Therefore, the author focused on Zeletin’s macro-sociological considerations, and described his neoliberalism in view of the ideologies characterizing the oligarchic modernizatory elites from Brazil to South Korea, combining certain elements of a market economy with measures of economic protectionism and with strong restrictions on the democratic institutions. In contrast, Preda’s aim was to dissociate Zeletin’s intellectual heritage from liberalism, asserting that his repudiation of market economy and support for an authoritarian political option disqualifies him from the liberal tradition. Although Preda mentions Zeletin’s striking nationalist considerations (pp. 41-47), he tried to re-describe him mainly in terms of the socialist system of values. My aim in this paper, however, was to establish an interpretative link between Zeletin’s socio-economic references and the most crucial ideological theme characterizing the East-European political cultures in the interwar period, namely the problem of nation-statehood.


The main ideologues of this new etatist trend were Béla Grünwald and Gusztáv Bekcsics, while its main political figure was István Tisza. On the transformation of Hungarian nationalism at the turn of the century, see Miklós Szabó’s classic study: “Új vonások a századforduló magyar politikai gondolkodásában” (New features in the Hungarian political thought at the turn of the century), in Miklós Szabó, *Politikai kultúra Magyarországon, 1896-1986* (Political culture in Hungary, 1896-1986) (Budapest: Atlantisz-Medvetánc, 1989), pp. 109-176.

Stefan Zeletin, Din tara măgarilor (From the land of donkeys) (Bucharest: Nemira, 1998), p. 41.

Zeletin, Din tara măgarilor, p. 42.

Zeletin, Din tara măgarilor, p. 67.

Zeletin, Din tara măgarilor, p. 45.

Zeletin, Din tara măgarilor, p. 68.

Zeletin, Din tara măgarilor, p. 68.

Let us recall that, in Hayden White’s metahistorical scheme, Tocqueville’s historiographical genre is described as “tragedy.” See Hayden White, Metahistory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 191-229.

Constantin Dobrgeanu-Gherea’s most important work is Neoiobâgia: Studiu economic-sociologic al problemei noastre agrare (New serfdom: Economic-sociological study on our agrarian problem) (Bucharest: Socec, 1910).

As Eminescu puts it, back in 1820 “two independent classes had been existing, one peasant class, originating from improprated soldiers, and the other, a city-dweller class. … The history of the last fifty years is called ‘national regeneration’ by many, but it could be better called the history of the eradication of yeomanry and guildsmen.” See Mihail Eminescu, Scrieri politice (Political writings), edited by D. Murărașu (Craiova: Scrisul Românesc, 1931), p. 64. The reformation of the political establishment created an “unhealthy stirring” and craving for positions, “based not on labour, but on privileges.” This “flocking to the gates of privileges” carried the members of the “positive classes” along as well, leaving an economic void behind, which could only be filled up with alien elements – eminently with Jews. “Where are these positive classes in our country? The historical aristocracy – it must be historical to be of any importance – almost disappeared, positive middle-class does not exist at all, the voids are filled up with strangers, the peasant class is too uncultivated, and although it is the only positive class, nobody understands it, represents it.” Eminescu, Scrieri politice, p. 70. On the Junimist vision of history, see Alexandru Zub, Junimea. Implicatii istoriografice (Junimea: Historiographical implications) (Iasi: Junimea, 1976); and Zigu Ornea, Junimea și junimismul (Junimea and Junimism) (Bucharest: Eminescu, 1978).


Adrian Marino pointed out that pasoptism, contrary to the Junimist criticism, did not propose the uncritical imitation of Western forms, but had a strong capacity of self-reflexion and, in the writings of its proponents, one can find the roots of the ideology of “forms without substance” (forme fără fond) that was subsequently turned against them. See Adrian Marino, “Pentru neopaşoptism” (For neo-pasoptism), Sfera politicii 60 (1998), pp. 12-26.


In an undated anecdote recorded by Petre Tutea, Zeletin asserted that he joined this party not because it had a splendid future, but because the whole Academy of Sciences was there, and it was a pleasant company, while the liberals had a “great future,” but were a bit disgusting “from inside:” peddlars, “smelling of brânză.” See C.D. Zeletin’s biographical introduction to Zeletin, Burghezia română. Neoliberalismul, p. 19.

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The Nationality of Reasoning: Autochthonist Understandings of Philosophy in Interwar Romania

Mihály Szilágyi-Gál

Introduction

My paper seeks to reconstruct certain arguments that asserted a direct relationship between philosophy and the cultural identity of the philosopher, originating in the interwar Romanian context. Furthermore, my intention is to demonstrate the conceptual implications of this relationship for a model of collective self-definition and an understanding of the nature of philosophy. My analysis seeks to exemplify an assumption according to which philosophical reasoning is a culturally-biased mental enterprise. Such a conception not only claims that philosophical reasoning might be culturally biased, but also formulates normative and ontological statements. According to this normative perspective, the relationship between reasoning and the identity of the philosopher is not accidental, but exists by necessity, while the ontological perspective asserts that this relationship is not only desirable, but it is the only possible one.

The historical significance of the selected arguments resides in the fact that they were part of an intellectual elite’s attempt to organize various local and regional identities into the framework of a modern nation. In the given historical context, these philosophical arguments may be perceived as an attempt to establish a cultural consensus by constructing a sense of national “togetherness.” As the following sections demonstrate, such a sense of togetherness was intended to underpin the creation of a homogenized state, based upon ethnic and religious categories.

The Historical Background

This section offers a brief historical overview of some European models of “organizing the masses into a people,” and discusses the relationship between fascism and conservatism, crucial ideological models for the Romanian attempts at defining the “national essence” in the interwar
period. In this respect, the concept of the “people” refers to a community of individuals who have a sense of togetherness. The first part refers to the general European context, while the second addresses the specificity of the Romanian case.

According to Martin Blinkhorn, it is difficult to offer a clear distinction between fascism and conservatism within the broader right/radical-right axis for the interwar period, since there were various blends of these orientations that revealed the problematic ideological standing of fascism. In a similar vein, Seymour Martin Lipset describes fascism as “extremism of the center,” because, he argues, it lacks any distinct ideological foundation and could be ideologically defined as a synthesis of attitudes from both extremes of the left-right axis. Given its overall authoritarianism, extremism and the adoption of different characteristics from both the left and the right – such as the plebeian style on the one hand, and the elitist tendencies, on the other – fascism, similar to communism, stood outside of the left-right axis.

Blinkhorn also observes that, after 1919, every European conservative formation reached a compromise with the fascists. This was mainly due to their attempt to preserve their own economic, military and, in the case of Germany, administrative positions. Moreover, Blinkhorn considers that the strong organizational power of fascism, as well as the misunderstanding of their goals, also facilitated a fascist-conservative cooperation. As Blinkhorn notes, Italian nationalism and conservative Catholicism, the Spanish monarcho-fascism during the Second Republic, as well as the Austrian Heimwehr from 1930 onwards were able to coexist with fascist formations. At the same time, the markedly divergent attitudes towards parliamentarism and constitutionalism remained a major ideological difference between fascism and conservatism.

However, as Jeremy Noakes points out, beyond the actual deception of the conservatives in the political dimension, there were other conceptual differences, as well. In the case of Germany, the conservatives held an etatist position, whereas the fascists adopted a “völkisch” understanding of the socio-cultural unity. An important aspect that seemed to be acceptable for the conservatives was the apparent willingness of the fascists to establish an organic unity of the German people. However, the anti-traditionalism of the fascists and their obvious leaning towards certain elements of socialism was unacceptable for the conservatives. Noakes argues that, at some point, the conservatives saw in the urbanized, alienated, atomized, materialist, and secular society something that was just the opposite of their own world-view. Starting with a strategic compromise to strengthen their positions and increase their popular support, and also following an apparently shared vision of the Gemeinschaft, the conservatives became disillusioned with the
Third Reich, which failed to reproduce the organic Volksgemeinschaft envisioned in the time of the Weimar Republic.

In his book, *The Nationalization of the Masses*, George Mosse argues that Nazi Germany and fascist Italy developed a peculiar environment of political and national cult, which was embodied in architecture, art, and national festivities. He stresses that the national symbolism of the Weimar Republic was not sufficiently powerful because the parliamentary democracy could not offer a sense of unity. Such a unity was finally achieved in the Third Reich, when the symbolic language of politics ritualized the expression of political consensus. According to Mosse, such a conception of political unity was an immediate consequence of an aesthetic sense of togetherness. He places the origins of the alliance between nationalism and mass-movement in German history at the beginning of the 19th century, and relates the establishment of this alliance to the different attempts at creating a unified Germany. Discussing the problem of organizing the masses, Mosse also emphasizes that the alliance between nationalism and mass-movement occurred within the framework of a secular national religion that used national symbols as cult objects.

In his *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Barrington Moore discusses the organizational tendencies, which appeared during the heydays of fascism and in the decades preceding it, by examining the various models of political economy related to them. Seeking to distinguish the causes that led different political-economic systems either towards liberal democracy or in the direction of mass-democracies that engendered fascist systems, Moore emphasizes that Japan, Italy and Germany demonstrated, in different ways, how a conservative government could rely on modernization in order to consolidate its economy. Furthermore, he demonstrates that the cooperation of certain social categories enabled the creation of conservative-modern hybrids of state organization, and argues that the extreme version of this cooperation resulted in the appearance of fascist regimes.

When one seeks to apply these models to the political and cultural landscape of interwar Romania, it becomes obvious that it is hard to describe it in terms of an interaction between fascism and conservatism, at least in the sense of a Western-European conceptual division. In Romania, there were no strong conservative political organizations in the given period. The ideological cleavage was fundamentally different from those characterizing the different Western national contexts, where, traditionally, the conservative-liberal-socialist divisions were more clear-cut. In the Romanian context, however, the interwar ideological cleavage was rooted in the division between the autochthonists and the modernists. On the whole, the organicist arguments I am going to reconstruct here had been ideologically
too unsystematic to be defined as conservative. While lacking a conceptually and politically clear-cut conservative character, their organicism had many common features with an academically intelligible conservativism. Nevertheless, the statements in question were too racist in their content, and conceptually too pre-political, to be described as “classical conservative.”

In 1918-1919, both the population and the territory of the country had doubled. The political measures adopted after World War I, such as the universal male suffrage, the emancipation of the Jews and the land reform, gave birth to new tensions. The problem of the elites was both ethnic and social, because in the acquired territories, especially in the case of Transylvania, only a very small part of the intellectuals and of the commercial elite was of ethnic Romanian background. The proportionally and socially significant Hungarian, German and Jewish population had changed not only the ethnic character of the country, but also led to the sharpening of the symbolic cleavages. In Transylvania or in Bukovina, there was a significant non-Romanian elite that had been educated in a foreign culture, while the ethnically Romanian peasantry had a strong sense of regional identity, together with its broader ethno-national consciousness. In 1914, ethnic minorities represented only 8.0% of the population, while in Greater Romania this proportion ran up to 30.0%. Moreover, in Greater Romania, the urban population made up 20.2% of the entire population, and, according to the 1930 census, only 58.2% of these were ethnic Romanians. In this context, priority was given to the creation of a unified national consciousness, which was to be forged simultaneously with the urbanization of society.

Assimilation was also a constitutive part of the nation-building process designed to achieve large-scale cultural inclusion. The nation-building process was supposed to work both on the level of social integration of the massively rural ethnic Romanian population and on the level of cultural assimilation of Hungarians, Jews and Germans. It was only the Treaty of Saint Germain that stipulated the full emancipation of the Jews. Actually, this treaty had a paradoxical consequence to the process of nation-building. On the one hand, it recognized the acquirement of former Austrian territories by Greater Romania, and, on the other hand, it conditioned the country’s international acceptance upon its willingness to emancipate the Jews. This involved an intrinsic tension: although, in the international context, the emancipation of the Jews was seen as a necessary step, the domestic nationalist circles received it with open hostility. Furthermore, the urban-peasant social conflict was often perceived as corresponding to the “foreigner”-Romanian cleavage. The Liberal Constitution of 1923, respecting the international requirements, offered equal rights to the ethnic minorities, but it gave birth to the radical nationalist
argument blaming the elite for “selling out” the country to foreign powers. This increasingly important rhetoric also determined the ambiguous stance of the Liberal government towards the anti-Semitic student movement in the early 1920s, which finally turned into brutal violence.

“Organic Truth”

As already mentioned, the literature identified the autochthonist-modernist dichotomy as defining the Romanian debate regarding the desirable path of development. The dichotomy illustrates the polarization between two orientations towards the nation-state. While the autochthonists gave priority to national specificity, regarded as the normative framework for integrating the society into an organic unity, the modernists argued for importing the modern West-European cultural and institutional structures that were expected to generate the national development in Romania as well.

The “theory of forms without substance,” elaborated in the second half of the 19th century by Titu Maiorescu – one of the most important literary critics of his time, prominent member of the Junimea circle and, later on, minister in several conservative governments – claimed that without organic development of both form and substance, the mere imitation of Western forms would not be efficient in establishing Western institutional structures. In the interwar period, the literary critic Eugen Lovinescu continued a complex dialogue with the “theory of forms without substance.” In his *Istoria civilizației române moderne* (History of modern Romanian civilization), Lovinescu argues that the problem of imitation of the Western institutions and values was inevitable for Romania. In his explanatory model of harmonic social structures, the form and its relationship with the substance were metaphorical expressions for the necessarily inorganic position of institutions existing in an environment which was not ready to structurally absorb the “alien” forms.

In the following, I discuss conceptions that relate the idea of organic unity to the idea of community, but in a markedly different manner. These arguments apply the metaphorical vocabulary composed of terms like “form,” “substance,” and “organic” in a more genuine sense than the “theory of forms without substance,” that is, considering them the essential features of a community. This line of reasoning is more fundamentally organicist, because it does not refer to the non-organic character of institutions, but to the non-organic character of certain categories of individuals, and questions their eligibility for cultural-national inclusion. This type of organicism relies upon racial and religious categories, rather than upon an understanding of a political-
In constitutional contract of togetherness, and, therefore, can be considered a pre-political attitude.

In order to analyze the content and the political attitude related to this type of organicism, I would like to identify the theoretical framework on which my analysis relies. Anthony Quinton defines organicism in the broader context of conservative thought. My working definition of organicism is more restrictive, as I consider it as a type of argument focusing on the cohesion among the members of a community. Accordingly, organicism considers the bounds among the members of a community to be as strong and natural as if they would be the elements of a living body.

Irina Livezeanu relates some characteristics of the high culture of the period to the question of nation-building. She employs the example of Octavian Goga, who wrote:

> It is a proof of the people’s health that the new intellectual generation professes this dogma and embarks upon its course with these slogans. This is a guarantee that out of the present ferment our organic truths will emerge victorious, and that the scum will sink to the bottom. With hope for the great renewal, I dedicate my book to the young generation. … We give the impression that we are a sick body, and on sick bodies … parasites usually appear.

Such terms as “organic truths,” the “sick body” with its “parasites,” as well as “health,” allude to a comparison of the community to a living being. The conceptual implication of these metaphoric expressions is that they are powerful illustrations of a sense of togetherness. By using the term “organic,” the author suggests a collective unity, which is composed of members that are not seen as self-sufficient individuals, but as cells. Moreover, each individual is considered a representative sample of the entire collective body. “Body,” especially when related to “health” (as collective integrity) and “parasites,” alludes to criteria for inclusion and exclusion. The term “organic truth” opens a line of reasoning towards the conception according to which the range of ideas to be accepted as valid is limited to the members of a pre-defined and closed community.

In the sense of this metaphorical terminology, organicist considerations had been expressed by authors who were ideologically and professionally very different. Looking at the texts published in the interwar period, one can notice that organicist ideas appeared almost regardless of any classification of the respective texts as conservative, liberal or socialist. For instance, in his *Istoria poporului românesc* (The History of the Romanian people), written between 1924-1925, Nicolae Iorga spoke of the duty of the historian...
to present his nation as a “living being.” The dilemma between the nationally specific and foreign imitation, as well as the problem of organic versus non-organic development were fundamental elements in almost every significant text and debate in political and social theory of the period.

The Nationality of Philosophy

Regarding the interwar period, Zigu Ornea points out that the negative effect of autochthonism lies in its normative character. The organicist conceptions of cultural homogeneity formulated a program of establishing an “ethical state,” a model opposed to that of the constitutionally understood “state of law.” In this view, the ethical power of the state was supposed to lead towards national progress. The ontological element in the definition of national specificity acquires an ethical dimension when critical attitudes towards the ontological unity are labeled not simply as different views, among many other possible views, but as signs of non-authentic membership.

As already mentioned, the social-political environment of the country radically changed after 1919. In this new context, there was a competition between the emerging Romanian elites and the elites of ethnic minorities. In these circumstances, a sharper ethno-national definition could serve as a criterion to restrict the number of eligible competitors. Any labeling as “non-Romanian” could lead to the exclusion from the benefits of the political-economic scheme of the nation-state. Instead of a scheme of cooperation based upon constitutional consent, an ethical and/or aesthetic understanding of the unity of those who had the right to compete and cooperate was promoted. This was the context in which the ethno-national and the modernizing schemes could be unified in one common political scheme. According to Ornea, behind the premise that modernity was alien to autochthonism, one can find a belief in “ethnocracy” and in the political will of the autochthonous species understood in biological terms. This reached its most radical formulation in the assumption of the radical right that “blood is tradition.” Accordingly, the ideologues of the most prominent radical right-wing political movement, the Legion of Archangel Michael, created a fusion of biology and metaphysics in defining the nation.

The most representative sources of this broad intellectual direction were the reviews Gândirea (Thought) and Cuvîntul (The Word). The biological conception of the nation, which was supposed to set the organicist conditions for cultural identity and national membership, was ideologically, religiously and racially exclusive. In the Gândirîșt movement, Orthodoxy was not just a national religion, but the Romanian national ideology itself. According to this perception of Orthodoxy, even the Greek-Catholic Romanians were
labeled as non-authentic Romanians. Similarly, Nae Ionescu, the leading philosopher of the radical right, argued that democracy, together with its specific rationalism, was incompatible with nationalism. He rejected Cartesian rationalism by claiming that it was alien to Romanianness, which he considered to be essentially non-Western and Orthodox.16 The conservative thinker Constantin Rădulescu-Motru, who, in the given context, could be seen as the main intellectual competitor of Nae Ionescu, was, nevertheless, also involved in tracing the alleged specific anthropological characters of the Romanians, which he regarded as scientifically detectable sources of their intellectual capacities.

The rejection of democracy and rationalism, as interrelated concepts, by the radical right, is a telling example for the rejection of philosophy as a cross-cultural mental exercise as well. The *ad hominem* nature of Nae Ionescu’s argument lies in his assumption that cultural membership of the philosopher is the central criterion for assessing the value of his argument. The source of legitimacy for any argument is the “organic” connection to cultural or national specificity. The paradoxical element of this line of thought is that, if anyone argues against this, the validity of their argument is automatically denied. A similar position was undertaken by Nichifor Crainic, the editor-in-chief of *Gîndirea*, who stressed the necessity to develop a “Romanian philosophy.”

The opponents of such a stance, as well as those who took a position in-between, believed that the innovative and the specific were not necessarily mutually exclusive alternatives. However, they comprised the minority of the intellectual elite. Some objections to the biological vision of Romanianness were formulated by the philosopher P.P. Negulescu. According to him, one should not confuse the biology with the sociology of the nation. The ideologically ambiguous Rădulescu-Motru claimed that although Orthodoxy should not be excluded from the constituting elements of the Romanian identity, it had to be rejected as a normative requirement for belonging to the nation. He stated that philosophy could only be universal. Mihai Ralea, who was among the few leading leftist intellectuals in the interwar period, argued for the compatibility of nationalism with democracy. He claimed that democracy is precisely the structure in which the free expression of national sentiments is warranted, whereas dictatorship excludes free commitment because of its essential nature of imposing, instead of allowing, individuals to choose for themselves.17 Ralea made a crucial distinction between the national feelings as sentiments that reflect the specificity, on the one hand, and the acceptance of the just and the good as universal human values, on the other. It was in this direction that the historian of philosophy Mircea Florian argued. In his essay on the relationship between philosophy and nationality, pub-
lished in 1933 in *Convorbiri literare*, he claimed that reflection, as a mental act, could not have a national character. From the modernist side, Tudor Vianu also considered that the idea of national philosophy was opposed to the freedom of reasoning. He illustrated his view by giving the example of Descartes, who was primarily regarded as a philosopher, while his French identity was secondary to his identity of being a philosopher.18

These examples hint at the basic difference between the autochthonists and the modernists, which consists in the fact that the former, who argued for a national philosophy, were not willing to accept the legitimacy of a system of thought which was not based upon autochthonous grounds. It is important to note that, from the autochthonist perspective, the philosophy understood in national terms was seen not only as a source of inspiration, but also as a methodological imperative for the researcher. In this respect, whereas Crainic considered the philosopher to be first and foremost a Romanian, Ralea, Florian, Negulescu, or Vianu claimed that a philosopher had to be first and foremost a philosopher. What the organicist movement of the Gindirists preached was the idea that immersing into a cultural context should be a national duty for all. Such an attitude places the criterion of the cultural identity of the philosopher prior to the content of what he actually thinks.19 This organicist conception relied upon the idea of a racial-religious exclusion, rather than upon a political-constitutional inclusion of those who were living within the borders of a state.

**Concluding Remarks**

Looking at similar philosophical debates, one can observe that the autochthonist vs. modernist polemic in interwar Romania was not an isolated case in the context of the 20th century debates on modernity. Before World War II, several European and non-European elites faced the dilemma of how to reconcile modernization with the attempt to preserve the authentic structures of the society. As already mentioned, although the causes of the conservative-fascist alliance varied from one national context to another, the main tendency was to harmonize the collective interests with collective identities. Mosse and Moore provided insightful explanations concerning the way in which the right, with its inherent political differences, responded to the competition imposed by the left, by relying on the non-elitist politics of “big numbers.”

As announced in the introduction, the identification of arguments adopted by an intellectual elite in order to provide a philosophical foundation for the unity of a people creates a link between the historical and the conceptual parts of the present analysis. The autochthonist authors
argue that philosophical arguments cannot be otherwise than having a normative cultural character, not only in inspiration, but also in their ultimate direction. This step creates a link between the ontological elements of the overall conception. An extension of this central assertion is that one cannot be familiar with meanings offered by the cultural context unless one organically belongs to it, through his identity. Regarding the relationship between the philosophical reasoning and the cultural identity of the philosopher, this line of argument implicitly assumes that grasping the meaning of philosophical arguments is always more than just understanding their statements. This surplus in someone’s capability to grasp the meanings derived from his or her identity.

As the above reconstruction illustrates, such an organicist vision of togetherness was based on a pre-political conceptualization of the national community. A direct implication of this conceptualization is that in the context of an autochthonist understanding of philosophy and reasoning in general, any methodology of conceptual detachment appears as national blasphemy, because being detached equals being alien to the national community. In this context, the “objectivity” of research and of reasoning in general acquires negative connotations, because in order to debate and question, one must keep the necessary distance of the observer. Then, the observer is inevitably an outsider, exactly because he has a critical stance. The one who raises questions concerning the axioms of this alleged “national consensus” manifests his profound lack of loyalty to the normativity of his or her own cultural membership. What makes this position fundamentally different from an average cultural relativism is that it does not claim comprehension to be culturally specific, but it asserts that the culturally specific way of comprehension is mandatory for anyone who defines himself as a member of a given culture. By establishing normative criteria regarding the way one should think in order to manifest his or her identity, this kind of reasoning became not only a possible philosophical stance, but also one that ultimately rejected philosophy as an open-ended intellectual exercise.

NOTES


8 For the problem of elites in the context of the post-1918 process of nation-building, see Irina Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building & Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).

9 Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania, pp. 218-240.

10 On the organicist element in conservatism, see Anthony Quinton, The Politics of Imperfection (Boston: Faber and Faber, 1978).


13 Vasile Marin, “Cred de generație: ideologia faptei” (The credo of a generation: Ideology of the deed), Axă (22 January 1933), pp. 3-5. Also quoted by Ornea, Anii treizeci, p. 58.

14 Ornea, Anii treizeci, pp. 102-103.

15 Ornea, Anii treizeci, p. 281.

16 The most representative sources of a biological conception of Romanianness, upon which this analysis had been based are Nae Ionescu, Roza vînturilor (The wind rose) (Bucharest: Roza vînturilor, 1990); and Nichifor Crainic, Ordoxorice si etnocrație (Orthodoxy and Ethnocracy) (Bucharest: Albatros, 1997).


18 Tudor Vianu, “Libertatea cugetării” (Liberty of thought), Gîndul vremii 3 (15 March 1933).

19 See Nae Ionescu, “A fi ‘Bun Român’” (Being a “Good Romanian”), in Roza vînturilor, pp. 194-198.
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National Prejudices, Mass Media and History Textbooks: The Mitu Controversy

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Introduction

At the end of the First World War, Western public opinion greeted the emergence, after a long period of imperial domination, of the new nation-states in East Central Europe as the triumph of liberalism. Very soon, however, this initial sympathy was followed by disillusionment as, except for the Masarykian Czechoslovak Republic, none of the new “nation-states” proved to be liberal. Nobody expected that the young national intelligentsia in these countries, marked by such an impressive and, sometimes, heroic history of opposing the autocratic regimes, would turn out to be less liberal and democratic than the imperial political culture they so ardently fought against.

The *annus mirabilis* of 1989 is a similar historical moment. Communism is gone and new regimes, which presented themselves as democratic and liberal, have been installed in the former East-European satellites of the Soviet Union. These countries are striving for integration in the European Union and NATO, all of them are trying hard to escape their communist past and, most striking, all of them are seeking to “overscore” their neighbors, considering them unpleasant competitors. At the same time, East-Europeans turned to ideas from the interwar period as the most convenient cultural references to counteract the legacy of communism. Thus, nationalism came to be identified with the program of returning to the *glorious days* of the interwar period, described as a National Heaven on Earth in view of the subsequent ordeals.

In this uncomfortable situation, the requirements of European Union to relax state centralism, national homogenization, and nationalizing educational policy in view of the minorities are in most cases perceived as an unpleasant interference of *outsiders* in *internal affairs*. More than that, this uneasiness to renounce the main ingredients of nation-state building is a salient point of reference for those political forces that do not dare to display their nostalgia for communism, but choose to express the frustrations of their transitional societies.
These are the general coordinates of the scandal around the first post-communist generation of history textbooks in Romania, which erupted in the fall of 1999, and involved many prominent intellectuals. Almost all commentators considered that the scandal was initiated by the publication of alternative textbooks for the last grade of high school. In reality, this scandal brought to light very deep cultural tensions. The fact that the direct and palpable results of the educational policy, namely the new textbooks, provoked the popular imagination to such an extent is one of the main justifications for the present paper. Besides, the scandal forced Romanian public life to focus on questions of national history. While revisiting some of the comments, it is possible to create an overall perspective of the Romanian cultural landscape, a sort of thick description, in which each individual has his own distinct position. It is too early to judge the effects of this reform, which tried to update the Romanian education to “European standards.” Nevertheless, the principal presupposition of this paper is that a radical reform of history-teaching is painful and troublesome without an important change in the cultural sphere and in the public opinion.

An Outline of the Debate

On 5 October 1999, Petru Bejinariu, at the time deputy of the opposition PDSR (Party of Social Democracy in Romania, currently in power under the name of the Social Democratic Party), called the Minister of National Education to answer concerning one of the five alternative history textbooks, stating that “the history textbook for the twelfth grade is an attack against our national history.” The very same day, Sergiu Nicolaescu, an independent senator and vice-president of the Committee of Culture, Arts and Mass Media, said in the Senate that “this textbook should be burned in a public square.” In the evening of the same day, the historian Sorin Mitu, the coordinator of the incriminated textbook, was invited to the Marius Tucă Show, a popular talk show of Antena 1 TV channel. Marius Tucă, together with Cristian Tudor Popescu, editor-in-chief of the daily Adevărul, launched a personal attack against Mitu. They denounced him as being the enemy of the nation. This presentation set the main coordinates and the tone for the debates that followed. In the next two weeks, the polemic was sustained by the main newspapers (Adevărul, România Liberă, Jurnalul Național, Evenimentul Zilei, Cotidianul), some cultural magazines (Dilema, Revista 22, România Literară) and some party journals (Dimineata and România Mare). Very soon, the main accusations started to implicate the Minister of National Education, Andrei Marga, and the viability of his education reform.
On 18 October 1999, Anghel Stanciu, a Greater Romania Party (PRM) deputy, questioned the Minister about education policy implemented in the curricula, in view of the general coordinates established by the law of education. The same day, Adrian Năstase, then vice-president of PDSR, gave an interview to Cotidianul. Năstase described the textbook as being a result of “Hungarian revisionism and the radically homogenizing internationalism.” In the next weeks, the main arguments were oriented along two main directions. On the one hand, the coordinator of the textbook was accused of being supported by external forces, mainly Hungarian ones. On the other hand, the Minister of National Education was accused of “taking too literally” the Recommendation 1283 of the Council of Europe. During November 1999, the scandal erupted again and again. Finally, 64 deputies signed a motion, entitled “The educational policy promoted through the textbooks of Romanian history.” This episode signaled the political interests behind the scandal. Nevertheless, some of the consequences went far beyond the political conflict.

The Incriminated Aspects of the New Textbooks

As already mentioned, it was the textbook coordinated by Sorin Mitu that became the center of contention. In the eyes of the opposition, it was a palpable proof for the claim that the government was profoundly anti-national. Very soon, the commentators, the critics and the politicians involved in the debate turned to the issue of the curricula and to the way in which the textbooks were designed. In this way, the other textbooks came into scrutiny as well, especially concerning the goals of national education. In this section, I review the main arguments against Mitu’s textbook. Most of them were indicating some divergences from the ethno-national “vulgata.”

A. The first contested sentence was the title of the second lesson. The keyword was “imagine”, as all commentators underlined that this implies that ethno-genesis is not true but a phantasm: “The next sub-chapter is much more relevant (chap. 2): ‘Ethno-genesis: How do Romanians imagine their origins.’ Consequently, in the author’s perspective, does ‘imagination’ successfully replace the historical proof?”

B. On the next page, a Roman sculpture representing Decebal, the Dacian king, is reproduced. The text devoted to this picture says: “The Roman artist wished to emphasize the eyes of a committed person, his delicate but still powerful nose, his raised and protuberant cheeks, as well as his sensual lips. Thus, his face combines nobleness and decided character, qualities attributed to Decebal by his Roman enemies.”

It is difficult to estimate how many people actually read this, but there was a huge wave of anger against the text that dared to describe...
Decebal as having “sensual lips.” The rest of the description was ignored in favor of this detail. It is worth saying that the figures of Decebal and Traianus, the Roman emperor who conquered Dacia, became symbols of the Romanian ethno-genesis in the last decades of the communist period. They symbolized the noble origins of the Romanian people. They also represented the myth of the common origins, as Anthony D. Smith would say, but a myth highly personalized.

C. A few pages later, another “infamy:” the authors questioned the veracity of Menumorut, Gelu and Glad. They were three rulers from the tenth century, supposedly Romanians, who were eventually defeated by the Hungarians. The story was told in the thirteenth century by the anonymous chronicler of the Hungarian king, Béla III. The importance of these three figures is due to two crucial points around which Romanian historiography has developed. One is that the Romanians were autochthonous in Transylvania, the other is that when the Hungarians came to Transylvania, Romanians had already developed some political entities, i.e., the territory was neither ethnically nor politically empty. And yet, the iconoclast authors dare to claim:

The first information about the political entities from Transylvania, which might have existed here in the tenth century when the Hungarians came, were put forward by an anonymous chronicler, the notary of the Hungarian king in the thirteenth century. Some researchers believe that the Romanian rulers mentioned by him (Menumorut, Glad and Gelu) did not truly exist. This is possible because the historians of that time used to mix the truth with fiction. Other sources, from the beginning of the thirteenth century, this time much more reliable, are mentioning other political establishments under Romanian control; they are “the cnezat of cneaz Bela’s sons” or Maramures.7

Once again, the textbook was not properly read by its vehement critics. Theoretically, Romanian-speakers were there, and were defeated by Hungarians, during their conquest of Transylvania. The embarrassing problem is not the information given by the textbook, but the fact that it reveals the weakness of the construction. Of course, the perspective of the Hungarian counterpart is a permanent reference. The question is, why to choose such an iconoclastic approach while the neighbors, Hungarians or Bulgarians, with the same aspirations to European integration, do not agree to bring into derision their heroic history.8

D. The next issue is that the heroic medieval history of Romanians is given scant attention in the textbook. The names of great voivods are scarce and with insufficient commentaries. The most outrageous cases are
Michael the Brave and Vlad the Impaler. For the current understanding of glorious Romanian past, the fact that only one sentence was consecrated to Michael the Brave, who unified Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania three centuries before the Great Union, is unpardonable.\(^9\) On the same page, Vlad the Impaler is referred to as a figure, who happened to gain international fame and became the most popular figure of Romanian medieval history under the name of Dracula. Contemporary movies present him as a vampire reborn in modern times. His fame, which generated many legends, originated from the cruelty with which he was punishing the outlaws or adversaries.\(^10\)

To accentuate the derisory place allotted by Mitu to these heroic figures, many commentators made a parallel between this page and the section on contemporary history where some TV stars were presented. Titles such as “Andreea Esca overshadows Michael the Brave” made it to the first page of journals.\(^11\)

Why these two figures of Romanian history are important for the present identity of Romanians? It is because they personify two themes of the national history. One is the “millenary dream of Romanians” about unifying the historical provinces into a national state (see the case of Michael the Brave), the other is that Romanians happened to be in a backward position precisely because rulers like Vlad the Impaler fought against the Ottomans instead of polishing Romanian civilization. Consequently, Europe owes much to the Romanians:

Had Romanians been defeated and obliged to join the Sultan’s army, like Serbians, the way to Rome would have been just a promenade over the insignificant troops of Italian condottieri and the fate of Moorish Spain or the Balkans would have reached the Italian peninsula as well. Then Michelangelo, Leonardo, and Raphael would have been Janissaries, and Bramante would have built mosques, as in Cordoba! This essential moment of Romanian history and of Southeast Europe, the moment when Islam ... was stopped at the Danube, you will never find in any of the five textbooks.\(^12\)

E. If the medieval rulers were badly treated, the second chapter, concerning the modern history of Romania, is probably even more repulsive for a respectable nationalist. “The ‘invention’ of the modern nation” is the title of the fifth section in the chapter. The textbook states that:
In the first half of the nineteenth century, Romanian intellectuals “invented” the modern Romanian nation, in other words, they wrote a beautified history of the nation, a history centered on the common origins and unity of all Romanians. They devised grammars and dictionaries in order to create a unique and coherent literary language. They constructed the self-image of the nation, identifying those traits that differentiate Romanians from other nations. They were searching this specificity predominantly in the popular culture, considering that peasants expressed most accurately the way of being Romanian. All these traits came to form the Romanian national identity.13

In a country, where the recent academic discussions in the West are largely unknown, where there was virtually no public debate about the process of nation-building and nineteenth-century romantic nationalism, these expressions shocked the audience. No argument was brought against these claims except for the like of “how do you dare to call people like Kogălniceanu or Bălcescu romantics?” For the interlocutor, “romantic” is apparently only a person who is daydreaming, absent-minded, silly, and giddy. The ultimate question posed by this critique was: “What are these people, romantics or patriots?”14

F. The last point concerns the image of the Revolution of 1989 in the textbook. Considering that it is not legitimate to come so close to the present and to politicize history, many commentators, most of them politically engaged, criticized the way in which the Revolution was described by the textbooks. The clue to this debate was the presumption that the high school students who used these textbooks during the academic year of 1999-2000 were to vote in the general election of October 2000. The Revolution is obviously an important element of social legitimacy for many parties and politicians, especially in the case of PDSR and Ion Iliescu, the first president of post-communist Romania.15 For Iliescu and his party it was quite embarrassing to read that no revolution took place, but a revolt, subsequently seized by the second echelon of the former communist party and reinforced by a military diversion. This interpretation is not new or unusual. Most of the supporters of the opposition during the ascendance of the Democratic Convention, between 1990-1996, shared this opinion.16 It is not surprising that, one year before the elections, PDSR did not want to let its image be spoiled by a textbook.

The Legacy of the National-Communist Discourse

In the following section, I will concentrate on three public figures: a film director, a professor of legal studies and a journalist; the first two are active politicians. Their cases are relevant because they launched the most...
violent attacks against the government, the Ministry of Education, and the textbook coordinated by Sorin Mitu. Their ideas illustrate the core of the national “vulgata” of history, since they employed, in a peculiarly coherent way, the majority of nationalist stereotypes.

The first public figure is Sergiu Nicolaescu, a prominent film director and politician, who was an independent senator at the moment of the public debate, while currently represents the governing party. The fact that Nicolaescu started the scandal is relevant for two reasons. First, this accentuated a basic feature of the debate: the main prosecutors of the incriminated textbook were not historians. Therefore, very soon after the first attacks, many historians reacted – in order to protect their profession and not necessarily to defend the textbook. Second, it threw light on the roots of the ethno-national “vulgata.” All media personalities involved in this debate, in spite of their questionable training in this respect, displayed an extraordinary vision of a national teleology, a vision much stronger than the one offered by historians. Both reasons made many historians feel like they were under siege by “the dictatorship of mass media.”

Senator Sergiu Nicolaescu was instrumental in the establishment of the national-communist historical canon. Born in 1930 in Târgu Jiu, he graduated from the Bucharest Polytechnic Institute, Faculty of Mechanics, but soon engaged himself with cinematography. Nicolaescu directed, in 1967, one of the first Romanian historical super-productions Dacii (Dacians), in 1970 Mihai Viteazul (Michael the Brave), in 1986, Noi cei din linia întâi (We, those from the front line), and several other movies. Actually, many important and heroic moments of Romanian history were represented in his works. In 1989, Nicolaescu participated in the revolution. Close to the newly-established Front of National Salvation and associated to many ambiguous moments of those events, he was often ironically accused as being the director and the scriptwriter of the Romanian revolution. Thereafter, he managed to secure his senatorial seat from 1990 until present.

What is the connection between this person and the history textbooks? The answer is that his story exemplifies the communist instrumentalization of nationalism. Speaking of the power strategy of the communist parties in Eastern Europe, the French sociologist, Bernard Paqueteau, pointed out the centrality of nationalism in legitimizing these authoritarian and totalitarian regimes.17 It is not by chance that Gomulka, Jaruzelski, Gheorghiu-Dej, Honecker, Hoxha, and Zhivkov all turned to a nationalist discourse at some point.

The nationalistic exacerbation reached its peak under the rule of the Albanian and Romanian communist parties, led by Enver Hoxha and Nicolae
Ceaușescu. In the case of Romania (most known otherwise), the communist practice of developing nationalist themes and rites became perfect. … An essential instrument of power was the maintenance and fortification of the governmental structures on a national basis, with the help of national-communist centralized parties. This was independent of the centralizing or decentralizing pressures manifested within the communist block. The system of the communist power was implemented through breaking the old social forms and through replacing them with others, adjusted to the project of totally controlling all social activities. The communist regime created a culture of social seclusion that did not negate but, on the contrary, adopted the nation-state. The nation-state represented one of the levels of this structure and one of the rare edifices of power to preserve the prestige of former symbols.18

Paqueteau refers to the national politics of the communist parties and to their cultural policies. Nicolaescu received political and public recognition precisely during the period when the Romanian party nationalized itself without any previous de-Stalinization. This period started in the late 1960s, with the first nationalist deviations of Ceaușescu, and culminated in 1974, when the Program of the Romanian Communist Party included a preamble with an outline of the history of Romanians.

From that moment, historical interpretation ceased to be a matter of academic research. Paqueteau was correct in indicating the nation-state as the instrument of totalitarian control. This ideology reinforced a siege mentality in a large part of the society. It is not accidental that in the same year, 1974, Edgar Papu developed the theory of Romanian “protochronism.”19 The historical meta-discourse was conquered by the totalitarian state. Historians were doomed to deal with small and more or less insignificant details, and to perpetually negotiate their “micro-historical” discourse with the all-encompassing national meta-discourse. The place of Nicolaescu is thus very significant. Cultural personalities like him created a sensibility toward statehood and leadership. In spite of the Marxist theory focusing on class struggle, dilettante and “nonconformist” historians were busy forging a traditionalist reinterpretation of history. Romantic heroes entered the canon in order to substantiate the Idea, and this idea was that of a unitary and independent nation-state.

This historical narrative became one of the most important, if not the only, source of social identity. It was extremely suitable for the national-communist ideology. The first crucial feature is the inherent teleology of historical interpretation. The rationalist Marxian “law of historical change” was substituted by a revealing continuity of a spiritual substance, the dream of national independence, which came true in the present.
The second feature is a centralizing narrative of history. The holistic perspective on the nation, “closely united around the flag,” contains a strong centralizing element of identification, making a sharp distinction between us and them. The third feature, and maybe the most important, is the large potential of this type of history to be instrumentalized as a tool for a personality cult. The long row of national heroes ending with Ceaușescu was hard to explain with the classical model of class-struggle or other Marxist concepts.

As the communist regime of Ceaușescu reoriented its rhetoric along nationalist lines, national history became a matter of the Party’s concern, a process that culminated in the party program of 1974. Outside the political establishment, convergent processes occurred. There was a kind of social enthusiasm in favor of the communist regime that became more nationalist and less communist in appearance. Many people, true believers or opportunists, were engaged in public projects for supporting the regime. The ideological reinterpretation that offered a new perspective on reality in which nation equaled society, state, and party. Precisely in the period of this transformation, Nicolaescu established his authority in historical iconography. His case exemplified a new fashion of “doing,” and not writing, history outside of the academic scene.

In the following, I turn to two case studies illustrative of the role the national communist canon came to play in contemporary public discourse. My first subject is Adrian Năstase, vice-president of PDSR at the moment of the debate, Prime Minister of Romania from 2001 onwards. Among all articles and interviews related to the public debate on education and the new history textbooks, his opinions were particularly revealing. Năstase has had an impressive public career after 1989, based on his achievements under the communist regime. His biography is very telling in this respect. He graduated from the Faculty of Law in 1973, Sociology in 1978, and received his Ph.D. in 1987. His career has been related to important academic institutions in the country and some respectable ones abroad, including membership in many national and international boards, committees, and clubs.20

Yet, his interview shows another side of his personality: a markedly nationalistic inclination. Some of his assertions are quite radical for a person trained in diplomacy where each word has its importance. His interview could be considered an accident, or an attempt to gain popularity on the eve of the elections. However, revisiting some of his recent activities, the defense of the nation seems to be a constant preoccupation for him. He signed the preface of a book, edited by Zeno Millea, 1989-1998: A Hungarian-Hungarian History in Documents, an attack against HDUR and its relations with Hungary. There, Năstase wrote:
I do not want to believe that the partisans of intrigues, of all kind of secessions, can be successful. This belief helps me not to become overly sad reading this book. However, I consider that this book must be known, having the utility of a self-defense manual, as a guide of protection that must be known by everybody.22

As he stated, “there is no dichotomy between the intellectual and the politician.”23 In his case, it is difficult to determine how much political opportunism24 and how much real conviction are behind his statements. It is not the goal of the present paper, however, to explore the consciousness or the subconscious of Romanian politicians. What is important is the role played by the nationalist doctrine in their public discourse. Denationalization, the loss of state sovereignty and Huntington are favorite topics for Năstase – be it at a PDSR conference, or a seminar organized by the Romanian Academy of Sciences:

I am very confident that a real analysis of this textbook by honest scholars will reveal surprising aspects. ... I am pretty sure, because I spent my last weekend reading this textbook. [I did this] not as a specialist, because I am neither a historian, nor a high school teacher, but an intellectual with solid knowledge of Romanian and universal history. And what I found is fantastic: this book, which I cannot call a textbook, is anti-national – developing the theses of the Hungarian historiography of Roeslerian origins. It uses efficient means of professional misinformation, from omissions and malevolent interpretations to the false [ideas] dressed in half-true information. It is a true arsenal of conscious manipulation, of ideas vividly promoted nowadays by revisionist circles aiming at the autonomy of Transylvania and the dismemberment of the Romanian state.25

Such an extreme danger indeed deserves an extreme vocabulary. Năstase, in the good old tradition of the 1970s, indicated the way a real history should be written. Doing this, he reiterated the most vulgar version of Romanian history.

Following the chronological order chosen by Năstase, there is incontestable evidence of the national treason committed by the authors of the incriminated textbook. The first such proof concerns the ethno-genesis of Romanians. In Năstase’s opinion, several important elements are missing from the story of the formation of the Romanian ethnicity. One is that the Dacian roots of Romanians are not sufficiently underlined, and are even discarded, because they would disturb the “Hungarian version” of history. In this reading, the role of Dacians in Romanian historiography is to pre-
vent any claim about a total withdrawal of the population in 274, when the Roman army left the territories North of the Danube. In this logic, any element of discontinuity must be removed. The logic is simple: concerning the history of the territories inhabited by Romanians, the Romanians must be a priori on the side of continuity, while Hungarians on the side of discontinuity.

This vision is based on three essential premises: the right of the one who came first; the refusal to question the established narration of the ethno-genesis and to express any doubt concerning its scientific basis; and a racial definition of Romanian Latinity. Some excerpts are illustrative:

Why do you think this [that the Romans had exterminated the Dacians and thereafter withdrew to the south of Danube]? Because in the ninth century, when Hungarians reached the Romanian soil, this territory should had been empty and Hungarians should have obtained the right of the first comer. ... It is true [that autochthonous Dacians are mentioned as participants in the Romanian ethno-genesis]. But the title is: “Ethno-genesis: How do Romanians imagine their origins.” Besides the fact that the one who wrote this title is professionally disqualified for the rest of his life, let me note that where there is imagination, there is no certitude. Or, this title is about the fundamental act of birth of the Romanian people as resulting from imagination. I do assure those interested that in Hungarian textbooks the [historical] fact that Dacians were exterminated and did not participate in the [Romanian] ethno-genesis is asserted with a very “scientific” certitude. ... The repeated mentioning of “the Latin-speaking population from the North of Danube,” as a smoke-screen, does not confirm but rejects the Romanization [process], excluding from any discussion the proto-Romanians resulting from the Dacian-Roman symbiosis who inhabited the region between the North Carpathians and the Balkans in the sixth century.26

Another major aspect of the Romanian history allegedly missing from the textbook is the emergence of Romanian statehood. Two titles and two map-titles especially disturbed Năstase. These are: “Transylvania and the Vlacho-Bulgaran state of the Assanides,” “The two Romanian Countries ruled by natives,” the map of “The Romanian Principalities and Transylvania in the seventeenth century,” and the map of “The Romanian Principalities and Transylvania in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century.” This means that:

There are two Romanian states and they are governed by natives – Wallachia and Moldavia – , while the Bulgarian Tsardom and Transylvania
are different (political) structures, the Romanian element being only one among others. This declared dichotomy between the two Romanian states and the third, non-Romanian one, is almost a leitmotif of the “textbook,” and it is not just an allusion but an explicit statement, if we take the map titles no. 2 and 3 at the end of the “textbook”... To treat Transylvania in this manner means to promote the idea of so-called “Transylvanism,” through which the Hungarian revisionists are supporting the idea – a commonplace for many people today – that Transylvania has its separate history, tradition, constitutional and juridical life. For centuries – they claim, such as the authors of this “textbook” – Transylvania developed its “own soul,” a certain specificity in the preservation of which the Hungarians as well as the Romanians are interested. 27

This issue of rejecting any idea that may lead to a fragmented vision of the Romanian nation-state is related to the problem of envisioning this state as a unitary entity long before its historical emergence. Mapping Romania is not an easy task for a Romanian historian and not at all free of ideology. A map was for a very long time, and still is, a political statement.

Two collateral observations might be interesting. There is a popular confusion between Ardeal (Transylvania) and the entire territory acquired by Romania from the Hungarian half of the Habsburg Empire in 1918. The reason for considering such an expanded version of Transylvania is to acquire historical legitimacy for a map that was drawn on ethnic principles. Second, there is a popular anxiety against any kind of autonomy. The nationalist creed in the unitary nation-state was extensively used by totalitarian regimes to enforce the monolithic understanding of society. By default, the present discourse of Năstase seems to allude to precisely this register. It is not surprising that the emergence of the Romanian nation-state is in the center of Năstase’s incriminatory monologue:

There are two essential moments of the Romanian evolution, the treating of which proves that this “textbook” is a deliberate attack against the foundations of Romanian identity:

1. By asserting that the creation of the Great Union of 1918 was primarily due to the European ideological, politic and military context, and the right of Greater Romania for the territory inhabited by Romanians was equal to the “consecration” of an “extremely advantageous situation for the Romanian Kingdom,” by the Peace Conference of Paris, the authors promote another favorite thesis of Hungarian revisionists who ask for the “revision” of the decisions taken at the Peace Conference, claiming that the union was due to military force and not to a popular decision. It is exactly what the “textbook” is saying.
2. The second moment is the creation of the modern Romanian nation in the nineteenth century. It is derided, minimized and falsified, starting even with the lesson’s title: “The ‘invention’ of the modern nation.” ... The crown on the arch of this “textbook” is supported by two pillars: Hungarian revisionism and the radical homogenizing internationalism that, at the present moment, is in expansion. These two decrepit strains of thought are using the present context of redefining the geopolitics of Europe and of the World for their own purposes. I do think that they are wrong because I am positive that the European Union will be a union of nations and not a union of anti-national integration. ... To assert that a real identity, such as a nation, that is the people, was the invention of some persons, be they intellectuals, is not only stupidity but also a certain interested obedience. ... Such a mode of presenting is simultaneously illogical and illicit, because it mixes up the effect with the cause, being addressed to young people, potential students in faculties of public relations, communication, political sciences and so on. Just listen to how historical reality is presented, in a falsified way: “there is an amorphous mass of people; a bunch of intellectuals are overflowing them with their convictions ‘invented’ by themselves; these convictions are accepted by the population to such an extent that they begin to like everyone who is talking about these ideas; seeing this, the politicians start to attract the population disseminating the ‘invented’ ideas, by which they realized their importance, in view of the already contaminated population.”

Can you say what normal human mind can write in such a way without asking yourself: qui prodest? It is useful precisely to those already mentioned. Anyway, it is not useful to Romania, be it ethnic nation or civic nation, as it is once again artificially theorized, with “natural” echoes in this “textbook” too.28

This long passage shows how far the level of this discussion was from Western academic standards. In spite of his academic training, including sociology, the beliefs advocated by Năstase fall under the same siege culture.29 Talking about a siege, the universal conspiracy must be somewhere in the subtext. Indeed, the “alliance” between the Hungarian extreme nationalism and the internationalist forces cannot be explained without presuming a universal conspiracy, a Jolly Joker of all such constructions based on prejudices, aversion, and frustration.

The subject of my last case study is Cristian Tudor Popescu, a popular figure in the Romanian mass media and editor-in-chief of the newspaper Adevărul.30 As many other journalists, Popescu also moved towards a nationalist position and radicalized his opinion particularly after the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. His main arguments concerned the dissolution of a sover-
eign state and the unjustifiability of external intervention. These themes evoked certain elements of the public discourse under the former communist regime. In the following, I refer to four articles written by Popescu in Adevărul, identifying his arguments against the textbook, the Ministry of National Education and what he perceived to be an “anti-national” reform of education. The first article appeared on the very day of the outburst of the scandal, 6 October. It was entitled “How many histories does Romania have?” Popescu raised five problems he considered important at first sight. One concerned the fact that he was included in the textbook. He indeed appeared in the textbook, together with other journalists, being referred to as the “tough guy” of Romanian mass media: “His merciless stance towards various politicians was very popular and brought him recognition.” He expressed his puzzlement about this, claiming that the textbook is designed to contain factual information on the past. He asked in his article: “Did I die and do not know of it?” Next, he went further in identifying other problems, all of them related to some important moments of Romanian history. They are significant in order to understand not only Popescu’s personal historical horizons, but that of a large segment of the society, partially of his readers, sharing the same historical “vulgata.”

The first problem concerns the Romanian ethno-genesis. The relativism of Mitu’s interpretation of the Romanian ethno-genesis provoked Popescu’s “national sensibility.” The immanent substance that transgresses time and space in order to unite all Romanians was in danger and, therefore, even the personal identity of Popescu was threatened: “It is said that we can presuppose the formation of Romanian nation around a Dacian-Roman nucleus. You start to ask yourself if you, the Romanian Popescu, exist at all, and, if the answer is yes, if you are not Costoboc, Iazig, Marcoman or Hun.”

The second problem is how this textbook depicts the first Romanian voivods. Again, Mitu’s version seems to relativize the roots of statehood. This issue is rooted in the discomfort concerning the genesis of the Romanian states. Obviously, there is an intimate relation between national identity and statehood. In Popescu’s next articles, this etatist identity became even more evident. The other element is the persistent conviction that the History of the Romanians has to counterweigh the History of the Hungarians. The fear of Hungarian revisionism is a serious element of Romanian public discourse and it can also be found to some extent in academic writings. Ironically, the deep distrust in Hungarian history and historians has to face an embarrassing fact, namely that the only source for the Romanian state-formation in the early-medieval period is a Hungarian chronicle. Therefore, in spite of any normal caution concerning this kind of history-writing, this chronicle has to be true:
On page 16, you are told that “some present researchers believe that the Romanian rulers mentioned by him (Menumorut, Glad, Gelu) did not exist because the historians (the chroniclers) at that time were accustomed to mix reality with fiction.” But the Hungarians of Árpád, those who killed Gelu, were they reality or fiction in Transylvania, if the death of Gelu did not happen?

The third problem was the presentation of the great Romanian voivods, Vlad the Impaler and Michael the Brave. In Popescu’s opinion, it is unpardonable for such central figures of Romanian history to be treated as legendary:

On page 27, the authors produce the most fabulous explanations about the portraits of Vlad the Impaler and Michael the Brave. ... About Vlad we are told that he became popular around the world because of movies, under the name of Dracula, and that he was cruel. That’s it. We are witnessing a unique performance in the worldwide didactic of history: about a real person, a first rank personality of the history of a given country, exclusively literary and cinematographic references are given to us. And this in a history textbook for high schools. About Michael the Brave, things are much clearer: he is a character! That means a fiction, a construction preferred by Romanian historians.

Finally, Popescu claims that any attack against canonized Romanian history is an attack against nation and state. This concerns the last problem formulated by Popescu regarding this textbook: How was it possible for the Ministry of National Education to approve such a book as an official textbook? He goes even further: “How is it possible to conceive of the history of Romania in several alternatives?” He accused directly this textbook as being idiotic, subversive and anti-national.

There is still a Romanian Academy, there are still many scholars, prominent historians – what can be more logical and normal than to form a National Commission with people like them who agree upon a certain textbook, an unique book for teaching Romanian History for the pupils of this country? If whatever publishing house edits a textbook on its own money and risk, this doesn’t matter, we cannot care less – if they manage to sell it, very well. But, to puzzle the minds of such young people, who don’t have references and models in the Romanian society any longer, to puzzle them, giving official sanction to such dirty subversives who clearly attack the historical foundation-myths of the Romanian people, it is a real anti-national and anti-state action.
This article was written on the first day of the scandal. It is evident that Popescu did not have time to read the entire textbook properly and to formulate a more coherent criticism. These were his opinions at first sight, referring to the most visible elements of the incriminated textbook. On the same day, he was invited to participate in a public debate hosted by *Tică Show*, a debate that scandalized many intellectuals through its verbal violence.

Two days later, Popescu re-launched his attack, this time using an interpretative framework symptomatic for many commentators. His article, “The anti-national history textbook – a premeditated crime of the Ministry of National Education,” is a clear case of conspiracy theory. The textbook is not an accident, but a result of the subservience of the Romanian government to American imperialism. First of all, “political correctness and multiculturalism are ideologies that accompany the expansion of American imperialism.” Second, this “ideological wave” (similar to Stalinism) reached the “empty, parvenu and obedient minds” of the governors of this country. 41

Some more details were necessary for giving a reality effect to the whole story and, meanwhile, to identify the instrument of such an “infamous treason.” Popescu referred to the seminar organized by the Project on Ethnic Relations, in collaboration with the Ministry of National Education. Activists, trained in Washington and Romania, designed the curricula for such textbooks. These activists are not Romanian or, if they are, they are former communists. He reveals that people like Maria Korek from Târgu Mureș or Dan Pavel, “former activist in the communist party,” signed the invitation to Sorin Mitu to participate in this seminar.

Identifying the conspiracy, the result was predictable, taking into consideration the organizers and the audience of this seminar. Both organizers and participants are openly anti-national.

It becomes obvious that national loyalty is seen as something evil, a disease that has to be eliminated – an old dream of Stalin and Madeleine Albright. Here are the directives listed by the Ministry of National Education, which is not just the blind administrator of this textbook and of others like that ... but a perfectly conscious co-instigator of their promotion.42

Soon, some intellectuals attacked this kind of reasoning.43 But, in reality, very few reacted to his journalistic aggression.44 Popescu was inviting a response from his critiques:

A howling of beasts was stirred by my opinion, expressed, in the name of Truth, about the question of the textbook. ... Scholars on stipend, members of the Group for Social Dialogue, the so-called intelligentsia, expectorated injuries on all channels ...: Fascist, Bolshevik, Ceausescuist, ultra-
reactionary, anti-democratic, eastern socialist, Goebbels, Vishinsky, etc.

... None of these above-mentioned jerks, barking dogs, and paid cyborgs answered my question.\textsuperscript{45}

His new article developed the main topic of the previous texts with some specifications. The first one concerns the education policy of the government. In his opinion, “the Ministry of National Education, as a state institution, is not allowed to approve something that many people reject.”\textsuperscript{46}

The second one is that the edition of alternative textbooks is a very hazardous venture at the moment because Romania is in a crisis and it might lose its internal social coherence. For Popescu, it is very clear that: “The history of a nation is an important unifying and stabilizing element indispensable in moments of crisis threatening with political instability, dissolution of authority and economic collapse, such as the moments which Romania is living through.”\textsuperscript{47} Popescu envisioned a “unique textbook, elaborated under the conditions of full professional autonomy and deliberative democracy, by a wide collective of scholars.”\textsuperscript{48} After some public clashes, Popescu found another tone, much more politically correct. But very soon he reverted to sheer aggression. His inner convictions are obviously based on the slogan, “one state, one history.” The very idea of having multiple histories is abnormal for him, and directly hints at the mutilation of the Romanian state. He literally said that many histories would be equivalent to many constitutions:

If the branch of historians is unable to elaborate through consultations a textbook expressing the indisputable fundaments of the history of Romania, a minimum existential baggage for any Romanian who wants to be called as such, this means that we can start to think about alternative constitutions as well!\textsuperscript{49}

Of course, the national-communist formulations are detectable in the subtext of these ideas. The Fundamental Problems of Romanian History was the title of a collection that replaced the ordinary textbooks in high schools in the late 1970s. These “fundamental problems” were the main moments of Romanian state-building and independence. In the prefaces, a strong accent was put on the scientific quality of socialist history and on its univocal result, the history of Romania.

Finally, concerning one critique raised by the philosopher, Gabriel Liiceanu, Popescu reopened the “file” of world conspiracy against Romania. Similar to a science fiction movie, the European cyborgs attack Romania:
Romanians are facing nowadays a creature without any face, a piece of plasma snaking soundless from the West, very close to the ground. It is the new man, *Homo Europaeus*, who has Romanian features. Made in the European genetic laboratories, under the strict surveillance of the United States and Great Britain, the new man does not have anymore what we call a country.\(^{50}\)

For a better understanding of what *Homo Europaeus* means, Popescu portrayed him in a very relevant manner. Europe is in an advanced stage of decomposition. National pride and the lack of patriotism are predominant. The army is no longer a national army and, therefore, it lost its prestige. The deficit of patriotism parallels another deficit. Religiosity is also lacking in *Homo Europaeus*. Of course, without the holy triangle State – Army – Church, not only the nation is endangered, but even humankind is under threat: “An entire series of notions, still living notions for many Romanians, are in an advanced stage of decomposition in Europe: state, nation, national army, the fight for your country, religion, national church and historical past.”\(^{51}\)

More than that, being less national, Europe is about to become less democratic, because nation means the people: “The supranational institutions are so strong compared to [European] states, not to mention the peoples, that it is imaginable that in the near future voting will be excluded from the democratic procedures, the election of high officials being based on drawing lots, like in ancient Athens.”\(^{52}\) To have a complete picture, Popescu states that the *European conspiracy* was directed by the United States and Great Britain. In these countries, the popular trust in the army is intact, the cult of nation, of banner and of national anthem is still alive. Protestantism is still the same powerful religion. Since the British-American conspiracy of Europeanism is not so tangible for ordinary people, it needs to be related to other more suggestive dangers: Hungarian revisionism.

Faced with this sinister European interference, Romania is ready to revolt against these horrors. “*I am defending my poverty, my needs, and my kin,*” as Eminescu, the national poet, put it in a famous poem, depicting the confrontation between Mircea the Brave, a fourteenth century Wallachian prince, and the Ottoman Sultan Beyazit I. The European ideology is helpless in face of Romanian poverty, a proud poverty. This poverty is an obstacle for the formation of the “new man.” Once again, the *new European man* is similar to the *communist new man* because it affects the national heritage. Poor societies are much stronger in defending their national identity because it is the last thing they are left with.\(^{53}\) Denationalization, ethnic autonomy, demilitarization, facultative military service,
exclusion of the “national” attributes from the orthodox church, and, finally, destroying the past with the help of the new history textbooks, these are the chief enemies of Romania as identified by Popescu.

The last article written by Popescu, “The textbook that makes the teacher feel ashamed,” is also illustrative. One of his claims was that a textbook should be a normative reference for a given discipline; another one was that the reform of education in Romania was supported by some privileged intellectuals who neglected the cultural level of ordinary people. What is interesting in this article is that the main objects of his criticism turned out to be the new literature textbooks. One has to add that in Romania literary studies are a more advanced field than historiography because the leadership was more tolerant with it in the 1970-1980s, as it was much less intertwined with the legitimacy of the regime. Therefore, the field of literary studies was much closer to contemporary Western developments than its historical counterpart.

In this context, Popescu was outraged by some texts belonging to the youngest generation of authors, which were introduced in the literature textbooks for the eleventh grade. In Popescu’s opinion, these texts are not appropriate for educational purpose. It is “trash put next to a diamond [Ion Creangă] to prove that the diamond is shining.” Modern literature is too abstract, nonfigurative, illiterate, and idiotic. The authors of the textbooks were guilty because they introduced “the 1980s group.” Professors Nicolae Manolescu and Mircea Martin are accused of subverting the national canon: “the biggest danger is the obstinacy of prestigious specialists involved in this affair of alternative textbooks, trying to support what is evidently bad, wrong, dubious, and fraudulent. That they will be dishonored and dismissed is the smallest possible harm.”

Popescu’s reaction against the educational reform and the new textbooks may be seen as trivial to this discussion, but his ideas provide a perfect example of the still very powerful ethno-national “vulgata.” These ideas were reiterated in some other journals, much more politically biased, as well as in the parliamentary debates.

Conclusions

Cultural reproduction is an important element of the cohesion and stability of a society. At the same time, for those societies that are in transition, cultural reproduction is a highly conservative element and an obstacle for societal change. Cultural reproduction, in this case, reproduces the former structures of power and becomes cultural capital in the hands of the former elite. What is more, in the particular case of historiography, cultural reproduction is enforcing the inherent conser-
vatism of history as a discipline. Considering this, the teaching of history and the contents of history textbooks are important issues for post-communist democracies. Nationalism, usually suppressed by the communist regimes, has played an important role in the anti-communist social and cultural movements. At the same time, this silenced nationalism has been instrumentalized by the communist regimes themselves in order to acquire popular support and legitimacy. Therefore, it is quite logical that ultra-nationalists are often in the same camp with former communists.

The debate about textbooks has revealed a growing distance between the new generation of historians and the ethno-national “vulgata.” After the scandal of 1999, it could be argued that young historians became frightened by the possible pressure of the ethno-national “vulgata” that tends to underpin the former establishment and hierarchies. In the context of the diminishing of state funds for historical research and studies, young historians, who are less integrated into state institutions, are forced to rely on external resources. The state is not a valuable source for professional recognition any more and these young intellectuals are inclined much more toward democratic values. At the same time, the crisis of the system jeopardizes the possibility of cultural reproduction. Therefore, the anxiety about a national history tends to be decreased in favor of a more open attitude about this issue. The professional mobility helps this phenomenon and may be a valuable source of change.

A favorable political context could strengthen the reformist mainstream. A public debate could probably offer a better framework for obtaining social support for a political reform of education, history teaching, cultural settings of the democratic political culture of Romania, but the present circumstances do not support any euphoric attitude. After the 2000 elections, politicians, who have criticized the *Sigma* textbook, came to power, and the conservative historians who are close to them have taken control over numerous academic institutions. Therefore, it seems that, for the moment at least, the historical “vulgata” is in no danger to be overthrown; it remains nevertheless to be seen if the polemic over “national” history will surface again.
NOTES

1 This text is part of an ongoing research project, entitled “The ethno-national vulgata vs. the historians.” My present paper is a collection of samples concerning the textbook scandal.

2 In the spring of 2000, Senator Sergiu Nicolaescu rejoined the PDSR after a long period of being an independent senator.


4 The title of the chapter was “Ethno-genesis: How do Romanians imagine their origins.” See Mitu et al., Istoria Românilor, p. 10.


6 Mitu et al., Istoria Românilor, p. 11.

7 Mitu et al., Istoria Românilor, p. 16.

8 See “O istorie a Bulgariei de care nimănui nu-i e ruse” (A history of Bulgaria, of which nobody is ashamed), Adevârul (18 October 1999), p. 2.

9 The sentence is the following: “Michael the Brave, the favorite character of Romanian historians, as he is depicted in a contemporary reproduction.” See Mitu et al., Istoria Românilor, p. 27.

10 Mitu et al., Istoria Românilor, p. 27

11 Andreea Esca is a popular TV speaker, who presents the evening news for ProTV.

12 Professor Dan Zamfirescu, interviewed by Florin Condurâteanu, “Dacă Mircea nu-i oprea pe otomani, Michelangelo ar fi devenit ienicer” (If Mircea did not stop the Ottomans, Michelangelo would have become a janissary), Journalul National (28 October 1999), p. 3.

13 Mitu et al., Istoria Românilor, p. 40.

14 It was the argument brought by Marius Tucă, the moderator of a talk show hosted by Antena 1 on 6 October 1999. See Liviu Papadima, “Tribunalul Poporului” (The Tribunal of the People), Dilema 349 (15-21 October 1999), p. 14.

15 PDSR derived from the former FSN (National Salvation Front) that took the power in December 1989. Initially a heterogeneous political entity around Ion Iliescu, FSN gradually became a party of former reform-communists and technocrats. During the radical political and social confrontations of 1990-1992, the legend of a group that “stole” the revolution was very fashionable.

16 Between 1996 and 2000, the Democratic Convention in Romania formed the governmental coalition with the Social Democratic Union and the Hungarian Democratic Union in Romania.


20 Associate Professor of Public International Law, Paris I – Panthéon, Sorbonne University, 1994-; Professor of International Law: Faculty of Law, University of Bucharest, 1990-; Associate Professor of International Law, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, 1977-1979, 1984-1985; Director of Studies, International Institute of Human Rights, Strasbourg, 1984; Visiting Fellow, Division of Human Rights and Peace, UNESCO, 1980; Visiting Research-Fellow, International Peace Institute, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, 1980; Research-Fellow, Institute of Legal Research, Bucharest, 1973-1990.


23 Adrian Nãstase, “Aceastã lucrare este antinaþionalã, dezvoltând toate tezele istoriografiei maghiare” (This work is anti-national, developing all theses of Hungarian historiography), *Timpul* (26 October – 1 November 1999), pp. 8-9.

24 One interpretation was offered by Cornel Nistorescu. He considered the nationalist virulence of PDSR an attempt to attract the electorate of the nationalist parties in Transylvania, and not only there. See Cornel Nistorescu, “Droful de sare” (The salt block), *Evenimentul Zilei* (14 October 1999), p. 1.

25 Nãstase, “Aceastã lucrare este antinaþionalã,” p. 8. Robert Roesler was an Austrian historian of the nineteenth century, who negated the theory of Daco-Romanian territorial continuity in his *Românische Studien* (Leipzig, 1871). His arguments were criticized by the Romanian historian, A. D. Xenopol.


29 Then, one might find an explanation why “for the first time in the history of Romania, the prisoners and academicians agreed on something?” See Adrian Cioroianu, “Pucãriºi ºi academicieni” (Prisoners and academicians), *Dilema* 351 (29 October – 4 November 1999), p. 4.


31 It was called “non-interfering policy in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state.”
Cristian Tudor Popescu, “Câte istorii are România?” (How many histories does Romania have?), Adevârul (6 October 1999), p. 6.


Mitu et al., Istoria Românilor, p. 141.

It is about Anonymus, the notary of King Béla III, who wrote three centuries later (c. 1210, Gesta Hungarorum) about the conquest of Transylvania by Hungarians.

Popescu, “Câte istorii are România?” p. 2.

It is impressive how Popescu manipulated the term personaj (in English: character). Taking into consideration the definition given by The Explicative Dictionary of Romanian Language (Bucharest: Univers Enciclopedic, 1996), personaj means “an important person of the political, social and cultural life, a personality”, and its second meaning “a hero of literature, music, cinema, or fine arts.”

Popescu, “Câte istorii are România?” p. 2.


Except for the two articles mentioned before, there are no other reactions to Popescu’s accusations.


“In the case of Romania, it is possible that the clash with the new man will make sparks. The motive is very simple: in Romania there is no peace and prosperity. It is exactly the same motive for which the previous attempt of creating the new man, i.e., the communist one, failed. A country that suffers by poverty and premature death is difficult to anaesthetize. She can desperately hold to such old ideas as country, nation, banner, church, history.” Popescu, “Omul nou,” p. 16.
Cristian Tudor Popescu, “Manualul care crapă obrazul dascălului” (The textbook that makes the teacher feel ashamed), Adevărul (22 October 1999), p. 2.

The case of Simona Popescu is cited for the perverse effects of introducing the 1980s group in the textbooks. Mrs. Popescu came under the public opprobrium because of her appearance in these textbooks.


SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY


p. 118
page empty
PART 2.

NATION-BUILDING AND REGIONALISM IN A MULTI-ETHNIC CONTEXT
p. 120
page empty
“The California of the Romanians”:
The Integration of Northern Dobrogea into Romania, 1878-1913

CONSTANTIN IORDACHI

This paper focuses on the integration of Northern Dobrogea into Romania, which is celebrated in Romanian historiography as the second stage of the creation of a national and unitary Romanian state, after the 1859 union of Wallachia and Moldavia.¹ From this perspective, the mechanisms of integration and assimilation used in Dobrogea by Romanian political elites prefigured the more complex and arduous process of administrative integration and cultural homogenization that took place in post-1918 Greater Romania. Nevertheless, while the process of national consolidation in Greater Romania has been recently subject to comprehensive research from non-teleological theoretical perspectives,² the case of Dobrogea’s assimilation into Romania has received limited attention.³ In spite of the individualized character of the province, general works on modern history of Romania have usually failed to distinguish Dobrogea from the Old Kingdom. As for the numerous Romanian and Bulgarian works on the history of Dobrogea, written at a time when historiography played an important role in the process of nation-building in East-Central Europe, they have focused almost unilaterally on the “validity” of their countries’ rights to the province. Thus, while producing an essentially primordialist and parochialist historiographic discourse, these works have left unexplored important aspects of the assimilation of Dobrogea into Romania.⁴

This paper argues that, in order to foster the national and economic incorporation of the multi-ethnic province of Northern Dobrogea, Romanian political elites designed a threefold mechanism composed of ethnic colonization, cultural homogenization, and economic modernization. The most important stimulus behind the annexation of Dobrogea was economic: due to its strategic geographical location, the province was regarded as a vital commercial outlet of Romania, granting it access to the sea and facilitating thus its elevation into the world economy, from periphery to semi-periphery. Demographically, Northern Dobrogea served as an “Internal America” for Romania, a dynamic frontier zone of new settlements for expanding the national economy and ethnic boundaries.⁵ From an institutional point of view, the mechanism of assimilation had citizenship legislation at its core: despite its formal incorporation into Romania, Northern
Dobrogea was subject to a separate, extra-constitutional administrative organization between 1878 and 1913. Under this status, the inhabitants of Dobrogea enjoyed a local type of citizenship, which denied them political participation and the right to acquire properties outside the province. The integration of the multi-ethnic province of Dobrogea into Romania resembled thus the model of “internal colonialism”: its organization was characterized by administrative distinctiveness and excessive centralization supported by claims of cultural superiority of the core region, by intense ethnic colonization, and by uneven regional economic development tailored to the needs of the metropolis.6

This analysis focuses on the mechanism of assimilation implemented in Dobrogea by the Romanian political elites. The first part of the paper explores the formation of the Romanian nationalist discourse about Dobrogea, and its influence on shaping citizenship and property legislation in the province. The second and main part of the paper investigates the integration of Dobrogea into Romania at the following levels: administrative organization, ethnic colonization, and cultural homogenization. Special attention is devoted to the effects of citizenship legislation on the ethnic assimilation of the province into Romania. The third part explores the association between national consolidation and modernization, and its side-effect, namely the relationship between Bucharest’s excessive centralization and regionalist tendencies in Northern Dobrogea. The fourth part examines the political emancipation of the Dobrogeans. In conclusion, some specific characteristics of the process of nation- and state-building in the province are highlighted, in an attempt to add the complementary case study of Northern Dobrogea’s prewar assimilation to the broader debate on the administrative integration and cultural homogenization in interwar Greater Romania.

Theoretically, in line with recent works on the “deconstruction” of the nation-state, the study looks at its heterogeneous linguistic, territorial, and ethnic composition, and stresses diversity rather than unity, by focusing on local history, and the history of regionalism. From this perspective, the case of Dobrogea features more general patterns of integration that would be repeated, in different historical conditions, on the larger scale of Greater Romania, but also original characteristics, deriving mostly from Dobrogea’s Ottoman legacy of a multiple imperial borderland, most evident in its demographic and religious composition, and military organization.7
1. Internal Orientalism

1.1 An Ottoman Imperial Legacy: Dobrogea, the Land and the People

Under Ottoman rule, Dobrogea functioned as a multiple imperial borderland, a zone of contact and convergence among multinational empires, as part of the Russian-Ottoman and Habsburg-Ottoman frontier belt, from the Caucasus to Southern Bessarabia, and the Balkan border areas. The province was occupied by the Ottoman Empire in the fifteenth century, and was subject to an intense military colonization with Turkish and Tartar population from South Crimea and Asia Minor, being gradually transformed into an Islamic area. During the eighteenth and nineteenth century, Dobrogea was demographically linked with a larger territory, absorbing numerous Romanian peasants from the Wallachian plains, Bulgarian peasants from the Balkan Mountains and Southern Bessarabia, Cossacks from the Dniepr Delta, Old Believers (Lipovans) from Central Russia, and German colonists from Southern Russia. Consequently, Dobrogea acquired a highly complex ethnic composition: the Danube Delta was populated by Slavic fishermen; the cities were largely inhabited by Italian, Jewish, Greek and Armenian merchants; the north was dominated by Bulgarians, the center and south by Turks and Tartars, while the right bank of the Danube was inhabited by Romanians.

Military events increased ethnic diversity in the province. Dobrogea was an important part of the Ottoman military system, which defended the access to Constantinople and allowed communications with the Crimean Tartars. Due to its strategic importance, the province served as a constant military battlefield during the Russian-Turkish wars (1768-1878). This provoked anarchy in the administration and great fluctuations in the population: as a consequence of the devastating 1828-1829 war, Dobrogea’s population decreased to 40,000 inhabitants, to increase to 100,000 by 1850. After the Crimean War (1853-1856), Dobrogea was again repopulated with over 100,000 Tartars from Crimea and Circassians from Kuban and the Caucasus. Finally, the 1877-1878 war provoked a considerable Muslim emigration from the province, estimated at 90,000 people. According to official Romanian sources, in 1879 – one year after the annexation of Dobrogea by Romania – the three main ethnic groups in the province were Romanians, numbering 31,177, Bulgarians – 28,715, and Turks and Tartars – 32,033, out of a total population of 106,943. Assessing the composite ethnic configuration of Dobrogea, the Romanian historian Nicolae Iorga identified “three Dobrogeas,” three parallel strips of land along the North-South axis of the province: the coast of the Black Sea, which functioned as a commercial outpost; the middle part of the province, which
served as a boulevard of military communications between Constantino-
ple and Southern Bessarabia; and, finally, the agricultural riverside of the
Danube, which was inhabited mostly by Romanians and was in permanent
contact with the Wallachian neighboring counties.

After 1878, Dobrogea abruptly transited from the multi-cultural
imperial heritage to the homogenizing order of the nation-state. By a deci-
sion of the Berlin Treaty (July 1878), the province was divided between
Romania, which acquired the larger Northern Dobrogea, and Bulgaria,
which incorporated Southern Dobrogea. In the ensuing period, Dobrogea
became the object of an acute Romanian-Bulgarian territorial conflict.
Both states engaged in assiduous and competing processes of national
expansion and border-making in the province. As a result, previous forms
of multiple identities and the network of formal and informal contacts
between the inhabitants of the southern and northern parts of the
province were discontinued, replaced by border demarcations and exclu-
sive national definitions of citizenship.12

1.2 FROM A “FATAL GIFT” TO AN “ANCIENT ROMANIAN LAND”:
MYTH-MAKING IN THE ROMANIAN NATIONALIST DISCOURSE
ABOUT DOBROGEA

As the previous section pointed out, at the time of its annexation to
Romania, Dobrogea carried a specific Ottoman legacy, most evidently in
the demographic sphere: the province had one of the most diverse ethnic
compositions in Europe, being inhabited by Turks, Tartars, Romanians,
Bulgarians, Russians, Greeks, Armenians, Serbs, Jews, Germans, Italians,
Albanians, and Arabs.13 In reaction, numerous Romanian politicians per-
ceived the geo-political location and ethnic composition of Dobrogea as
a danger to Romania’s ethnic homogeneity and political stability. The
1878 annexation of the province to Romania spurred therefore a puzzling
diplomatic and domestic episode: according to W. Gladstone, the province
was “a gift ungraciously given and reluctantly received.”14 The following
section explores the shifting place of Northern Dobrogea in the Romanian
national ideology, and documents a symbolic substitution between North-
ern Dobrogea and Southern Bessarabia.

Ever since its appearance on the Eastern European diplomatic agen-
da, the political fate of Dobrogea was linked to the delicate territorial sit-
uation of Southern Bessarabia. An integral part of the larger province of
Bessarabia, occupied by Russia in 1812, Southern Bessarabia was returned
to Moldavia by a decision of the Paris Congress (1856) that followed the
Crimean War (1853-1856). Subsequently, the province became a central
target of Russia’s diplomatic agenda, mostly during the Eastern Crisis
Ultimately, at the end of the 1877-1878 Russian-Turkish War, by the Treaty of San Stefano concluded on 3 March 1878, Russia obtained Dobrogea and the Danube Delta from Turkey. According to the same treaty, Russia unilaterally reserved the right of exchanging these provinces for Romania’s Southern Bessarabia. The proposed territorial exchange aroused great indignation in Bucharest, where Romanian politicians and public opinion refused almost unanimously to comply.

How can one account for the stiff refusal of Romanian politicians to endorse the proposed territorial exchange? In fact, even if Dobrogea was allegedly inferior in its overall economic value, in territorial and demographic terms the exchange was quite even, with a slight advantage on the side of Dobrogea: according to estimates by Leonida Colescu, in 1878 Southern Bessarabia had a surface of 8,355 square kilometers with 163,000 inhabitants, while Northern Dobrogea had a surface of 15,536 square kilometers (from which 4,964 square kilometers were covered by waters and swamps in the Danube Delta), with 169,000 inhabitants. Surely, a paramount reason for the Romanians’ refusal of the exchange was their commitment to defend the territorial inviolability of their country. In a context in which Romania’s diplomatic efforts were exclusively directed toward the preservation of Bessarabia, Dobrogea became the very symbol of an onerous bargain, and its refusal – a way of defending the integrity of the country.

The refusal of the Romanian politicians to cede Southern Bessarabia to Russia becomes even more understandable in view of the important economic role of the province within Romania. Southern Bessarabia represented, through its access to the Black Sea, a vital commercial harbor for Romania’s foreign trade. This idea was eloquently spelled out by Prime Minister Ion C. Brătianu, who, on 21 March/2 April 1878, declared:

> We cannot exist without that small part of Bessarabia. We would be suffocated without that region. Through it, the gates of the world are opening up to us. Without Bessarabia we would be engulfed by Russia, Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria. Dobrogea doesn’t open up any exit for us, and in the lack of direct communication routes, we would be able to communicate with it only through swamps and marshes, or through a round journey that we would have to take through the mouth of the Danube. This we would not be able to accept under any circumstances.

Brătianu expressed thus not only Romania’s strong attachment to Southern Bessarabia, but also the country’s determination to reject unilaterally the annexation of the province of Dobrogea. Committed to this view, the Romanian government tried to secure diplomatic support for a favorable re-examination of the stipulations of the San Stefano Treaty by the Inter-
national Congress of Great European Powers that took place in June 1878 in Berlin. Nevertheless, the Treaty of Berlin stipulated that Romania must cede Southern Bessarabia to Russia (Art. 45), receiving instead the province of Northern Dobrogea (Art. 46).

The decisions of the Berlin Congress opened a second phase of resistance to Dobrogea’s annexation, by dividing Romanian politicians between “pro-Dobrogeans and anti-Dobrogeans.” Considering that resistance to the European decision would be “political suicide,” the most important political personalities of Romania, such as Prince Carol I, Prime Minister Ion. C. Brătianu and Foreign Minister Mihail Kogălniceanu favored compliance with the Berlin Treaty and the annexation of Dobrogea. By contrast, other leading politicians, such as Dimitrie A. Sturdza, Nicolae Dimancea, and Petre P. Carp continued to oppose the annexation. Under their influence, on 28 June 1878, a resolution of the Chamber of Deputies, voted by 46 deputies, firmly rejected the annexation of Dobrogea under any circumstances, considering it “detrimental to Romania’s interest.” In their view, Dobrogea was “a fatal gift,” whose acquisition would dismember the Latin ethnic homogeneity of the Romanian people, embroil Romania within Russia’s geo-political plans in the Balkans, deteriorate the diplomatic relations with Serbia and Bulgaria, and require an unreasonable financial sacrifice. Adversaries of the annexation employed an impressive range of arguments against Dobrogea, portraying the population of the province as “an assemblage of most turbulent elements, gathered there from all over the world,” and characterizing the province as “a marshy country, in which yellow fever is endemic,” and the organization of which would prove “the ruin of our finance.”

A substantial nationalist concern with regard to Dobrogea’s annexation was the ethnic and religious diversity of its population. The province was a “micro-cosmos of all religions:” together with Romanians, Bulgarians and Greeks of Orthodox Christian denomination and the Russian Old Believers, there were also numerous Muslims, Jews, Catholics and Protestants. In Romania, the existence of an overwhelming Orthodox Christian majority, coupled with the tradition of the old treaties (capitulations) allegedly concluded between the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia and the Ottoman Empire, which forbade the practice of Muslim religion on Romanian territory, favored a legal association between Romanian national identity and Christianity. This principle was legally consecrated by Article 7 of the 1866 Constitution of Romania, which read that: “Only foreigners of Christian denomination can acquire naturalization.” From a legal point of view, the potential contradiction between Romania’s legislation and Dobrogea’s religious composition was partially liquidated just one year after the annexation of Dobrogea. Following
a stipulation of the Treaty of Berlin, which conditioned the recognition of Romania’s independence on granting access to citizenship to non-Christian inhabitants, in 1879, Article 7 of the Constitution was revised as follows: “In Romania, the difference of religious belief and confession can prevent neither the accession to civil and political rights, nor the exercise of these rights.” But the acquisition of Dobrogea created an unprecedented category of non-Christian citizens in Romania, by annexation. Although the emerging international law did not provide clear codes of conduct in such a situation, the Romanian state was expected to assure the representation of the Dobrogeans in the political institutions of the country, protecting and providing them with favorable conditions for practicing their religion.

The decisive political confrontation between “pro” and “anti-Dobrogea” politicians occurred during an extraordinary session of the Romanian Parliament convoked between 28-30 September 1878 in order to decide upon Romania’s official position with regard to the decision of the Berlin Congress. Mihail Kogălniceanu and Ion C. Brătianu used all their rhetorical skills in order to convince the Romanian Parliament to accept the annexation of Dobrogea. In two memorable speeches, Kogălniceanu highlighted the economic and geo-political advantages posed by a land with “an immense seacoast and three harbors,” and recommended that Romania invested in “expanding the harbors for developing the wealth of Dobrogea.” Most importantly, as a trained historian, Kogălniceanu crystallized the Romanian nationalist discourse about Dobrogea, by stressing Romania’s historical rights to the province, by setting the nationalist priorities of the Romanian administration – “the only works that we will do in Dobrogea will be schools and roads” – and by downplaying the danger of Bulgarian resentment. In sharp contrast to his early position on the issue, Prime Minister Brătianu associated himself with Kogălniceanu’s pro-annexation campaign. In an eloquent speech, Brătianu underlined the geo-political and economic advantages offered by possession over Dobrogea, rejected unequivocally Bulgaria’s historical rights to the province, and urged parliamentarians to overcome their fears and to trust Romania’s ability to assimilate Dobrogea:

You fear that we will not be able to Romanianize a province that was previously in our possession? You want to reject a land between the sea and the greatest river in Europe? But other nations would look at it as a hungry man looks at fresh caviar. Every people tends naturally to possess as much sea as it can, and you are refusing it? ... Do you want us today ... to suffocate our breath, and to lose the sea and the mouth of the Danube?
Animated by Brătianu and Kogălniceanu, the Liberal parliamentary majority succeeded in imposing its conception over the future organization of Dobrogea. On 28 September, the Senate endorsed the annexation of Dobrogea, followed on 30 September by the approval of the Chamber of Deputies. In addition, the government was authorized by the Parliament to administer Dobrogea through ad-hoc governmental regulations, until a future Legislative Assembly would pass a law on Dobrogea’s definitive organization.

The favorable vote of the Parliament on Dobrogea’s annexation was a strong indication that, in a short period of time, the Romanian national discourse about Dobrogea underwent a spectacular transformation. At the time of the San Stefano Treaty, Dobrogea was to many politicians a foreign province, the symbol of an “onerous bargain,” “a fatal gift,” or a “geo-political embarrassment.” Gradually, in face of the irrevocable decision of the Berlin Congress, the province began to be valued as a war trophy, Romania’s recompense for its blood sacrifices in the 1877-1878 Russian-Turkish war, and as a compensation for the loss of Southern Bessarabia to Russia. In 1908, Nicolae Iorga, a key figure of Romanian national ideology, suggestively synthesized this view, by pointing out that Dobrogea was “twice dear to Romanians” since “it was paid for two times: … the first time with blood, and the second time with land.” By the end of the parliamentary debates over the Berlin Treaty, Dobrogea was reconsidered almost unanimously as an ancient Romanian land, and an integral part of the Romanian national heritage.


2.1 Administrative Organization and the Assimilation of Northern Dobrogea

Romania took over the administration of Northern Dobrogea on 14 November 1878. The entry of the Romanian army in the province was soon followed by a multitude of administrators, geographers, anthropologists and economists, who studied the province and devised plans of economic organization. Following the annexation, Romanian political elites implemented in Dobrogea a modernizing nationalist project, which was meant to consecrate Romania’s economic integration into the West and to confer a legitimizing progressive character on the assimilation process. At the same time, in an “Orientalist” manner, Dobrogea was mastered by a bureaucratic nationalism. The result was a three-stage mechanism of ethnic assimilation, economic modernization and cultural homogenization,
which combined attempts at sheltered industrialization with a campaign for national consolidation. Built on restraining citizenship legislation, this mechanism facilitated the integration of Northern Dobrogea into Romania at the following levels: 1) the colonization of Dobrogea with ethnic Romanians; 2) the nationalization of the landed property in the province; 3) the cultural homogenization of the Dobrogeans; 4) the implementation of a highly centralized political regime, which promoted the interests of the Bucharest-based political elites and weakened regional political resistance; and 5) the exclusion of Dobrogea’s non-Romanian economic elites from political rights.

In order to implement this developmental strategy, the ruling National Liberal Party (1876-1888) designed a so-called “exceptional administrative regime” for the province, which occurred in three main stages: a) “the regulatory period” (1878-1880), when the province was ruled by ad-hoc regulations issued by the government; b) a second period, (1880-1909), when the province was administered on the basis of a separate law issued by the parliament; and c) a third phase, (1909-1913), when Dobrogea’s administrative and political organization was gradually harmonized with that of Romania. The following section explores the assimilation strategies employed by the Romanian political elite in Dobrogea at the level of administration, citizenship and property legislation.

2.2 FROM SYMBOLIC INCLUSION TO ADMINISTRATIVE EXCLUSION: CITIZENSHIP LEGISLATION IN NORTHERN DOBROGEA

On 14 November 1878, in a proclamation issued in Romanian, Bulgarian, and Turkish, Prince Carol I guaranteed the Dobrogeans that: “You now belong to a state governed only by laws debated and approved by the nation. Your life, your honor and your prosperity – the saint and most cherished goods of the mankind – are under the protection of the Constitution.” In spite of these royal assurances, the organization of Dobrogea was in fact characterized by a peculiar dialectics of symbolic inclusion and administrative exclusion.

“The Law Concerning Dobrogea’s Administrative Organization,” adopted by the Romanian Parliament in March 1880, had as its primary aim the assimilation of Dobrogea to Romania. Article 3 of that law read that: “All the inhabitants of Dobrogea, who, on 11 April 1877 were Ottoman citizens, have become Romanian citizens.” Article 5 stipulated that: “The inhabitants of Dobrogea who have become Romanian citizens are equal before the law, enjoy all the civic rights, and can be appointed in public functions, regardless of their origin or religion,” while Article 6 extended to the inhabitants of Dobrogea numerous civil rights provided
by the Romanian Constitution. Yet, in spite of Dobrogea’s formal incorporation into Romania, the 1880 law was conceived as a “Dobrogean Constitution,” and was to form the basis of a separate, exceptional administrative regime in the province. This meant that, although nominally Romanian citizens, the Dobrogeans had no political rights: Article 4 stipulated that: “A special law will determine the conditions under which the Dobrogeans will be able to exercise their political rights and buy immovable property in Romania proper. Another law will stipulate their representation in the Romanian Parliament.”35 Furthermore, civic liberties were potentially restricted by Article 6 of the law, which read that: “The Government, through a decree by the Council of Ministers, can forbid every demonstration that is dangerous to public order.”

Laws on the political emancipation of the Dobrogeans announced by Article 4 of the 1880 law would be gradually passed only in 1909-1913. From 1878 to 1909, the inhabitants of Dobrogea thus enjoyed only a local-type of citizenship, since: 1) They were denied political representation in the Romanian Parliament and the right to enroll in political parties. Instead, once a year, two representatives of the province would raise issues of specific Dobrogean interest to the King; and 2) Once they crossed the Danube into Romania, they were treated as virtual foreigners, being denied: a) political participation; and b) the right to acquire immovable property. In the words of the French traveler André Bellessort, the Dobrogeans were placed in a situation “at least as extraordinary as the nature of their country. ... They are Romanian citizens in Dobrogea, but outside the province, they are neither Romanians nor citizens, and do not belong to any known category.”36

According to one of its main authors, Mihail Kogălniceanu, at that time Minister of Interior (11 July 1879-16 April 1880), the separate administrative regime in Dobrogea was conceived as a temporary measure meant to rebuild, repopulate, and reorganize the province ruined by the devastating 1877-1878 war.37 In addition, Kogălniceanu emphasized that, since prior to 1878 Dobrogea had been shaped by a radically different socio-political system, the former Ottoman province needed a transitional period before being fully integrated into Romania, during which the new authorities would gradually extend the country’s property regime and political institutions to Dobrogea, in order to elevate its inhabitants to the material situation and political culture of Romania proper. Considered from the perspective of these declared aims, the stipulations of the 1880 law went, however, not only far beyond, but even against its original scope, since it subjected Dobrogea to a heavily centralized political regime that “quarantined” its inhabitants into a territorial enclave, cut some of their already acquired rights, and denied them meaningful political participation. The illiberal stip-
ulations of the 1880 law met significant opposition in the Romanian Parliament. Deputy D. Ghica considered that the law “gives material life, but totally refuses public life to Dobrogea,” while another deputy claimed that it “treats the Dobrogeans as a herd of slaves.” Kogălniceanu countered this criticism and won the Parliament’s approval for the bill only by underlying its national priorities: “This law is made for nothing else but for Dobrogea to become part of Romania, and its inhabitants to slowly assimilate and become Romanians.”

What did Kogălniceanu mean by assimilation? Judging from his overall political activity, Kogălniceanu was a liberal-democrat. As a prominent leader of the 1848 revolution in Moldavia, he militated for the socio-political emancipation of the lower classes, pleaded for religious tolerance toward non-Orthodox Christians, and for the abolition of slavery of the Gypsies in Moldavia. However, one can detect an underlying tension between liberalism and nationalism in Kogălniceanu’s political vision, most evident in his conception of the “assimilation” of Dobrogea put forward during the parliamentary debates over the Law on the Organization of Dobrogea.

On the one hand, Kogălniceanu backed a liberal organization of the province, in order to observe the religious and cultural autonomy of all ethnic groups, convinced that, on the basis of reciprocity, a showcase would help to improve the national rights enjoyed by ethnic Romanians in neighboring countries as well. On the other hand, Kogălniceanu pleaded for the implementation of a “Romanian political order” in Dobrogea, which was meant to extend in the province the jurisdiction of the institutions of the Romanian nation-state and to favor the political and economic domination of ethnic Romanians. These objectives set limits to the degree of cultural autonomy allowed to ethnic groups in the province: Kogălniceanu defended the rights of ethnic minorities in Dobrogea to education in their own language, providing that they study courses in Romanian as well, to practicing their own religion, with the provision that they accept the jurisdiction of Romanian civil laws, and to a minimum standard of civil rights and liberties, except for cases in which this endangered the “public order.” The means chosen to implement a “Romanian order” in Dobrogea further highlighted the tension between liberalism and nationalism in Kogălniceanu’s conception of assimilation. First, Kogălniceanu believed that the success of the program of “Romanianization” of Dobrogea depends on the implementation of a temporary separate administrative organization in the province:

We want, therefore, this province to be overwhelmingly [eminamente] Romanian, but who is saying assimilation is saying a labor period, an epoch of transition; it is a work to assimilate. If we are to give this
province all liberties that are currently available in Romania, then there will not be any assimilation.  

Second, this separate organization was to give the Romanian administration the main tools for implementing a gradual program of assimilation, among which the most important were the centralization of the administration, the denial of political rights to the Dobrogeans, and the extension of the Romanian national educational and religious systems in the province. The core of the separate organization of Dobrogea was the extensive administrative powers given to Romanian authorities, mainly in multiethnic localities where Romanians were in numerical inferiority. According to Kogălniceanu:

The prefect ... has to stimulate the assimilation of the inhabitants, and Dobrogean Romanians have to be ultimately admitted even in the Parliament. Give therefore the prefect the possibility to introduce in the communal council these necessary Romanian elements. If you decide to deny him this right, then in the cities of Tulcea and Constanța, where the majority of the inhabitants are Greeks, as well as in other areas where the majority of the inhabitants are Bulgarians, Romanians would not be represented.  

Kogălniceanu urged therefore the Romanian deputies “to make national laws, before making liberal ones,” and “to invest local authority with extensive powers” for assimilating Dobrogea. It became thus obvious that, in the confrontation between nationalism and liberalism in the organization of Dobrogea, the former vision prevailed: the rights of ethnic minorities in the province were acceptable, provided that they did not challenge Romanian political interests in the province. Ultimately, Kogălniceanu’s passionate arguments in the Romanian Parliament succeeded in shaping much of the content of the law on Dobrogea’s organization, which was to govern the province for the next 35 years.

2.3 PROPERTY LEGISLATION AND LAND NATIONALIZATION IN NORTHERN DOBROGEA, 1878-1913

Apart from shaping the content of the law, Kogălniceanu also set the priorities of the Romanian administration in the province, among which the regulation of the property regime figured predominantly. The transfer of the Ottoman hierarchical property system into unconditional capitalist property occasioned massive reallocation of ownership among ethnic groups in Northern Dobrogea, and ultimately resulted in the appropria-
tion of the landed property in the province by ethnic Romanians. Organ-
ized under the close supervision of the Romanian state, the process of
land naturalization occurred in four major ways: 1) the succession of the
Romanian state to the property rights of the Ottoman state in Dobrogea;
2) the appropriation by the Romanian state of parts of the land possessed
by Dobrogeans. 3) the opening of virgin lands for cultivation by ethnic
Romanian colonists; and 4) the distribution of the lands of all Dobrogeans
who emigrated from the province to ethnic Romanians. The Romanian
state established thus a virtual monopoly on land redistribution in Dobro-
gea, assuring the gradual transfer of ownership to ethnic Romanians.

The Ottoman legislation had distinguished five juridical categories
of land property: mülk, miriè, vakf, metrukè, and mevat. Among them,
only mülk was compatible with capitalist private ownership. The other
four types of land were nominally owned by the Ottoman state, and they
had therefore to be legally harmonized with the stipulation of Art. 23 of
the Romanian Constitution that defined private property as “sacred and
inviolable.” Due to its complex character, this legal transfer of property
gradually occurred from 1878 to 1882. While studying the Ottoman system
of land property and preparing the new property legislation, Romanian
authorities preserved Ottoman laws that were in effect until 11 April 1877.
The first Romanian law regulating landed property in Dobrogea was
issued in 1880. The Law stipulated the succession of the Romanian state
to “all the rights and attributions the Ottoman government had had on
immobile property in Dobrogea.” The Romanian state became thus the
greatest landowner in the province, by gaining possession of over
1,000,000 hectares of arable land, and over numerous forests, mines, and
lakes. The lands outside localities cultivated by the Dobrogeans – called
miriè – were also considered state property. In the period 1880-1882, the
Romanian state conducted a campaign for verification of all Ottoman
property documents – tapù – and their replacement with new Romanian
titles of property. Upon the completion of this process, the property
regime in the province was finally regulated by “The Law Concerning
Immobile Property in Dobrogea,” issued on 3 April 1882.

The law aimed at transforming the Ottoman conditional property
over agricultural lands outside localities – miriè – into capitalist ownership.
In order to become full owners, peasants had to redeem their annual tithe
previously paid to the Ottoman state, by paying, in successive installments,
a financial compensation toward the Romanian state (Art. 11). The value of
this compensation was established at one-third of the total price of the
plot. Since many peasants proved unable to pay their compensation, a reg-
ulation from 1884 stipulated that the Dobrogeans “who have not paid all
their installments in three years lose to the state their right to the land, as
well as their previous payments.” Finally, the 1910 “Interpretative Law” further extended state power to dispossess “through administrative means and without any warning or juridical assistance, any holder who did not fulfill his financial obligations toward the state.” On this basis, the Romanian state appropriated part of the land owned by Dobrogeans, expanding thus the size of the state domain available for ethnic colonization.

2.4 Economic Utilitarianism versus Ethnic Assimilation: Legislation on Colonization in Northern Dobrogea, 1878-1913

The second major aim of the 1882 law was Dobrogea’s colonization, seen as an imperative in an age when “economic progress depends on the number of hands employed.” While the population of the province was about 100,000 in 1878, the geographer M. D. Ionescu appreciated that Dobrogea could easily feed 900,000 inhabitants. By and large, one can identify two main colonization strategies. One, represented by such politicians as Ion Ionescu de la Brad, was driven by economic motivations and argued that Dobrogea should be open to everybody willing to emigrate to the province, irrespective of nationality. The other, represented by Kogălniceanu, and the first prefect of Constanța, Romus Opreanu, advocated for a massive Romanian colonization of the province.

The 1882 law provided the government with the necessary legal framework for Dobrogea’s ethnic colonization. According to the law, the Romanian government could parcel state lands in plots of 3 to 10 hectares, preferably in new localities, and sell it, under favorable financial conditions, to rural colonists (Art. 25-26). This colonization was to remain the exclusive monopoly of the state: “Nobody has the right to bring and settle families of farmers on his land without the consent of the Council of Ministers, the only one in charge to decide, within the limits of the Constitution, the conditions under which such families can settle” (Art. 31). The 1882 law functioned as a powerful instrument of social closure: in order to strengthen the economic position of Romanians in the province, the Law connected land ownership in the province with citizenship status: “Only Romanians can acquire immovable property” (Art. 2). Under this generic label (Romanians), the law distinguished several categories of citizens: 1) the former subjects of the Ottoman Empire – raya – who had been residing in the province as of 11 April 1877; 2) Romanian citizens from Romania proper (either by birth or naturalized) who were encouraged to settle in Dobrogea; if relocated to Dobrogea, they naturally retained their Romanian citizenship, but would de facto lose the exercise of their political rights, given the lack of political life in the province; and 3) ethnic Romanians from the neighboring countries who immigrated in Dobrogea. The latter stipulation was in line with Article
of the 1866 Constitution of Romania, which favored the granting of Romanian citizenship to ethnic Romanians from abroad without a naturalization stage.

The 1882 Property Law was modified in 1884, 1885, 1889, 1893, and was finally supplemented with the “Interpretative Law” on 10 April 1910. These modifications highlighted the specific interests of the state in the colonization process, namely: 1) to assure a constant source of income for the state budget, by selling land to colonists;53 and 2) to implement an effective colonization of Dobrogea with ethnic Romanians. To this end, the Romanian state established a strict monopoly on land circulation in Dobrogea. Thus, the law of March 1909 enabled the state to buy 1,012 hectares of land from the Dobrogean Russians who chose to emigrate to Siberia. The 1910 “Interpretative Law” also granted the state the right to annul any land transaction between a colonist and a third party, which was not supervised by the Romanian state.54 Overall, during the period 1889-1912, the state confiscated 127,483 hectares of land from the native Dobrogeans who failed to redeem their tithe, and from the colonists who failed to pay their installments or to relocate into the province. In the period 1889-1914, 82,127 hectares of this total land were redistributed to ethnic Romanian colonists, in order to strengthen the Romanian character of the province.55

2.5 THE FRONTIER ECONOMY: ETHNIC COLONIZATION IN NORTHERN DOBROGEA

Dobrogea’s frontier economy attracted very early pan-Romanian immigration, as the province entered “within the radius of the Romanian expansion.”56 This trend was reinforced by the 1880 law, which favored a massive Romanian colonization of Dobrogea. This colonization occurred in several waves: 1884-1891, 1893-1897, 1904-1907 and 1912-1914.57 As a result, Dobrogea became “a Dacia in miniature,” or “a mosaic of Romanian races.”58 Together with autochthonous Romanians in Dobrogea, several other categories of Romanians settled in the province, originating from Transylvania, Wallachia, Moldavia and Bessarabia, and various Balkan regions (Vlachs from Pind and the Timoc Valley, etc.). This immigration had profound social consequences for Romanian society, creating new social identities and political loyalties. Dobrogea became a melting pot of regional differences and a laboratory for fostering Romanian national identity.

Under the impact of state-sponsored ethnic colonization, the overall population of the province saw a dramatic increase: from approximately 100,000 inhabitants in 1878, to 261,490 in 1900, and 368,189 inhabitants in 1912.59 Although Northern Dobrogea remained an ethnic mosaic,60 ethnic
colonization substantially altered the relationship between the three major ethnic groups in the province. The Romanian population skyrocketed from 31,177 in 1879, to 43,671 in 1880, to 119,562 in 1900 and to 216,425 in 1913. In only 25 years, the ratio of ethnic Romanians in Northern Dobrogea thus grew from a relative to an absolute majority (from 36.3% in 1880 to 52.5% in 1905). The territorial distribution of Romanians changed as well, since they penetrated areas previously inhabited by Turks and Tartars, or by Bulgarians, especially in the north, around Tulcea and Babadag, and in the south, at the border with Bulgaria. The Romanian population in Dobrogea was very heterogeneous, being composed of native Dicieni (24.2% of the total Romanian population), Wallachian Cojani (39.5%), Moldavians (8.0%), Bessarabians (5.6%), Mocani from Transylvania and the Banat (21.8%), Bukovinians (0.1%), and from other foreign countries (0.8%). These groups retained strong regional identities, which disappeared only gradually through pan-Romanian inter-marriages and integration into the wider Romanian national community.

The major changes that occurred in the ethnic composition of Dobrogea also affected the pattern of land property in the province. In 1882, Dobrogea had 175,075 hectares of arable land. Considered together, Turks and Tartars were the leading landowning ethnic group in the province, with almost 50% of the arable land, followed by Romanians and Bulgarians, both with shares of approximately 23% of the total land. The colonization process radically altered these proportions. By 1905, the cultivated land increased to 685,449 hectares. Significantly, Romanians became the dominant landowners, possessing a share of about 63% of Dobrogea’s land. By contrast, the portion possessed by Turks and Tartars dramatically decreased to only 7.0% of the land. The share owned by Bulgarians, while increasing in surface from 38,038 to 129,231 hectares, decreased nevertheless in proportion to 19% of the total arable land. Thus, by 1905 the Romanians had already managed to acquire approximately two-thirds of Dobrogea’s landed property.

2.6 Politics of Identity in a Border Region: Cultural Homogenization, Religious Organization and Educational System in Northern Dobrogea

Ethnic assimilation in Dobrogea was accompanied by a cultural offensive of the Romanian state, based on two main pillars: church and school. Thus, Romanian authorities pursued a determined religious policy in the region that subjected the Dobrogean churches to the authority of the Romanian Orthodox Church, and built numerous religious edifices. The Romanian state also organized a comprehensive network of schools in order to spread
the values of the new political order and to induce loyalty to the Romanian state, renamed Dobrogea’s localities, and built numerous Romanian historical monuments, as landmarks of the new political order.

In Dobrogea, the national awakening of the Romanians, Greeks and Bulgarians was linked to a struggle for control over the power and wealth of the Orthodox Church. During the 1870s, the newly established Bulgarian Exarchate challenged the authority of the Greek Ecumenic Patriarchy in Dobrogea, mostly by attempting to attract under its jurisdiction the Romanian Orthodox population. After 1878, Romanian political elites acknowledged the important role played by the Church in the process of national awakening in Dobrogea. In spite of strong opposition from Bulgarian clerics, the 1880 law on Dobrogea’s organization subjected Orthodox churches in the province to the jurisdiction of the Romanian Orthodox Church (which became autocephalous in 1885), and integrated them into the Diocese of the Lower Danube.

Another central pillar of the Romanian administration in Dobrogea was the educational system. The school was regarded as the main institution for fostering cultural homogenization, and for overcoming the local parochialism and segregation that characterized the life of ethnic communities in the province. Until 1878, Dobrogea possessed a network of Romanian, Bulgarian, Greek, and Russian confessional schools supported by local communes. Under Romanian rule, the 1880 law provided for state-sponsored primary education. It also allowed the functioning of local schools in minority languages, provided that they teach courses in Romanian, too. Supported by the central administration, the network of Romanian state schools in Dobrogea increased, while that of confessional schools gradually decreased. In spite of its strong national connotations, the educational offensive of the Romanian state was nevertheless largely inconsistent, progressing in waves marked by either material difficulties or personal initiatives of the Dobrogean prefects. While the network of primary schools considerably expanded, there were still no institutions for secondary or higher education. Established in 1883, the Romanian Gymnasium in Tulcea encountered such financial problems that in 1891-1892 the director had to despondently report that Romanian parents redirected their children toward the Bulgarian Gymnasium in Tulcea and the Russian Gymnasium in Ismail.

A major boost in Dobrogea’s educational system was due to the activity of Spiru Haret, the Romanian Ministry of Education in 1897-1899, 1901-1904, and 1907-1910. As part of the industrialization policy of the National Liberal Party, Spiru Haret conducted a sustained cultural campaign for emancipating the impoverished sharecropper peasantry and transforming them into independent farmers. His strategy, contained in his Education-
al Law of April 1898, was to invest schools with an increased socio-cultural role, through an active state intervention. During several visits in the province, Haret personally organized the schooling system and encouraged the development of rural banks. Due also to his sustained efforts, the level of literacy in Dobrogea rose from 24.8% of the total population in 1899, to 45.2% of the population in 1912, thus a significant growth of 20.4% in 13 years.66 This rate of literacy (45.2%) was not only much above the national average of 39.3%, but also superior to any other historical province of Romania considered separately, namely 39.1% in Moldova, 41.2% in Muntenia Mare, and 33.5% in Oltenia.67 This situation highlights the important role assigned to education in Dobrogea as a means of fostering assimilation and national integration by the Romanian state.

3. Nationalism and Modernization: The Economic Incorporation of Northern Dobrogea into Romania

Cultural homogenization was accompanied by Dobrogea’s economic modernization. In the economic organization of Dobrogea, Romanian political leaders were influenced by the protectionist arguments put forward by the “father” of national economy, Friedrich List, who emphasized the role of the sea in fostering economic development.68 The most important promoter of the program of Romania’s commercial expansion on the sea was the economist Petre S. Aurelian, the main artisan of the economic policy of the National Liberal Party. Aurelian pointed out the organic link between the evolution of industry and the development of a comprehensive system of naval transportation: “The manufacturing industry is the fundament of the navigation, the more the manufactures are developing, the more the commercial navigation is growing.”69

As a Prime Minister in the period December 1896-April 1897, Aurelian pleaded for a national program of major investments in Dobrogea in order to link the province with Romania through a system of railway and naval communication, to build a major Black Sea port at Constanța to serve as a commercial outlet for Romania’s exports, and to assemble a commercial maritime fleet. Ion C. Brătianu, the leader of the National Liberal Party, was an enthusiastic supporter of Aurelian’s economic program. Brătianu suggestively expressed the Liberal strategy on Dobrogea’s modernization:

The seaport of Constanța is the lung of Romania, the mouth through which the country is breathing. Constanta will also become the fortress for Romania’s defense; through it we will set contact with the whole world, and we will secure the most important communication route for
our trade. ... We will spend 16, 20 or 25 more millions, as much as it takes to build the necessary seaport and bridge over the Danube, but this will be the best proof that we are a powerful nation and that the future of the entire Orient depends on us.70

The economic incorporation of Dobrogea into Romania coincided with an increased role played by the Romanian state in stimulating economic development. The province benefited from exceptional material investments, concentrated preponderantly in communications. Initially, because of a lack of regular naval transportation and bridges over the Danube, the province was quasi-isolated from Romania, especially in winter. In October 1882, the Romanian state bought the Constanța-Cernavodă railway from the Barklay company for 16 million golden francs; and invested an additional 35 million lei in a major bridge over the Danube, in order to complete the railway communication between Bucharest and Constanța. Inaugurated in 1895, the “grandiose” bridge “King Carol I,” was the longest in Europe and the second longest in the world at that time. Celebrated by the public as an emblem of Romania’s technological achievements and as a symbol of Dobrogea’s union with “the mother-country,” the bridge had an instrumental role in Dobrogea’s colonization, facilitating the immigration of approximately 70,000 people. The bridge was also the shortest link between Asia Minor and Western Europe: Constanța became the terminal station of the Orient Express, the place where Western travelers embarked for Asia Minor.

In October 1896, the Romanian state also began the construction of a major harbor for redirecting Romanian exports from land to the Black Sea. Unlike Romania’s leading Danubian ports of Galați and Brăila, the new Black Sea harbor was not placed under the supervision of “The European Commission of the Danube,” being therefore regarded as a symbol of Romania’s economic independence. Soon, Constanța harbor became a major objective of the Romanian national economy and turned into “the lung of the county.” The total volume of Romania’s sea export grew from 89,400 tones in 1889 to 1.5 million tones in 1913, one third of Romania’s export.72

3.1 Urbanization and Ethnic Assimilation in Northern Dobrogea

Urbanization also made important progress in the province. Under Ottoman rule, Dobrogea had fourteen cities, largely dominated by merchant colonies of Greeks, Armenians and Jews. After 1878, the state-sponsored urbanization altered this ethnic composition. In 1912, Dobrogea had a total urban population of 94,915 inhabitants (25.7% of its total
population). Together with the administrative centers of Tulcea and Constanța (22,262 and respectively 31,576 inhabitants), there were 6 other towns over 5,000 inhabitants. Favoring the new political order, Romanians monopolized the state administration and increased their urban residence in the province. In 1909, urban Romanians acquired majority in seven cities, representing 98% in Cuzgun, 92% in Ostrov, 66% in Măcin, 68% in Cernavodă, 61% in Hîrșova, 51% in Isaccea, and 50.6% in Mahmudia. In the other six cities, Romanians held a relative majority, with a proportion of 37% of the population in Medgidia, 34% in Constanța, 33% in Babadag, 28% in Mangalia, 27% in Chilia, and 26.8% in Tulcea. The Romanian urban element was in the minority only in Sulina, with a ratio of 17% of the population. The rising Romanian urban bourgeoisie succeeded also in nationalizing the commercial activity in the province, while the economic role of former “Oriental” urban elites decreased systematically. Thus, if in 1878 “the few Romanian merchants in Dobrogea could be counted on the fingers of a single hand,” in 1909, from 7,664 registered Dobrogean merchants, there were 4,815 Romanians and 2,849 “foreigners” (Greeks, Jews and Armenians). The symbol of Dobrogea’s urban modernization was the development of Constanța that thrived from 5,000 inhabitants in 1878, to 12,725 in 1900, and to a modern city of 31,000 in 1912. These successes were praised by the Romanian elites, who used economic progress as a legitimizing factor for Romanian rule. In 1903, 25 years after Dobrogea’s annexation, M. D. Ionescu assessed enthusiastically that “in the economic domain Dobrogea has advanced with giant steps.” Based on statistical comparisons between Dobrogea, other parts of Romania and different European countries, Ionescu documented Dobrogea’s miraculous transformation, from a “pile of ruins” into a prosperous province.

3.3 CENTRALIZATION VERSUS REGIONALISM: STRATEGIES OF POLITICAL EMANCIPATION EMPLOYED BY NORTHERN DOBROGEANS

A central component of the exceptional administrative regime in Dobrogea was the local administration. The province labored under a heavily centralized bureaucratic apparatus, which escaped the control of locally elected institutions, but was tightly controlled from Bucharest. According to the 1880 law, mayors in Dobrogea were not elected, but appointed by the prefect in villages, and by the Ministry of Interior in cities. Furthermore, unlike in Romania proper, where members of the communal councils were elected on a larger electoral basis, in Dobrogea local councilors were partly named by the prefect, while only some were elected by local inhabitants, in a restrictive franchise. Finally, local administrators had
juridical immunity: the prefects, sub-prefects, policemen and mayors could not be sued without prior authorization from the Council of Ministers (Art. 35). The 1880 law invested thus the bureaucracy in Dobrogea with full control over the local population. To make things worse, the majority of these bureaucrats were recruited from outside of Dobrogea and regarded the transfer to the remote province as a profitable but severe administrative ostracism. This situation favored corruption and abuses against the Dobrogeans, especially on the part of petty functionaries, such as tax collectors and land inspectors.

The attitude of the Bucharest-dominated administration placed it in conflict with an emerging local elite, made up of great landowners, the rising urban bourgeoisie and persons engaged in liberal professions. This new Dobrogean elite was mainly composed of colonists, the products of Romanian rule. However, while benefiting from the new opportunities for economic development, their lack of political rights prevented the colonists from making a decisive political impact in the province. In reaction, the Dobrogean elites developed a regional discourse of resistance against centralization and administrative colonization, called Dobrogenism. Under the slogan “Dobrogea for the Dobrogeans,” Dobrogenism aimed at correcting the discrepancy between the prominent socio-economic role of Dobrogean elites and their powerless political position. The main target of Dobrogenism became the exceptional administrative regime in the province, which denied Dobrogeans the rights to political participation and parliamentary representation. Gradually, this campaign generated a nucleus of tenacious local leaders, such as Ioan Roman, a Transylvanian jurist and publicist who settled in Dobrogea in 1898. In a political pamphlet entitled Dobrogea și drepturile politice ale locuitorilor ei (Dobrogea and the political rights of its inhabitants), Roman constructed a fully articulated regionalist discourse demanding a separate administrative budget of the province, an administrative reorganization of Dobrogea, more appropriate to regional needs, and incentives for regional economic development. Gathered around a regionalist political agenda, numerous Dobrogean departmental delegations lobbied the King and the Parliament for full political rights in 1893, 1899, 1902 and 1905.

4. “Political Rights without Liberties”: Dilemmas of Citizenship in Northern Dobrogea, 1908-1913

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the issue of the Dobrogeans’ political emancipation gained momentum. In 1905, a new Conservative government appointed a commission for studying the access of Dobrogeans to political rights. In spite of the positive recommendation of the
commission, the Dobrogeans’ emancipation proceeded, however, at a slow pace. It was only on 15 November 1908 when the Message of King Carol I to the Romanian Parliament proclaimed that, after 30 years of “grandiose and fruitful works, … the time has come to extend our constitutional regime to Constanta and Tulcea counties.” The slowness of the emancipation process expressed in fact the citizenship dilemma faced by the Romanian political elites in Dobrogea. Although geo-political considerations recommended the *en bloc* emancipation of Dobrogea’s multi-ethnic population, such a decision would have nevertheless contradicted Romania’s *jus sanguinis* citizenship legislation. This legal incompatibility was utilized by nationalist political forces in order to promote a maximal political agenda in Dobrogea. In 1905, Nicolae Iorga imputed that “the appearance of Dobrogea is still very cosmopolitan, and the Romanian work of colonization is far from being completed.” He criticized the attitude of the administration in the province and deplored the insufficient attention given to cultural assimilation. On this basis, in 1908, Iorga opposed the granting of political rights for the Dobrogeans as premature, considering that the restrictive Romanian electoral system would favor the rich non-Romanian Dobrogeans, thus undermining the national interest.

This nationalist political campaign shaped the attitude of Romanian political elites concerning the Dobrogeans’ political rights. Invoking the principle according to which “the Constitution grants political rights only to Romanians,” Prime Minister Ion I. C. Brâtianu reiterated his determination to apply the citizenship legislation “in the same spirit on both sides of the Danube.” In other words, Romanian political elites were unwilling to grant to non-Romanians in Dobrogea those political rights which were refused to them in Romania proper. Consequently, on 19 April 1909, the first law on the Dobrogeans’ citizenship, initiated by a Liberal government, granted full political rights: 1) to Ottoman citizens who resided in the province by 11 April 1878, and to their descendants; and 2) to “Romanians from every state, regardless their place of birth, owners of rural properties in Constanta and Tulcea counties,” and their descendants, provided that they renounce their previous citizenship. Together with the former Ottoman subjects in Dobrogea, the law granted full citizenship to all ethnic Romanian rural colonists. Nonetheless, the law excluded from political rights all post-1878 non-ethnic Romanian immigrants in Dobrogea, either in the countryside or urban areas. It also excluded Romanians with only urban properties and those without property.

These stipulations provoked incendiary reactions among Romanian elites in Dobrogea. In a virulent political pamphlet, Vasile Kogălniceanu characterized the 1909 law as “a brutal, anti-liberal and anti-democratic” decision, “which violates already acquired rights, and
deteriorates, instead of improving, the situation of tens of thousands of people.”\textsuperscript{85} The most controversial stipulation of the law was the exclusion of urban Romanians from political rights. Ultimately, a new law on 14 April 1910 removed \textit{rural} properties as a precondition for full citizenship, granting instead political rights to all rural and urban Romanians, “owners of \textit{immobile property} in Constanța or Tulcea counties, and domiciled there at the time of the law promulgation.”\textsuperscript{86} The text of the new law remained, however, highly restrictive, and could not appease public opinion in Dobrogea. Following a preliminary meeting of Dobrogean leaders in Hîrșova, a provincial delegation led by Constantin Sarry met King Carol I on 14 September 1911, and lobbied for a more inclusive citizenship law. As a result, on 3 March 1912, a Conservative government led by Petre P. Carp issued yet another citizenship law for Dobrogea.\textsuperscript{87} Compared to the previous ones, the new law was more inclusive, conferring political rights: 1) on former Ottoman subjects, legally residents in Dobrogea by the date of 11 April 1877; and on Turks and Tartars who had emigrated from Dobrogea after the 1877-78 War, but returned at least two years before the time of the law promulgation; 2) on all categories of Romanian population, namely: \textit{autochthonous} Romanians; Romanian colonists who owned \textit{rural or urban property} in the province; and Romanians \textit{without property} who had settled there by the time of the law promulgation; and, 3) on foreign colonists who acquired \textit{rural property} in Dobrogea. In a dissimilationist spirit, the law still excluded from political rights non-ethnic Romanians domiciled in urban areas, namely the numerous Jewish, Armenian and Greek merchants who “infiltrated” Dobrogea after 1878. Citizenship legislation in Dobrogea was thus conceived of as the last important step in “the work of national importance” conducted by Romanian authorities in the province. According to Ioan Georgescu, the citizenship commissions “favored in every possible way the Romanian element,” especially Transylvanian Romanians.\textsuperscript{88}

After 35 years of being “second class” citizens, the Dobrogeans were granted rights of participation in the Romanian political life. Given the restrictive electoral system of Romania, the effects of the law on the political emancipation of the Dobrogeans were, nevertheless, quite limited. According to the first electoral statistics, in 1912 there were 12,872 “active citizens” in Dobrogea out of a total population of 368,189.\textsuperscript{89} As compared to the other provinces that composed Romania at the time, Dobrogea remained largely underrepresented in the Romanian political life: the Dobrogeans elected only 4 parliamentary representatives in Constanța county, and 4 in Tulcea county, thus a total of 8 deputies for the entire region of Dobrogea. In comparison, Moldavia elected 79 deputies, while the Wallachian provinces of Muntenia Mare and Oltenia elected 75 and,
respectively, 29 deputies. No wonder, therefore, that the province of Dobrogea remained marginalized in the political life of Romania. The Dobrogeans gained a voice in the Romanian parliament; but their representatives were compelled to look for political alliances in order to foster solutions in accordance with their specific interests.

5. Conclusions

This paper proposes a comprehensive analysis of the process of ethnic assimilation and national integration of Northern Dobrogea into Romania, during the 1878-1913 period. It argues that the post-1878 administrative organization of Dobrogea exhibited an underlying contradiction between economic interests and the national political agenda of the Romanian political elites. On the one hand, at a time of an intense European colonial and economic expansion, Romanian political elites regarded possession over the Danube Delta and the Dobrogean shore of the Black Sea as essential for the country’s economical development and geopolitical role in the Balkans. On the other hand, the ethnic and religious diversity of Dobrogea challenged the prevailing ethnic and religious policies. In solving this contradiction, Romanian politicians instituted in Dobrogea a separate administrative organization under which Dobrogeans were granted only a local type of citizenship. In doing so, Dobrogea introduced several innovations in Romania’s citizenship legislation, among which the most important were the institution of colonization, and the emphasis on educational policies in fostering cultural assimilation. The result was the building of a threefold mechanism, composed of ethnic colonization, cultural homogenization, and economic modernization that functioned in the province in the period 1878-1913. This mechanism was based on an uneven allocation of resources and decision-making capabilities between center and periphery within a nation-state. In analyzing this, the paper exposes some “internal colonial” practices employed by Romanian political elites in the process of the national integration of Northern Dobrogea, which cannot be contained solely within the core-periphery model, such as: excessive centralization, administrative distinctiveness, local citizenship status, ethnic colonization, and massive transfer of property.

The annexation of Dobrogea had a great impact on the more general process of nation- and state-building in Romania. The province was annexed to Romania at a particularly formative political period, when the country experienced a new stage in the institutionalization of an independent nation-state, marked by the achievement of state sovereignty following its participation to the 1877-1878 Russian-Ottoman War, the proclamation of the Kingdom in 1881, and the subsequent process of insti-
tutional reorganization. This process was accompanied by a great political turmoil, marked by territorial losses (Southern Bessarabia), the socio-political upheaval stirred by mass conscription and the country’s military participation to the 1877-1878 war, and, eventually, by the European diplomatic intervention in favor of the political emancipation of Jews in Romania. This peculiar timing of the annexation of Dobrogea had important consequences for shaping the patterns of the integration of the province into Romania. Dobrogea was the first major test of Romania’s national institutions and power of assimilation, which explains the importance assigned by Romanian political elites to administrative centralization and cultural homogenization in the province. Finally, the end of the separate administrative regime in Northern Dobrogea in 1913 was an indication that the assimilation of the province produced satisfactory results: in only 35 years (1878-1913), Dobrogea was nationalized by a growing Romanian ethnic majority. In addition, massive economic investments developed the province into “the most shining diamond on King Carol’s crown,” and an indispensable component of the Romanian national economy. Consequently, Dobrogea’s integration was celebrated by Romanian political elites as a success, a self-congratulatory evidence of Romania’s civilizing power.

The assimilation of Northern Dobrogea acquired therefore a specific significance in the Romanian national ideology. “The wonderful work of civilization” accomplished in the province was seen as a confirmation of the tenet that Romania had become part of the West, having a civilizing
role in the Orient. In addition, the province served concomitantly as a new economic, territorial, ethnic, and maritime frontier for Romania. The ethnic colonization, cultural homogenization, and market nationalization in the province can be thus regarded as forming part of a more general process of internal and external colonial expansion in Europe. It confirms, as Katherine Verdery pointed out, that ethnicity and ethnic borders are the creations and not the driving causes of nation-building.93

NOTES


2 For the most authoritative analysis of the process of administrative unification and cultural homogenization in Greater Romania, with an emphasis on education, see Irina Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building & Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).


6 I am using the concept of “internal colonialism” as stems from Michel Hechter’s work *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966* (London: Routledge, 1975): an unilateral pattern of authority and allocation of resources between metropolis and periphery which characterized not exclusively the organization of European colonies in Latin America, Africa or Asia, but developments within European states as well.
In analyzing the patterns of Dobrogea’s integration into Romania, the paper benefited from Peter Sahlins’ analysis of the making of French-Spanish border in the Pyrenees. Sahlins put forward several findings for the historical analysis of multiple borderlands, highlighting the analytical usefulness of the concept of multiple identities, pointing out the “oppositional model” of constructing identity in border regions, seen as “privileged sites for the articulation of national distinctions,” and reconceptualizing the relationship between center and periphery, as a mutually dependent relationship. See Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley: California University Press, 1993), p. 7, 8.


Statistica din România (Bucharest, 1879), p. 3. Given the Romanian-Bulgarian territorial conflict over Dobrogea, statistics on the population of the province should be regarded with caution. Generally, they tell more about nationalist aims than about the reality on the field. To this, for the period following the end of the 1877-1878 war, one should add the lack of a general census of population in Dobrogea and the intensive emigration movements from the province. As a result, even official statistics provided conflicting data. Compare, for example, the above mentioned data with those provided by Leonida Colescu (see endnote 15).

In this respect, Dobrogea exhibits remarkable similarities with Cerdanya, the borderland between Spain and France. See Sahlins, Boundaries.

For a comprehensive treatment of the Ottoman legacy in the Balkans, see Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, pp. 161-183.


Leonida Colescu, Analiza recensământul general al populatiei României dela 1899 (The analysis of the 1899 general census of the Romanian population) (Bucharest: Institutul Central de Statistică, 1944), p. 9.


See the editorial article from *Steaua României* (June 23, 1878), a sample of the virulent pamphlets against the annexation of Dobrogea. Regarding the arguments employed against Dobrogea, see Nicolae Locusteanu’s passionate anti-annexation brochure, *Dobrogea* (Bucharest, 1878).


For an elaboration on this point, see Iordachi, “The Unyielding Boundaries of Citizenship.”

“Constitutia din 1866” in Ion Muraru and Gheorghe Iancu, eds., *Constituțiile Române* (Romanian Constitutions) (Bucharest: Monitorul Oficial, 1995), p. 34.


For an attempt to study the link between the historical vision of Kogălniceanu and his activity as a foreign minister, see Barbara Jelavich, “Mihail Kogălniceanu: Historian as Foreign Minister, 1876-8,” in Dennis Deletant and Harry Hanak, eds., *Historians as Nation-Builders: Central and South-East Europe* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), pp. 87-105; see also Catherine Durandin, “La Russie, La Roumanie et les Nouvelles Frontières dans les Balkans. Les Cas de la Dobroudja,” in *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique* XX (January-March 1979), pp. 61-77.


This process of myth-making was initiated by Mihail Kogălniceanu, whose nationalist discourse on the province was based on the historical argument of Wallachia’s temporary possession of Dobrogea, at the beginning of the fifteenth century, and on the substantial native Romanian element in the province. Later, this thesis was put forward by Romanian historiography and has become an important component of Romanian national ideology, dominating all subsequent Romanian historical works about Dobrogea. See Mihail Kogălniceanu, *Opere*, vol. 5, part I (1878-80), p. 639.

The metaphor was coined by the agronomy engineer Ion Ionescu de la Brad. See Victor Slăvescu, *Corespondența dintre Ion Ionescu de la Brad și Ion Ghica, 1848-1874* (Correspondence between Ion Ionescu de la Brad and Ion Ghica, 1848-1874) (Bucharest: Imprimeria Națională, 1943), p. 127.

During the Russian-Turkish War, Dobrogea was occupied by the Russian troops. This occupation lasted from April 1877 until November 1878.


On 11 April 1877 Romania declared war on Turkey.


*Mülk* denoted private property over lands in villages and cities; 2) *Miriè* – the most common form of property in Dobrogea – designated state property outside localities, in concession to individuals in exchange for an annual tithe (the right of land usage was attested by an official document called *tapu*); 3) *Vakf* was the property of religious institutions; 4) *Metrukè* was the public property over squares, roads, and communal places; and finally, 5) *Mevat*, was the unused land, represented in Dobrogea mainly by the Danube Delta.


M. D. Ionescu, *Dobrogea în pragul*, p. 929.


Toma Ionescu, “Asupra proprietãþii si colonizãrii in Dobrogea” (On property and colonization in Dobrogea), in *Dobrogea. Cincizeci de ani*, p. 274.


Toma Ionescu, “Asupra proprietãþii si colonizãrii in Dobrogea,“ pp. 266-267.


M. D. Ionescu, *Dobrogea în pragul*; for 1912, see Sabin Manuilă, “La population du Dobroudja” in *La Dobroudja Roumaine* (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1938), p. 456. Apart from natural growth, this spectacular increase of the population was due to immigration: in only 15 years (1884-1899), the popu-
lation of Dobrogea grew by 49%, while Romania as a whole reached a similar demographic rate (54%) in forty years (1859-1899). See Leonida Colescu, Recensământul general al populațiunii României, apud Ioan N. Roman, Dobrogea și drepturile politice ale locuitorilor ei (Dobrogea and the Political Rights of its Inhabitants) (Constanța: Ovidiu, 1905), p. 123.

The 1913 census indicated 17 ethnic groups, among them Romanians (216,425 or 56.9% of the total population), Bulgarians (51,149 or 13.4%), Turks and Târtars (41,442 or 10.8%), Russians (35,849 or 9.4%), Greeks (10,000 or 2.6%), Germans (7,697 or 2%), Jews, (4,573 or 1.2%), Gypsies (3,263 or 0.9%), Armenians (3,194 or 0.8%), and Italians (1,928 or 0.5%). See Ioan N. Roman “La population de la Dobrogea” in La Dobrogea Roumaine: études et documents (Bucharest, 1919), p. 92.

Percentages derived from the figures provided for 1940 by Sandru, Mocanii in Dobrogea, p. 108.


See Statistica știuțorilor de carte din România, după recensământul din 19 decembrie 1912 (The statistics of the literate people in Romania, according to the census of 19 December 1912) (Bucharest: Albert Baer, 1915), p. XVIII.


See Ioan Georgescu, “Învățămîntul public în Dobrogea,” in Dobrogea, cincizeci de ani de viață, p. 661.


Ioan Georgescu, “Învățămîntul public în Dobrogea” in Dobrogea, cincizeci de ani de viață, p. 661.


See Statistica știuțorilor de carte din România, după recensământul din 19 decembrie 1912 (The statistics of the literate people in Romania, according to the census of 19 December 1912) (Bucharest: Albert Baer, 1915), p. XVIII.

See Ioan Georgescu, “Învățămîntul public în Dobrogea,” in Dobrogea, cincizeci de ani de viață, p. 661.

81 Iorga, România, cum era pînã la 1918, p. 330.
83 Adunare Deputaþilor: Dezbaterile, 1908-1909, pp. 105-106. Ion I. C. Brãtianu (1864-1927) was the son of Ion C. Brãtianu (1821-1891).
86 Hamangiu, Codul General al României, vol. 6 (1909-1910), p. 357. Compared to the previous law, the only modification was in fact the removal of the word “rural” from Article 3, Point B (see above).
89 Statistica știitorilor de carte din România, p. LV; for the population of Dobrogea, see Ioan N. Roman “La population de la Dobrogea,” p. 92.
90 Statistica știitorilor de carte din România, p. LV.
91 Constantin N. Sarry, Regele Carol I, Dobrogea si Dobrogenii (King Carol I, Dobrogea and the Dobrogeans) (Constanta: Biblioteca Dobrogei June, 1915), p. 7.
92 As one of the prefects in Dobrogea expressed it: “What has been achieved in this time is a remarkable work of civilization, which other peoples could not fulfill – in their colonies – in a period even four times longer than this. It is neither presumption, nor egoism to appreciate that we have made, out of a mixture of races, a people. The ethnic conglomerate that we had found upon our settlement here has been melted down by the heat of our patriotic ideal.” See Luca Ionescu, Judeþul Tulcea: Dare de seamã prezentatã consiliul judeþean (Tulcea County: Report presented to the county council) (Bucharest: Aurora, 1904), p. 4.

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Contrasting/Conflicting Identities: Bessarabians, Romanians, Moldovans

CRISTINA PETRESCU

Moldova has been an interesting footnote to Sovietology, not only as a study of minorities under the Soviet regime, but also because of its latent potential, unique among the Soviet Republics, to become the subject of another socialist country’s irredentism, i.e., Romania. During the Cold War, Soviet or pro-Soviet authors argued for the existence of a separate Moldovan language, and, implicitly, of a distinctive Moldovan nation. At the same time, many Western authors, including Romanian refugees, supported the identity of the Moldovan and Romanian languages, underlining that the policy of mankurtization undertaken by Moscow attempted to artificially create Moldovanness. Surprisingly for the proponents of the latter viewpoint, after the fall of communism, the Romanian-speaking population of the former Soviet Moldova opted for an independent republic, expressing in this way its will to be a nation apart, neither provincie nor guberniia, as a leading politician of that time put it. According to the results of a survey made in 1992, when asked to choose between Romanian and Moldovan, 87% of the interviewed indicated the latter as their identity. In short, it seems that the Moldovan nation is more than a Soviet fiction today.

Obviously, this situation can be explained by taking into account the crucial role played by the Soviet propaganda in forging a distinct Moldovan identity. However, in relation to the self-identification of the Romanian-speaking population between the rivers Prut and Dnestr, the problems regarding the short period when the current Republic of Moldova was a province in Greater Romania, when the Bucharest political elite had its chance to convince its new subjects, reunited with the “mother-country” after more than a century under the Russian rule, that they are part of the Romanian nation, are much less examined. This paper discusses the incorporation of Bessarabia, as this region was known in the Russian Empire and then in Greater Romania, not only from the perspective of the Bucharest-based politicians, but also from that of its inhabitants. In other words, it focuses on the underlying conditions that made the Romanian-speaking peasants of Bessarabia consider themselves Moldovans, in spite of the homogenizing cultural efforts carried out by the central authorities. In an attempt to give
a voice to those from below, I analyze the combination between the profound transformations in administrative organization and educational policy undertaken by the Romanian modernizing state, and the complete stagnation in the economy and in the everyday life of the peasant population, which, in my view, prevented the national integration of the Bessarabians.

The stories told by a group of Bessarabians coming from several villages of Bălți county, who, it should be noted, chose to come to Romania instead of living under the Soviet regime, seems to suggest that their native region was the only province acquired after World War I where the Romanian central authorities did not succeed in integrating their own co-ethnics, among whom some even felt nostalgia for the Tsarist period. Although citizens of Greater Romania, a large majority of Bessarabians did not even begin to consider themselves part of the Romanian nation, going beyond their allegiance to regional and local ties. In short, as these oral history interviews reveal, during the interwar period, the Romanian homogenizing state failed in its attempt to transform the peasants of Bessarabia into Romanians.

*The Shortest History Away from the Historical Motherland, but the Longest (Re)unification Process*

Any attempt aiming at understanding the peculiarities of the nation-building process in Bessarabia must begin by considering the historical background and the intricate circumstances in which the 1918 union was accomplished. From all the provinces of Greater Romania, Bessarabia had the shortest history as a region apart, since it was created only in 1812, following the Turkish-Russian war that ended with the Peace Treaty of Bucharest. The treaty stipulated the annexation of the eastern part of historical Moldova, lying between the rivers Prut and Dnestr, by the Russian Empire. Until then, as it is known from the *Descrip{\v tio Moldaviae* of Dimitrie Cantemir, the traditional regional partition of Moldova was between the northern (*Țara de Sus*) and the southern parts (*Țara de Jos*). In other words, the west-east division of Moldova did not have historical roots older than the moment when, according to a diplomatic agreement, its eastern part, since then known as Bessarabia, exited the Turkish “sphere of influence” to enter into the Russian one. Bessarabia remained part of the Russian Empire until its collapse, while the rest of Moldova joined neighboring Wallachia in 1859, creating the modern Romanian state through a *Risorgimento* type of national movement. In this time span, Bessarabia missed not only the reforms aimed at transforming the two united principalities into a modern state, but also the parallel process.
that resulted in the making of a high national culture and a Romanian language capable of expressing it.\textsuperscript{16}

It is also important to note that, unlike in the case of the other regions united with Romania in 1918, in Bessarabia, the Romanian-speaking elite eager to advocate national ideas represented just a tiny minority. The role of Russification, however, must not be overrated. Indeed, the Russian language was gradually imposed in administration, then in church service, while Romanian was taken out of the schools. Nevertheless, when discussing the results of this process, one must take into account that it affected very differently the aristocracy, largely Russified, and the peasantry, which remained more or less untouched. In 1901, speaking to the French ambassador in Bucharest, Take Ionescu – a member of the progressive wing of the Conservative Party at the time, and, later on (in 1908), a founding father of the breakaway Conservative Democratic Party – underlined the social differentiation regarding the national problem. He acknowledged that the Romanian landlords were Russified through a policy of cooptation, the government allowing them to maintain leading positions in the administration of the province, whereas the peasantry was indifferent to the national problem: there were no schools for de-nationalization, and, although the church service was held in Russian, this was actually of little significance.\textsuperscript{17}

Indeed, since no university existed in Bessarabia, the local aristocracy of Romanian background completed its higher education in Russian university centers. It is true that there were some Bessarabians who left the province and settled in the Old Kingdom, becoming important cultural figures, such as Bogdan Petriceicu Hasdeu and Constantin Stere, but no important ties were established between Bucharest or Iasi and Chi\u017binau.\textsuperscript{18} However, ironically it was the influence of Russian liberalism that contributed, at the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, to the emergence of a pro-Romanian young elite.\textsuperscript{19} After the 1905 Revolution, three main political currents emerged in Bessarabia: the radical nationalists, who supported the full autonomy of the province, the moderate nationalists, who wanted to initiate a national movement while preserving the status of the province within the Empire, and the pro-Russian loyalists. Although, in the beginning, the first two were more active and influential, after the conservative turn of 1907, the third one succeeded to surpass them. However, after the February Revolution of 1917, the radical nationalists organized themselves politically, founding the Moldovan National Party,\textsuperscript{20} which formulated a program that seems to be inspired by the aims of the Provisional Government: universal suffrage, freedom of speech, assembly and religion, introduction of Moldovan language in education, and the preservation of the autocephalous status of the Orthodox Church in Bessarabia.
These reforms were to be implemented in a federal framework. Only after the October Revolution did full independence become the explicit goal of the party. Later on, due to the turmoil that followed the Bolshevik coup, the party finally opted for a union with Romania.21

Among the provinces that joined Romania in the aftermath of the First World War, Bessarabia underwent the longest process of (re)unification. First, the newly-established parliament, Sfatul Țării (National Council), declared Bessarabia an autonomous republic within Russia on 2 December 1917. Since the outcome of the October Revolution, as well as that of the war, was still unclear, the best scenario regarding the future of the newly-proclaimed republic – as it was foreseen by the local leaders, who had more ties with Moscow than with Romania – was to acquire a status similar to that of Finland in the Russian empire.22 But, facing the general chaos in the republic, the Sfatul Țării asked the Romanian government to send troops to secure the railroad lines against Bolshevik attacks and restore the order. On 13 January 1918, Romanian troops entered Bessarabia and in several days succeeded in pushing the Bolsheviks beyond the Dnestr. Immediately after, on 24 January 1918, the Sfatul Țării declared the complete independence of the Republic.

The next step, namely the conclusion of a conditional union with Romania, voted by the Sfatul Țării on 27 March 1918, is particularly controversial, because it was accomplished at a time when Romanian troops were already in Bessarabia.23 As Sorin Alexandrescu suggests,24 taking into account the situation at that time, the chaos in Russia and the undecided balance in the war, it is reasonable to suppose that the presence of Romanian troops in Bessarabia created a situation in which the majority in the Sfatul Țării decided to rally the faction that was advocating the union with Romania as a solution for overcoming of the triple threat of Bolshevism, Ukrainian expansionism and general anarchy.25 On the other hand, it can be said that the Romanian elites saw Bessarabia as a potential hinterland of their own statehood in a post-war Europe dominated by the Central Powers. In the conditional union with Romania, 14 special privileges were stipulated, including control over the local budget and administration exercised by a freely-elected regional assembly. However, following the victory of the Entente in the war, the pro-Romanian group in Sfatul Țării urged for an unconditional and immediate union with Romania, which was voted on 27 November 1918,26 so that Bessarabia, together with Transylvania, Bukovina, and the Banat, became part of Greater Romania. The union being accomplished, the Moldovan National Party, unlike the National Party in Transylvania, dissolved itself, and its leaders entered Old Kingdom-style Romanian politics by joining the Bucharest-based parties, mainly the National Liberal Party and the newly-established Peasant Party. Once the political elite opted
for individual paths of social insertion in the new capital, the integration of the Bessarabians into Greater Romania remained essentially a case of transformation of a rural population into a modern nation.

**Moldovan Peasants into Romanians**

It is well known that, politically and institutionally, Greater Romania was forged by centralizing decisions in Bucharest, unifying the administration, introducing a unique legislation and a state-sponsored educational system in accordance with the model that functioned in the Old Kingdom. However, beyond structural transformations, it was the challenging task of creating the nation, of transforming the peasants into a community of citizens, which had to be fulfilled by the central authorities.\(^{27}\) As it is shown below, the integration of the Romanian-speaking population of Bessarabia raised problems far more difficult than those encountered in other regions. The members of this overwhelmingly rural, mostly illiterate and quasi-immobile peasant population, who had no sense of national identification with the Romanians, but had idealized memories from the Tsarist period, found themselves overnight citizens of Romania. It was the transition from the Tsarist-type of local government to the Romanian-type of centralized modern state with a corrupt administration that alienated the Bessarabians, many of whom felt, as the interviewed persons bear witness, that they were rather occupied by their alleged brothers than united with them.

As the already mentioned opinion of Take Ionescu suggests, the Bucharest elite was aware of the fact that the rural Romanian-speaking population of Bessarabia, still untouched by national propaganda, was indifferent to its Romanianness. Unlike in Transylvania, where the process of national awakening was actually initiated, or in Bukovina, where even the peasants were exposed to the influence of the Romanian literature and, thus, began to change their self-appellative from Moldovans into Romanians, in Bessarabia, the Romanian-speaking population continued to consider itself as Moldovan. In 1917-1918, the Transylvanian and the Banat refugees, who went there thinking that they will contribute to the national awakening, quickly realized that their task was not the resurrection of a long dormant national conscience – as they might have imagined considering that Bessarabia was still part of Moldova at a time when the Romanians in Transylvania had already a developed national conscience\(^{28}\) –, but to construct one from the scratch. Even the Romanian-speaking teachers had no knowledge of Romanian culture or history, nor any memory of a common past with the people across the river Prut.\(^{29}\) For them, historical knowledge was limited to that of Moldova, and the identity of the language was not enough to reveal the common origins with the Romanians.\(^{30}\) Not only that they con-
considered themselves Moldovans, but if one took into consideration any kinship with another people, these were the Russians and not the Romanians.\textsuperscript{31}

Comparing this situation with the problems they were facing at home, related to the policy of Magyarization, many Transylvanians put the blame on the Tsarist regime and its Russification policy.\textsuperscript{32} However, as already pointed out, this affected the elite but not the illiterate peasant population. The appellative “Romanian,” which entered into public use in the United Principalities in the second half of the 19th century, meant nothing to the Romanian-speaking population east of the Prut, whose members, subjects of the Tsar, continued to define themselves as Moldovans. This was the way they used to think about themselves “since the beginning of the world,” as they put it, meaning actually as early as their family memories reached. Thus, the problem of Bessarabian indifference to the national cause, which embittered many Romanians from other provinces, must be understood not as a result of Russification, but as sign of rural isolation. Moreover, in 1918, their self-identification as Moldovans had nothing to do with the Russian attempts to forge a separate Moldovan nation; this strategy was employed only by the Soviets in the interwar period,\textsuperscript{33} with the establishment, on 12 October 1924, of the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic between the rivers Dnestr and Bug, on Ukrainian territory, in the region later known as Transnistria.

It was the rural isolation that made the task of awakening the national conscience among the Bessarabians so problematic. In 1918, Bessarabia was the least urbanized region of Greater Romania, and it remained so up to World War II. According to the 1930 census, the only one made in the interwar period, 87\% of the population still lived in rural areas, whereas the cities continued to be dominated by Jews and Russians. Taking into account the data available from the last Russian census of 1897, and those from the 1930 Romanian census, it can be seen that the Romanians, in spite of the fact that their proportion in urban areas rose in this period from 14.2\% to 30.6\%\textsuperscript{34} still represented a minority in Bessarabian cities.\textsuperscript{35} This can be explained by the fact that there was neither a significant migration of Romanians from other regions to Bessarabia, with the exception of administrative personnel and a relatively small number of newly-trained teachers, nor a notable migration of the locals from villages to cities. This is not surprising, considering that nothing could attract the peasants to cities. The Romanian economy was primarily agrarian in all the historical provinces, but in the Old Kingdom and in Transylvania there was also a representative industrial sector.\textsuperscript{36} In the case of Bessarabia, one cannot even claim that an industrialization process began; the data, provided in a eulogy of the Romanian administration in the region, certify the existence
of only 10 industrial and 11 commercial societies in 1937. In the absence of industry, urban development was insignificant and the rural character of the region was maintained throughout the entire interwar period.

Aware of the problems posed by the integration of the new subjects from Bessarabia, the Liberal governments that dominated political life until 1928, and especially their Minister of Education, Constantin Angelescu, concentrated on implementing a schooling system similar to the one already functioning in the Old Kingdom, counting on teachers as “apostles” of Romanianness. This represented a major change in village life as compared with the educational system that functioned in Bessarabia under the Tsarist regime. Before 1918, according to the zemstvo system, not the state but the local administrative council took care of education in every local community. As a result, the council of elders in each village annually hired a teacher, who was usually a more learned peasant. By rotation, each family with children had to assure accommodation, board and a modest payment for the teacher, an arrangement similar to that used for employing a cattleman. In fact, the teacher was seen as a less useful person than the cattleman, because the latter was indispensable, whereas the former was often regarded as an unjustified expenditure. All that a teacher had to do was to teach the children to read, write and count; that was anyway more than they needed in their traditional way of life, in which no written contracts were used, and only small amounts of money were handled by peasants, since every household produced the basic needs and everything beyond this level was considered a luxury. Actually, there were villages that did not even hire teachers, because peasants could not see any immediate benefits of literacy in the household economy. On the contrary, they preferred to keep children on the farm, to help with the agricultural work, most peasants considering their own descendants just a useful workforce in the household.

As shown above, due to this system of education (or rather to its non-existence), the Bessarabian peasants remained untouched by Russification, a process that, at first glance, seemed, especially to teachers who came from other regions, to be an advantage in the process of nation-building through cultural propaganda and education. In the beginning, there was some enthusiasm for the program launched by Constantin Angelescu to build as many primary schools as possible, using local resources as much as possible. School committees were established in every commune, including the local notables: the mayor, the priest, the most respected peasants and the newly-appointed teachers. The state provided only a small amount of money and some building materials, but the rest was supplied by local efforts: every villager contributed something, the wealthiest donated land and money, those less wealthy provided their labor.
In this way, the number of primary schools dramatically increased in a decade, but this effort had a rather limited effect among the Bessarabian peasants. The rate of illiteracy decreased as compared with the Tsarist period, but, according to the 1930 census, from all the historical regions of Greater Romania, Bessarabia still had the lowest percentage of literate population: 38.1%, while the country average was 57%, the same as that of Spain or Greece. In spite of the intense propaganda for education, the peasants remained unenthusiastic about schools, just as they were under the Tsarist regime. Most of the peasants still thought that they would not be able to finish all the necessary agricultural work on time without the help of their children. In the case of families with little land, parents preferred to send their children to work for others to supplement the household income. Even those children whose parents were less narrow-minded were able to attend school only after the harvest, so that their accumulation of knowledge was rather inconsistent and unsystematic. The fear of losing a precious work force by sending the children to school was even higher than before, since those who were diligent had more opportunities to become clerks or teachers, leaving the native village and their parents. In short, most of the Bessarabian peasants did not understand the importance of education and, with few exceptions, did not encourage their children to attend classes.

The problem was not only that the peasants were unable to understand the benefits of schooling, but also that, as the National Peasantists’ criticism underlined, the Liberals’ educational program developed unilaterally. Besides its chaotic management, which did not support the construction of new schools with adequate funding and qualified teachers, the Liberal plan for education was conceived without taking into account the general rural poverty. Therefore, in the end, it proved to be less effective than expected. As Dimitrie Gusti, Minister of Education in several National Peasant Party governments and the leading sociologist of interwar Romania, put it, education could not be only limited to the spread of literacy. According to him, the cultural process in rural areas had to be civilizing, not purely intellectual; peasants needed to learn to read and to write just as much as they needed to understand the main sanitary requirements for a healthy life, or some of the basic rules of the market economy in order to increase their earnings.

In this respect, besides encouraging the construction of new schools in order to have the necessary infrastructure for implementing the standard educational system, interwar Romanian governments did little to improve the way of life of the Bessarabian peasants. As shown above, the region remained overwhelmingly agricultural, so that people continued to live the life they have been living for centuries. For most of these people, the world was not larger than the neighboring villages. The very poor road system also
contributed to their isolation. Under the Tsarist regime, it was up to the local council to take care of the road network, and not much was done in this respect; paved roads remained a rarity before the union with Romania. However, little was done even by the Romanian administration, which built roads to connect Chișinău and other large cities with Bucharest, but did nothing for the villages. By 1940, a large majority of Bessarabian roads were still unpaved, so that, with the coming of the rainy season, they became impassable, condemning entire villages to isolation for months. Therefore, people felt that they were paying taxes not for the benefit of their province, but, as they put it, “for the modernization of the Bucharest-Sinaia road, used by the king and the political elite to go on vacation.”

On the whole, the peasants’ way of life did not improve much during the interwar period. They continued to cultivate cereals, without taking into consideration the loss of the Russian market. The soil of Bessarabia is very good for growing cereals, so that, traditionally, this is what most peasants produced primarily. This meant that nearly all had wheat to make bread and oat to feed the horses, but could not earn a significant amount of money by selling what they harvested from their land because, with only one product offered by all, the price of cereals was very low. However, most of the peasants were reluctant to try other crops to assure themselves a higher income, as they were reluctant to change their habits, from the religious calendar to the use of the Cyrillic alphabet. Moreover, the additional income made by mills or raising poultry, cattle, or sheep, was the lowest of all the regions in Greater Romania. In terms of consumption, almost the entire family income was spent on food and clothing. A very small amount of money went to the church, while there was no spending on books, newspapers, or other things needed for school, such as copybooks, ink, etc., except for the families with more than 3 hectares of land. This illustrates once again the discrepancy between the educational program of the Liberals and the basic material conditions needed to make it functional. With poverty and illiteracy reinforcing each other, the effort to spread education in the hope of making the peasant population of Bessarabia “understand” its Romanian-ness had very limited results. It helped creating a tiny local elite of rural background, but did not succeed in making the peasants of Bessarabia feel that they were Romanian citizens. Cultural homogenization was inefficient without economic development.

The “Good Old” Russian Times

Although Bessarabia remained the poorest and the least modernized province of Greater Romania until 1940, it was not this relative backwardness that made its peasant population perceive the Romanian administration
as an occupying force, but the social and the fiscal transformations that occurred under the new authorities, who demanded more than the Tsarist regime from their new subjects, without offering more. However low the taxes paid by them were as compared to those from other regions, the Bessarabians had the impression that these were nevertheless higher than those paid under the previous regime, without having clear benefits for their communities. Since their life-style did not improve with the coming of the Romanians, they considered that Bucharest did nothing for them. As compared to the other provinces, even land reform, in their view, was due to local initiatives rather than to the central government. It is true that the Romanian Parliament ratified, on 22 December 1918, the decree-law on land reform for Bessarabia proposed by the Sfatul Țării, but, in this region, the turmoils of the Revolution in 1917 had already given the peasants the opportunity to seize land from the landowners by themselves. It is due to this time sequence that, in their memory, the crucial action in the redistribution of land was theirs and not that of the Romanian government, so they never felt grateful to Bucharest for this reform.

When blaming the Romanian administration for its carelessness towards the local problems, the Bessarabian peasants had only one term of comparison: the previous Tsarist regime. Therefore, the key element in analyzing their resentment towards the Romanian central government is the crucial difference between the Russian and the Romanian state structure. With the administrative unification within Greater Romania, the Bessarabians found themselves overnight in a modern state, where a direct relationship between the most humble citizen and the central authority was established. Until December 1918, the zemstvo system of local administration functioned in this province. Through this system, created by the reformist Tsar Alexander II in 1864, and introduced in Bessarabia in 1869, every city or province was granted the right to administer the issues that were too small to be handled by the central government directly, such as public services, the maintenance of roads, the public education, the medical services, etc. These problems were handled by a local administrative council, which was elected by the inhabitants themselves, and included landlords, who held an ex officio majority over the other categories of the Tsar’s subjects, elected representatives of the urban and rural communities.

Due to this tradition of local government, the Bessarabian peasants thought that the most trusted members of their own community should take care of all the administrative problems and mediate between them and the central power represented by the Tsar. Although it cannot be said that the peasant representatives had a real influence on the zemstvo affairs, their simple presence at meetings was enough to make the peasants who elected them think that nothing was decided against their inter-
ests. Obviously, my point is not to underline the alleged superiority or efficiency of the system introduced by Alexander II in his attempt to reorganize the Tsarist regime according to Western European ideas, but the radical difference between this Russian-type of administration and the Romanian-type of modern centralized system, in which the relationship between every citizen and the state was unmediated by local institutions.

How these structural changes, occurred after the incorporation into Greater Romania, were perceived by the Bessarabian peasants? In terms of social relations, the estates, more or less symbolic, but with origins that went back to the fifteenth century, preserved under the Tsarist administration, lost their significance. All the peasants became simple inhabitants of the village, as it was inscribed in their identity papers. Although the memory of these traditional hierarchies prevented a radical and sudden change of the rural social relationships, this transformation brought discontent for those who represented a kind of village nobility. Besides the status leveling, the Romanian centralized administration put an end to the zemstvo-system that, according to the wishes expressed in the conditional union of 27 March 1918, was to be maintained. Although, as shown above, the peasants did not really participate in the process of decision-making in the zemstva, at least they felt that they were represented. In turn, as citizens of Greater Romania, they felt that someone else decided their affairs in Bucharest, without taking their local needs into account.

The Romanian state also replaced the administrative personnel and sent its own representatives to the province. It is well-known that appointments to Bessarabia, the poorest region of the country, were seen rather as a punishment, so that not exactly the best clerks arrived there. Therefore, it is not surprising that these people, who represented the central government, were not held in high esteem in the eyes of the local population. As there was no significant colonization of Bessarabia with people from other provinces, their main interaction with the Romanians was through these state representatives, among whom the most visible were the tax collector, the policeman, the teacher and the priest. Most of the grievances were raised by the tax collector, who was seen as a corrupted clerk, a person who tried to cheat the locals, taking advantage of their illiteracy. There were numerous cases when the peasants were asked to pay the same tax a second or even a third time. The policeman, often a drunkard, was associated to the tax collector and with his attempts at extorting money from the peasants. The attitude towards the priest was different. As seen above, besides clothing, most of the family spending went to the church, which meant the priest. It is also true that, in many cases, the priests were locals, sons of peasants, and, obviously, had a different type of relationship with the villagers than the tax collector or the policeman, who, usually, were from other regions.
Besides the priest, the teacher was the only one who sometimes enjoyed the esteem of the population, or at least of the most “enlightened” part, who understood the benefits of education. However, as shown above, for the rest, who saw him as a threat to the working force of the household, the teacher was just a lazy peasant, who went to school in order to avoid the hardships of agricultural work.

**Conclusions**

Obviously, it is hard to make generalizations from the experience of several villages. However, these memories illuminate the complex combination of factors that hampered the incorporation of the immobile, overwhelmingly rural, and illiterate Bessarabians into the Romanian nation. In spite of the educational efforts to transform the Bessarabians into loyal Romanian citizens, the results were far below expectations. The common language, an ingredient of the national identity that can be acknowledged even by those who did not pass through the process of standardized education, was not enough to make the Bessarabians identify themselves with Romania. Moreover, the Romanian administration did little to improve their everyday life, but, through some representatives, did much to alienate them. Therefore, the isolated and immobile Bessarabians, as some of those interviewed recalled, perceived the Romanians as an occupying force, similar to the Russians. The difference was that they had better memories from the Russian period than from the Romanian one. Without knowing what profound political and social transformations occurred across the Dnestr, in 1940 some greeted with joy the return of what they thought to be the Tsarist regime. Only a part of the local elite – teachers, priests, clerks and wealthy peasants – fled across the river Prut when the Soviet army entered Bessarabia in 1940. In 1944, already knowing that Soviet occupation meant deportation to Siberia, the number of refugees was higher. However, most of the peasants remained “at home,” being preoccupied with grabbing as much as possible from the belongings of those who were leaving without knowing whether they would ever return. The social insertion of the refugees in post-war Romania was a slow and painful process. The new regime suspected them of anti-communism because of their refusal to stay in Soviet-occupied Bessarabia and tried to send them back, while the population considered them Soviet spies and avoided close contacts with them. After all, in their eyes, the refugees were “second class” citizens, not Romanians, but just Bessarabians.

If the Romanian state had more time, it would have possibly completed the transformation of the Bessarabians into Romanians. But in the short period between the two World Wars, in the given conditions illus-
trated above, the homogenizing force of the Romanian state did not suc-
cceed in socializing the Bessarabians as Romanian nationals and convert-
ing their pre-modern regional identity into a modern national one. Thus,
the Soviets' project to construct a Moldovan national identity found favor-
able conditions in Bessarabia. The independent path – chosen in 1991,
when, in the political chaos that followed the August coup in Moscow, the
local Moldovan parliament decided on a rupture with the Soviet Union,
and, then, reaffirmed in the following elections, when popular support was
given to the proponents of the two-state doctrine and not to the pan-Roma-
nianists – demonstrates that the Moldovans prefer to be a nation apart.70
From the Romanian perspective, all agree that the Moldovans are, in fact,
Romans, but the project of reunification has not been considered seri-
ously by the post-communist governments in Bucharest.71 It seems that with
the passing of the generation of Bessarabians that sought refuge in Roma-
nia in 1940 or 1944, the reunification project will be completely forgotten.

NOTES

1  Indeed, since the early 1960s, with the discovery of Marx's writings on the
Romans, which assured an irrefutable scientific justification for the claims
on the Romanianness of the Moldovans, the “maverick” regime in Bucharest
alluded more or less explicitly to the Bessarabian problem. See Karl Marx,
Însemnãri despre români: Manuscrisce inedite (Notes on the Romanians: Unedit-
ed manuscripts) (Bucharest: Editura Academiei RPR, 1964). On the circum-
stances in which Marx's notes on the Romanians were published in Romania,
see Pavel Tugui, Istoria si limba românã în vremea lui Gheorghiu-Dej: Memori-
ile unui fost sef de sectie a CC al PMR (History and Romanian language during
Dej's time: The memoirs of a former chief of section of the Central Commit-
tee of the Romanian Workers Party) (Bucharest: Editura Ion Cristoiu, 1999).
The way Dej and Ceausescu regimes regarded the problem of Bessarabia
could be a very interesting subject of study. It seems that, beginning with the
condemnation of the Cominternist theses related to the multinational charac-
ter of Greater Romania at the forty-fifth anniversary of the Romanian Com-
munist Party in May 1966, and ending with the condemnation of the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact at the Fourteenth Congress of the RCP in November 1989,
Nicolae Ceausescu kept Bessarabia on a hidden agenda. He brought it up
whenever appropriate, and even allowed the publication of a study that assert-
ed that the union of 1918 was the will of the Romanians from both sides of the
river Prut. See Stefan Pascu, “Momente din lupta poporului roman pentru for-
marea statului national unitar” (Episodes from Romanian people’s struggle
for the formation of the unitary nation-state), Magazin Istoric 2 (February
Throughout this paper, I use only the forms Moldova/Moldovan in reference to this political entity, regardless of historical period or state affiliation, considering that these spellings correspond to the vernacular form used as self-identification by the locals. Moldavia is the Latin form, used in diplomatic correspondence and political documents throughout the Middle Ages, as well as in the work of the erudite Prince Dimitrie Cantemir, *Descriptio Moldaviae* in the early 18th century. Moldavia is also the English form, which designates especially the historical principality of Moldova. Finally, the forms Moldavian/Moldavia correspond to the Russian spelling, so many authors used them for the political entities established by the Soviets or for the dialect spoken there. In short, “from a linguistic point of view, the name switch – from Moldavia to Moldova – illustrates a case of vernacular versus transnational designation.” See Andrei Brezianu, *Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Moldova* (Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, 2000), pp. 127-128.

The term *mankurt* was introduced by Chingiz Aitmatov in his novel *The Day Lasts More than a Hundred Years*, first published in 1980, in the journal *Novyi mir*, an allegoric critique of Moscow’s policy of erasing the pre-Soviet cultural layers, depriving the ethnic minorities of their previous identities. “The *mankurt* did not know who he had been, whence and from what tribe he had come, did not know his name, could not remember his childhood, father and mother, ... Deprived of any understanding of his own ego, the *mankurt* was, from his masters’ point of view ... absolutely obedient and safe.” See Chingiz Aitmatov, *The Day Lasts More than a Hundred Years* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 126. The novel was a success, especially among the intelligentsia of the Soviet Socialist Republics. The term *mankurt* was used in the pro-Romanian literature, produced in the late 1980s in the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic, as a metaphor symbolizing the Moldovans who had forgotten their common origins with the Romanians.

This option was surprising, considering that the very process of democratization in this Soviet Republic had begun in 1988-1989 with the debates over the nature of the spoken language – between those who considered Moldovan language one and the same with the Romanian, and those who argued that it was just another Romance language having many commonalties with Romanian – that were interpreted as a sign of national awakening at the time. In understanding the complicated developments in Moldova from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, when very different forces instrumentalized the problem of Romanian-ness of the majority population as a lift to power and a means to secure political positions in the unstable period of late Gorbachevism, the work of Charles King is essential. See his book, *The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2000), especially pp. 120-167.

The survey was made by William Crowther, and the results were included in his presentation at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, entitled “The Politics of Ethnic Confrontation in Moldova.” Cited in King, *The Moldovans*, p. 159.

The form Dnestr (sometimes spelled Dniestr) represents the Slavic name of this river, which is an adaptation of the ancient Latin name Danaster. In the secondary literature one finds this river sometimes under the local vernacular name, Nistru. See Brezianu, *Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Moldova*, p. 144.
It should be noted that the territory of the current Republic of Moldova is slightly different than that of the former province of Greater Romania. The southern parts of the latter were incorporated by Stalin into Ukraine, whereas the Transnistrian parts, roughly equivalent with the territory where, in 1924, the first ever Republic of Moldova, the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was established, were added, in 1940, to the newly occupied zone to form the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1990, the Dniestr Moldovan Republic was created in the Transnistrian territory. This political entity remained unrecognized internationally until today.

Western observers of Romanian and Moldovan history, without neglecting the role of the Soviet propaganda in forging a Moldovan identity for the Romanian-speaking population between the rivers Prut and Dniestr, have started to look further back in history and take into account the inappropriate way the Romanian governments administered this territory during the time when this was a province of Greater Romania. In this respect, see the above-mentioned work of King, The Moldovans, especially chap. 3, pp. 36-62. With respect to the process of nation-building in Bessarabia and its critiques, see Irina Livezeanu Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building & Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 89-127. However, it should be noted that critical voices regarding the harshness of the Romanian administration in Bessarabia were heard already in the 1920s. See Hamilton Fish Armstrong, The New Balkans (London: Harper and Brothers, 1926), pp. 158-160.

The group under scrutiny is composed of teachers, priests, village clerks and simple peasants from Northern Bessarabia, from the following communes: Sofia, Hânsânei, and Alexândreni, all from Bâlți county. They are all survivors of the generation that left Bessarabia in 1940 or 1944 to come to Romania. In judging their criticism of the Romanian administration, it is worth keeping in mind that they were among those who have kept the hope for reunification alive.

This paper discusses the causes that hampered the integration of the Romanian-speaking population of Bessarabia. The status of minorities in Bessarabia is a different issue, which needs a separate discussion.

For the relation between the type of social cohesion in society and collective identity, see Ernest Gellner, Culture, Identity and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

Originally, the name Bessarabia was used for the southern parts of medieval Moldova, near the Danube Delta and the Black Sea, which in the 14th century belonged, for a short time, to the Wallachian dynasty of Basarab. The view, supported by some sources according to which the origins of this name would be the Russian bez Arabov (without Arabs), which alluded to the flight of the Muslim Ottomans from the steppe in southern Moldova, being chased by Tsar Alexander II, was widespread at a popular level, but is historically inaccurate. This erroneous view was diffused even among the Romanian-speaking population. See Paul Goma, Din Calidor: O copilărie basarabeană (From the terrace: A Bessarabian Childhood) (Bucharest: Albatros, 1990), p. 44. In drafting the Bucharest Treaty of 1812, being in need of a specific name for the parts of Moldova to be incorporated into the Russian Empire, the Russians proposed
to use Bessarabia in reference to the whole region between the Prut and Dniestr rivers. This was also a shrewd diplomatic solution, since in the previous Treaty of Tilsit it was stipulated that the Russian troops must evacuate the principalities of Moldova and Wallachia, but nothing was said about Bessarabia. See Nicholas Dima, From Moldavia to Moldova: The Soviet Romanian Territorial Dispute (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1991), pp. 13-14.

13 The regional differences between north and south were underlined by Dimitrie Cantemir, Prince of Moldova (1710-1711), in his Descrierea Moldovei (The Description of Moldavia) (Bucharest: Minerva, 1971). For him, Bessarabia was the southern part of Moldova, near the Danube Delta and the Black Sea, the first Moldovan territory conquered by the Ottomans.

14 For a history of Bessarabia under the Russian administration, see Ion Nistor, Istoria Basarabiei (The History of Bessarabia) (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1991).

15 In the case of Romania, it must be emphasized that the nation-state was created before the nation, or, using Miroslav Hroch’s phases, before entering in phase C of mass support for national ideas. Following Miroslav Hroch, any national movement has three phases: A) the period of scholarly interest without political implications; B) the period of patriotic agitation in which only a small elite advocates national ideas; and C) the period of mass support for national ideas. See Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). It is also important to mention that the elite which advocated national ideas was the governing elite of the United Principalities of Moldova and Wallachia, then of the Kingdom of Romania, and, in the interwar period, of Greater Romania. Or, using the categories defined by Peter Sugar regarding East European nationalism, Romanian nationalism was bureaucratic because the leader of the national movement was the government itself. See Peter Sugar, Nationalism in Eastern Europe (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969).

16 The transformations the Romanian language underwent during the second half of the 19th century involved a change of the alphabet from Cyrillic to Latin and the import of a large part of the vocabulary from other Romance languages, mainly French and Italian. It is this radical change that offered arguments for the proponents of the distinctiveness of the Moldovan language. In their view, the Moldovan language was not identical, but only similar to the other east-Romance language, i.e., the Romanian. See King, The Moldovans, pp. 64-72.


18 Constantin Stere, the main proponent of poporanism, wrote critical articles, published in Viaţa Românească, on the indifference of a major part of intellectuals in the Old Kingdom to the young Bessarabians who came to study in their “mother-country.” Some of those articles have been reprinted in Constantin Stere, Singur împotriva tuturor (Alone against everybody) (Chişinău: Cartier, 1997).
19 It was the 1905 Revolution that gave some impulse to the more radical students, who started to organize themselves and succeeded in convincing a number of aristocrats to finance newspapers that spread national ideas among the poor peasantry. This group, which included people who were to become key political figures, such as Ion Pelivan or Pantelimon Halippa, founded, in 1905, the Society for Moldovan National Culture. Beginning in May 1906, they published the first newspaper in Romanian, Basarabia, which formulated the program for national emancipation, including the autonomy of Bessarabia, the introduction of the Moldovan language in schools and administration, and the land reform. After less than one year, in March 1907, the newspaper was banned. It was followed, for a short period, by a more moderate one, Viata Basarabiei, which eventually met the same fate. Only in 1913 it became possible to found another newspaper, entitled Cuvântul moldovenesc, destined to enlighten the Romanians from Bessarabia. See King, The Moldovans, pp. 28-31.

20 A very interesting subject, but completely overlooked, is the crucial influence played by Romanians from Transylvania in counseling the Bessarabian elite how to initiate the national awakening movement. Above all, Onisifor Ghibu, a school inspector who held a doctoral degree in philosophy and education from the University of Jena, was instrumental in convincing the Bessarabians to establish a political party. It is interesting to note the tremendous difference between the Transylvanians, who had political experience, and the Bessarabians, who hardly understood the importance of having a political party. The following story is telling in this respect. Vasile Stroescu, a wealthy Bessarabian boyar who financed the Romanian-language newspapers, was asked by Ghibu to contribute to the organization of a political party that would militate for the national cause. Stroescu replied that he was ready to give as much as he had, but only for cultural enterprises, because politics, he said, was a dirty activity. Nevertheless, later on, he would become one of the main supporters of the Moldovan National Party. See Onisifor Ghibu, Pe baricadele vieții: În Basarabia revoluționară, 1917-1918 (On the barricades of life: In revolutionary Bessarabia, 1917-1918) (Chisinau: Universitas, 1990), pp. 83-84 and 90-92.

21 For an interesting account of the debates over the future of Bessarabia, that mobilized the intelectual circles of Chisinau during the 1917-1918 period, see Vasile Harea, Basarabia pe drumul unirii: Amintiri și comentarii (Bessarabia on its way to unification: Memories and comments) (Bucharest: Eminescu, 1995).

22 Regarding the political currents within the Sfatul Țării, see King, The Moldovans, pp. 32-35.

23 Actually, it is not very clear whether the Romanian government used the army in order to manipulate the unification. Yet it is known that although by mid-January the Romanian army had pushed the Bolshevik contingents east of the river Dnestr, it remained in Bessarabia, enraging the local population who started to see it as an occupying force. Therefore, the Sfatul Țării had to take some position and to declare that the Romanian troops came as a fraternal army to help restoring order, and not to occupy the new republic. For the behavior of the Romanian troops in Bessarabia, see Ștefan Ciobanu, Unirea Basarabiei (The Union of Bessarabia) (Chisinau: Universitas, 1993), pp. 224-231. See also Catherine Durandin, Histoire des Roumains, pp. 213-221.
For a balanced evaluation of the relations between Bessarabia and Romania in January-March 1918, and of the entire process of Bessarabia’s unification as compared with those of the other provinces, see Sorin Alexandrescu, *Paradoxul Român* (The Romanian Paradox) (Bucharest: Univers, 1998), especially pp. 46-49.

An illustrative example in this respect is that of Ion Inculet, the chairman of the Șfatul Țării, who, on 27 March 1918, announced “with emotion,” as he said, that the union with Romania was voted. Just a couple of months before, Inculet had argued that the path of Bessarabia was alongside Russia, because it was a freer country than Romania. See Stere, *Singur împotrivă tuturor*, pp. 94-95.

It is worth mentioning that the incorporation of Bessarabia into Romania was never protected by an international treaty. The representatives of the Great Powers were disturbed by the fact that a plebiscite was not held in the province. Nevertheless, Take Ionescu, the president of the Council of Romanian National Unity in Paris, succeeded in signing a treaty that recognized the union. However, that treaty was a worthless document as long as the United States and Japan did not ratify it. Moreover, the Soviet Union never recognized the incorporation of Bessarabia into Romania. In fact, during the interwar period, this was a subject of endless diplomatic negotiations between Romania and the Soviet Union. However, by 1940, the two countries could not reach any agreement. The Romanians’ position was that their rights on Bessarabia were historical, and therefore a plebiscite was futile. See Alexandru V. Boldur, *Bessarabia și relațiile româno-ruse: Chestiunea Basarabiei și dreptul internațional* (Bessarabia and the Romanian-Russian relations: The problem of Bessarabia and the international law) (Bucharest: Albatros, 2000).

National integration of the peasant population is a long-term process. As Eugen Weber has shown, the integration of rural France into the modern French nation occurred only a century after the Revolution, during the 1870-1914 period, when remote villages were connected to the outside world and the people’s traditional way of life dramatically changed. Weber identifies several agents of change, i.e., means of opening the isolated rural communities to the values of the “imagined” national community, such as: the establishment of a road network, the migration of the workforce from region to region, the military service, and the schooling system. See Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).


The refugees from Transylvania and the Banat were astonished by the fact that the Romanians from Bessarabia lacked the sentiment of belonging to the same nation with the Romanian-speaking population from across the border. Onisifor Ghibu, who was also instrumental in establishing the Romanian school system in Bessarabia, described with bitterness the Bessarabians’ lack of enthusiasm for learning the Romanian literary language or history. Such an attitude was also specific for the local teachers of Romanian origin. Besides *Pe baricadele vieții*, see also his *Trei ani pe frontul basarabei* (Three years on the Bessarabian front) (Bucharest: Editura Fundației Culturale Române, 1996), and *De la Basarabia*
Contrasting/Conflicting Identities

rusească la Basarabia românească (From the Russian Bessarabia to the Romanian Bessarabia) (Bucharest: Semne, 1997).


32 For the gradual policy of Russification through successive changes in the administrative status of Bessarabia, and gradual introduction of Russian in church and school, see Nistor, Istoria Basarabiei, pp. 178-197 and 226-276. However important these changes were, it seems to me that, since the largest part of the population was rural and illiterate, they remained untouched by the introduction of the Russian language. The policy of modifying the ethnic map of Bessarabia by settling various other groups, such as Germans, Russians, Ukrainians, Cossacks and Jews was more successful, effectively transforming the region from a prevalently Romanian into a multiethnic one. As a result, the percentage of Moldovans decreased constantly. According to the data gathered by the Russians in Bessarabia in 1817, it is estimated that 86% of the population was Moldovan. See Nistor, Istoria Basarabiei, p. 203. A Russian military statistics, published in 1871, indicated that the Moldovans made up 67.4% of the population, while the last Russian census of 1897 showed that, according to the mother tongue, the Moldovans were only 47.58%. See Boldur, Basarabia, pp. 112-113.

33 As Charles King observes, the Russian Slavophile writers did not make any difference between the Bessarabians and their neighbors from across the Prut. Russia’s rights on Bessarabia were based on the historical argument of the Slav primacy on that territory. With the establishment of the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the Soviets initiated a propaganda campaign, which used class arguments, taken from the Comintern theses, in order to support the difference between the Moldovans and the Romanians. The former, who were the descendants of the peasants once under the yoke of Wallachian and Western Moldovan aristocrats, had nothing to do with the latter, who were the descendants of their exploiters. In the post-war period, since Romania also became a socialist country, the Soviet argument had to be changed. The Soviet historians argued that the Moldovans were a separate nation, the product of a normal process of nation-formation that took place in the 19th and 20th centuries, when this region, with the exception of twenty-two years, was separated from Romania. See King, The Moldovans, pp. 26, 59-62 and 106-110.

34 Data from both censuses are provided in Nistor, Istoria Basarabiei, p. 304.

35 In 1930, in the urban areas of the other newly-acquired provinces of Greater Romania, Romanians made up 33% in Bukovina, and 34.7% in Transylvania; by contrast, in the Old Kingdom, Romanians represented 74.3% of the urban population. See Livezeanu’s calculation in her Cultural Politics, p. 10.

37 See Ion Nistor, “Basarabia sub gospodăria românească” (Bessarabia under Romanian administration), in his Istoria Basarabiei, pp. 321-323.

38 Actually, among the arguments used by the proponents of the modernist-constructivist approach to nation-building, industrialization ranks high. Industrialization generates internal migration from villages to cities or from region to region, breaking the local ties and favoring integration into larger communities. Therefore, as Eric Hobsbawm notices, a nation exists only in the context of a particular stage of technological and economic development. See Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1789 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

39 This policy of assimilation by cultural propaganda and education was analyzed in great detail by Irina Livezeanu. The Romanian Liberal governments of the interwar period, as she demonstrates, counted much on the role of schooling in the process of nation-building. Thus, in Bessarabia a standardized, compulsory, mass education system was implemented, similar to the one that functioned in the Old Kingdom, which aimed at creating a common mass culture. See Livezeanu, Cultural Politics, pp. 97-120.

40 The lessons were usually held in the local pub (bodegă), because that was the only place in the village where a large room with tables could be found. This pre-war process of instruction was described to me by several Bessarabian teachers, such as Nicolae Brăduleac from Sofia, Ion Motruc and Vasile Moraru from Alexăndreni, Teofana and Petre Gherman from Hășnașeni, and also by my grandfather, Nicolae Măgăleasa. A similar system was used in France, as Eugene Weber shows in his Peasants into Frenchmen, p. 305.

41 One of my informants remembers that his mother had the opportunity to learn only the letter “a.” This happened because after the first day of schooling the agreement between the villagers and the teacher was broken, due to some misunderstanding regarding the payment of the latter.

42 Besides the persons interviewed by the author, an American observer of Bessarabia, Charles Upson Clark, expressed the same opinion. See his United Romania, p. 84.

43 On the outcome of this project and its criticism, coming especially from the National Peasant Party’s ministers, see Livezeanu, Cultural Politics, pp. 35-41.

44 This was an arrangement easy to settle because, in Bessarabian villages, there was a well-established institution of unpaid mutual help, called clacă. By this system, when somebody had to build a house, all others came and worked for free, expecting to be helped when their turn would come.

45 According to the data provided by Ion Nistor, until the First World War there was no Romanian primary school, while in 1920-1921 there were already 1233, and in 1932-1933 their number increased up to 2185. See Nistor, Istoria Basarabiei, p. 308.

46 The rural literacy in Bessarabia was even lower, only 34.1%, while the average for the rural areas of Greater Romania was 51.3%. The urban rate was considerably higher, 62.6%, but this was of little significance for the process of nation-building since the Romanian element was very weak in cities. The low literacy of Bessarabia was exceptional as compared with the other historical provinces of Greater Romania. In 1930, the former Austro-Hungarian territories still had the highest percentage of literacy: the Banat 72.0%, Transylvania

172
68.3%, Bukovina 65.7%, and Crișana-Maramures 61.5%. The provinces of the Old Kingdom were ranked around the country average: Wallachia had 57.6% of literate population, Moldova 57.0%, Dobrogea 52.9%, and Oltenia 49.5%. See the data reproduced in Gheorghe Iacob and Luminița Iacob, *Modernizare-Europenism: România de la Cuza Vodă la Carol al II-lea* (Modernization-Europeanism: Romania from Cuza Vodă to Carol II), vol. 1 (Iași: Editura Universității Al. I. Cuza, 1995), p. 63.

As some of my informants suggest, the initial frenzy of school-building could be explained in terms of prestige. Usually, the peasant community decided that they needed a school not because they necessarily thought of its utility in the educational process, but because they had heard that all the surrounding villages were constructing one. After all, it was part of the tradition to build houses with several rooms, although only the kitchen was used as sleeping room for the entire family, while the rest was kept full of beautiful hand-made carpets, as a proof of the family's wealth.

All the Bessarabian teachers I interviewed, although they were themselves sons of Bessarabian peasants, encountered the same hostile attitude towards schooling among villagers.

These professions did not enjoy much esteem in peasants' view because they implied a different life-style, away from the farm and its fresh home-grown products, making the family's nourishment dependent on the products bought on the market.

Only slowly, with the returning of the first university graduates, who were successfully integrated into cities, people understood the importance of education, but this happened only in the late 1930s. For instance, in the case of Sofia or Alexândreni, the first university students of peasant background graduated only in 1938.


For a detailed inventory of the roads, bridges and railroads constructed and modernized under the Romanian administration in Bessarabia, see Nistor, *Istoria Basarabiei*, pp. 323-331.

In 1938, 86.06% of the arable soil of Bessarabia was cultivated with cereals. See Virgil Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei românești după războiul mondial* (The evolution of Romanian economy after the world war) (Bucharest: Independența Economică, 1940; reprint, Bucharest: Editura Științifică, 1995), p. 45 (page citations are to the reprint edition). Cereals occupied the largest part of the arable land in the whole Greater Romania, but the overall percentage was only 66.05%. See the statistics reproduced in Henry L. Roberts, *Rumânia: Political Problems of an Agrarian State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951; reprint, n.p.: Archon Books, 1969), p. 376 (citations are to the reprint edition).

See Anton Golopenția and D.C. Georgescu, *60 de sate românești* (60 Romanian villages) (Bucharest: Institutul de Științe Sociale al României, 1941; reprint, Bucharest: Paideia, 1999), pp. 205-267 (page citations are to the reprint edition). The same data are analyzed in Madgearu, *Evoluția economiei românești*, pp. 33-36. Moreover, the Bessarabian peasant family, as compared with peasant families in other regions, was the poorest in terms of cattle and agricultural tools, even basic ones, such as ploughs. See Golopenția and
Georgescu, _60 de sate românești_, pp. 124-204, and Madgearu, _Evoluția economiei românești_, pp. 49-53 and 54-60.

55 Geo Bogza, a leftist writer, provided a very telling description of Bessarabia, especially in view of the poverty that dominated the region. Bogza observed that most of the tailors did not have the chance to make a single cloth in their life-time. Their only job was to turn old coats inside out. See his _Basarabia: Țară de pământ_ (Bessarabia: Land of soil) (Bucharest: Ara, 1991), pp. 64-66.

56 For households with 0.1 to 3 hectares of land, the most significant part of the family expenditure went for clothing. By comparing the amount from the family budget spent for clothing in Bessarabia (206 lei) with the average spent in Transylvania (3663 lei), one realizes how poorer Bessarabia was in comparison with other regions of Romania. Even for families with up to 10 hectares, the money spent on education was not significant (around 9 lei for the school and between 13 and 162 lei for books and journals). See Golopenția and Georgescu, _60 de sate românești_, p. 289.

57 As compared with the other provinces of Greater Romania, Bessarabia’s poverty can also be seen from the taxation statistics. By comparing the direct taxes paid by the historical provinces, which included agricultural, property, commercial, professional, turnover and military revenues, it can be seen immediately that the inhabitants of Bessarabia contributed with the lowest average amount, that represented only half of that paid by the Old Kingdom. For the year 1929, the average direct taxes paid in the Old Kingdom amounted to 450 lei, in Transylvania to 300 lei, in Bukovina to 274 lei and in Bessarabia to 223 lei. See Forter and Rostovsky, _The Roumanian Handbook_, pp. 223-224 and 238.

58 As Roberts notes, between July 1917 and the end of the same year, the Bessarabian peasants succeeded in seizing two-thirds of the large estates. See Roberts, _Rumania_, p. 33.

59 Moreover, 1917 was remembered as a heavenly time, when everybody ate only pancakes made from the finest wheat flour, grabbed from the landowners’ depots. By contrast, in the following years – the first years within Greater Romania – due to a severe drought, the crops were very poor and many people actually starved. I owe this information to my grandmother, Antonia Zavat.

60 According to the modernist-constructivist view, the emergence of the modern type of state administration, which establishes direct links between every citizen and the central authority, is a prerequisite of the process of nation-building. For the relation between the emergence of the modern state and the rise of nationalism, see Hobsbawm, _Nations and Nationalism since 1789_, pp. 80-100.

61 The Bessarabian peasants elected their leaders from among the most respected peasants, who were usually the wealthiest. This was no source of dissension within the peasant community, since it was usually acknowledged by all that the wealthiest were also among the most diligent, wisest and hard-working. As long as all lived from the land, only those who worked more could gain more and, by spending wisely and parsimoniously, they could save more and, consequently, own more land than others. Land represented the only valued asset in the rural world and the only criteria to build hierarchies in a peasant community. This view was expressed by most of the interviewed peasants. They were convinced that the best people in a community must be its leaders. For this rea-
son, many considered communism an anomaly from the first encounter with the Soviet regime, in 1940, when they saw that the poorest peasants were appointed in the local soviets.

The same view as that expressed by my informants was recorded by B.N. Chicherin, who served in a zemstvo in the province of Tambov. “We treat the peasant deputies as equals, ... but for the most part they remained silent spectators. We ... asked their opinions on matters which they knew intimately and which closely concerned their vital interests; but it was rare that one of them would get up by himself to speak. The main significance was that they were witnesses to what went on in the meeting and could vote for those whom they trusted. They could report to the population that affairs in the zemstvo were conducted with complete justice, not only without prejudice to the peasants, but with careful attention to their needs and interests.” This fragment was translated and published in Martin McCauley and Peter Waldron, *The Emergence of the Modern Russian State, 1855-81* (Houndmills: Macmillan Press, 1988), p. 70.

In this respect, Anton Golopenþia’s study of a Bessarabian village from Orhei county, Cornova, is very relevant. In the late 1930s, the traditional hierarchy, although abolished by the Romanian state, was still respected by the older villagers. From the medieval times there were three estates: dvorenii, mazili, and the peasants. The system was preserved under the Russian administration, which put each estate under a different authority, and also added some additional estates. Golopenþia’s essay was first published in 1988 in *Agora*, a Romanian review for alternative culture published in the United States, long after the author’s death in a communist prison. See Anton Golopenþia, “Un sat Basarabeian” (A Bessarabian village), *Agora* 2 (1988), pp. 255-271. It was reprinted in Golopenþia and Georgescu, *60 de sate româneºti*, pp. I-X.

The zemstvo-system was abolished in December 1918, but the Romanian institutions took over its attributions only gradually. For the administrative integration of Bessarabia into Greater Romania, see Svetlana Suveicã, “Integrarea administrativã a Basarabiei în România, 1918-1925” (The administrative integration of Bessarabia into Romania, 1918-1925), in *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie “A. D. Xenopol”* 36 (1999), pp. 125-145.

It is also interesting to add that these people, most of whom were coming from the Old Kingdom, were seen as an alien anthropological type, since they were mostly dark-haired, while the locals were fair-haired.

In villages, the only state representatives were the teacher and the priest. The tax-collector and the policeman, as well as the notary, were appointed only at the level of communes, which, usually, comprised several villages.

The tactic of some tax-collectors was to take the money without giving any receipt, claiming that anyway the peasants were not able to read it, or to give a receipt for less money than they were receiving. In this way, they could come and ask the peasants to pay the same tax again. For instance, in Alexandreni, the case of the tax collector Novac was notorious. A peasant who got angry because Novac asked for the same tax a third time, and threw him out violently, was denounced by the corrupted clerk and had to go to court for more than a decade to clear himself. The policeman asked from the allegedly guilty peasant a sum equivalent to the price of three cows only for not using the chains.
when escorting him to town. The peasant was finally acquitted in 1944, but had to spend a lot of money to prove his cause.

The experience of these Bessarabian refugees in “rump” Romania of 1940 was also extremely frustrating, since their “brothers” across the Prut treated them as second rank citizens. In this respect, see the memories of Paul Mihail, a priest from the county of Orhei, who, between 1940 and 1941, tried to integrate himself in Iasi. See his Jurnal (1940-1944) și corespondență (Diary, 1940-1944, and correspondence) (Bucharest: Paideia, 1999).

Personal information from my grandfather, Nicolae Măgăleasa.

For the emergence of the independent Republic of Moldova in the Gorbachev era, see Michael Bruchis, The Republic of Moldavia: From the Collapse of the Soviet Empire to the Restoration of the Russian Empire (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1996).

However, it must be noted that Romania was the first country to recognize the independence of the Republic of Moldova. Furthermore, it immediately introduced scholarships for the Moldovan students, allowed visa-free and passport-free circulation between the two countries, and established inter-ministerial committees on bilateral relations. Cultural associations, such as Pro-Basarabia și Bucovina, were also established and networks of cooperation at a more informal level started to develop. Therefore, for a while, it seemed that the two countries were heading towards unification. For a harsh criticism of both the Romanian and the Moldovan governments for their hesitation in accomplishing the union when, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, political circumstances were favorable, see Alexandru Zub, Impasul reîntregirii (The deadlock of reunification) (Iasi: Timpul, 1995).
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The Dislocated Transylvanian Hungarian Student Body and the Process of Hungarian Nation-Building after 1918

ZOLTÁN PÁLFY

The break-up of the Dual Monarchy in 1918 had decisive consequences in the field of higher educational policies and practices in East-Central Europe. In the case of pre-war Hungary, the structure was, even though largely dominated by the Hungarian element, still a multi-ethnic educational “commonwealth.” In the successor states, the course of events almost immediately led to the nationalization of higher educational institutions. The very existence of universities became a political issue, in the sense that institutions of higher learning were perceived as direct expressions of national domination, of ethnic and cultural autonomy, or the lack of it. In the 1920s, the universities in the new “nation-states” lost much of their independence to the cause of cultural warfare. Both in Hungary and Romania, state-engineered nationalism found the universities instrumental in attaining its goals. Besides the social and ethnic composition of student-populations, individual career-choices and academic careers themselves were often molded by nationalist goals within a broader political framework.

Together with the territories ceded to the “successor states,” Hungary lost two of its four universities. The one in Pozsony (Bratislava) was taken over by Czechoslovakia, while the other in Kolozsvár (Cluj), the second largest university in the former Greater Hungary, fell under Romanian sovereignty. In both cases, this meant that many of their academic staff and student body emigrated even before the ratification of the Peace Treaty. Also, the take-over was carried out in such a manner that not only the former academic staff was practically dismissed, but the enrollment or continuation of studies for ethnic Hungarians and other minorities was also seriously hindered. Even after the first and largest wave of refugees shortly after the war, Hungarian students from the “lost territories” kept pouring into universities of “Trianon Hungary” throughout the 1920s.

As the Horthy-regime gained ground in the early 1920s, a shift occurred in the activities of the government and the associations which represented the refugees. The regime was marked by a revisionist orientation which, given the geopolitical position of the defeated country, was
manifested in indirect forms, namely in cultural politics. The care for Hungarian minorities outside the new borders and the preparation for the revision of these borders were inseparably inter-linked in both official policies and non-governmental actions. Moreover, the principles of the Minority Treaty legitimized the maintenance of strong cultural links with the minorities in the successor-states, making it possible to circumvent the charge of direct political irredentism.

In the defeated, forcibly demilitarized country, culture and education were seen as qualitative compensations for quantitative loss. The need for a substantial reform in this field was already formulated at the end of the century, and this demand re-surfaced under the pressure of the new conditions. Count Kunó Klebelsberg, Minister of Education and Religion (1922-1931), declared that maintaining the pre-war intellectual potential for the benefit of the much smaller “Trianon Hungary” was absolutely imperative – “the Ministry of Education should also be the Ministry of Defense.” Hence the size of the higher educational network and the impressive reforms carried out in the school-system during his time.¹

In order to translate the idea of “silent” cultural warfare into everyday reality, special care had to be taken for the institutional basis of culture. Higher education was regarded as the chief factor in putting Hungarian culture and national traditions into practice, let alone the cultural supremacy claimed by the official elite. Hungary was left with two universities, one in Budapest, and a much smaller one in Debrecen, founded only in 1912. With two other institutions being “in exile,” there were ample debates concerning their future. Both were willing to maintain their separate legal status and did not wish to merge with either the Budapest or the Debrecen faculties. All of the parties concerned were nonetheless conscious of the political dimensions of the problem. Merging the universities on the grounds that there were no means or reasons for Hungary to retain four universities would have meant a serious setback to the revisionist argumentation. Merging would have meant renouncing the legal continuity of the refugee universities, that is renouncing Hungarian “cultural supremacy,” which was seen as a major argument on behalf of “Trianon Hungary” for reclaiming its lost territories. Furthermore, in the argument supporting the cause of four universities, there was a concern for the future Hungarian minority students coming from the lost territories, as well as for the enhancement of educational opportunities by decentralization.²

It was finally in this spirit that the re-location (to Pécs and to Szeged respectively) of the refugee universities, as separate institutions of higher education and inheritors of the “lost” universities, was finally carried out in 1921. It is noteworthy that the Romanian authorities found this move
resentful, since both “new” universities were close to the Hungarian-Romanian border and attracted Hungarian students from Transylvania. Especially the Szeged University elicited distress, since it apparently functioned as if it was still the University of Kolozsvár. In the eyes of the Romanian authorities, Hungarian students returning from Szeged were radiating irredentism. The Romanian government was eager to seize any pretext to stop the traffic of students and diplomas across the border, and when the Hungarian government refused to recognize the Czechoslovak and Romanian governments, Romania also refused to recognize Hungarian diplomas. The Romanian Ministry of Education went even further and explicitly forbade Magyar students to go to Hungary for their studies.3

In the given context, the massive presence of refugee students in Hungary came first as a shock, yet in a few years it was interpreted almost as a natural matter. With a high rate of academic overproduction, general distress and intellectual unemployment, their presence seemed to be justified, as it underlined the rightfulness of cultural revisionism.4 In both government decrees (1921 and 1924), forbidding the influx of refugees in unaccountable numbers and cases, students coming into the country in order to have their studies completed were consequently treated as exceptions to the rule. The Országos Menekültügyi Hivatal (National Refugee Office, OMH) had a separate office to assist students financially. Meager as these resources were, especially in Budapest, where the majority of students arrived in the first three years after 1918, this assistance amounted to one-third of OMH’s emergency budget. Thus, in the period of 1918-1924, the financial assistance offered by OMH (including cash, goods, and credit) amounted to 270,124,435 Hungarian koronas. The share of the Student Aid Office was 91,322,891 koronas, representing 33.8% of the total amount. Taking into consideration that one-third of the sum went for credits to small enterprises, the share of students rose to over 50% of the financial assistance provided by OMH.5

Major refugee organizations, especially the “Popular Literary Association” (NIT), sought to assist Hungarian minorities of the successor states in maintaining their network of institutions, especially in the realm of culture and education. It was under NIT patronage that the “Association of Szekler University Students” (SZEFHE)6 was created (with about 1,000 members during the 1920s). SZEFHE had a Foreign Affairs Department, which conducted a research project on Romanian-Hungarian relations. Already in 1923, they proposed that, instead of leaving for Hungary, ethnic Hungarian students from Transylvania should study at home. The Hungarian government was requested to dedicate funds for creating a college for Hungarian students in Kolozsvár. Yet it was not until the end of the twenties that financial assistance for Hungarian minority education
was reoriented, with the larger part being sent to the lost territories. With all these efforts, in the first half of the twenties, young Hungarians from Transylvania with academic ambitions were oriented towards Hungarian higher education (preferably Budapest).

Originally, it was the war conjuncture that increased the number of students in the capital, a trend that had already started one year before the influx of refugees. The climax was reached in 1920-1922. Naturally, the dismemberment of “Magyar” universities in the lost territories accounted for the mobility of most of the students. The size of the student body alone, frustrated and distressed, would have been enough to trigger political radicalization. Yet, it was a unique combination of factors that led to a markedly illiberal, ethnically discriminatory legislation concerning access to higher education. All of the factions of the political right were convinced that the revolutions of 1918 and 1919 were to blame for the dismemberment of historical Hungary, and that no other social strata had a greater role in that revolutions than the urban “non-Hungarian” intellectuals, especially the Jews, who were commonly assumed to have played a key role in anything that envisaged the “disintegration of the nation.”

The 1920 *numerus clausus* law used the high rate of Jewish students in upper-level education as a starting point for filtering rightist-nationalist political orthodoxy in educational and cultural matters. Apparently aimed at limiting the number of students according to the needs of the country and according to the share of each nationality in the total population, it became a tool for political and ethnic discrimination. Haunted by the threat of another revolution by a sizable intellectual proletariat, the “Christian-national” regime sought to turn the social crisis to its own benefit, undermining liberal competition in education by manipulating state-bound authorizations regarding the cultural capital. Forcing many liberal or left-wing intellectuals to leave the academic and professional market and emigrate to the West was a consequence to be noticed only later, but “it was commonly understood that the future ramifications of the *numerus clausus* bill reached far beyond matters of education.”

The system of admission into higher education changed in 1920. Graduation at a high-school was no longer the sole criteria of acceptance. National and political credentials came to the fore. In order to obtain an enrollment permit, every student had to submit data referring to previous education, and additional certifications, warranting his reliability with regard to “national loyalty and moral rectitude.” Except for former army officers, members of the university battalions, and most of the refugees, each student had to go through a severe “disciplinary examination.” Failing this meant exclusion from all the universities and academies in the country. Though it was only in the capital and during the first 3-4 years
that the legislation was most severely imposed, it was only after the con-
solidation of István Bethlen’s conservative regime that the anti-confes-
sional edge of the admittance regulation was moderated, being eventual-
ly abolished in 1928.15

Strangely enough, the refugee universities were not among the chief
advocates of the discriminatory clause (some, as István Schneller, pro-rec-
tor of the Kolozsvár refugee university, even opposed it), despite the fact
that the number of refugee students in the academic battalions, motivat-
ed chiefly by regular monthly payment, were not insignificant (930 in 1920,
that is, about one-fifth of the refugee students). The presence of about
4,500 refugee students in the capital had an additional radicalizing effect,
but they were not the chief promoters of the xenophobic policies. Right-
wing organizations and movements mobilized a relatively small number of
students, but these were ultra-radical in their means. Throughout the peri-
od, such associations comprised only about one-quarter of the entire stu-
dent body: the majority, though many sympathized with their actions, did
not take part in these activities.16

Nevertheless, there occurred a significant change in the university-
based youth organizations. By far surpassing the 15 “traditional” organi-
izations founded during the liberal era – subordinated to given faculties
and formally subjected to university regulations – the new organizations
that appeared after the war acquired a global character and transgressed
the boundaries of individual faculties. New – overtly politicized and mili-
tantly “Christian” – organizations were formed, such as the academic bat-
 talions or the university fraternities (“Turul,” “Foederatio Emericana,”
and “Hungária,” to mention only the most important). Their activities
were far more related to student penury and rightist radicalism than to
academic issues. The most prominent ones were antechambers for future
policy-makers.17

As the distressing effects of the war were keenly felt by the state-
bound middle class, whose children comprised almost four-fifths of the
entire student body in the early twenties, the majority of the students did
not receive adequate financial resources from home. The pre-war system
of tuition-waivers, stipends, and scholarships was dismembered. The dif-
ferent non-governmental organizations were unable to provide assis-
tance in the long run. Despite all its efforts, with its meager budget, the
government was not capable to substantially improve the situation.
In a time of merciless competition for scarce resources, student penury
became an additional factor in political radicalization. For the ensuing
generation of intellectuals, loyalty to the official policy of the state
meant the only hope of preserving their privileged social status, let alone
earning an adequate living.18
In the early 1920s, about three-quarters of the refugee students were heading towards the already overcrowded academic agglomeration of Budapest. Meager as they were, the city’s resources kept attracting more than one-half of the Hungarian higher education clientèle, refugee or not. This was the case throughout the interwar period. In the first year of exile, the refugee universities of Pozsony and Kolozsvár were also placed here. Such a temporary arrangement presented a precarious condition, as all the belongings of the dispatched universities were retained by their new owners “at home.” The number of students was also quite low, amounting to 2,000 in the second year. According to the census carried out by the Ministry of Education in 1921, the total number of refugee students was 4,632, (37.5% of the Budapest student body; see Table 1 below). Most of them came from Transylvania (43.1% of the total number of refugee students). Those from Czechoslovakia followed with 33.9%, and then those from Yugoslavia with 23.7%. The rate of refugee students was the highest at the University of Kolozsvár (56.5%), but it reached a high percentage (37.2%) at the University of Budapest as well (most specifically at the faculty of medical sciences, where 41.7% of the students were refugees). At the Technical University of Budapest, their number slightly exceeded one-third (38.8%).

Thus, according to the above-mentioned census, in the universities of Budapest there were altogether 12,338 students in the 1920-1921 academic year. The distribution of refugees among the different faculties and universities is presented in Table 1.

Regarding the proportion of refugees within the various branches of study, a relevant comparison can be made only if we add up the similar faculties of the different universities. It is evident from the table above that the choice of university related to a more complicated pattern than sheer territorial provenience. Table 2 refers to the distribution of refugees according to fields of study.

Thus, related to the total number of students in the different faculties, there was a significant disproportion between the number of students at law and technical faculties, where Transylvanian presence was about one-quarter above the average, and those listed at arts and economics, where the number of Transylvanian refugees was approximately one-quarter less than the average within the entire Transylvanian refugee-group. One can see that law and engineering were proportionally twice as large as the arts and economics. Very few chose economics, an otherwise recently created faculty (the separate University of Economics in Budapest was opened in 1920). Still, regarding the absolute numbers, there is a striking difference between Transylvanian refugee presence in the humanities and the technical fields. More than twice as many students were enrolled at the “traditional” university than at the more “modern” Technical Univer-
### Table 1. Students from Transylvania in Budapest Universities in the 1920-1921 Academic Year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Faculty</th>
<th>Total number of students</th>
<th>Total number of refugees</th>
<th>Refugee students from Transylvania</th>
<th>Percentage of refugees</th>
<th>Percentage of Transylvanians among refugees</th>
<th>Percentage of Transylvanians among students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University of Budapest</td>
<td>Theology</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Law</td>
<td>1,332</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>3,209</td>
<td>1,277</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>1,164</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical University</td>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Architecture</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mechanic Engineering</td>
<td>1,886</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chemistry</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolozsvár refugee university</td>
<td>Law</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>54.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Natural sciences</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pozsony ref. univ.</td>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Univ. of Economics</td>
<td></td>
<td>814</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>12,339</td>
<td>4,632</td>
<td>1,997</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data compiled on the basis of the Ministry of Education census; see OL VKM K636 IV.a.
sity. Yet, the comparison might be considered unfair since there was no technical faculty at the University of Kolozsvár. From this perspective, the number of would-be engineers is quite high. It seems logical to presume that most of these Transylvanian students had begun their studies before the end of the war (and were refugees in the “political sense” only), switched to technical studies from something else, or were only first/second year students.

The issue of technical university students coming from Transylvania raises a problem concerning the criteria according to which students may or may not be regarded as refugees. It is impossible to state the exact number of refugee students. There must have been a certain migration from such peripheral regions of historical Hungary as Transylvania to the center in the period prior to the war. A lesser counter-migration, out of “inner Hungary,” is also conceivable. Yet, the new borders obviously changed the nature of this migration. In the early-1920s, ethnic Hungarian students fled to “inner Hungary” in massive numbers. Even those who (for instance, Technical University students) started their studies before June 1920, when the Peace Treaty was ratified, may have well decided to

TABLE 2. The Proportion of Transylvanians in Different Faculties in Budapest in 1920-1921.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faculty</th>
<th>Total number of students</th>
<th>Total number of refugees</th>
<th>Refugee students from Transylvania</th>
<th>Percentage of refugees</th>
<th>Percentage of Transylvanians among refugees</th>
<th>Percentage of Transylvanians among students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>1,692</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>4,602</td>
<td>1,923</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>1,213</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7,507</td>
<td>3,033</td>
<td>1,249</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of Technical faculties</td>
<td>3,270</td>
<td>1,272</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1,018</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data compiled by author on the basis of OL VKM K636 IV. a. The total of technical faculties includes the students listed above in the natural sciences. The Faculty of Theology at the Budapest University and the separate faculties of the Technical University are not included, since they bear relevance by themselves. See Table 1.
stay away from their homes and merge with those students who were forced out of the nationalized institutions. The term “refugee student” may, as a matter of convenience, be used until 1924, when the first and most numerous contingent of dislocated students had either completed their studies or had been integrated into the educational institutions in “Trianon Hungary.” Those coming to study in Hungary in the second half of the twenties should not therefore be identified with the refugees of the early 1920s.

Aiming at a somewhat more accurate differentiation, the literature (mostly statistical surveys) of the period resorts to several separate categories when referring to students coming from the lost territories: actual citizenship, place of birth, and the residence of parents.\textsuperscript{23} For obvious reasons, estimating the number of “students from the lost territories” by using these different criteria will give different results, that is, lower figures for Transylvanians when taken according to citizenship, and a somewhat higher number when referring to their parents’ regional affiliation. As citizenship is a misleading category in determining the size of the “refugee” student body, it is cited only in cases where other criteria (such as relating to parents) are not available.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faculty</th>
<th>Budapest University</th>
<th>Kolozsvár University</th>
<th>Total in the faculties</th>
<th>Percentage of Kolozsvár students related to Budapest faculties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>3,046</td>
<td>1,202</td>
<td>4,248</td>
<td>39.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>2,994</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>3,524</td>
<td>17.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>1,115</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>1,293</td>
<td>15.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Science</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacology</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>49.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>7,407</td>
<td>2,119</td>
<td>9,526</td>
<td>28.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{Source:} Magyar statisztikai évkönyv, 1914, p. 290.
Regarding the altered pattern of student migration in the early twenties, more precisely the 1920-1921 academic year discussed above, it seems relevant to look at the distribution of students among the three universities, namely the University of Budapest, the Budapest Technical University, and the University of Kolozsvár in the last peace year, that is 1913-1914. A comparison of these universities gives some hints at the proportions of the student exodus (from Romania to Hungary), occurring as a consequence of the new political situation after the war (see Table 3). In the second semester of the 1913-1914 academic year, the total number of students in the three universities was 11,887.24 In 1914-1916, all universities lost students for obvious reasons: enrollment to the army. This pattern nevertheless changed in the following two years. Thus, while there was a spectacular increase of the number of students in Budapest (from 5,230 in 1916 to 17,920 in 1918, almost equaling the highest pre-war number), the number of students in the University of Kolozsvár continuously decreased during the war (from 2,119 in 1914 to less than one third of this number in 1918). Owing to the uneven effect of the war, the influx (even if not in massive numbers) of students into the capital had already commenced during the last year of the war, long before the ratification of new political borders.25

A comparison of the 1920-1921 refugee contingent from Romania and the 1913-1914 student body of Kolozsvár can be made in two respects (see Table 4 below). First, one has to look at the number of students in the different faculties, then at the impact of the refugees on universities in Budapest.26 Regarding the distribution of students from Kolozsvár and Budapest among faculties related to the total number of students in the given university, in Kolozsvár there was a much stronger orientation of students towards law and political science than towards any other branches of study. This holds true even if one compares the percentage of law students enrolled at Kolozsvár University to that of Budapest. Medicine, on the contrary, is far less preferred in the former university than in the latter. Related to the share of students in the given universities, pharmacology lags behind in Budapest, while there is lesser preference for the arts among Kolozsvár students.

In the 1920-1921 academic year, the influx of refugees altered the departmental distribution. According to Table 2, refugees averaged 40.4% in the “classical” faculties, an almost equal proportion (38.8%) in technical departments, while the lowest degree of presence was recorded in economics (29.0%). The percentage of Transylvanian refugees among the total number of students is relevant in view of the overall impact of refugees on the growth of the student population in Budapest. Thus, students from territories ceded to Romania had a proportionate share in law and engineer-
ing, almost twice as large than that in the arts, and a much lower preference for economics than the average of refugees.

The absolute numbers taken separately, the 1,997 students listed in 1920-1921 as refugees from Transylvania present the following distribution among branches of study: 6.7% (135) studied economics, while 60.5% (1,249) were students of “classical” departments. Of the latter, 62.3% (779) studied medicine, 26.5% (331) studied law, and 11.1% (139) were arts students. Compared to the 1913-1914 Kolozsvár contingent, the proportional share of law students was less than one-half, while that of medical students more than doubled. Adding the 30.3% (606) of students listed in the technical departments, and the 6.7% (135) of economy-students (out of the total of 1,997), it is evident that the academic orientation of the 1920-1921 Transylvanian refugee contingent was somewhat lagging behind the average Hungarian academic market of the period.27

The academic retrenchment of the dislocated students did alter the social composition of the student body to the detriment of those with a social background other than the “historic middle class.” (In 1914, 16%
of the students came from state-employee or army officer families, while, in 1924, almost 30% belonged to the same background). Yet, there occurred a significant change in the prevalent career objectives. Civil service was less and less pursued by the sons of the Hungarian “middle class.” Instead, the younger generation of students (and the dislocated among them) with such a background were pushed towards other occupations than that of their fathers. Thus, while the refugees had the lion’s share in right-wing radicalism throughout the 1920s, the dislocated students underwent a similar shift in their professional orientation from the second half of the decade onwards.28

In May 1925, a meeting was held, with the participation of Prime Minister István Bethlen and the Minister of Education, Kunó Klebelsberg, to discuss the situation of students from the lost territories. Having in mind that few diplomas were accepted in Romania, they agreed that studying at home would serve the cause of the Transylvanian Hungarians better. Also, in order to urge students who had already joined the universities of “Trianon Hungary” to return home upon completion of studies, they suggested that these students should be issued diplomas which would not be valid in Hungary. By 1928-1929, it was a consensus of policy-makers that it would be better for ethnic Hungarians from Transylvania to pursue their studies at home. In order to enhance this, a scheme of financial aid for Kolozsvár students was proposed, together with a set of measures facilitating post-graduate studies in Hungary. Thus, a small number (from 20 to 50 in average) of post-graduate scholarships were offered. At first, there were post-graduate students in medicine and law, then, from the early 1930s onwards, an increasing number of technical faculty students appeared in these programs.29

Nevertheless, in Budapest, at the beginning of the 1924-1925 academic year, 3,095 students (32.8% of the total number of students) born in the lost territories were registered, and 1,450 out of them (15.3%) were from Romania.30 Overall, by 1924, the share of students originating from the lost territories decreased to roughly two-thirds of its 1920-1921 size. Yet, these students still comprised slightly more than 30% of the student body of the main universities. In economics, their number increased from 286 to 435, which made up 32% of the total number. The highest rate of the students from the lost territories (39%), was registered in the Veterinary College, even though this meant only 113 in absolute numbers. Contrasted to the 1920-1921 distribution among branches of study, a significant switch in career orientation can be observed, since the number of “refugee” students in the Technical University increased from 606 to 756, while the number of those enrolled in the “classical” faculties decreased to 1,704.31 Measured by the residency of parents, the Hungarian minority
students’ share was only around 9.0% in Budapest. According to the first criterion, the place of birth, the decrease of the Transylvanian refugee-contingent amounted to one-quarter between 1921 and 1924. Regarding the second criterion, i.e., the permanent residency of parents, the Transylvanian student body of Budapest decreased by 50.0%.32

In 1921, the repatriation of the exiled universities to Szeged and Pécs altered the distribution of students of Transylvanian origins. Still, the number of those who preferred Budapest to the “provincial” universities remained quite large throughout the twenties. Thus, in the 1923-1924 academic year, Hungarian universities comprised 1,483 students originating from territories ceded to Romania.33 Of these, 1,083 were registered in Budapest. In 1926-1927, out of the 570 students listed as Romanian citizens, 130 attended “provincial” universities.34 The balance changed in 1927-1928 (the last academic year for which official statistics found it relevant to provide separate sets of data for students coming from the respective successor states).35 Out of the 474 students of Romanian citizenship, 262 attended Budapest universities. Nevertheless, the sizeable difference between the capital and the other university centers is largely a result of the fact that the only Technical University of the country was in Budapest. If one considers the “classical” universities separately, the distribution of Transylvanian students is fairly even between the capital and the other centers, with an evident preference for Szeged.36

The statistics of the period regarding higher education witnessed another phenomenon. Throughout the twenties, there was a gradual decrease in the number of students coming to Hungary from the lost territories. Related to the total number of university students, this shrank from 40.0% (in 1920-1921) to an overall 7.3% (this is the share of students whose parents lived in the successor states) in 1929-1930. In 1930, Budapest universities had 4.3% of Transylvanians, Szeged had 8.9%, while Pécs and Debrecen had an average of 2.8%. As to what these figures amounted in absolute numbers, one can look at the number of students who joined Hungarian universities on the basis of school certificates acquired in foreign countries. In 1928-1929, there were 105 such students from Romania, while, in the following year, only 85 (in 1929-1930, the total number of students enrolled in the above-mentioned five universities was 11,886).37

It is illustrative for the ethno-political division of the academic market in the interwar period that, between 1922 and 1929, out of the 200 members of the various colleges that were founded in Hungary for Transylvanian students, only 30 managed to receive employment in Romania. Furthermore, diplomas issued in Hungary were seldom, if ever, accepted by Romanian authorities; what is more, students going home for the holidays were often harassed. Thus, fewer and fewer ethnic Hungarians
returned home after the completion of their studies. Out of the 200 mentioned above, 102 found employment in Hungary, 53 in “other places,” and 15 in “unknown places” (a formulation which might well have been euphemism for “unemployed,” or, at best, under-employed). Meanwhile, of the approximately 250 diplomas that were naturalized in interwar Hungary, only 2 were issued by a Romanian university. For Hungarians from the successor states who intended to pursue a career that corresponded to their academic qualifications, choosing the geographic location of their university studies meant a choice of citizenship as well. With the altered patterns of student migration of the interwar period, the direct or covert forced migration of this group had an important effect on the social, political and intellectual history of the region.

NOTES


2 For more details, see László Szögi, “Párhuzamos utak. A kolozsvári és a pozsonyi egyetem válságos időszakának történetéhez” (Parallel roads: On the critical period of the history of the universities of Kolozsvár and Pozsony), in József Mihály Kiss, ed., Tanulmányok a magyar felsőoktatás XIX-XX. századi történetéből (Studies on the history of higher education in Hungary in the 19th and 20th centuries) (Budapest: ELTE, 1991); see also Julius Kornis, Education in Hungary (New York: Columbia University Teachers College, 1932), pp. 129-130, and Mészáros, A magyar nevelésügy, p. 80.


5 Emil Petrichevich, Jelentés az Országos Menekültügyi Hivatal négy évi működéséről (Report on the four-year activity of the National Refugee Office) (Budapest: Pesti Könyvnyomda R.T., 1924), pp. 18-39. Between 1920 and 1924,
5,507 university students received financial support in the form of tax-exempted meal tickets, and 1,920 others were granted direct financial support. The sums, however, were hardly enough to live on. Only those students who were literally on the verge of starvation received such aid. Petrichevich, *Jelentés az Országos Menekültügyi Hivatal négy évi működéséről*, p. 21.

6 The refugee students from Czechoslovakia and the Serb-Croat-Slovenian Kingdom also had their associations. Yet, the most active among these was that of the Transylvanians. See Andor Ladányi, *Az egyetemi ifjúság az ellenforradalom első éveiben* (The university youth in the first years of the counter-revolution) (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1979), p. 103.

7 See Nándor Bárdi, “A Keleti Akció – A romániai magyar intézmények támogatása az 1920-as években” (The Eastern Action – support for Hungarian institutions in Romania in the 1920s), in László Diószegi, ed., *Magyarságkutatás, 1995-96* (Hungarian studies, 1995-1996) (Budapest: Teleki László Alapítvány, 1996), pp. 150, 157-158, 161-163. The sums disposed with for such purposes were, nevertheless, relatively small, amounting to about 0.1-0.2% of the government budget. For more on these matters, see Bárdi’s above-mentioned study.


10 In the first two decades after the turn of the century, the average rate of Jewish students was around 23-24%, with an exceptionally high percentage (sometimes double of the above-mentioned figures) in the medical faculty, and, despite a decreasing tendency, in the law and technical faculties. Exactly in these faculties, massive Jewish presence may account for the eagerness of implementing the “Jewish quota.” For a comparison, the proportion of Jews in “Trianon Hungary” was around 6%. See Ladányi, *Az egyetemi ifjúság*, pp. 60-61; Mészáros, *A magyar nevelésügy*, p. 79.


13 Kovács, *Liberal Professions*, p. 56.


17 Dezső Schuler, “A tanulóiifjúság védelme” (The social protection of students) in *Hatósági és társadalmi embervédelem Budapesten* (Official and social human protection in Budapest), vol. 1 (Budapest, 1936), pp. 296-297; for details on
university youth organizations in Budapest, see Kornis, *Education in Hungary*, pp. 143-144.


19 Szögi, “Párhuzamos utak,” p. 52.

20 Yet, together with those placed at universities and academies outside Budapest, the overall number of refugee students in 1921 may have well amounted to 6,000. See Mócsy, *The Effects of World War I*, p. 192.

21 Thus: 1,980 from Romania, 1,589 and 1,100, from the other two countries, respectively. See Mócsy, *The Effects of World War I*, p. 192.

22 Országos Levéltár (Hungarian State Archive, OL) K636, VKM, 1921/86.726, IV. a. The document also underlines the deficiencies regarding the determination of the number of refugees. It was impossible to state exact figures, since the criteria of the refugee-status (permanent residence, citizenship, place of birth, even the political status of given territories) were themselves confusing at that time. In most cases, the calculation was based on the declaration of the students themselves. It may well be presumed that these statements were biased. Yet, it also seems probable that the number of those incorrectly taken as refugees and the number of those who were, again incorrectly, excluded from this category, is relatively small, and by and large equal each other.


24 For the pre-war data, place of origin and mother tongue/nationality are disregarded for reasons of irrelevance. Nevertheless, in the mentioned academic year, the University of Kolozsvár had 1,785 ethnic Hungarians, 215 Romanians (that is about 10%), 101 Saxons, and 18 others. See the above-mentioned Statistical Yearbook for 1914.


26 Such comparison, nevertheless, remains inaccurate regarding the actual number of refugee students from Romania, since it does not include students of the academies.

27 According to Laky, already at the turn of the century one can witness a significant shift in professional orientation: more and more future intellectuals opted for the so-called “free careers” (engineering, medicine), mainly to the detriment of law. The aura of the “lawyer-nation” almost dispersed by the 1910s. Yet, with the saturation of the professional market, preference for the “liberal professions” once again decreased by the end of the decade. The ensuing war-conjuncture changed the balance. With a quickly passing downfall in the number of law students in 1919 (especially in Budapest), there came an unprecedented increase in 1922-1923. These fluctuations relate to a more general problem: the professional orientation of Hungarian students in the late 19th and early 20th century followed the conjuncture of the day. While these diplomas, upon completion of studies, seemed to secure steady careers, these generations were nevertheless deceived in their expectations by a saturated job market. Laky, *A M. Kir. Ferencz József*, pp. 30 -39.

30 The universities taken into account are: Budapest University (together with Theology), the Technical University, the University of Economics, and, in addition to the above-mentioned ones, the Veterinary College.
31 Olga Molnár, “A főiskolai hallgatók szociális és gazdasági viszonyai Budapesten” (The social and material conditions of university students in Budapest), Statisztikai közlemények vol. 54 (1930), pp. 34-35.
33 Only 564 were Romanian citizens. 423 of them went to Budapest.
34 See Asztalos, “A főiskolai hallgatók az 1926-27-es tanévben” (University students in the 1926-1927 academic year), Magyar statisztikai szemle 14, pp. 1019-1030. Having in mind the spectacular divergence that results from the use of different criteria, it may safely be estimated that there were around 1,300-1,400 students of Transylvanian origins in 1926-1927. As we approach the end of the decade, though, it is likely for such students to have switched to Hungarian citizenship before they enrolled in the university. Hence the low rate of representation, if only citizenship was regarded.
36 This was due not so much to the historical association of Szeged and Kolozsvár in university matters, as to more practical reasons, such as proximity and financial considerations.
37 See for instance the sources cited in footnote 11.

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Transylvania Revisited: Public Discourse and Historical Representation in Contemporary Romania

MARIUS TURDA

The Context

One of the issues that repeatedly arose in the Romanian public sphere is the suspicion that the country’s territorial integrity may suffer a change and its national essence may be altered. This is not a new theme in the Romanian discursive landscape. Since its emergence as a modern state, Romania has been defined in opposition either to something external (Europe, the Balkans, the Slavic world) or internal (the Hungarians, the Jews, etc.) After 1989, however, the debate on Romania’s place on the European map not only vividly re-emerged, but also opened new issues.

Interestingly, conflicts of identity and unexpected cleavages within the same cultural memory paralleled these discussions, making Romania a classic post-communist example of a society marked by the resurrection of nationalism. Recently, Alina Mungiu-Pippidi analyzed this phenomenon in her book, Subjective Transylvania. Attempting to offer an alternative explanation to recent Romanian nationalism, she faced, as other scholars working in the field, the problem of defining the “national problem” in Romania:

Obviously, it means different things to different political actors. To the nationalist Romanian parties, mostly post-communist parties, ... the national problem is the lack of loyalty and therefore the danger of irredentism of the 1.7 million Hungarian community inhabiting Transylvania. For the Romanian anti-Communist intellectuals the “national problem” seems to be the regaining of some meaning of the Romanian identity in a world so different from the one before the Second World War, the last moment said – although little evidence supports this – to have presented such a clear identity. For the Romanian Hungarian elite the problem is to find a political formula, which can accommodate their very distinct cultural identity. Finally, for the international
community, the “national problem” of Romania is seen only as the containment of the ethnic competition between Romanians and Hungarians in the strict legal and administrative framework of Romania and Europe.³

Contrary to the fact that Romania has a “national problem,” the significant role nationalism performs in this country is not easily acknowledged.⁴ After all, what makes Romania such an interesting case? Similar to other East European nationalisms, the Romanian nationalism combines an ethnic essentialist philosophy (as developed in the 19th century) with a suffused authoritarianism (determined by the image of the Nation-State), and a traditionalism that attempts to preserve the Romanian nation from external and internal menaces. By eliminating references to external historical, socio-cultural and political conditions as well as internal interactions with other national groups, Romanianness is generally referred to in the nationalist discourse as pure and uncontaminated. How does this monolithic version of national identity relate to the construction of historical representation in contemporary Romania?

At present, there is, by the very logic of nationalism and “Europenisation,” an intense conflict, focusing on questions of loyalty and identity, among Romanian politicians and intellectuals.⁵ Both nationalists and Europeanists (if we assume that those Europeanised Romanians are not nationalists) vacillate between glorifying the State (nation-state, federal state, etc.) or the Nation (ethnic, contractual, etc.), depending on their ontological reference.⁶ Whether the focus is on the liberal protectionism of the Europeanists or on the more militant, illiberal and anti-minority populism of the nationalists, I would argue that nationalism is the most encompassing ideology in Romania.⁷ There is probably no better perspective from which to examine this assumption than to focus on how Transylvania appeals to the contemporary Romanian political imagery.

This essay examines this diffuse topic from a different perspective. Firstly, by assessing the vicious orchestration of Transylvania in the public sphere, I examine the most attendant political and intellectual themes on the Romanian discursive field. Secondly, by pointing out various conflicting discourses, I indicate the existence of an identity conflict within Romania. Lastly, I suggest that there is something more than simple adherence to European values with which Romanians have to come to terms in order to be externally accredited as such and internally create sufficient space to adjust complementary (even if conflicting) political and intellectual visions.
Transylvania and Again Transylvania

In modern times, the representation of Transylvania identified this region: a) politically – as an expression of a particular ethnonational group (mainly Romanian or Hungarian); and, b) geographically – as coterminous with the people’s homeland. Not surprisingly, by imagining Transylvania as either Romanian or Hungarian, intellectuals have endlessly legitimized power and reproduced conflict. After almost a century of the Romanian “unitary nation-state” or post-Trianon Hungary, there remains a pathological need to enhance arguments for either a “Romanian” or “Hungarian” Transylvania. It seems that this region acts both as a filter through which Romanian and Hungarian cultural, social and political items are exchanged and as a barometer of the real functioning of the Romanian and Hungarian states.

Thus, within many scenarios presented to the public, Transylvania occupies a central place and categorically shapes the idea Romanians or Hungarians have about each other. To say this, however, is not simply to identify the centrality of imagery in the nationalist discourse. Although these assumptions refer to the specific context of Romanian and Hungarian historical imagery, they express, I would argue, a more general perspective concerning the relationship among different forms of national histories and the problems that emerge when one narrative (such as “the Transylvanian problem”) is appropriated by another (such as nationalism). How did this happen?

According to the dialectic of the homogeneous state (the nation-state par excellence), ethnically and religiously heterogeneous regions such as Transylvania are politically disfunctional. After 1918, tremendous efforts were spent to articulate a new conceptual repertoire that placed Transylvania on the map of Romania. In other words, Transylvania had to be internalized as part of the new state. Similarly, the very idea of “Romania” – defined by the 19th century Romantic nationalism as the spiritual home of all Romanians – and of Transylvania – regarded as the “cradle of Românism” – dramatically changed after the Union, as did different political and administrative functions the new state had to perform in order to acquire consistency and legitimacy.

Romania’s long political history of assimilating Transylvania notwithstanding, I refer to recent variations of the subject. As federalism and national autonomy permeated Romania’s public discourse after 1989, Romanian nationalists regarded them as symbols meant to illustrate nothing more than old revisionist themes (as those espoused by Hungary, Bulgaria or the Soviet Union in the interwar period). The pivotal association these terms imply threatens the very essence of the Romanian state, i.e.,
its “national and unitary” character. This attitude marks a change in the representation of Transylvania, since the polemic is no longer only between centralists and regionalists, but over the notion of the state itself. It is clear that, despite serious efforts to integrate into the new European order, Romanians should first attempt to surpass the endemic problem of “defending” a powerful construction: “Greater Romania.”

After all, the identity convulsions Romanians experienced after 1989 may well suggest something that was tacitly “avoided,” i.e., that the celebrated “unitary Romanian state” might be powerful, and, perhaps, necessary, but yet a historical anachronism. This point is important because it represents yet another oppositional stance within the increasingly global discourse about “the nation-state.” As a localised commentary on the historical representation in Romania and its dialogue with imported Western models, my perspective suggests that the Western conceptions of the state may be quite restrictive and misleading. It is not surprising that the emerging formulae of European integration (as, for example, those described by Gusztáv Molnár), based almost exclusively on Western European experiences, could hardly be associated with the image of România – seen as the total state, and as the only depository of the power of the society. This brings us to the next point. How does the discussion concerning the nation-state and regionalism influence the perception Romanians have about Europe?

**Intersected Discourses**

Romanian discourse on Europe is fragmented and multifaceted. This situation makes any analysis of Romanian society extremely difficult. Although, in many respects Romania does not differ radically from other Eastern European countries, in some other respects, however, it does possess several unique characteristics.

Since the birth of the modern age, states have either attempted to forge a homogeneous nations from disparate cultural and regional groupings within their domain, or ethnic groups have sought political autonomy in order to establish themselves as independent actors on the national stage. In order to understand this permanent negotiation, one should relate to the tortuous representation of national integration. It is, for example, impossible to deny that we are witnessing a profound transformation of the idea of the nation-state. In a world of porous borders, the ability of nation-states to define themselves as compact entities seems to be condemned to atrophy. Underlying this is another, possibly deeper, problem that arises from the mechanisms that determine how regional identities are internalised. It is within this contested terrain of polymorphic power relationships that Transylvania – as generator of regional
identities – is represented in Romanian public discourse. Simply put, this representation takes two distinct discursive forms.

The first calls for unity against foreign forms of ideological oppression, implying that Romanians are one people within a centralised form of government, embodied in “the Romanian unitary nation-state.” This expression is yet another facet of the phenomenon – emphasized earlier in this study – which describes the nation-state as possessing the only expression of sovereignty. The supporters of this conception, integralists, suggest that Romania is the “home of all (and only of) Romanians,” the eternal state. The slogans and populist rhetoric of Romanian nationalists – the most common being “Transylvania is in danger of being occupied by Hungarians” – reflect a common psychological phenomenon that many Romanians spontaneously share. From this perspective, the communist regime proved successful in uniformly shaping the Romanian psyche and inoculating various fundamentalist themes. Well-represented in Transylvania by the Mayor of Cluj, Gheorghe Funar, and in Bucharest by Corneliu Vadim Tudor, the leader of Greater Romania Party, this national-communist perspective does indeed benefit from quite large domestic support, hence its variations and representations in the public opinion.

The second form emanates mainly from Transylvania (and Hungary) and suggests that centralisation has lived its days and other forms of political loyalty should be introduced (via devolution and federalization). That is, the supporters of regionalism (or regionalists) believe that a sense of distinctness survived in Transylvania and can successfully be exercised in order to gain various strategic political goals. In other words, within the official national character that presents the Romanian nation as superior to other nations, a subaltern mentality has emerged in Transylvania, indicating a transgression of Romanianness. By pointing out that parts of Romania, such as Transylvania and the Banat, may more convincingly integrate into an European framework – due to historic traditions, multi-ethnic cohabitation, religious tolerance –, this new trend visibly creates space for addressing fundamental questions concerning the Romanian psyche, i.e., that there is a difference within Romania in terms of the same national group, or, in other words, it seems that “Europeanness” has different connotations in Cluj than in Bucharest. Promoting the idea of belonging to Central Europe, intellectuals from Transylvania and the Banat attempt to construct a distinction between their regions, in which civil society and political pluralism had certain traditions, and the rest of Romania, which they putatively associate with the Balkans. At the intersection of these two symbolic geographies resides an understanding of both Transylvania’s relationship with Romania and of Romania’s place in Europe. How could these positions be reconciled?
Internal Orientalism: Transylvania and Romania

To a regionalist, Transylvania and Romania represent conflicting poles of loyalty. Apart from the attractiveness of this axiom, there is, however, a very interesting detail of identity construction implied by this assumption that must be considered. Within various historical representations, a mimetic competition to gaining political domination emerged in Romania and simultaneously augmented the elaboration of a subaltern discourse, an \textit{internal Orientalism}.\footnote{13}

Explicit or diluted, the alteritist discourse has always existed in the modern history of Romania.\footnote{14} After 1989, however, the simultaneous acceleration of economic poverty and attempts to administratively decentralise the country produced conflicting principles of legitimacy with respect to the place Transylvania occupies within Romania. Consequently, Transylvania proved to be a domain of contested power and competing national mythologies, in which local and national groups permanently and horizontally negotiated relationships of subordination and control.

Internal Orientalism has gained prominence in the political rhetoric after 1989, as the Romanian politics centred on the inclusion in “Europe” and European organisms. The process of inclusion and its counterpart, that of exclusion, are central to the redefinition of any post-communist Eastern European political attitude. In many ways, the so-called “Central Europeans” constructed a new image of themselves, defined in opposition to images of an external “Eastern European,” sometimes identified with the Balkans. Balkanism, although latent for decades, explicitly emerged in political and academic discourse in the 1990s, as a corollary of the tragic events that accompanied the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia.

Furthermore, a re-definition of Transylvania has emerged, which suggests that this region is (at least) culturally different than other parts of Romania. In the context of this frustration, generated by political marginality and economic disparities, intellectuals from Transylvania contoured this region as a distinct zone, with a particular identity, neither “Eastern” nor “Western,” but “Central European,” simultaneously different and superior than the rest of Romania. In many respects, this presumed supremacy profoundly permeated the self-perception of Transylvanians, so that today this cultural difference not only functions as an alteritist cliché, but also serves to define the identity clash within Romania.

In essence, both representations compete to gain ascendancy within Romanian public rhetoric. Thus, Transylvanians would never conceive of themselves as being “Balkanized,” suggesting that such a perspective applied only to the rest of Romania, while intellectuals from Bucharest, although implicitly accepting “Balkan” features as being part of the Romanian \textit{Weltan-}
schauung, would never accept a civilizational, post-Huntingtonian division of Romania.

Without entering an esoteric discussion about Orientalism, my argument is that, in the discussion about Romania’s place on the European map, Transylvania is used not only to cement the argumentation of both sides, but also as the main trope of political performance. This suggests yet another well-rooted cliché: similar to Transylvania being considered the most advanced bastion of Romania, so is Romania regarded as the last bastion of European civilisation in the face of “Oriental barbarism.” What constitutes the appealing side of this story is that any Europeanised discourse is either parallel or produced as a reaction to various forms of nationalism or autochthonism.¹⁵

Conclusions

I have argued in this essay, via the discussion of recent discursive tropes in Romania, that my vision of Transylvania is a critique of both Romania (seen as the eternal nation-state), and of constructing a superfluous regional identity.

Firstly, I think that both regionalists and integralists ignore a very important element. After 1918, new vertical power relationships were formed in Transylvania that absorbed their vitality from the very existence of Bucharest. This is a fact that cannot be oversimplified by affirming a cultural memory of separate cultural spheres.¹⁶ Apart from futile variations on this allegedly self-imposed superiority, Transylvania is too profound a part of Romania to be dispersed so easily. It is not a separate piece of the national puzzle that respects the present political arrangements due (only) to centralist coercion (as regionalists advocate), nor is it a part of Romania since times immemorial (as integralists suggest). The union of Transylvania with Romania was, after all, the result of a process that conflated various points of reference – i.e., the myth of a common history, a unified land and a shared destiny – with favourable historical circumstances (1918 and 1945). In addition, to imagine (as the regionalists do) that just affirming a regional identity can express a benign, democratic Zeitgeist would neglect the power of opposing interests in Romania and exaggerate the civic patriotism of Transylvanians (the recent elections illustrate this eloquently).

Secondly, there is a sense of difference within Romania that should not be discarded. Benefiting from interaction with various ethnic groups, Romanians from Transylvania have gained a sense of cultural superiority, clearly used in present debates on Romanian identity as powerful arguments. With respect to this form of difference, a variable scale of symbolic boundaries does indeed separate Transylvania from other parts of Romania. Finally, I would suggest that such considerations as those analysed in this essay acutely indicate
a chronic political competition for national affiliations in Romania. In my opinion, this competition proves to be not only historically obsolete but also individually repressive. In order to unmask its negative effects, one should finally admit its corrosiveness. Personally, I would argue that, in many respects, Transylvania has saturated the political discourses in which it circulates. Even more, I think that the Transylvanian problem does not exist anymore.

NOTES

1 An earlier version of this essay was published in *Sfera politică* 80 (2000), and, in the form of a short essay, under the title “Europe in the Imagination of an Apolitical Romanian Cynic,” by Oxford University European Affairs Society (February 2001).

2 One could attempt to compare the present discussions on Romania’s place in Europe with corresponding dilemmas experienced after 1848 or 1918. See Adrian Marino, *Pentru Europa. Integrarea României: Aspecte ideologice și culturale* (For Europe. The Integration of Romania: Ideological and Cultural Aspects) (Iași: Polirom, 1995).


5 Romanian society has traditionally been split between two camps, but, as Sorin Antohi observed: “In Romania, the efforts aiming at a transfiguration of the national symbolic space have fallen traditionally into two main categories: the former includes arguments rooted in the Westernizing ‘invented traditions,’ while the latter includes the Autochtonists’ ‘imagined community.’ Both Westernizers and Autochtonists are rather ideal types, the mutually exclusive, if interwoven, extremes of a continuum: Romania’s political imagery.” Sorin Antohi, “Putting Romania on Europe’s Map,” paper presented at the workshop *Euro-Balkans and Balkan Literature*, Budapest (6-7 February 1998), p. 36.


7 In a similar vein, George Schöpflin argued that post-communist governments are rather interested in representing the nation than the society. “The nation in its ethnic dimension functions in politics as a category that is connected primarily to the establishment of the state and to definitions of identity. ... The nation is sacralized and cannot be the subject of the bargains and compromises needed for the smooth functioning of democracy.” George Schöpflin, *Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-1992* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 278. My argument is also complemented by Tom Gallagher’s pertinent analysis of
Romanian nationalism in his “Nationalism and Romanian Political Culture in the 1990s,” in Duncan Light and David Phinnemore, eds., Post-Communist Romania: Coming to Terms with Transition (New York: Palgrave, 2001). According to him, the central place nationalism performs in Romanian political life could be explained by the fact that: “First, the state must govern in the name of ethnic majority. ... Second, state laws must not be subject to external interference or regulation, as this will encroach upon Romanian sovereignty in unacceptable ways. ... Third, freedom from foreign rule is more important than the upholding of freedom against tyranny. ... Fourth, native traditions are the best ones to shape Romanian government.” Gallagher, “Nationalism and Romanian Political Culture in the 1990s,” pp. 105-106.

8 As George W. White suggested: “At the macro-scale, Transylvania is seen as an integral component of a broader national territory that is viewed as an organic and inviolable unit; within these broader organic units Transylvania is the cradle for both Romanian and Hungarian civilisations. At the micro-scale, Transylvania contains within it a number of places of great cultural and historical significance.” See George W. White, “Transylvania: Hungarian, Romanian or Neither?” in Guntram H. Herb and David H. Kaplan, eds., Nested Identities, Nationalism, Territory and Scale (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), p. 268.


11 Regions described by Gusztáv Molnár as “fragmentary regions of Mitteleuropa that have been left outside the new eastern frontiers of the West.” See Molnár, “Problema transilvană,” p. 21.

12 However, as Sorin Antohi observes: “Such negative views of the native space are not central to the way Romanians imagine their Sitz im Leben, but they show how the most stable landmarks of collective identity melt down eventually, and cannot be taken for granted. Thus, we realise how unstable, artificial, recent, and even unpredictable the co-ordinates of the national existence can be.” See Antohi, “Putting Romania on Europe’s Map,” p. 37. See also the radical discourse of Sabin Gherman and his “M-am săturat de România” (I have had enough of Romania), Monitorul de Cluj (16 September 1998).

13 Orientalism was originally conceptualized by Edward Said in his Orientalism (New York: Pantheon, 1978). My argumentation here depends heavily on arguments developed by Sorin Antohi and Robert Hayden. As the latter suggested: “Orientalism can be applied within Europe itself, between European ‘proper’ and those parts of the continent that were under Ottoman (hence Oriental) rule. The evaluation implied by this distinction can be seen in the rhetoric typically applied to the later: Balkan mentality, Balkan primitivism, Balkanization, Byzantine, Orthodoxy.” See Milica Bakic-Hayden and Robert Hayden, “Orientalist Variations on the Theme ‘Balkans:’ Symbolic Geographies in Yugoslav Cultural Politics,” Slavic Review 51 (Spring 1992), p. 3.

14 See Sorin Antohi, Civitas Imaginalis: Istorie și utopie în cultura română (Civitas Imaginalis: History and utopia in Romanian culture) (Bucharest: Litera, 1994).

At this point I agree with Sorin Mitu’s scepticism regarding the separate cultural memory of Transylvanians. “Regardless of what Transylvanians thought, were there not in fact real civilisational structures, values, attitudes, mentalities, capable of conferring a distinct character to this province? The Habsburg heritage – the Empire’s well-ordered bureaucracy or the spirit of Central Europe – has not imprinted a character on this region, which categorically distinguishes it from other Romanian provinces? The answer, in my opinion, is that almost nothing concrete has survived of such a heritage, with the exception of a sea of memories, regrets and nostalgia with nothing to back them.” Sorin Mitu, “Illusions and Facts about Transylvania,” The Hungarian Quarterly 39 (Winter 1998), p. 72.

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PART 3.

NATIONALIZING MAJORITIES
AND MINORITIES
The Idea of Independent Romanian National Economy in Transylvania at the Turn of the 20th Century

Barna Ábrahám

This paper deals with the modernization process of the Romanians of Transylvania at the turn of the 20th century. It addresses the process of social stratification, focusing on certain regions marked by more favorable conditions for economic and social development. My aim is to give a brief account of the economic and cultural activity of the young Romanian middle class, seeking to stabilize its positions, widen its social base, and, eventually, striving to construct an independent ethnic-based Romanian “national economy” in Transylvania.¹

During the period under consideration (the half century after the Compromise of 1867), the Romanian population of Transylvania had a markedly less industrial character than the Hungarian and Saxon populations in terms of its occupational structure. In 1900, more than 86% of the Romanians attained a living by “primary production” (wage-earners and dependents), while a mere 6.4% earned their living in mining, metallurgy, industry, commerce, finances and transport.² Only 1.4% worked in civil and church service or in liberal professions (at the same time, among the Magyars this stratum made up almost 5%, while among the Saxons only a bit less). This means that if one is to identify a process of embourgeoisment among Romanians, one must look at the peasantry.³

Naturally, it is the backwardness and the misery of the peasantry that is generally reflected in the works of the contemporary observers, but one can hear some other voices as well. As the famous economist Mihail Manoilescu stated: “In the Old Kingdom peasants were too down, while boyars too high to assimilate the bourgeois mentality and way of life. On the other hand, in Transylvania, the rich peasantry and the connected professionals have created a favorable milieu for bourgeois virtues.”⁴

This milieu can be localized mainly in the territory of Königboden (Királyföld/Pămîntul Crâies),⁵ with the flourishing villages near Hermannstadt (Nagyszeben/Sibiu).⁶ The most famous settlement, Săliștea (Szefistye) was considered a model for Romanian embourgeoisment both in a Hungarian sociological questionnaire⁷ and in a Romanian tourist guidebook. In the narration of the latter, the richness of this tiny, purely
Romanian town was derived from sheep-raising in the past, when in the winter flocks were driven to Romania and Bessarabia, as well as to Bulgarian and Turkish territories. These experienced, enterprising people earned their living in commerce. Meanwhile, the village obtained municipal status and became urbanized, with several professional associations.8

The modernization of Romanian peasantry occurred in other villages of this region, such as Rășinari (Resinár), Orlat (Orlát), Gura Rîului (Guraró), or Rehău (Rehó). The developing economy created a stratified society, “which did not bow its thick neck in front of every coat-wearing men.” Folk customs have only partially survived: “Three-day long weddings and funeral feasts are disappearing, in exchange the mourners grant smaller or larger sums of money. Public utilities were established thanks to these donations.”9 I quoted these sentences from the monography of Rășinari, which stressed the solidarity and altruism of the inhabitants, emphasizing their cultural ambitions as well.10

As for the whole of Transylvania, one can point to the spread of middle and larger estates owned by Romanian peasants.11 It was this rising stratum that was considered by contemporaries as the cradle of a would-be Transylvanian Romanian bourgeoisie. As early as 1879, George Baritiu pointed out that one can hardly find Romanians with industrial and commercial property, and the creation of the modern Romanian bourgeoisie was conditioned by the appearance of intelligent and well-to-do elements of the peasantry.12

In the following decades, the young Romanian bourgeoisie preserved their close ties to the agrarian sphere because of family roots and not least because of the estates purchased by its members.13 The general agricultural conscription of 1895 registered 1,068 Romanian land-owners (in the whole Hungarian Kingdom) with over 100 acres (as for Transylvania proper: 693 persons between 100 and 1,000 acres and 26 large land-owners). In 1910, there were 1,249 such persons (or 1,435 persons, tenants included). During the same period, the number of farmers with 50-100 acres increased from 2,975 to 5,500, rising to 6,204 by the end of World War I.14

The formation, economic activity, and national role of the Romanian bourgeoisie were passionately debated. Ernő Éber, representative of the well-informed but prejudiced Hungarian public opinion of the time, accused the Romanian banks of acting at the expense of Romanian and Hungarian smallholders in order to create a stratum of middle landowners.15 The claim that the activity of the Romanian banks was ambiguous appeared in the writings of Romanian contemporaries, too.16 The banks – through their organ, Revista Economică, monthly of the “Romanian Bank Alliance” – considered it necessary to refute these accusations, pointing at
the responsibility and harmful customs of peasant debtors: endless holidays, laziness, irrational entertainment and luxury. The article recognized that peasants often used the money for “non-productive” purposes (baptism, entertainment, cloth and the schooling of their sons – in order to “make gentlemen of them”), and called upon the banks to publish informative booklets on rational investment and, the dangers of excessive loans.17

As for Romanian historiography, in his study on the role of the Romanian banks in strengthening the bourgeois strata, Bujor Surdu focused on the policy of the bank Albina regarding the credit associations.18 In his opinion, banks did not pursue a national policy, they aimed at profitability.19 The author underlined the political power of the banks as well: due to the open ballot, the Romanian voters, “especially the rich peasants,” voted for the candidates of the bank because of their debts and dependence of future borrowing. The urban middle class was also dependent, because many of its members earned their living as lawyers and legal advisors to the bank.20 Vasile Dobrescu, who researched the Romanian elite, provides a subtle analysis of the land estate policy of the banks. They passed over many large estates to the hands of the rich peasantry, but, at the same time, they regularly made their debtors’ lots come under the hammer.21

The Romanian banking networks could not become a national financial system because of their insufficient capital: they could not satisfy all the requests for credit, and, in cases of increased risk, they did not even want to do so.22 It was mostly the urban middle class and the Romanian political elite they sought to promote.23 How broad was this middle class? It is difficult to determine, because the very notion of a middle class was not clear to contemporaries. Sometimes, it denoted the rich peasantry, while Petru Suciu, for example, applied this concept to craftsmen, giving a number of over 26,000 wage-earners (or 50,000 with their dependants).24 The economist Ioan Roman, however, broadened this notion and stated that “the middle class consisted of the so-called honoratarios, clergy, lawyers, teachers, the so-called gentry and, in addition, craftsmen, manufacturers and merchants.”25 These different conceptions can be explained not so much by a methodological divergence, rather by the amorphous state of the Romanian society, where bourgeois elements, landowners and professionals could hardly be sociologically dissociated, as one and the same person often pursued two or three ways of living.26

Irrespective of the actual numbers, contemporaries considered the middle class to be extremely weak, moreover, they called its very existence into question. A decade after the Compromise, Ieronim G. Baritiu urged the rise of the peasantry in order to bring forth the missing bourgeois and intellectual class without which progress is impossible.27 As far as the
intelligentsia is concerned, they thought rather of persons in practical careers, in liberal professions, because they were the only ones capable of leading the national movement.\textsuperscript{28}

The strengthening of this stratum was considered by contemporaries as a national mission and they called for creating a new, more practical \textit{Weltanschauung}. This is clearly expressed by the insurance expert, Ioan I. Lăpedatu, in his speech held in Kronstadt (Brassó/Brașov) in 1904. He urged the Romanian intelligentsia to abandon the purely theoretical orientation and to study instead the actual problems of political economy, finances and statistics.\textsuperscript{29} He referred to the example of Germany where there were many good soldiers, merchants and craftsmen who had been trained in the modernized schools, so that Germany became a fearful rival of England. However, due to their “idealism,” Romanians did not even realize how much could be done through every-day work, although this was the only way they could join the struggle for the natural treasures and commerce of Transylvania. According to Lăpedatu, the natural focus of this national revival was Kronstadt, a city that had become a Romanian cultural center half a century before, due to the generosity of its citizens (through the foundation of the orthodox grammar school).\textsuperscript{30}

Besides the renewal of the urban middle class, the material and moral “revolution” of the villages was outlined by the contemporaries. They had a common slogan: “Let’s found co-operatives!” An article in \textit{Revista Economica} referred to the example of other nations in order to demonstrate the backwardness of Romanians, and to encourage them.\textsuperscript{31} Similarly, in his speech quoted above, Ioan Lăpedatu summarized the history of the co-operative movement that had started in Rochdale, England, in the middle of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. What deserves attention is the emphasis on spiritual and moral development as much as on material benefit: “members of the co-operative learn order, discipline and solidarity.” Looking at this problem from a national perspective, the consumption process of the Romanians should be taken into their own hands, not to be dependent on the expensive products of foreigners. The supervisory board of these co-operatives should have been the economic sections of ASTRA (Literary and Cultural Association of the Romanian People), which was thus given a new function besides its merely theoretical and linguistic activities (i.e., permanent reforms of commercial and legal terminology).\textsuperscript{32}

At the turn of the century, an entire branch of literature was born concerning the co-operatives, consisting of mainly popularizing articles and brochures for the peasantry. Among these works, the most characteristic one is Romul Simu’s utopian booklet on the rebirth of the imaginary village, \textit{Viitorul} (Future). The author, schoolteacher in Orlat, based his book on his personal experience. In the preface, he clearly expressed that intellectuals
should not relegate the task of social advancement to the peasants themselves, but they should pursue it under the leadership of the priest and the schoolteacher. The life of this fictitious village was transformed: besides intensive farming, peasants produced handicrafts as well, which they sold advantageously through their co-operative. Meanwhile, many associations were established (firemen, beautifying the church, a sobriety association, a reading circle, a choir and an orchestra), furthermore, a library and a local branch of ASTRA were also founded. As a token of a brighter future, the school was enlarged and modernized: in the spacious building an increasing number of teachers educated the new generation.

Perhaps, this idyllic situation could be found only in those settlements near Hermannstadt that did not have to be “re-educated” because they had already been developed, nevertheless, the Romanian elite focused on the middle and rich peasantry. They wanted to establish a Transylvanian Romanian agricultural association, which could have become a “national organ,” but the Ministry of Internal Affairs eventually turned down their application, reducing the area of activity to Szeben county. A regional association was established in 1888 and, through its various activities (public lectures, expositions, distribution of improved seeds and breeding animals, founding of co-operatives, etc.), it provided an example for the most ambitious farmers.

As it is clear from Lăpedatu’s speech and Simu’s booklet, the Romanian elite urged the foundation of village banks and credit cooperatives. The first such co-operative was founded in Rășinari, in 1868, due to Visarion Roman’s initiative, symbolizing the co-operation of the intelligentsia and the rich peasantry. After a decade, it came to an end because of an unfavorable economic environment, and, as a result, the peasants were reduced to asking regular banks for credit. As a matter of fact, Visarion Roman’s large-scale plan of establishing a Transylvanian Romanian credit association remained on paper. In his vision, every Romanian should have offered a single cruicer (“penny”) for this enterprise and, in such a way, a capital of ten thousand forints might be gathered, which presumably could have been supplemented with large sums from Romania. The agricultural section of the association might offer advantageous loans to the farmers and, following the example of the Hungarian Erdélyi Gazdasági Egylet (Transylvanian Economic Association), it might elaborate development plans, while the commercial-industrial section might be modeled on the chambers of commerce and industry. As Roman suggested, nothing could be expected from the government, instead, he referred to a Saxon credit institution in order to demonstrate that success could be reached while relying exclusively on the forces of the community.
Instead of this doubtful enterprise, Roman eventually founded the most important Romanian bank, *Albina*.

Although the overwhelming majority of Romanians lived from agriculture, their specialists were aware of the great importance of industrial development and commerce. In the magazine *Economul* (from Blaj/Balázsfalva), Ioan Roman proposed a protectionist economic policy towards the more developed countries, and a similar protection for Transylvania towards Austria and even towards Hungary proper. He deduced the lack of Romanian national industry and commerce from the liberal economic system professed by the Hungarian political elite that sacrificed the economic autonomy of the country in favor of their “unfortunate idea” of Magyarization. Nevertheless, the Romanian elite believed in the possibility of creating a strong “national” industry and commerce only by shopping exclusively at Romanian shops and using the services of Romanian craftsmen. The press highlighted the national importance of this process by pointing out that, with Romanian *crucers* migrating into Romanian hands, a real national wealth could be created.

In reality, the Romanian middle class could not contribute to the development of the manufacturing industry, since its capital was insufficient. Instead, the Romanian elite supported the traditional crafts and domestic industry, encouraging the preservation of traditional costumes, and condemning the use of manufactured textile and ready-made cloth. They insisted on sending talented peasant boys to apprentice schools and, at their “national” exhibitions, they allocated space for the products of the most skillful craftsmen, nimble-fingered peasants, and peasant women.

The organization of exhibitions was considered of national importance, since they demonstrated the ability and creativity of Romanians, supplementing the political efforts that aimed at national emancipation. This was expressed as early as 1862 by Gheorghe Baritiu in his articles concerning the first exhibition: according to him, the main purpose of the exhibition was to change the disdainful opinion that other nations had about Romanians. On its part, the government considered this program a political issue, and forbade the organization of the exhibition in 1881. On the other hand, the Saxon press published appreciative articles about the objects exhibited, as well as about the skills of the Romanian craftsmen. The Romanian newspapers reported the event with enthusiasm. *Telegraful Român*, for example, claimed that the exhibition considerably improved the image of the Romanians of Transylvania.

After this display that demonstrated the dynamism of the Romanian national economy, the exhibition organized by the Astra in 1905 focused on traditional peasant culture (houses, costume), historical documents, literary works and publishing houses, making it clear that the elite
sought legitimation through the cultural values of the nation. An even stronger connection was created between the middle class and the peasantry by the brochures disseminating the new economic conceptions, as witnessed by Romul Simu’s fictive monography. In this respect, the activity of ASTRA served the aim of general education in two ways: it established a rural library network and published cheap books to enrich the stock of these libraries. The first volume of the series Biblioteca poporală appeared in 1900 and the literary, scientific, economic and historical sections of the association published 37 booklets in ten years, generally in 2-3000 copies. In 1910, it was decided that ten brochures and a calendar would be published every year. The number of subscriptions reached 11,851 in 1912, while the number of copies reached 15,000. The successful cultural and educational activities of ASTRA were also recognized by some Hungarian contemporaries, such as the architect Károly Kós. In the Budapesti Hírlap, Kós reported on the fiftieth anniversary meeting of ASTRA with the following – anguished and appreciative – words:

I could see in Balázsfalva some six thousand people flocking together: some gentlemen and ladies from Romania and from all the angles of our country; some prelates, professors, landowners, lawyers and deputies; poor preachers and schoolteachers, craftsmen, merchants and countrymen – a whole society. These numerous and different people came here all from enthusiasm, on their own choice; not to drink, not to revel, but only to enthuse, to learn, to listen to their leaders and to engrave those words upon their memory in order to take home, for another ten years, some love of work and national consciousness to those who remained at home. We, Hungarians, cannot imitate them.

By the turn of the century, the leading cultural association of the Romanians became an extensive national institution (by the end of 1906, its property was worth 884,812 koronas). Besides this, many other voluntary associations and charity foundations existed. The crowning of these efforts was the creation of special schools and high schools. A high commercial school already existed in Kronstadt and contemporaries spoke of it enthusiastically. Nevertheless, an agricultural school was even more necessary as a primary condition for the economic emancipation of the Romanian peasants. As far as higher education is concerned, the first resolution of Blaj, in May 1848, demanded an independent Romanian university at state expense. Of course, this demand was quite unrealistic, even in peacetime: in December 1850, the Minister of Education, Leo Thun, told the Romanian delegates who petitioned him for a Romanian philosophical and a law faculty in Kolozsvár (Cluj/Klausenburg) that it was
impossible for the state to establish universities on ethnic basis, but the nationalities could do it at their own expense. In 1866, after a debate lasting more than a decade, a national collection was initiated for a law academy and an agricultural college. From direct donations, incomes of balls and performances, only twenty thousand forints were accumulated by 1883 (it was estimated that the interests of a deposit around 600,000 forints would have been necessary to run the faculty). Finally, this sum was used for the building of a girls’ school in Hermannstadt. This action demonstrated, on the one hand, the organizational skills and initiative of the elite and, on the other hand, the general poverty of Romanian society.

It was exactly this duality that characterized the situation of the Romanians living in Hungary. Their middle class – comprising the bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia and the professionals – lived on the level of the Transylvanian middle class, establishing the largest provincial bank and the richest private foundation of Hungary. It financed a national cultural association, there were some grammar schools of high standard, and the idea of a Romanian college was also popular. The peasantry became differentiated, a middle stratum was born, evoking the admiration and envy of the elite of Romania, and the most developed regions became models of embourgeoisement. But these strata could not redeem the general backwardness and poverty of Transylvania that led to the stagnation of agrarian technology and to the collapse of traditional craftsmanship, connected with the upsurge of a new manufacturing industry, which was not Romanian. With this background, the creation of a strong industrial and commercial entrepreneur class was virtually impossible and these conditions did not favor the creation of a dynamic network of economic relations that could be considered an independent Romanian “national economy” in Transylvania.

NOTES

1 The question remains, whether the separate treatment of Transylvanian Romanian social development, disconnected from the global context of Hungary, is a permissible mode of analysis at all. In my opinion, it is a legitimate subject, because the “Romanian society” – similarly to other non-Hungarian peoples of the country – evolved in other directions than the Hungarian one: from religious and linguistic perspectives it was a second-class minority; it lost (through a long process of assimilation) its nobility; and, due to its inferior situation, it did not assimilate sizeable bourgeois elements, and could not create a genuine Romanian stratum of industrial or merchant entrepreneurs. Its promising microsocieties were swept away as the challenge of the more competitive foreign capital became more acute, such as in the case of the Romanian levantine
merchant bourgeoisie of Kronstadt (Brassó, Brașov). In addition, one must remember that the percentage of Romanians in the public administration, being relatively high in the absolutistic Bach-era (1850-1859), gradually decreased after the Compromise (1867), and only the church, the basic education and the liberal professions offered more promising career opportunities. Finally, one can examine the Transylvanian Romanian embourgeoisment process in itself (though not isolated from other contexts) because the contemporaries have also envisioned it as an autonomously developing “national society,” or “national space.”

2 These proportions in the case of the Magyar population were 63.0% and 22.0% respectively, while in the case of Germans (Saxons) 60.0% and 28.0%, respectively. See Zoltán Szász, ed., Erdély története (History of Transylvania), vol. 3 (Budapest: Akadémiai, 1986), p. 1569.

3 As Ákos Egyed, a specialist in the history of Transylvanian peasantry, put it: “The process of embourgeoisment has led to relevant changes in the economic and social relations of every ethnic group, though undoubtedly not to the same extent. A unilateral reliance on the statistics may even be misleading. When researchers give some figures in order to prove the backwardness of a certain ethnic group, for example that 98.18% of Ukrainians in Galicia, 90.10% of Romanians in Hungary and 86.0% of Croatians belonged to the agrarian population in 1900, they are not inaccurate, but their interpretation is one-sided. For, as it is well known, the process of embourgeoisment advanced, more or less successfully, among the peasantry, too. … For this reason, the study of the process of embourgeoisment in the case of agrarian societies requires special approaches and methods.” Egyed Ákos, “Polgárosodás, etnikum, udvar” (Embourgeoisment, ethnicity and the Court), in Polgárosodás és modernizáció a Monarchiában (Embourgeoisment and modernization in the Monarchy), Special issue of the review Műhely (1993), p. 43.


5 In order to circumvent different national exclusivisms, references to geographical entities feature all the relevant languages. In the case of villages, cities and regions, the first place was given to the language of the community that determined the ethnic and cultural character of the given settlement. In the case of administrative units (e.g., counties) of the time, the official – Hungarian – name is used.

6 Surely, this area was the most developed region of Transylvania, with the best conditions for the process of embourgeoisment. “Studying this question in an adequate way, we can find that the Saxon agrarian area represented a more advantageous pattern of embourgeoisment than e.g., a mining area grappling with continuous crisis and with its destructiveness towards the environment.” Egyed, “Polgárosodás, etnikum, udvar,” p. 43. As far as the Romanians were concerned, let us listen to the opinion of a contemporary, coming from Romania. Constantin Stere, the ideologue of poporanism (a socio-cultural stream aiming at rural embourgeoisment based on cooperatives and associations), who repeatedly came to Transylvania, visited the flourishing Sâliștea (Szeben
county). In his article, he warmly described the activities of the local co-operative and the self-consciousness of the inhabitants: “Hats off to these free people, who are proud of being peasants, who have never lived in serfdom, who have been able to block the voraciousness of the council of Sibiu and who will prevent every future attempt of subjection too, implementing the idea of a healthy, stable democracy in their wonderful rural life that is really a Romanian one.” See Zigu Ornea, Viata lui C. Stere (The Life of C. Stere), vol. 1 (Bucharest: Cartea Românească, 1989), pp. 384-385.

7 “During the elaboration of the questionnaire, it was impossible to start from the romantic preconception that genuine Romanian peasants can be studied only in Sălîstea,” because “unfortunately, such flourishing Romanian villages, similar to Sălîstea, can hardly be found yet.” Róbert Braun, “A falu lélektana” (The psychology of the village), Húszadik Század 5-6 (1913), p. 548.

8 “It has got such an élan in its development since 1860 that today it is one of the little towns of our country. It has some paved streets, many large and beautiful buildings, a district notary and a deputy sheriff, a post and telegraph office, weekly market, large shops etc. and more cultural institutions. … Eight teachers work in the upper school, there is a reading circle or casino, an association of firemen, another one of artisans and a savings bank.” Silvestru Moldovan, Tara nôstră: Descrerea părtîlor Ardéltui dela Mureș spre médâ-di și valea Murâsului (Our land: Description of the parts of Transylvania south of river Mures and the Mures valley) (Sibiu: 1894), pp. 129-131.


10 “The inhabitants have a spirit of community and generosity, too. It has its evidence in the establishing and maintaining of relatively numerous social, cultural and charity institutions financed from the donations of some rich land-holders, some children [i.e., heirs] while sharing their heritage, some young people before their marriage, and some mourners, perpetuating the memory of their beloved. The ‘Mitrea Aleman,’ ‘Sâguna’ and ‘Dâncâs Emilian’ foundations, the women’s association, the reading society, etc. all spend thousands on clothes for pupils, scholarships for students, aiding the poor old people, those who are not able to work and those mentally ill. Rășinari already possessed an ambitious intelligentsia too, but this was not the case in the past. There were enough rich sheep-owners living here before, who could have afforded to send their children to school, but they rather sent them up to the mountains, where the children were growing up without care. … Thanks to the recent educational reforms, these disadvantages disappeared, bringing the benefits of general culture. The village has an excellently equipped and organized school with seven teachers, with the mission to spread the culture. … The younger generation of Rășinari, brought up by rigorous religious principles in the family, once rising to higher social positions, shows self-conscious and warm patriotism, firm awareness of its duties, and an impeccable way of living.” Pâcală, “A Nagyszeben vidéki resinárok lakóhelye és életviszonyai,” p. 325.

11 It was realized, on the one hand, by parcelling some large estates (in general Hungarian), and, on the other hand, by selling at auctions some (mainly Romanian) smaller farms. At the turn of the century, Transylvania underwent
a significant transfer of landed property, which generated, mostly on the Hungarian side, a polemic literature. A stratum of Romanian large estate holders started to be formed, though it was proportionally much less significant in the Romanian society than in the case of their Hungarian counterparts. However, as far as the middle estates between 50 and 100 Hungarian acres were concerned, their social weight did not differ that much: within the Hungarian society they represented 0.74%, while in the Romanian one 0.49%. But 47.4% of the total middle estate territory of Transylvania was owned by Romanian farmers, while their Hungarian counterparts held only 40.8%. See Zoltán Szász, “Az erdélyi román polgárság szerepéről 1918 őszén” (On the role of the Romanian bourgeoisie of Transylvania in autumn 1918), Századok 2 (1972), p. 305.


13 In 1907, among the 715 members of the Romanian agricultural association of Szeben county, there were only 128 rich peasants, while the remaining 587 persons earned a living as priests, teachers, lawyers, doctors and officials, although many of them joined the association in their quality of landowners. Sometimes the very term middle class appears in these sources in the sense of a landowner of an estate of 100-200 acres. See Dobrescu, Elita românească în lumea satului transilvan, 1867-1918, pp. 23-24.


15 See Ernő Éber, Fajok harca: Adatok az erdélyi nemzetiségi kérdéshez (The fight of the races: Contributions to the nationality question in Transylvania) (Budapest: 1905), p. 168. Antal Bodor, a well-known financial expert, held a similar opinion in his study on the bank system of Transylvania: the Hungarian peasant, when he is in difficulties and “he is not given more money by the Hungarian bank, goes to the Romanian savings bank, where he always gets enough money at a high interest rate.” In his opinion, Romanian banks were ruining Romanian and Hungarian peasants alike. “Because of their high operational expenses, two third of them offer to their clients of low income loans at 15-20% – by adding various fees – instead of the legal 8%. In fact, land could be disencumbered only through mortgage, but this category represents only some 9.5 million koronas from the actual credit stock of Romanian banks, while the quantity of bill credits with guarantors that are extremely disadvantageous for farmers amounts to almost 26.5 million. In such a way, people are made vagabonds, dangerous elements for public safety. The reason for this was the fritterness of the financial institutions: they are founded to offer a stable existence, moreover a quick way of getting rich for the unpropertied members of the minority intelligentsia.” Antal Bodor, “Az erdélyrészi pénzintézetek” (The Transylvanian banks), Közgazdasági Szemle (December 1904), p. 932.

16 The sociologist Petru Suciu underlined the personal responsibility of peasants: “Our banks started their activity not very succesful as for our peasants who did not understand the importance and role of borrowed money. ... With an infantile rashness they wasted it for unnecessary things and they forgot to pay the interest in due time.” Then came the executors and the peasants “went to America. But the situation changed at the turn of the century: loans were used rationally, invested in large proportion in land” often through the medium of

Chapter X provided for the establishing of rural credit associations, because it was their collective guarantee that could assure the repayment of the loans. But the leadership liquidated them in three years with the argument that peasants had behaved light-headed and they had not observed the payment deadlines. In the author’s opinion, the bank in fact considered the profit too small, as it could circulate its money in more profitable operations than the long-term mortgage loans. See Bujor Surdu, “Aspecte privind rolul bâncilor în consolidarea burgheziei românesti din Transilvania pînă la primul război mondial” (Some aspects of the role of banks in the consolidation of the Romanian bourgeoisie in Transylvania up to the First World War), in Anuarul Institutului de istorie din Cluj 5 (1962), pp. 186-187.

Surdu seeks to answer the accusation of the contemporary Hungarian propaganda that the Romanian banks aimed at a deliberate transfer of Hungarian “national” estates into Romanian hands through parcelling. He points out that at the bidding only the local smallholders had chances (they were given bank loans), and the respective estates were situated in regions inhabited by Romanians. Thanks to the Romanian banks, the rich peasantry became stronger, while the middle and poor strata declined. Surdu, “Aspecte privind rolul bâncilor,” pp.195-196.

In 1913, the Hungarian banks lent mortgage loans worth more than 21 million koronas to Romanian smallholders. This sum approximates the total value of agrarian investments of the Romanian banks, while the Saxon banks lent some 15 millions. On the other hand, Romanian banks lent some 5.7 millions to Hungarian owners. Surdu, “Aspecte privind rolul bâncilor,” p. 194.

Their importance in the social development – compared to the situation in Romania – is also highlighted by Hungarian researchers: “While beyond the Carpathians the leading political groups, based on the merchant class, created a political oligarchy interested mainly in the finances, on this side of the mountains it was possible to shape a banking bourgeoisie that could become a strong middle class within the Hungarian society.” Miskolczy, A brassói román levantei kereskedõpolgárság kelet-nyugati közvetítõ szerepe (1780-1860), p. 173.


A Hungarian pamphleteer, Pál Farkas, tried to map the middle class by using data from 28 counties of the eastern part of the Great Hungarian Plain and Transylvania. He considered the popas (priests, 3,223 persons) and the school-teachers (2,951 persons) as a transitional stratum between the peasantry and
the middle class; in remote localities, this stratum “sinks into its milieu, while in the larger and more wealthy villages it takes part in the general activity of the intelligentsia – in the process of getting rich.” One must add the 371 Romanian village notaries; besides them “the Romanian intelligentsia is reduced to a very narrow group,” in which the most numerous were the middle and smallholders (1,068 persons), though, at the same time, they were lawyers, doctors or clerks, too. One should focus on the *circa* 400 bank functionaries, while other occupations are more sporadically represented. “Thus, the Romanian middle class that acts in the name of, and against, three million people, consists of two thousand persons.” See Farkas Pál, *Az oláh kérdésről* (On the oláh [i.e., Romanian] question) (Budapest: Singer és Wolfner, 1907), pp. 19-22. The author emphasized the egoistic mentality of this middle class: “The oláh lawyers, bank directors, popas, or schoolmasters are very reserved admirers of sandalled peasants.” Farkas quotes Iuliu Maniu’s public statement that “what we need here at home are not smallholders, but a strong Romanian middle landowner class.” See Farkas, *Az oláh kérdésről*, pp. 13-14. Moreover, Éber (in *Fajók harca*, p.168) and Bodor (in his “Az erdélyrészi pénzintézetek.” p. 932), expressed the same opinion. Contrary to Farkas’s underestimated figures, Petru Suciu gave a five times higher number for the widely defined intelligentsia (public service, public health system, churches, education, etc.). Suciu, “Clasele sociale ale românilor,” p. 702, while Zoltán Szász estimated the middle class at some fifty thousand people at the outbreak of World War I. Szász, “A román polgárság,” p. 306.

27 “While we do not have educated and well-to-do peasants, we will not have a bourgeoisie either.” See Dobrescu, *Elita românească în lumea satului transilvan, 1867-1918*, p. 22.

28 “Lawyers and bank functionaries were the first conscious conquerors in the cities of Transylvania. We had some churches and even some confessional schools, but they could do little for saving the national creed. Only the Romanian liberal professions introduced a new period in the life of the Transylvanian towns: the age of open struggle for the penetration of Romanian element.” Suciu, “Clasele sociale ale românilor,” p. 701.

29 Professionals, living in the same town, “would form an alliance for coming together every two weeks, or even more frequently, to discuss and study the actual economic, financial and social issues that we should have an interest in. … It was hard at the beginning, of course, maybe we would not have any topic to discuss, we would laugh at each other as it is our custom, but with time we started to understand this thing. …These circles produced some studies, some ideas to keep others informed about the spirit of real life, so the process, which we needed so much, started: a spiritual movement towards the practical life.” Ioan I. Lăpedatu, *Probleme sociale și economice: Ajuță-te și Dumnezeu te va ajuta* (Social and economic problems: Help yourself and God will help you) (Brașov, 1904), pp. 23-24.


221
“We could all show some villages that became wealthy or even flourishing, thanks to the priest, the schoolteacher and some other leaders. In contrast, we could name such villages that degenerated and got to the margins of the abyss mainly because of the faults of their leaders.” Romul Simu, *Comuna ‘Viitorul:’ Sfaturi și pilduiri pentru înaintarea unui sat prin sine însuși* (The commune “Viitorul” [Future]: Advice and examples for the advancement of a village by its own forces) (Sibiu, 1907), p. 1. The first step was to persuade the people to attend church; the religious education for children and the forming of a church choir were followed by the establishment of a school for adults, and only after the dissolution of the darkness in the peasants’ heads could the priest set to the modernization of the economy. The savings bank was the signpost of the bourgeois way of living and the means of procuring modern machines, improved grafts, seeds and breeding animals: “Step by step we will urge everybody to use the money rationally, not for hospitalities, funeral feasts, confectioned clothes and a lot of useless and often unnecessary things, but for things that make the farmer’s wealth and improve him spiritually, too.” Simu, *Comuna ‘Viitorul,’”* p. 30.


Earlier, he was the editor of *Telegraful Român*, afterwards he taught at Rășinari, and, eventually, he became the inspector of the “Transilvania” insurance association and one of the founders of *Albina*, the most important Romanian bank in the province. He had a crucial influence upon the financial institution of Rășinari, which started immediately to stagnate after his departure, and finally went bankrupt in 1881. See Bujor Surdu, “Societatea de păstrare și împrumut din Rășinari” (The savings and credit association of Rășinari), *Acta Musei Napocensis* 3 (1966), pp. 317 and 322-323.

Surdu, “Societatea de păstrare,” pp. 327-328

“A nation can become free and independent only to the extent it can manufacture and sell some products”, since “industry is the center, which, like the Sun, diffuses light and warmth upon all agricultural goods; no serious development is possible without it and the whole economic activity of a nation turns around it, like the planets turn around the Sun.” See Nicolae Cordos, “Problema industrializării în paginile revistei ‘Economul’ din Blaj (1873-1880)” (The problem of industrialization in the review “Economul” from Blaj, 1873-1880), *Acta Musei Napocensis* 13, p. 533.

Cordos, “Problema industrializării”, p. 534.

“We will go to Romanian shops, we will give our crucers into our sons’ hands and from the profit no synagogue will be built, no enemies of the nation will be fed, but such sons will be supported who have the nation and the church at their heart, and, from the money received from the Romanian nation, a national wealth will emerge.” B...a, “Cei mulți înainte!” (Go ahead, multitude!), *Revista Orăștiei*, 28 October 1895, p. 2.

*Revista Economică* underlined not so much the aesthetic, rather the financial aspect of the problem: “Romanian money moves to foreign pockets. But if some Romanian girls could be sent abroad with scholarships to learn the art of mechanical weaving, it would be possible to found some factories of our
own....We would have our own factories with Romanian workers, they would assure us consumer goods and we would not be debtors of everybody any longer.” S., “Industria noastrã de casã” (Our home industry), Revista Economicã 1 (10 July 1899), p. 291.

41 The exhibition was organized “in order to present themselves to those who were always crying that Romanians had no crafts, no agriculture and no fine arts.” See Vasile Vesa, “Aspecte ale activitãþii cultural-politice a burgheziei române din Transilvania la sfîrºul sec. XIX si începutul sec. XX” (Some aspects of the cultural-political activites of the Romanian bourgeoisie in Transylvania at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century), Acta Musei Napocensis 3 (1966), p. 538.

42 Vesa, “Aspecte ale activitãþii cultural-politice a burgheziei române din Transilvania,” pp. 539 and 541.


44 These exhibitions – besides the “national” ones, many others were organized by the Romanian Agricultural Association of Szeben county, by the Association of Romanian Journeymen of Hermannstadt, and by the different women’s associations – served not only the aim of strenghtening the solidarity of Romanians living on the two sides of the Carpathians (in 1905, some two thousand visitors came from Romania) but, at the same time, to establish closer links between the middle class and the peasantry, hence local committees had to be set up everywhere in order to gather the necessary objects and to organize the travel to the exhibition. See Vesa, “Aspecte ale activitãþii cultural-politice a burgheziei române din Transilvania,” p. 544.


46 Statistics show that these publications were really popular: for instance, in 1912, of 11,852 readers, 9,536 were peasants and 736 craftsmen. On the other hand, the fragile financial situation of the public is reflected by the fact that, in 1913, the number of subscribers dropped to 7664 because of the global overproduction crisis and rise of taxes. As for the topics of the series, various booklets were published with belletristic, historical, economic, hygienic, educational, religious, and folkloristic contents. See Glodariu, “Din activitatea editorialã a Astrei,” pp. 314-318.


48 One could mention here the “Society for Creating a Fund of a Romanian Theatre” that, in 1907, had a fund of some four hundred thousand koronas, giving scholarship grants, announcing competitions for original plays and financing many performances; or the “Romanian National Cultural Association of Arad” and the similar association in Máramaros (Maramureº). The conpossessors of Karánsebes (Caransebes) and Naszód (Nasãud) also spent significant sums on scholarships. But all these funds were surpassed by the largest private fund of Hungary, the Gozsdu Fund (having a property of 6,493,055 koronas at the beginning of 1907) supporting orthodox pupils who studied in
secondary schools, as well as university students (in the academic year 1906-1907, the total number of bursaries was 177). For more details about the Romanian church, cultural, educational and economic institutions, see Antal Huszár, A magyarországi Románok: Bizalmas használatra (The Romanians of Hungary: For confidential purposes) (Budapest: 1907) and Veritas, A magyarországi románok egyházi, iskolai, közművelődési, közigazdasági intézményeinek és mozgalmainak ismertetése (Description of the church, school, educational, cultural and economic institutions and movements of the Romanians in Hungary) (Budapest: 1908). Besides these large funds, many well-to-do peasants, schoolmasters, notaries established little funds for enlarging the school and offering scholarships for talented pupils. For instance, Iacob Zorca, retired notary of Vlădeni (Vledény, Brassó county) established a fund of one thousand forints in 1895 for the schooling of orthodox girls. See Iacob Zorca, Monografia comunei Vlădeni (Monography of the commune Vlădeni) (Sibiu: 1896), p. 101.

49 “Scoala comercială superioară română din Brașov” (The commercial college of Brasov), Revista Economică 1 (10 August 1899), pp. 350-352.

50 “Those nations who are not able to profit from the new scientific explorations, will become poorer, degenerate, come under the yoke of others and, eventually, will disappear from among the nations.” Since it is the peasantry that the nation is based on, it must be supported in its efforts of economic emancipation. S., “Lipsa unei şcoale de agricultură” (The lack of an agricultural school), Revista Economică 1 (10 August 1899), pp. 321 and 324.

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Veritas. A magyarországi románok egyházi, iskolai, közmûvelôdési, kögzazdasági intézményeinek és mozgalmainak ismertetése (Description of the church, school, educational, cultural and economic institutions and movements of the Romanians in Hungary). Budapest: 1908.


The production of identity is a process organized by, and, at the same time, organizing our experiences and interactions. Two of the main components of identity-construction on which the present study ponders are ethnicity and citizenship. Ethnicity, as a cultural concept, and citizenship, as an organizational concept, both affect the way we conceive of ourselves, the way we present ourselves, and the way we relate to other individuals and to various situations. Similarly, others’ representation and perception of our ethnicity, as well as the value-judgments they assign to our citizenship, structure the identity-image we attach to ourselves. It is exactly this process of self-identification and identification of the other that constitutes the incentive for writing this study.

The structure of the process is dual. One set of rules applies both to the mechanisms of self-identification and to the mechanisms of identifying the other. Relations of neighborhood, work, friendship, competition and everyday interaction reveal peculiarities attributed to “the other,” and objectify one’s own self-image. Another set of rules animates mechanisms of identification in terms of “us” and “them,” which are often formalized through institutionalized notions of belonging, such as nationality and citizenship. These mechanisms are often symmetric – that is, they follow the same logic, but produce opposite results. One can objectify the structure of these concurrent processes in many instances: in the discourse constructed about our own identity, the evaluation of elements of our own culture, the interpretation of historical episodes of one’s people, marital strategies, linguistic practices, and so on.

This study is not intended to exhaust the topic of identity production. Instead, it examines a number of key issues, as they have been revealed in empirical investigations. My analysis employs a constructivist view on the nation, as elaborated by the theorists of nationalism, who associate it with aspects of modernization. Though I am reluctant to acknowledge the actuality and compelling quality of a “community of history and destiny” that essentialists profess, I nevertheless admit the social and emotional reality of nations, as basic operators in a widespread system of social classification. The idea of the nation is naturalized in the form of durable dispositions, of structured and structuring structures that function as practices and representa-
Nations are ineluctably related to states, as a means to legitimize competing power claims and institutional goals. It is a mutually reinforcing relationship, as states relentlessly redefine the content of their relation with their subjects, thus creating an arena of political struggles for membership in and “ownership” of the nation. The organization of the political system and the way it institutionalizes membership in the political community provides a framework for constructing the nation and nationhood. Thus the ethno-cultural component of identity, understood as an instrument to organize perception and action, is imbued with political connotations. Consequently, ethnicity and nationality are interchangeable terms in this study. In any of the wordings, they are conceived of as crucial for the identity of the actors.

The following sections are devoted to various issues of self-identification and identification of the other concerning the Romanians and Hungarians living in Romania, with a particular concern for the latter. At this point, the author acknowledges her “situation” of being an ethnic Romanian from Transylvania. It is therefore the perspective of an ethnic Romanian, with an advanced degree in sociology, and interacting on a continuous basis with ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania, that is presented in the following. Even though the considerations of this study are based on the particular case of Romanians and Hungarians living in Transylvania, I believe that their pertinence can be extended to other cases that are similar in some relevant respects.

Two Historical Processes

The modernization process in Romania encompassed ethnicity, understood as “ethnolinguistically or ethnoreligiously embedded culture,” as the constitutive element of the nation-state. Once the unification of the territories inhabited by Romanians was accomplished, supplementing the efforts of economic and social integration, the political elite in Bucharest opted for a policy of homogenizing nation-building, which aimed at merging both the “regional identities” and the minority ethnic groups (particularly the Hungarians) into the body of the Romanian nation.

Communist ideology and policies tackled the problem of the state in a different manner. Nicolae Ceausescu’s personalized rule can be best expressed as one where no individual, group or institution escaped the arbitrary intervention of the ruler, in the public space as well as the private. As elsewhere in the former communist block, nationality was shaped through institutionalized forms. At the same time, as Katherine Verdery showed, the recourse of the communist party to the national ideology and the intellectuals’ continuous elaboration of the national idea indigenized and overthrew the Marxist discourse.
I claim that the production of the present-day identities of Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania is essentially structured by these two historical processes, besides the emotional and symbolic heritage of the common history within the Habsburg Empire. In Transylvania, the first historical process meant the demotion of a national group, as the Hungarians lost their administrative positions together with all the privileges associated with a politically dominant ethnicity. This was accompanied by the political and cultural rise of the formerly subjugated ethnic group: the Transylvanian Romanians. At the level of elite discourse, “Transylvanism,” the ideology of the Transylvanian Hungarian elite, born as a result of the separation of Transylvania from Hungary, was symptomatic for the Hungarian trauma of territorial and symbolic loss. In contrast, the Romanian reaction included various integrationist ideological productions.

The second historical process injured both national groups. The national ideology developed during Ceaușescu’s rule was, in fact, a form of de-nationalization of the Romanians themselves, rooted in a need to mystify national history according to the logic of an immanent communist society, and to legitimize the communist leader who represented himself as the symbol of the “novel” social and mental structures of the Romanian society. This process of “modernization” and of “new” nation-building affected the Hungarians as well. During this period of time, they also witnessed a further demotion of their national group in terms of the status of the education in Hungarian language.

Conceptual Framework

The fall of the totalitarian system in December 1989 produced the reformulation of arguments (and fears) regarding the nation and the state, thus consecrating the language of debates that were carried within a different institutional context and following different rules of communication than before. One may argue that the national discourse was a constitutive part of the process of re-institutionalization of the Romanian society, especially in the spheres of education, local administration, and party-politics.

Therefore, such an analysis necessitates a relational perspective.\textsuperscript{15} The identities that the majority population and the minority groups construct (both self-identities and identities of the other), as well as the relationship between them, are shaped not only by recent history, but also by the continuous struggles to legitimate their discourses and actions within the current Romanian political field. Both the majority and the minority elites seek positions of domination, trying to define the legitimate values and symbolic capitals, and imposing perception schemes that would serve their aims and goals.
The most powerful conceptual framework to analyze the relationship between the majority and the minority and, more specific, the production of identities, was recently proposed by Rogers Brubaker. He devised a conceptual construct to encompass the complex relationship between the majority and the minority, between the minority and the national state, as well as between cultural identity, national identity and citizenship. Brubaker’s conceptual construct comprises the relational triadic nexus of “nationalizing states,” “national minorities” and “external national homelands.” The word “nationalizing” instead of “national” suggests that the political and cultural elites of these ethnically heterogeneous states “promote (to various degrees) the language, culture, demographic position, economic flourishing, or political hegemony of the nominally state-bearing nation.” This is a part of a larger process of strengthening the state through social-political and economic integration.

The national minority enters this relationship to the degree it represents a substantial, self-conscious, and organized community. It demands, by means of elite discourse and political action, cultural or political autonomy, and reacts to perceived discrimination or assimilation policies. As Brubaker argues, a state becomes an “external national homeland” when its political or cultural elites decide that their co-ethnics living in other states are members of one and the same nation. They claim that these co-ethnics “belong,” in some sense, to the state, and assert that their condition must be monitored and their interests protected and promoted by the state: when the state actually does take action in the name of monitoring, promoting, or protecting the interests of its ethnonational kin abroad.

**Socialization and Citizenship**

Hungarians from Transylvania acquire their first framework of identification within the symbolic space of a Hungarian family. Their world is constituted by relations and references centered on Hungarian cultural elements: language, celebrations, traditions, religious rituals, legends, myths, stories, and specific costume. As the child matures, his relationship with the outside world becomes more diversified and complex, as his schemes of perception develop and become contoured. He begins to make use of classifications, classifying criteria, distinction markers and signs.

In this process, the relationship with “the other” (i.e., ethnic Romanians) represents a constitutive element in the shaping of dispositions. The interaction with “the other” fulfills several functions, such as experiencing and recognizing diversity; organizing this diversity so that certain cate-
categories are produced, evaluated and hierarchized; and employing these categories in the production of self-definition and definition of the other, through operations of ascription and opposition. Ties established with Romanians help them understand and define their relationship with the Romanian state and its institutions (on the one hand, through interactions with Romanian employees working in the various institutions; on the other hand, with Romanians as representatives of a culture that marks the character of the state).

The bonds with the Romanian state undergo a qualitative change when the person, belonging to the (Hungarian) minority, realizes his or her situation of being a citizen of Romania, a state bearing the name of another nation. Perhaps one of the first encounters with the Romanian state is the experience of acquiring the first identity card. In many cases, this moment also represents an opportunity to assert a person’s own ethnic belonging. The relationship with the Romanian state is continuous and stable, since Romanian institutions structure the activity and everyday life of the ethnic Hungarian citizen: education, work, leisure, etc. In fact, the Hungarian is accommodated within the Romanian state as much as any Romanian. To be dissatisfied with the performance of state institutions and to express this fact is as natural and legitimate for him as would be for any ethnic Romanian.

But once the Hungarian relates himself to the other state, to the external homeland, his existence as citizen of the Romanian state alters. The direct experience of the institutions and the people of the homeland (much increased after 1989 by the free travel between the two countries) modifies both the continuous process of identity-construction, and the way he relates to the Romanian state. Having experienced the functioning of the administration and institutions of the homeland, the Hungarian from Romania redefines his understanding and assessment of the performance of the Romanian state institutions accordingly. A dissatisfaction with the performance of institutions is gradually doubled by a dissatisfaction with the performance of the Romanian state compared to the Hungarian state. In fact, this process of “ethnicizing” assessments and interactions is often present in situations characterized by inconvenience, tension, or conflict, while objectively they are independent of the ethnic variable of the actors.

The relationship with the Romanian state is once more redefined according to the expectations of the Hungarian with respect to the external homeland. The political and cultural elites from Hungary repeatedly asserted that the ethnonational kin abroad have a special relation to the Hungarian state, as members of the Hungarian nation. This discourse legitimizes the expectations of Hungarians abroad with regard to
the protection of their interests and provision of particular rights. Yet, these interests are expressed and represented by the political and cultural elites of the Hungarian minority in Romania (Transylvania). Obviously, there is a homology between the politics pursued by Budapest and the dynamics of the Hungarian minority elite in Romania. Thus, the “civic” identity of the Hungarians in Romania is substantially influenced by the positions taken by the Romanian state in devising and implementing legislation with respect to national minorities, local administration, and education; by the positions taken by the Hungarian state expressed in the degree and form of responsibility assumed for the ethnonational kin abroad; and by the relations between the two states. The Hungarians in Romania tend to be dissatisfied and frustrated by their membership in the Romanian polity, as the data in Table 1 suggests.

Table 1. Degrees of agreement with the following statement: “I would rather be a Romanian citizen than a citizen of any other country”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Romanians</th>
<th>Hungarians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fully agree</td>
<td>57.2%</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather agree</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather disagree</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully disagree</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Irina Culic, István Horváth and Marius Lazăr, *Ethnobarometer: Interethnic Relations in Romania* (Cluj-Napoca: Research Center for Interethnic Relations – CCRIT, 2000). Random multi-cluster multi-stratified samples for the Romanian population, N=1253 and the Hungarian population, N=798. In the national weighted sample, the Hungarians were 10 times over-represented, and the Romanians from Szeklerland were 57 times over-represented. 22

There are several reasons behind these responses. However, the Hungarians’ institutional situation as a national minority in Romania is only a minor reason. The Hungarians in Romania currently enjoy most cultural rights. 23 In Marshall’s terms of citizenship, 24 Hungarians enjoy the same membership in the political community as Romanians, and their economic situation is not different from that of the Romanians. 25 Any actual disadvantage arises as a result of contextual factors such as ethnic distribution in a specific locality, but this holds true for Romanians as well. 26 There are more important reasons, in my opinion, that account for the Hungarians’ dissatisfaction with Romanian citizenship. The frustrating experience of Hungarians traveling abroad as Romanian citizens – identified, labeled and treated as “Romanians” – is particularly illustra-

232
tive. That is, situations when Hungarians feel that Romanian features (mostly of negative connotation) are unjustly assigned to them are important sources of dissatisfaction. The following data provide insight to the extent of this feeling.27

TABLE 2. Degrees of agreement with the following statement: “Certain things make me feel ashamed of being a Romanian citizen.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Romanians</th>
<th>Hungarians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fully agree</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>56.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather agree</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather disagree</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully disagree</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Culic, Horváth and Lazár, Ethnobarometer: Interethnic Relations in Romania.

Another reason is the perceived situation of Romania within the region, not least compared to Hungary. Obviously, the ethnic Hungarians’ experience of the institutions of the Romanian state is very similar to what Romanians themselves experience. Nevertheless, they feel entitled to receive all the extra benefits, not least symbolic, offered by their nationality and national external homeland.28

**Self-Identification and Identification of the “Other”**

According to Table 3, most Romanians identify themselves with a national type. When asked whether they primarily identified with local, regional or national terms, 71.1% of Romanians declared themselves simply “Romanians.”


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romanian</td>
<td>71.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional type (ardelean, oltean, etc.)</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East-European</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkan</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 suggests that about a quarter of Romanians identify primarily with a regional/local type, thus maintaining a stronger regional than national identity. Closer scrutiny of these respondents reveals that, contrary to some expectations, the dwellers of Transylvania do not tend to identify in regional terms to a greater degree than the average regional identification at national level. (See Table 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage in the sample</th>
<th>Percentage of those who identified in regional terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transylvania</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muntenia</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This is not the case for the rest of Romania. People living in Muntenia tend to identify themselves with a regional type to a relatively lower degree than the rest of the regional groups. In this respect, 77.5% of Muntenians identified themselves in the first place as Romanians, compared to 66.8% of Transylvanians and 63.3% of Moldavians.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Percentage in the sample</th>
<th>Percentage of those who identified themselves in regional terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transylvania</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-West (Crișana, Maramureș)</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banat</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szeklerland</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oltenia</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muntenia</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dobrogea</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bucharest</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 refers to the self-identification of Hungarians in Romania. The authors of Ethnobarometer formulated a list of phrases referring to geographical-cultural differences. The option of being simply “Hungarian” was eluded.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian from Romania</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transylvanian Hungarian</td>
<td>53.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian of Romanian citizenship</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szekler</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The self-identification of Hungarians indirectly account for their relationship with the Romanian state, understood as a territorially centralized set of institutions organizing the activity in – and holding monopoly of force over – a territory. According to Table 6, more than half of the Hungarians (53.0%) chose a regional identification, describing themselves as both Hungarians and Transylvanians. In this way, they distinguished themselves from the Hungarians in Hungary – asserting that they are “another sort” of Hungarians. Nevertheless, they acknowledged being part of the Hungarian nation. Regional identification is, to an important extent, explained by the cultural-historical specificities (including the ethnic distribution) of the respective area. Hungarians identified themselves in regional terms to the following degree: 82.6% in Szeklerland, 65.6% in Transylvania (including the Partium), 55.6% in North-West (Crisana, Maramures), 40% in the Banat. Returning to Table 6, about the same percentage of the Hungarian population chose two “official” or “institutional” definitions: 15.2% of Hungarians identified themselves as “Hungarians from Romania,” respectively 15.8% as “Hungarians of Romanian citizenship.” Both maintain to be part of the Hungarian nation, but in quite different ways. The term “Hungarian of Romanian citizenship” eludes the regional (Transylvanian) identification and stresses the unequivocal identification with the Hungarian nation and the attachment to the people living in the Hungarian national state. Hungarians who identified themselves as such do not perceive themselves different from Hungarians in Hungary in any other way than citizenship. The former term, “Hungarian from Romania,” is adopted by Hungarians who constructed and hold a specific identity, as inhabitants of Romania. They are distinct
from Hungarians who describe themselves as “Transylvanian Hungarians” in the way they envision Transylvania within Romania. By calling themselves “Hungarians from Romania,” they acknowledge that there is something that can be called an integrated Romanian political community, that Transylvania as a province has become culturally similar to the rest of Romania, and that Romanian culture has an important impact on the Hungarians’ way of life.

The presence of the triadic perspective in the self-identification and identification of the other on the part of the members of the Hungarian minority is empirically observable in their answers given to questions concerning their identity, and also in the discourses of the Romanian politicians. This is how the Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania define themselves, in terms of an agreement with statements regarding facts (birthplace, ethnic origin, and residence), cultural factors (language, religion, and tradition) and institutions (state symbols and citizenship).31

Table 7 suggests that, experiencing the situation of being subjects to a nation-state built by and bearing the name of another nation, the Hungarians tend to recognize culture as a marker of national identity to a greater degree than the Romanians (44.7% compared to 23.1%).

Table 7. The definition of Romanian identity by Romanians, and, respectively of Hungarian identity by Hungarians in Romania. The figures represent the cumulated answers for the question: “In your opinion, what are the most important three things for someone to be considered (Romanian/Hungarian)?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Romanians about Romanians (% of cases)</th>
<th>Hungarians about Hungarians (% of cases)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. to be born in (Romania/Hungary)</td>
<td>56.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. to hold (Romanian/Hungarian) citizenship</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. mother tongue is (Romanian/Hungarian)</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. to be baptized by a (Romanian/Hungarian) church</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. to live in (Romania/Hungary)</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. to honor the (Romanian/Hungarian) flag</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. to belong to (Romanian/Hungarian) culture</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. to consider himself (Romanian/Hungarian)</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. to respect the traditions of (Romanians/Hungarians).</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. to speak the (Romanian/Hungarian) language within the family</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Culture functions as a principle of distinction. On the one hand, it comprises elements that simultaneously distinguish the Hungarians from the Romanians and homogenize them (not least in terms of common belonging) under a collective identity. On the other hand, while consecrating their bond with the Hungarian nation and the legitimacy of their alleged attachment to the external national homeland, culture further differentiates them from Hungarians in Hungary.

Only 8.2% of the Hungarians in Transylvania believe that being a Hungarian citizen is essential for being considered a Hungarian. Even more arbitrary, and thus less significant, is the place where one was born and the place where one lives. Birthplace is considered important in national identification by 3.0% of Hungarians, compared to 56.3% of Romanians (this is the most important defining characteristic for the majority group). Residence is of importance for 2.4% of Hungarians, and, respectively, 18.2% of Romanians. The most important feature for Hungarians is the language (82.5%), operating both as a practical and a symbolic means of national self-assertion. Language is one key element of the relationship between Romanians and Hungarians (not least at an institutional level), as it is the most powerful symbolic and institutional element of domination. If citizenship (which may be understood as a bureaucratic, administrative, or institutional element) is not important for the self-identification as an ethnic Hungarian in Transylvania, the situation is opposite in the case of the Hungarian flag, symbolically situated at the confluence of the institutional and the cultural field. Honoring the Hungarian flag receives a more important weight than the one accorded to citizenship (17.3%).

Analytically, the national self-definition of Romanians is a mixed territorial-cultural construct. The Hungarians’ national self-definition is par excellence cultural. Nevertheless, as I indicated before, nation and nationality as systems of categories of perception and practice are shaped by the individual and group relations with the set of institutions (state-territorial, regional, and local, respectively cultural and political) organizing their everyday life.

In order to analyze the internal consistency of these definitions, I examine the correspondent definitions of “the other.” Do Romanians preserve their criteria of identification when they offer definitions of Hungarians? Do Hungarians preserve their criteria of identification when they define the Romanians? In the following table the paired figures are presented:
Table 8. The definition of Romanian identity by Hungarians in Romania, and of Hungarian identity by Romanians. The figures represent the cumulated answers for the question: “In your opinion, what are the most important three things for someone to be considered (Romanian/Hungarian)?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Romanians about Hungarians (% of cases)</th>
<th>Hungarians about Romanians (% of cases)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. to be born in (Romania/Hungary)</td>
<td>48.5%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. to hold (Romanian/Hungarian) citizenship</td>
<td>37.4%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. mother tongue is (Romanian/Hungarian)</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. to be baptized by a (Romanian/Hungarian) church</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. to live in (Romania/Hungary)</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. to honor the (Romanian/Hungarian) flag</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. to belong to (Romanian/Hungarian) culture</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. to consider himself (Romanian/Hungarian)</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>61.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. to respect the traditions of (Romanians/Hungarians)</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. to speak the (Romanian/Hungarian) language within the family</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Culic, Horváth, and Lazăr, *Ethnobarometer: Interethnic Relations in Romania*.

According to Table 8, both Romanians and Hungarians are consistent with their self-definition of identity, though some percentages are in a reversed order. Romanians tend to stress the importance of language and to decrease the importance of birthplace when identifying a person as Hungarian. Conversely, Hungarians stress more the importance of birthplace, citizenship and residence. These slight differences are based on the respective acknowledgment of the features that characterize the relations of “the other” with the state (territory and institutions), the fellow citizens (region and ethnic distribution of locality), and fellow nationals (culture and ethnicity).

State, Identity and Loyalty

One of the themes structuring the relationship between Romanians and Hungarians, which is often constitutive to the process of self-identification and identification of the other for the Hungarians, is that of their loyalty towards the Romanian state. In many situations, the Romanians feel entitled to doubt the Hungarians’ loyalty towards the Romanian state. The most trivial situation is that of a football match between the national teams of Romania and Hungary, when their loyalty can be manifested by supporting the Romanian team. But how should one react when the Hungarians support the Hungarian team? What is more, in the case of a foot-
ball match, the national anthems of both states are performed, the national flags of both states are displayed, and the players wear the colors of their respective flags.

One of the means by which the Romanian state secures the loyalty of its subjects (be they Romanian or Hungarian) is compulsory military service. When drafted, the recruit must take an oath of allegiance to “his country.” In this way, the Hungarians, as much as Romanians, pledge to defend the unity, the sovereignty and the independence of their country. But what would happen in the hypothetical situation of a conflict between the two countries?

The reasons why Romanians would question the loyalty of Hungarians are historically constructed. Narratives of the past relations between the Romanian and the Hungarian nations and of the collective memory of interaction prevail in the interpretative schemes of Romanians. In situations characterized by a certain sensitivity with respect to Hungarian loyalty towards the Romanian state (such as the request for specific forms of autonomy), the discourse of the Romanian majority is often structured in terms of historical episodes and past experiences of Hungarian political and cultural domination, of symbolic territorial claims, and so on. Hungarian claims for collective rights (or group-differentiated rights) are produced in a discursive space where the driving force is not the rational language of the benefits of the self-administration of one’s own ethnic group, but the language of the historical contest between the two nations.

The sentiment of distrust with respect to a Hungarian’s loyalty comes from a perception of the relationship between the symbols and ingredients necessary for constructing loyalty towards the Romanian state, and the symbols and ingredients implied by the ethnocultural identity-building of the minority. There are several figures that could justify Romanian doubts regarding the loyalty of their fellow citizens – they refer, for example, to sentiments involving symbolic celebrations of the Romanian and Hungarian states. To the question “How important is the first of December for you?” only 20.0% of the Hungarians in Transylvania answered that it was “very important” or “important.” Conversely, to the question “How important is the twentieth of August for you?” 63.0% of Hungarians in Transylvania declared that it was “very important” or “important.” I suggest, however, that these figures do not reflect disloyalty; as these elements are rather consistent with the Hungarians’ conception of the nation. Obviously, they could not celebrate the integration of Transylvania into a Romanian nationalizing state, which meant also a demotion of the Hungarian population in both symbolic and material terms. At the same time, the other event signifies the “birth” of the Hungarian nation, and is cherished as such.
Notably, this is how the Hungarians answered the question “What is the territory that you consider your country?”\textsuperscript{36}: Romania 68.0%, Transylvania 21.0%, the place where I live 3.0%, Hungary 2.0%, no answer 5.0%. It is significant that two-thirds of the Hungarians in Transylvania perceive the whole of Romania as their country, and in this way they implicitly assert their loyalty towards the Romanian state.

\textit{Conclusions}

There are several components of the construction of national identity that can be clarified by an empirical research on the inter-ethnic relations in Romania.\textsuperscript{37} First, members of both majority and minority national groups have illusory expectations of the other. Hungarians expect Romanians to acknowledge their existence as a national minority. Moreover, they often expect them to have the same understanding of a minority status. This is not a realistic assumption. Most Romanians rarely have the chance to get familiarized with the cultural peculiarities of a minority, or with the particular needs of a person belonging to a minority group. Most often this is explainable by their objective position within the social space.\textsuperscript{38} Romanians may lack awareness or sensitivity with regard to Hungarian differences and, consequently, to their different problems and demands, due to the particular setting of their interaction.\textsuperscript{39} I would suggest that the lack of knowledge and familiarity with the Hungarian life-world on the part of the Romanians is often the main cause of misunderstanding and misinterpretation of their political requests, when the symbolic connotations are either ignored or overestimated.\textsuperscript{40} This lack of knowledge also accounts for the unfounded Romanian expectation that Hungarians should feel and relate to institutions, processes and symbols in a similar way.

Second, the distribution of ethnic groups in a locality (and a region) is a crucial explanatory variable. It is of crucial importance, whether an ethnic community represents a strong majority, a majority, or is relatively equal to the other ethnic group in a locality.\textsuperscript{41} Thus, there are divergent frameworks of interaction and familiarization with the other, and also various opportunities of dissension, tension and conflict. These conditions also shape the patterns of real and perceived dominance, whether symbolic or other.

Borrowing a concept from economics, one could conceive of \textit{citizenship} in a nation-state as a \textit{public good}. Citizenship is characterized by the indivisibility of production and consumption, by non-excludability (no one can be prevented from enjoying it), and it is not subject to crowding (i.e., non-rivalness). Practically, there is no formal way by which anyone, born in a certain country from parents who are citizens of that country, could be
denied citizenship. Likewise, the efficiency of its use (or of its civic, political and social components) depends on the characteristics of the social field within the borders of the state.

Following the same logic, in a nation-state where the concept of nation is primarily territorial-political, such as France, the \textit{nation} functions as a public good. But the logic of nationhood in a state where the nation is primarily conceived ethnoculturally – such as Germany, and Romania as well – is no longer that of the public good, but rather \textit{the logic of the club}. That is, the use of this collective good is restricted to the members of the club. The Romanians “enjoy” their nation, while the Hungarians are excluded from it. Or, to conceive the situation from another point of view, the Hungarians exclude themselves from it, by entering the “club” of the Hungarian nation, and enjoying its goods and services.

One may as well conceive of nationalities as clubs within nation-states. Nationality constitutes a collective good that everyone may use for personal goals, and no one can be prevented from enjoying it. This collective good is abundant and so are its uses. But the quality of this good depends, naturally, on how it is used or abused. Perhaps every Romanian has a strong opinion on the use of nationality as a collective good by the “members of the club.” This is the logic of the Hungarians as well: they are members of a club that extends its boundary beyond the (geographical) borders of the Romanian state. The collective good provided by the club – Hungarian nationality – is produced and maintained by all the members of the club (both Hungarians from Hungary, and from abroad).

If one confines the analysis to the ways in which Hungarians in Romania make use of their ethnicity, one may say that, beyond the immediate, perceptible disadvantages they experience – which can be identified in the discourse of the Hungarian elite in Romania – at a practical level, at least from a Romanian’s point of view, \textit{their ethnicity constitutes a considerable resource for the Hungarians}. The first component of this resource is knowledge of the Hungarian language. The advantages are easily identified. First, in the competition for positions in the state administration (obviously, this depends on the current formulation of the local administration law), where speaking the Hungarian language is required, and second, in the opportunities created by the external homeland. One example from academic circles is the foreign scientific literature translated into Hungarian, not yet available in Romanian. From this point of view, the situation of the Romanians is not (and can not be) symmetric. There are no structural incentives to learn Hungarian and the contexts of actually practicing it are scarce. Moreover, Romanians do not dispose of comparable opportunities and means to learn Hungarian – the Hungarian language is not compulsory or optionally taught in elementary or secondary schools.
In fact, the only chance for a Romanian to learn the Hungarian language in an organized way is at the Faculty of Letters, as a foreign language. Naturally, one could argue that Romanians might choose to speak another foreign language than Hungarian, which could be of more use in many circumstances, while the Hungarians are “forced” to learn Romanian. This argument is frail, and one can cite many counter-examples of Hungarians, or persons belonging to other ethnic minorities, who learned Romanian along with their mother tongue, and who were not impeded by this fact in learning another foreign language.42

Another component of this resource – i.e., Hungarian nationality – for the Hungarians in Romania is double socialization. Among other things, this comprises access to double sets of networks of various sorts – in the state where they live, in the external homeland (that is, networks of Romanian citizens, and of Hungarian citizens respectively), and their local Romanian and Hungarian networks. Again, the situation of the Romanians is not symmetric. Even if they enter networks of Hungarians in Romania (without necessarily speaking Hungarian), their access to networks of Hungarians in Hungary is severely limited.

The analysis may be continued by discussing several other components. I believe that the moral is at hand for everyone and may constitute a conclusion for the entire study. Nations, nationalities, identities are constructed and reproduced through schemes of perception and classification. Their social reality is constantly actuated as both means and results of struggles between actors aiming at imposing a particular worldview and seeking to legitimize their own positions. Once these processes are objectified, the picture becomes clear, and it is at anyone’s disposal to enjoy his or her nationality in a way that represents a positive sum game for each of the actors involved.

NOTES


5 Verdery argues that “systems of social classification not only classify in institutionalized form, they also establish grounds for authority and legitimacy, through the categories they set down, and they make their categories seem both natural and socially real.” See Katherine Verdery, “Whither ‘Nation’ and ‘Nationalism’?” p. 37.


7 According to Verdery, “‘Nation’ is a name for the relationship that links a state (actual or potential) with its subjects. Historically, it has meant a relationship of at least two kinds: 1) a *citizenship* relation, in which the nation is the collective sovereign emanating from common political participation; 2) a relation known as *ethnicity*, in which the nation comprises all those of supposedly common language, history or broader ‘cultural’ identity.” See Katherine Verdery, “Nationalism and National Sentiment in Post-Socialist Romania,” *Slavic Review* 52 (Summer 1993), p. 180.

8 Greenfeld argues that “an essential characteristic of any identity is that it is necessarily the view the concerned actor has of himself or herself. It therefore either exists or does not. … Identity is perception. If a particular identity does not mean anything to the population in question, this population does not have this particular identity.” See Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 13.

9 Such as the history of group-domination and territorial claims, geographical distribution of the majority and minority populations, the relation between the respective national states, and between a state and its ethnonational kin in the other state.

10 Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, p. 82.

11 For a comprehensive analysis of these efforts, see Irina Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building & Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).


13 For instance, through quotas in the party leadership or educational institutions, along with other differentiating characteristics such as sex, residence, and class.


16 Initially, this was a discussion paper presented at Collegium Budapest; a more elaborated study was subsequently published in Daedalus, and included as a chapter in Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, pp. 23-54.

17 Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, p. 57.

18 Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, p. 57.

19 Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, p. 58.

20 I am not talking of persons of mixed-origins, who experience more complex identification problems, and whose practices and identity construction depend both on the family context – the language and ethnic belonging of the person who takes care of the baby, the structure of the family, etc. – and on the larger structural socialization set-up of the child.

21 It is important for Hungarians that their nationality is asserted alongside their citizenship. For example, the new Romanian passports only have one heading, “Nationalitate” (Nationality), standing for citizenship (where the authorities filled in “Romanian” automatically). I know of cases of Hungarians who required having their passport changed so that it became clear that their citizenship, and not nationality, is Romanian. Under this heading it is now specified: “Romanian citizen.”

22 Data from a previous research are presented in Irina Culic et al., Bazinul Carpati: Români și maghiari în tranziție – Imagini mentale și relații interetnice în Transilvania (The Carpathian Basin: Romanians and Hungarians in transition – Mental images and interethnic relations in Transylvania) (Cluj-Napoca: Research Center for Interethnic Relations, 1998).

23 Except for the use of minority language in courts.


25 According to Ethnobarometer, there is no significant difference in the average income, possession of home appliances (except for color TVs and automatic washing machines, which Hungarians are better provided with), or appeal to alternative sources of income. Nevertheless, 58.5% of Romanians, compared to 26.3% of Hungarians, declared that they experienced situations when they were short of money for buying food, respectively 60.2% of Romanians, com-
pared to 31.3% of Hungarians, were short of money for paying house utilities. These differences can be explained by different cultural practices.

I refer to Romanians from Szeklerland, or living in localities where Hungarians constitute a majority of the population. The following data from Ethno-barometer indicates this. Asked whether nationality makes a difference in getting a job, 25.9% of Romanians in Muntenia believed that Romanians were advantaged, 2.4% said that they were disadvantaged, and 63.9% claimed that nationality did not matter. At the same time, only 5.6% of Romanians from Szeklerland believed that Romanians were advantaged, 30% claimed that they were disadvantaged, and 47% said that nationality did not matter. Most of the Romanians from Szeklerland also believed that Hungarians were advantaged in getting a job (33.4%), while only 2.1% thought that they were disadvantaged.

The things that make Hungarians ashamed of being Romanian citizens may range from government activity to dirtiness of one’s locality and manners of fellow citizens. Everyday interaction indicates that most of them can be reduced to (negative) stereotypes ascribed to Romanians.

According to Ethno-barometer: Interethnic Relations in Romania data, 90.3% of Hungarians in Romania believe that the Hungarian state should grant Hungarian citizenship to Hungarians in Romania, compared to 47% of Romanians who believe so, and 87.5% of Hungarians in Romania think that the Hungarian state should give scholarships to Hungarian students in Romania, compared to 62.6% of Romanians who share the same belief.

Hungarians from Szeklerland sometimes refer to Hungarians from Hungary as “pale faces,” as opposed to “natives.” This is one way to express the distinctiveness of their Transylvanian identity: they are “genuine” Hungarians, they speak the “purest” Hungarian language, they still cherish the ancient traditions, they are less corrupted by the negative elements of Western civilization, etc. Personal communication by István Horváth.

One should be cautious with respect to these figures, as the sample was too small to provide valid results at area level.


On linguistic practices and the political significance of language use, see István Horváth, “Institutions of Ethnicity” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, 2001).

This rhetoric is nurtured by the fear that, once approved, the Hungarian request for territorial autonomy will be followed by secession.


See Culic, “Between Civic and National Identity,” p. 21. The first of December is the current national day of Romania, commemorating the Unification of Transylvania with Romania. The corresponding date for Hungary is the twentieth of August, celebrating St. Steven, the first king of Hungary, who officially introduced Christianity in the country.

37 Both quantitative research, where ethnic distribution or size of locality represent independent variables, explaining various processes and phenomena, and qualitative research, where categories employed by researchers are identified or confirmed, and where the operation of variables is made explicit.

38 For instance, the objective chance to interact with a minority person depends on the ratio of the minority population within the population of a locality.

39 That is, language of communication and type of common activities, etc.

40 By this, I do not intend to underestimate other important causes, such as competition for resources, market-positions, etc. See Verdery, “Nationalism and National Sentiment in Post-Socialist Romania;” see also her study “Nationalism, Post-Socialism, and Space in Eastern Europe,” Social Research 63 (1996), pp. 77-86.

41 Tîrgu-Mureș is the only city in Romania (except for Marghita) where the number of Hungarian and Romanian populations is almost equal. It was also the setting of the most important inter-ethnic conflict in post-socialist Romania, in March 1990.

42 Moreover, linguistic and psychological studies show that the ability to use more than one language enhances the comprehension capacities of the children as well as their school and social performance.
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Nationalizing Minorities and Homeland Politics: The Case of the Hungarians in Romania

ZOLTÁN KÁNTOR

Introduction

This paper develops an interpretative framework for the study of the Hungarian national minority in Romania that could help one understand the ongoing social and political processes, and explain the process of nationalization of a national minority. My ambition is, nevertheless, broader. I hope that this theoretical framework can also be utilized for the analysis of analogous cases. Obviously, many possible frameworks can be employed to analyze a national minority. However, to understand the essence of the issue, one has to concentrate on questions related to nationhood and nationalism.

The politics of national minorities is rooted in the principle of nationality. Also, their organizations are based on national or ethnic grounds. In order to understand the nationalizing policy of a national minority, one must analyze the process through which a particular group became a national minority, and the institutionalization of that national minority on ethnocultural basis. Approaches that focus on particular issues, such as inter-ethnic conflicts, the use of national symbols, ethnic parties, multiculturalism and minority rights, cannot be understood without a comprehensive analytical framework.

Following World War I, Romania acquired Transylvania. As a result, a sizeable Hungarian population became a national minority in this country. In other words, a part of an already formed nation, which had been involved in the process of nation-building, suddenly became a national minority. Up to 1918, the Hungarians considered themselves the rightful masters of Transylvania, and acted on the basis of this idea. Consequently, after 1918, while being backed ideologically by the revisionist politics of the Hungarian state, the leaders of the Hungarian national minority in Romania organized their political and cultural organizations on an ethnocultural basis and promoted a policy of self-defense in regard to the nationalizing thrust of the enlarged Romanian state. The essential point is
that the ethnocultural basis of organization, which increasingly character-
ized the Hungarian politics of nation-building after the Compromise of
1867, prevailed after a part of that nation became a national minority.
Obviously, the framework had changed dramatically, but the politics based
on the ethnocultural conception of the community remained dominant.

The nationalizing process of the national minority characterized the
Hungarian social and political life in Romania since 1918. Besides striving
for different forms of autonomy and self-government, the political elite,
with the help of the intelligentsia, has been engaged in the establishment
of separate Hungarian institutions. The idea behind this practice is that
without such institutions Hungarian culture cannot be preserved and pro-
moted. The nationalization process of the national minority has been
influenced both by the “nationalizing state” and by the “external national
homeland.”

The policy of the nationalizing state, in our case Romania, questions
the legitimacy of the claims formulated by the Hungarian elite as essential
for its nationalizing process: the decentralization of power and the estab-
ishment of institutions that reproduce the Hungarian elite. The external
national homeland, in our case Hungary, supports this nationalization
process with political and financial resources. At the same time, it also
influences the self-perception of the members of the national minority
and plays an important role in the power-relations within the national
minority. In this paper, I focus on the nationalizing minority and on a par-
ticular political measure of the external national homeland, namely the
“Law on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries.” The analysis of
the politics of the Romanian national state, which, nonetheless, has an
essential influence on the nationalizing politics of the national minority, is
beyond the limits of this paper.

The Theoretical Framework

At a theoretical level, I consider that one should focus on the processes of
institutionalization, both of the majority and of the minority, unfolding on
an ethnocultural basis. Methodologically, my account derives from Rogers
Brubaker’s work, entitled “Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the
National Question in the New Europe.” His statement about nations and
nationalism is valid also for national minorities:

Nationalism can and should be understood without invoking “nations” as
substantial entities. Instead of focusing on nations as real groups, we
should focus on nationhood and nationness, on “nation” as a practical
category, institutionalized form, and contingent event. “Nation” is a cat-
egory of practice, not (in the first instance) a category of analysis. To understand nationalism, we have to understand the practical uses of the category “nation,” the ways it can come to structure perception, to inform thought and experience, to organize discourse and political action.3

One should not commit the mistake of essentializing national minorities. National minorities are constructed and imagined as much as nations are. One should analyze them also as practical categories, institutionalized forms, and contingent events. In line with Brubaker’s conceptual transformation of the nation-state into nationalizing state,4 I propose the concept of nationalizing minority instead of national minority.5

Miroslav Hroch’s analysis of non-dominant ethnic groups in the framework of nation-formation summarizes their goals as follows: (1) the development or improvement of national culture based on a local language, which had to be used in education, administration, and economic life; (2) the creation of a complete social structure, including their “own” educated elites and entrepreneurial classes; and (3) the achievement of equal civil rights and of some degree of political self-administration.6 In my interpretation (as Hroch already suggested), there are similarities between the process of nation-formation in the 19th century and present-day minority nationalism.

Considering this, I also propose that one should employ the concept of nationalizing minority in order to analyze the nationalism of a national minority. This concept captures the internal dynamics of the national minority and permits the analysis of long-term processes. These processes are slightly different from those of the nationalizing state, but the mechanisms are similar. National minorities engaged in a nation-building process are nationalizing minorities. This distinction is of primary importance in a sociological or political sense, and is of little significance for legal use. It can be employed only in an analytical approach, and not in a normative one. Furthermore, nationalizing minorities are distinguishable from the non-nationalizing ones.7

Empirically, one can present the following distinctive features: (1) a nationalizing minority is sufficiently numerous to have a real chance of achieving a number of its goals; (2) nationalizing minorities express political goals, and not only cultural ones. Their goal is not only the preservation of national/cultural identity, but also the promotion and institutionalization of it. The creation of institutions that resemble those of a state is essential, as is the establishment of a minority “life-world;” and (3) nationalizing minorities attempt to transform the political structure of the state and struggle for political representation on state level.
In order to understand the nationalism of a national minority, one should analyze the nationalism of nations. It is not the difference of the situation that matters, but the belief of a given group. Concerning the nationalizing dynamics of the titular nation, Brubaker says:

Nationalizing nationalisms involve claims made in the name of “a core nation” or nationality defined in ethnocultural terms, and sharply distinguished from the citizenry as a whole. The core nation is understood as the legitimate “owner” of the state, which is conceived as the state of and for the core nation.8

The claims of national minorities are also made in the name of a core nation or nationality, defined in ethnocultural terms, and are not related to citizenship. The difference in this case is that the “core” of the ethnocultural nation is localized in the “external national homeland.” However, institutionally, a national minority is distinct from an ethnocultural nation. The national minority has no state of its own. Therefore, the leaders of the national minority create a “surrogate state,” a system of political representation of the national minority, which, as mentioned, is conceived of in ethnocultural terms.

Usually, national minorities are defined without reference to an external national homeland. Such definitions emphasize only that a national minority is a minority in relation to the titular nationality, and characterize it by accentuating the quantitative aspect. The question of the ethnocultural nation, including all the members of the same ethnic group, is marginal. On the one hand, this is due to the preponderance of legal and political definitions that concentrate on the rights of the national minority, and, on the other hand, to the perspective of social scientists who analyze the transition to democracy, nationalism and ethnic conflicts within a country by discussing only short-term processes and concentrating on the situational setting. To transgress the limitations of these approaches, one must analyze such questions in a historical perspective. In order to do this, one must look for a different approach and, once again, Brubaker’s definition is useful in this respect:

A national minority is not simply a “group” that is given by the facts of ethnic demography. It is a dynamic political stance, or, more precisely, a family of related yet mutually competing stances, not a static ethno-demographic condition. Three elements are characteristic of this political stance, or family of stances: (1) the public claim to membership of an ethnocultural nation different from the numerically or politically dominant ethnocultural nation; (2) the demand for state recognition of this distinct ethnocul-
tural nationality; and (3) the assertion, on the basis of this ethnocultural nationality, of certain collective cultural or political rights.9

This approach is analytically and methodologically rewarding. At the same time, Brubaker does not concentrate on the national minority, but on the interplay of the three elements. While this approach is very useful, one must, nevertheless, go further and focus more on the national minority. After the definition of the entity, one should also look at the definition of the nationalism of a specific group:

Minority nationalist stances characteristically involve a self-understanding in specially “national” rather than merely “ethnic” terms, a demand for state recognition of their distinct ethnocultural nationality, and the assertion of certain collective, nationality-based cultural or political rights.10

The nation and the national minority can be defined in many ways, but one can capture their dynamic aspect only by analyzing them in terms of ongoing processes, such as nationalism. Obviously, I use nationalism as a value-free and descriptive concept, in the sense of a politics based on the nationality principle.

Furthermore, I am interested in the mechanisms and patterns of these processes because my assumption is that one must analyze the very same mechanisms in the case of national minorities. Taking into consideration the actors and the agents involved, one can understand the interplay of different types of nationalism, but not the policy of the national minority. In order to understand this policy, one should describe it sociologically, taking into account both the expressed political goals and the hidden, but assumed ends. Obviously, I have to answer how one can analyze an unfinished process, and how one can anticipate the outcome. In my view, this question cannot be answered with scientific rigor. What are the criteria for a nation? When can one say that the nation exists? One knows that the German, the French, the Hungarian, the Romanian, etc. nations do exist, moreover, one has no doubts about this, even though they are in a permanent process of transformation.

Walker Connor is rightly stressing the “when” question.11 Nevertheless, he only narrows the time span by arguing that nationalism is a mass phenomenon and only with the integration of the masses into the body of the nation one may consider the process finalized. As a matter of fact, both Hroch and Connor emphasize the importance of the mass character of nationalism. As Hroch puts it, “the process of nation-forming acquires an irreversible character only once the national movement won mass support, thereby reaching phase C.”12 However, by analyzing the process and
the related mechanisms, one can avoid the hypothetical final stage: the “built,” “assembled,” or “formed” nation (or national minority). I agree with those who suggest that there are no objective criteria for the formed nation; and this is obviously true for national minorities as well. The nation, once “awakened,” must not fall asleep again – this is the nationalists’ credo. There is no example of any state or nation, especially in East-Central Europe, that relinquished the nationalizing project. One can establish that the nationalizing process has started, but it is impossible to decide upon the moment of its end because there are no criteria that define the successfully accomplished process. Moreover, even if the elite (politicians, intellectuals, etc.) consider that the process has reached an end, one has to maintain, sometimes to “re-build,” and to “refurbish” the nation. Since nationalism has appeared, the process is permanent. Nationalism has become the central ideology of the state, especially in the eastern part of Europe.

Some authors spend considerable energy on demonstrating that the nation-state, the nation, or the state are dying or losing their importance. Others, such as Michael Mann, claim that nation-states are diversifying, transforming, but their foundations remain, more or less, untouched.13 It is not my intention to enter into a debate about the future of the nation-state, considering that predictions on the issue do not facilitate the analysis of processes. One possible approach to national conflicts in Eastern Europe is to stress the parallel and often conflictual processes of nation-building. Once the ideal of the nation became important, there does not seem to be any sign that it will lose its salience. Nationalism may be transformed, but it remains an important organizational principle in our world.

One of the essential questions on national minorities is their distinctive dynamics. However, not so much has been written on this issue. The literature on minority nationalism usually searches for “deeper” explanations, and generally analyzes the national minority in the present context. Such works are usually written by the members of that particular national minority, and focus on their claims toward the state or the majority. These authors are not interested in social phenomena, but make an effort to provide solutions for achieving the goals of the minority. In such studies, the national minority is sharply separated from the dynamics of the ethnocultural nation. From the moment when it became a national minority, many studies focus on the manifestations of nationalism in a given context, but fail to explain it as a process. Therefore, one must examine the formation of the ethnocultural nation and the nation-building process in order to understand the dynamics of the national minority’s politics.
In this study, I am analyzing a national minority that was once part of a larger nation within the framework of one state. One of the consequences of the dissolution of that state was that a part of that nation became a national minority in another state. The remaining part of the ethnocultural nation, now a national minority, has not accepted the new situation. It has continued the nation-building process, but it has reshaped it. Although this nation-building process is different from the former, its mechanisms are similar. Ethnocultural bonds do not lose their strength, on the contrary, generally they are invigorated. Since the nation-building of the majority challenges the nation-building of the national minority, the strengthening of the internal boundaries of the national minority is a logical consequence.

Members of the national minority still consider themselves as belonging to the former ethnocultural nation, emphasizing the common culture and language. They used to perceive themselves as one nation, and still conceive themselves in such a way. However, they also perceive themselves as a national minority. National minorities are characterized by these two complementary, but nevertheless competing, images. They are institutionalized on the same ethnocultural basis as the nation in the external homeland, but the framework and resources are different. The particular principle of nationality is identical, and therefore there is no reason to search for other explanations why a national minority is engaged in a nationalizing process.

A nationalizing minority's politics is oriented toward strengthening and maintaining these ethnocultural boundaries. This is done by the creation of institutions for achieving the above-mentioned aims. It is the creation of a parallel social and political system, and the struggle for a legal setting in which nationalization can continue in more favorable conditions. Similar to the nationalizing state, the nationalizing minority faces competing goals, which are channeled by its institutions and its public sphere. Obviously, the goals and policies are constrained by several internal and external factors. The nationalizing minority acts in a specific political arena, and not all the political actions of the national minority can be subsumed under this process. There are also processes that have the opposite result and, from a different point-of-view, one could also say that we are witnessing a process of disintegration. My account does not touch upon these processes. I only assume that the political will of a nationalizing minority is a specific form of nation-building, and this will is organized along the lines of nation-building. The outcome will not necessarily be what nationalist politicians and intellectuals expect, as the conflict between and within nation-state and minority projects create unexpected political results.
The concept of nationalizing minority is thus helpful for a general account regarding the politics of national minorities, but for a meticulous analysis one has to operationalize the concept. The operationalization can be achieved by analyzing the involved actors: the ethnic party and the elite of the national minority. These are the factors I will tackle in the following two sections.

**Ethnic Parties**

The main promoters of the nationalizing processes on the part of the national minority are the ethnic parties. In this study, I use the concept of “ethnic party” as a synonym for “national minority party” or “minority party.” Ethnic parties are formed in societies that are organized along ethnic or national cleavages. In cases where nationally relevant conflicts exist, for example, in times of revolutions or changes of regimes, it is almost certain that the elite of the national minority will form an ethnic party. Ethnic parties are mainly supported by members of their own ethnic group; at the same time, it is very unlikely that non-members will vote for that party. Bearing this in mind, one may conclude that the main task of an ethnic party is to make sure that their co-ethnics will vote for it; to convince the non-co-ethnics to vote for it is less important. At the same time, the elite has to persuade their co-ethnics that they should act in the interest of the group as a whole. Thus, an ethnic party is very different from non-ethnic parties in the sense that the national minority usually has a program that is meant to secure the individual and collective rights of its members.

The main concern of national minorities, expressed by the goals and policies of the ethnic parties, is generally the preservation of their culture and the promotion of the interests of the members of the group and the perceived interests of the group as a whole. To achieve this aim, the minority has, on the one hand, to secure the legal and political framework on the state level and, on the other hand, to establish institutions and an internal organization that enable them to form a distinct society. Therefore, one has to analyze the ethnic party as both an ethno-political party and an ethnic organization. The ethnic party has to act simultaneously as a political party, as a representative and promoter of the interests of its community, and has to strengthen the internal boundaries of the community, organizing them into an *ethno-civil society*. The key difference is the political arena in which the party acts. As a political party, the ethnic party acts in the political sphere of the state. As an ethnic or minority organization, its sphere of action is the ethnic or national political subculture.

For ethnic parties, the problems regarding the entire population are important in so far as they touch upon the interests of their distinct
community. Interestingly, ethnic parties, at least in East-Central Europe, can be considered liberal parties. Their general program focuses on decentralization, promotion of the principle of subsidiarity, freedom of the press, freedom of association, political pluralism, human dignity, etc. These are all democratic and liberal principles, and can be considered as common goods for the whole population of the state. Nevertheless, these principles are favorable for the nationalization of the national minority. The program regarding the national minority itself is less liberal, moreover, it is exclusivist. The democratization of the respective state is important in the first instance to create a favorable area for the development of the national minority’s own system of institutions.

Elite theories are usually of little help in analyzing national minority elites. The main reason for this shortcoming is that elite theories focus on the formal aspects of acquiring power, while in the case of national minorities the substantial aspect is more important. In my understanding, the substantial aspect is that members of national minority elites originate from a particular national or ethnic group and represent the goals of a particular national minority. On this basis, one can say that the framework of theories of nationalism offers better results, especially in the case of East-Central Europe, where nation-building and the politics of nationalization are directed from above. Obviously, there are power struggles within the national minority elites, and the elite of the national minority competes with other elites in the political sphere. However, these struggles rarely go so far as to question the minority’s essential goals. My interpretation is that the political differences within these minority elites are about competing projects of minority nation-building.

As described above, an ethnic party is at the same time a political party and a social organization that represents the goals of the national minority and strengthens its institutions. The political elite of the national minority is composed of professional politicians, representatives of the “ethno-civil” society and intellectuals. All three categories – that are not necessarily homogeneous groups – act in the same political sphere, define the politics of the party, and set the priorities for the society.

The Hungarian Political Elite in Romania

The Hungarian Democratic Union in Romania (HDUR), formed in December 1989, considers itself, and is considered by the other actors in Romanian politics, as the sole representative of Hungarians in Romania. As an ethnic party, it acts in the Romanian political sphere, and is organized and functions as any other party. In the political arena, the party partici-
participates in elections, takes part in parliamentary life either as part of the government, or in opposition. On the one hand, HDUR’s goals on the state level can be summarized as follows: it strives for the creation of smaller units within the state, by advocating administrative decentralization, federalism, and territorial autonomy, in order to create structures in which the Hungarian minority would be in a relative majority in order to influence the decision-making process. On the other hand, it attempts to create separate, ethnically-based institutions, in which the minority decides over salient issues. The final goal is to create a parallel society. Basically, this is what I call minority nation-building. The HDUR, as a mixture of an ethnic party and an organization, uses its two faces to achieve these goals. This is a specific attribute of ethnic parties and not of other types of political parties.

Many Romanian, but also some Hungarian, politicians accuse the elite of the HDUR of striving to build a “state within a state,” and thus taking the first steps toward secession. The “state within a state” metaphor presupposes that the Hungarians wish to create a power structure which is similar to the state political system. Although this model is misplaced, several signs show that the relationship between the party and the Hungarian population indeed resembles the state–society relationship. Nevertheless, several elements are missing for the “state within a state” metaphor to hold: e.g., there is no Hungarian judiciary, no Hungarian police, and no Hungarian military in Romania.

On the other hand, the “presidency,” the “government” and the “parliament,” (i.e., Szövetségi Küldöttek Tanácsa), resemble the state power structure. The “parliament” includes Hungarian deputies in the Romanian Senate and House of Deputies, the representatives of territorial organizations and representatives of political platforms and factions. Part of the representatives become members of the Council automatically, some are elected in the Congress, and the others are delegated by their local organizations. Essentially, the structure attempts to include all those who represent, on one level or another, the Hungarian minority. There are several kinds of legitimacy in the legislative body. The Congress (composed by local delegations, deputies and senators of HDUR, representatives of political platforms/factions, and of affiliated organizations) substitutes the elections. Even if several decisions are not taken in accordance to democratic principles, the internal political life of the Hungarian political sphere resembles that of a state much more than the internal political life of non-ethnic parties.

Only ethnic parties have their own “civil society,” which I called “ethno-civil” society. Civil organizations and civil society were also created by the elite (and intellectuals) after the fall of the communist regime in 1989. The relationship between the ethno-civil society and the ethnic party
is that they are functionally complementary, although there is a permanent competition between them. The institutions and organizations belonging to the civil sphere have such functions that resemble the functions of ministries in a government. For instance, the Bolyai Társaság (Bolyai Society) corresponds to the Ministry of Education, and the Erdélyi Múzeum Egyesület (Transylvanian Museum Organization) resembles the Ministry of Culture. Such educational and cultural organizations become important in times of crisis. Also, crisis situations make it possible for some leaders to legitimize themselves and enter into the political elite. In these cases, they lose their role in civic organizations and assume certain political responsibilities. These organizations are theoretically part of the Hungarian civic sphere, but since the cultural and educational problems are politicized, they enter the political sphere and act as interest or pressure groups. Internal debates are often channeled by these institutions, and the outcome of the debates and decisions often have political consequences for the entire minority. In the following parts, I analyze certain cases of internal debates and divisions that, in my view, support the model described above. I briefly describe issues concerning education, the participation of the HDUR in the Romanian government, and, in a separate chapter, the “Status Law.” For a national minority, interpreted as a nationalizing minority, separate educational institutions are of vital importance. It is not my intention to enter into such debates whether a national minority has the right for a separate, self-governed university in their minority language; I simply take into account the expressed goal of the HDUR to establish a state-financed Hungarian University in Romania. This separate university is a key institution of nation-building, since it is the institution where elite reproduction would be possible. Therefore, the debate around the university in 1997 has to be interpreted within the framework of nation-building or nationalization.

Within the minority elite, there were two camps involved in the debate: those who were in favor of a separate university, and those who favored the current situation. However, the dispute was not about the usefulness of a separate university, but about the question of elite reproduction. On the one hand, the argument was that, at present, Hungarians are not able to run a high-quality separate university, and the current situation serves better the purpose of having a well-educated elite. On the other hand, those who argued for a separate university assumed that, in spite of short-term sacrifices, separate institutions serve better their goals in the long run. Besides the internal agreements and disagreements, the Romanian government did not pass the law regarding the state-financed Hungarian University. In my view, this is a clear sign that the state also considered the Hungarian University as a key institution for minority nation-building. A similar view is reflected
also by the Hungarian government, but, logically, it evaluates the situation differently. In 1999, the Hungarian government included in its budget a 2 billion HUF (approx. 7 million USD) sum for establishing a Hungarian private university in Romania.

As for the participation in Romanian political life, in 1990-1996, the HDUR was in opposition and attempted to achieve the above-described goals, but it had neither state support, nor the political means to achieve them. The nationalization process was financed by internal and external resources, the latter coming from the external national homeland. In 1996, when the HDUR entered the government, the political setting changed and, thereafter, certain state resources were also deployed for this project.

In this context, one can easily understand why the HDUR decided to participate in the Romanian government. One can also grasp, however, why the internal opposition within the HDUR opposed such participation. The debate was between different conceptions of minority nation-building. The leaders of the HDUR reckoned that participating in the government and occupying administrative and political positions were more likely to secure several rights and resources that could help their project. At the same time, these decisions were also rooted in the leaders' conception that they had to integrate the members of the Hungarian minority into the Romanian society on an “individual basis.” In the view of the internal opposition, however, Hungarians should integrate into the Romanian society only in “collective” terms. They argued that the strengthening of Hungarian society within Romania could be accomplished better in opposition, without making any – even tactical – concessions to the governing parties. To make the picture complete, one must mention that the internal opposition of the HDUR does not make distinctions between the Romanian parties in view of their attitudes toward Hungarians. They claim that such differences are only ephemeral and not of any real substance. In light of the positions described above, one can conclude that the debate concerning participation was basically a debate regarding minority nation-building.

The Hungarian State and its “External Homeland Politics”

The Hungarian state influences the nationalization of the Hungarian minority in Romania, and, as such, one may analyze it as an external factor. I analyze only one aspect of this relationship: the law concerning the Hungarians living in neighboring states. Hungary, as a state concerned with the fate of Hungarians living abroad, considers it a political and moral duty to help Hungarians, especially those who live in the bordering countries. Until recently, the Hungarian state supported principally the institutions of the
national minorities. In 2001, however, the conservative Hungarian government proposed a law regarding Hungarians living in the neighboring countries. Political and scientific discourse refers to it as the “Status Law” (státustörvény). The government considers that the existence of such a law, and the facilities offered, encourages the Hungarians to refrain from emigration, and could moderate the process of assimilation.

Following the revolution of 1989, the relationship between Hungary and the Hungarians living in neighboring countries entered a new phase. During the communist period, official politics was characterized by the fiction of the ethnoculturally neutral state, and it was often asserted that questions regarding nationality belonged to the internal affairs of the respective country. Until the mid-1980s, Hungary did not show official interest in Hungarians living in other states. In the late 1980s, the problem of Hungarians living abroad, especially in Transylvania, was brought into the center of attention. After the breakdown of the communist regimes, the situation changed even more radically. Finally, the concern for Hungarians living in the neighboring countries was materialized in legislation and governmental politics.

In the Hungarian constitution a paragraph was introduced, stating Hungary’s responsibility regarding the Hungarians living abroad. On the basis of this constitutional and “ethnocultural” responsibility, the Hungarian governments established several governmental institutions and foundations to support Hungarian institutions in the neighboring countries. A certain part of the Hungarian budget was allocated to finance Hungarian political, educational, and cultural institutions. Important financial assistance was given to students, pedagogues, and artists studying in Hungary, with the aim of bringing up the future Hungarian intelligentsia. Naturally, it has been expected that these people would return to their home country.

Although a detailed analysis suggests that there are important differences among the three post-communist Hungarian governments in the politics towards Hungarians abroad, my paper does not focus on these discrepancies. However, I must note that the first governments, both right-wing, emphasized more their concern with the Hungarians living in neighboring countries than the second one. While the right-wing governments (and parties) asserted the ethnocultural unity of all Hungarians, the left-wing government framed its political discourse in view of the community of “Hungarian citizens.”

In 1997, Hungary has become a NATO member, and it is expected that it will soon become a member of the European Union (EU). In this case, Hungary will also join the Schengen agreement, which means that it will have to introduce visa requirements for non-EU citizens. At present, it is obvious that Romania, Croatia, Yugoslavia, and the Ukraine will join
the EU at a considerably latter stage.\textsuperscript{26} As a consequence, many Hungarians living in these states will find it hard to travel to Hungary. This poses the fear that a new Iron Curtain will separate the Hungarians from the above-mentioned countries and their “homeland.”

As a response to this new situation, some representatives of the Hungarian national minorities advanced the idea of giving double citizenship to Hungarians living in neighboring states.\textsuperscript{27} In the electoral campaign of 1998, the present government parties also suggested double citizenship as a solution. The idea was dropped after the elections, but, in order to keep (partially) its promise, the government included the framing of the “Status Law” into its agenda.

The newly formed government expressed the following goals regarding national policy:

The Government’s policy on ethnic Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries aims to build and develop political, cultural, and economic ties between Hungary and Hungarian communities abroad as part of the general process of European unification, as well as to help Hungarians living in neighboring countries to live and prosper in their own homeland.

In order to achieve this, the bonds between ethnic Hungarian minorities and Hungary must be settled within a framework of legislation and government, so as to preserve the organic ties of Hungarian communities to Hungary, even after its accession to the European Union.\textsuperscript{28}

This program reinforces Hungary’s special relationship with the Hungarian minorities in the neighboring countries, but emphasizes the importance of settling this relationship within the legislative framework. In addition, for the first time it is expressed that, similar to the accession to the EU, the \textit{organic ties} of the Hungarian communities and Hungary are of primary importance. The official argument for framing the “Law on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries” is:

The main aim of this Law is to ensure special relations of the Hungarians living in neighboring countries to their kin state, the promotion and preservation of their national identity and well-being within their home country; therefore to contribute to the political and economic stability of the region, and through this to contribute to the Euro-Atlantic integration process of Hungary in particular and the Central and Eastern European region in general. In this context the Law promotes the preservation of the cultural and social cohesion as well as the economic consolidation of Hungarian communities abroad.\textsuperscript{29}
The central scope of the law is to ensure the special relations of the Hungarians living in the region, despite their state-allegiances, and to convince the Hungarians living in neighboring countries to remain in their home country. Besides the initial idea that the “Status Law” will serve as a basis for according preferential national visas to the possessors of the “Certificate of Hungarian Nationality,” the public debate focused on the effect of this law on the emigration of the Hungarians from the neighboring countries. The expressed goal of the law is explained as follows:

While promoting the national identity of Hungarians living in neighboring countries, the Law obviously ensures prosperity and staying within the home country. According to the scope of the Law, the codifier applies different provisions to encourage living within the home country and does not support resettling to Hungary. Most forms of assistance will be applied within the home countries of Hungarians living in neighboring countries; the institutional structure needed for any assistance for the Hungarian minorities in the neighboring countries is established through this legal norm.30

However, other aspects cannot be disregarded:

The Law meets the interest of the Hungarian citizens, since it is protecting and supervising the labor market. This is of a great importance both for foreign companies investing in Hungary and thus, indirectly for the EU. Actually, Hungarians living in neighboring countries are often employed in Hungary – illegally. Should we legalize employing them in Hungary – their contribution to the health insurance system and taxes will increase the amount of the central state budget. The contribution of Hungarians living in neighboring countries to the development of economic relations between Hungary and the neighboring countries may be regarded as an economic investment being refunded in the near future.31

While in the early stages of framing the law this second argument was not employed, recently it became of central importance, as a partial response to the critics who emphasize that the implementation of the law will cost a lot to the Hungarian state.

However, the most salient question is whether the law, once it became operational, will increase or decrease ethnic Hungarian immigration to Hungary. Hungary’s official position is that Hungarians from neighboring countries should remain in their home country. The government’s argument is that, when the law enters into force, Hungarians from the neighboring countries will prefer to remain in their home country,
while being able to work legally in Hungary. The opposition (the left-wing Hungarian Socialist Party and the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats) challenged this view and argued that this law, since it offers the possibility to work legally, will increase emigration to Hungary. According to this argument, those who work for several months in Hungary will have the possibility to find out how to settle in Hungary. A further disagreement concerns the legalization of illegal work. The critiques of the law assert that cheap illegal work will be preferred both by employees and employers, and, as a consequence, nothing will change. However, both arguments are speculative. Even if public opinion polls support one or another option, from a sociological perspective none of these positions can be confirmed or disproved.  

Two further questions are also central to the debate. The first concerns Hungary’s forthcoming integration into the EU, which is often perceived as a threat to Hungarians living in neighboring countries. Because the law has no provisions for the period after Hungary’s accession to the EU, the Hungarian population in neighboring countries is afraid that traveling to or settling in Hungary will be very difficult. Such a perception influences much more the decisions regarding emigration. Needless to say, the existence or inexistence of the “Status Law” will have a minor influence on individual decisions regarding emigration. The second question concerns Hungary’s increasing demand of skilled workers. Recently, the Prime Minister of Hungary also resorted to this argument:

Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on 31 May [2001] told a Budapest conference entitled “The Hungarian Model” that Hungary will have to attract labor from neighboring countries to fuel its soaring economy. He pointed out that without foreign labor, the country’s supply of quality labor will be unsatisfactory within four to five years. 

Many European states face similar problems. The case of Hungary is different only in the sense that there is a large number of people who, culturally and linguistically, can be easily integrated into the Hungarian society. On the one hand, there is a preference to keep Hungarians from neighboring countries in their home country, on the other hand, economic reasons may force Hungary to increase the number of immigrants. It is probable that Hungary will prefer Hungarians from neighboring countries over non-Hungarian potential immigrants.

Even if politicians avoid discussing this issue, it is absolutely clear that the practical decisions concerning the implementation of the law pose the question: *Who is Hungarian in the neighboring countries?* The legislators’ intention is to include every Hungarian living in neighboring countries, but
only Hungarians. However, achieving this goal is not just impractical, but also theoretically impossible. In public debates, this question was formulated as a dichotomy between the freedom of choice in defining one’s own national identity and the requirement of proving one’s Hungarianness. Theoretically, this dispute can be translated as a debate between the objective and subjective definitions of the nation.

The draft of the law enounces the scope as follows:

§1 (1) The Act covers those persons of Hungarian nationality who are not Hungarian citizens and reside in the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Austria, Romania, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic or the Ukraine, who
a. have lost their Hungarian citizenship for reasons other than voluntary declaration of renunciation, and
b. are not in possession of a permanent residence permit in Hungary,
c. are in possession of an identification document as specified in § 20.

(2) This Act also applies to the spouse living together with the person identified in article (1) and to the children of minor age being raised in their common household even if these persons are not of Hungarian nationality.

One can observe that only the “neighboring countries” are included. For this, the following explanation has been provided:

The Act will cover those persons of Hungarian national identity who are not Hungarian citizens and reside in the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Austria, Romania, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic or the Ukraine. Therefore the Law exclusively affects individuals of Hungarian national identity in the neighboring countries, and not members of the Hungarian diaspora (emigration) living in Western Europe, and overseas. However, this Law does not have any negative effect on the established rights of the diaspora (emigration). Therefore, persons of Hungarian national identity, who have already obtained Hungarian citizenship or are in possession of a permanent residence permit in Hungary are not entitled to become subjects of the law. The definition of the subjects of this law is primarily based on the basic human rights principle on the free choice of identity.34

The reason for excluding the Western diaspora from the benefits is probably that they live in countries characterized by a better economic situation, and it
is considered to be needless to support them with Hungarian state resources. This argument seems logical, but theoretically it undermines the coherence of the definition of nationhood. It seems as if Hungary applied an ethnocultural definition of the nation only selectively, in view of the Hungarians living in the neighboring states.

The debate over the objective and subjective criteria of belonging to the Hungarian nation brought into light an old, and irresolvable, dispute about the definition of the nation. While the opposition accepts only self-definition as a basis of stating somebody’s Hungarianness, the government parties argue that it is necessary to include also “objective criteria.” They argue that, in the case of self-definition, many non-Hungarians would declare themselves Hungarian in order to benefit from the privileges accorded by the law, and this exceeds the present economic capacity of Hungary. To avoid the perils of self-definition, the Hungarian Standing Conference (HSC) recommended the following criteria:

In order for the recommendation to be issued, written identification with the Hungarian nation, application for the recommendation and knowledge of the Hungarian language are required. Under special appraisement, the recommending organization may grant an exemption from the Hungarian language requirement if the applicant meets one of the criteria below:

- a. he or she is considered Hungarian by the country of citizenship,
- b. one of his or her parents is of Hungarian nationality,
- c. his or her spouse possesses a Hungarian Card,
- d. he or she is a member of a registered Hungarian organization,
- e. he or she is treated as Hungarian by a church registry,
- f. he or she has attended, at least, for four years a public educational institution where the language of tuition was Hungarian, or his or her child or children attend(s) such an institution.

Should the applicants be capable of providing evidence of meeting the above-listed criteria, the recommendation has to be issued irrespective of his or her origin, religion or political affiliation.35

Finally this recommendations were framed in the law:

§ 21 (1) The evaluating authority will issue the ID if:
- a. the applicant has a recommendation issued by an organization representing the Hungarian communities in that particular neighboring state and being recognized by the Government of the Republic of Hungary as a recommending organization,
b. the recommendation certifies that the applicant is of Hungarian nationality and includes the followings,
   ba. application of the individual,
   bb. name, place and date of birth, permanent residence, and maiden name of the mother of applicant,
   bc. the name, the print of the official seal of the recommending organization, and the signature of the person acting on behalf of this organization,
   bd. the place and date of issue of the recommendation.

(2) Recommendation issued for the spouse of non-Hungarian nationality and for the child of minor age of the person under this Act, only certifies the family relationship between the applicant and a Hungarian person living outside the borders.

The Hungarian government, together with the political representatives of the Hungarian national minorities, will establish organizations that will collect the applications for the Hungarian Identity Card. The card will be issued by the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Hungary. The evaluating organizations will be selected in accordance with the following principles:

(3) The Government of the Republic of Hungary will recognize an organization representing the Hungarian communities in a given country as a recommending organization, that is able to
   a. represent the Hungarian community in its entirety living in a given country,
   b. provide for organizational and human resources for receiving and evaluating applications for recommendations.

Besides the principle of the free choice of identity, the law includes several “objective” criteria for the definition of the Hungarian nation (at least regarding those who live in the neighboring countries).

One can draw the conclusion that ultimately the Hungarian state (with the assistance and contribution of the HSC) vindicates the right to decide who is Hungarian in the neighboring countries, advancing an “objective” definition of the Hungarian nation, based on ethnocultural principles. The process of framing the law and the future application of the law can be perceived as a new institutionalization of the Hungarian nation. Even if it does not affect Hungarian citizens, it presumably will have effects – at least on a theoretical level – on the status of the non-ethnocultural Hungarians within Hungary as well. The law establishes a new relationship between the Hungarian state and Hungarian individuals. The
procedure of issuing the cards also suggests the unity of the ethnocultural nation. The cooperation of the evaluating organizations and the Hungarian state reinforces this institutionalization.

Possible Consequences of the “Status Law”

Several East-Central European states have already adopted, or are planning to adopt, similar laws. However, the Hungarian “Status Law” was broadly criticized and attacked. Especially the Slovakian and the Romanian governments expressed their concerns regarding the law. They stated that, by implementing the law, Hungary discriminates on an ethnocultural basis among citizens of the neighboring states, it seeks to establish state institutions (the so-called evaluating commissions) on the territory of other states, and that some provisions of the law, especially those regarding the support of profit-oriented enterprises, contradict the principles of a market economy. These governments also resented that Hungary did not inform them about the project of the law. One can debate whether these arguments are valid, but it is highly probable that, given the historical tensions between Hungary and most of its neighbors, the law will have some negative effects on Hungary’s relationship with neighboring states. However, this particular law does not create new tensions, it only reinforces old ones.

From another angle, it is obvious that this law creates tensions among different Hungarian organizations in the neighboring countries as well. There are already ongoing internal debates on the composition of the future evaluating commissions. Since Hungary will finance these organizations and important financial resources will be distributed, those who control this process can easily become dominant in a particular Hungarian political sphere. Furthermore, the acquired information is another important source of power.

In summary, the idea of such a law is, on the one hand, to express the (ethnocultural) unity of the Hungarians living in the Carpathian Basin, and, on the other hand, to enhance the nationalizing process of the Hungarian national minorities. On a theoretical level, two aspects are important. The first is that this law establishes a relationship between the Hungarian individual and the Hungarian state. The second one is that it redefines, and re-institutionalizes the Hungarian conception of the nation.

After 1990, the Hungarian state has been financing the political, cultural, and educational institutions of Hungarians living abroad. The “Status Law” adds another aspect, by creating a relationship between the Hungarian state and individuals belonging to the ethnoculturally defined Hungarian nation, that is similar to the relationship between Hungarian citizens and the Hungarian state. However, Hungarians from neighboring countries will not
acquire Hungarian citizenship. By defining the subjects of the law, one implicitly defines who is Hungarian. The ongoing debate focuses on the conflicting conceptualizations of Hungarianness. It seems that an “objectivist” definition will prevail, and the aspirants will have to prove their Hungarianness with documents. The law refers only to Hungarians living in the bordering countries, therefore one may say that there is a process of institutionalization of the Hungarian nation on an ethno-territorial basis.

Starting from this ethnocultural redefinition of the nation, Hungary also plays an important role in the redefinition of the Hungarian national minorities. Hungarian national minorities in the neighboring countries are involved in nationalizing processes within the framework of their respective states. The “Status Law” strengthens the symbolic boundaries of Hungary and the national minorities living in neighboring countries. The theoretical question is whether there are several parallel processes of Hungarian nation-building, or only one. The situation existing prior to the “Status Law” suggests the former, while the post-“Status Law” situation the latter. The “Status Law” binds all the members of the Hungarian ethnocultural nation (living in the neighboring states) together. In this respect, it has a decisive influence on the politics of the national minorities.

Throughout the last decade, Hungary has been supporting most of the important cultural institutions. In the future, however, it will have also a decisive role in the life-strategies of the Hungarian individuals living in the neighboring countries. Hungarian political elites and intellectuals will be even more dependent on Hungary, and Budapest is meant to become the focal point for every member of the Hungarian ethnocultural community. However, this connection is mediated by Hungarian organizations from neighboring countries, and by this mediation, that is using Hungarian financial resources, they can realize their nation-building project.36

Conclusion

This paper sought to provide a conceptual framework for analyzing national minorities, based on the case study of the Hungarian national minority in Romania. It suggests that one should use the concept of nationalizing minority instead of national minority, because it better captures the dynamics of the given community and offers a better explanation for nationalism in East-Central Europe. Nationalizing minority is a concept of the same category as nationalizing state, and does not suppose different motivations for the titular nation and the national minority. My intention was to propose an approach that is valid despite the regime or border changes; the actors (the groups) may change, but the logic is similar.
Furthermore, I have briefly demonstrated that the debate regarding the establishment of a Hungarian university is not understandable if one concentrates only on education and disregards the nation-building process. I have argued that, from this perspective, one can grasp the meaning of the debates within the ethnic parties on the question of participating in the government or remaining in opposition. Similarly, the conception of the “Status Law” cannot be understood if one does not analyze the ethnocultural definition of the Hungarian nation, and does not take into account the underlying assumptions of the Hungarian government regarding the national minorities as nationalizing minorities. However, it is still a question whether Hungary’s politics, as an external national homeland, leads to a general Hungarian nation-building, or to separate minority nation-buildings in the neighboring states.

NOTES


3 Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, p. 7.

4 Brubaker argues, “I choose this term [nationalizing state] rather than ‘nation-state’ to emphasize that I am talking about a dynamic political stance—or a family of related yet competing stances—rather than a static condition.” Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, p. 63.


7 For example, Hungarians in Romania constitute a nationalizing minority, while Bulgarians in Romania or Hungarians in Austria do not; in Western Europe, the Northern-Irish Catholic community is a typical nationalizing minority. In the light of the events of the last twenty years, Albanians in Kosovo can also be considered a nationalizing minority.

9 Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, p. 60.
14 The HDUR defines itself as “the community of the autonomous territorial, political, social and cultural organizations of Hungarians in Romania.” Its main objective is “to protect the interests and rights for the Hungarian minority.”
15 In contrast to many opinions, this does not imply territorial separation. Especially after 1945, the Hungarian minority in Romania accepted the state of affairs and searched for solutions within the framework of the Romanian state.
17 The actual translation would be “Council of the Representatives.”
18 By internal opposition I designate the so-called Reform Tömörülés (Reform Group), that pleads for an “internal democratization” of the HDUR and advocates a more radical policy towards the Romanian state.
19 Törvény a szomszédos országokban élő magyarakról (Act on the Hungarians living in neighboring countries).
21 Határon Túli Magyarak Hivatala (Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad – GOHMA). The Hungarian government also allocated important sums to several foundations that distributed the resources: Illyés Foundation, Segítő Jobb Foundation, (Új)Kézfogás Foundation, Apáczai Foundation, etc.
22 Several studies show that only a minor part of those who studied in Hungary returned or intend to return to their home countries.
23 The government was formed in 1990 by the coalition led by the *Magyar Demokrata Fórum* (Hungarian Democratic Forum), with József Antall as Prime Minister.
24 The government was formed in 1998 by the coalition led by the *FIDESZ* (Alliance of Young Democrats), with Viktor Orbán as Prime Minister.
25 The government was formed in 1994 by the coalition led by the *Magyar Szocialista Párt* (Hungarian Socialist Party), with Gyula Horn as Prime Minister.
26 Slovakia and Slovenia will probably join the EU almost simultaneously with Hungary. Even if not, the citizens of these countries will not need a visa to travel to the EU states. It is also probable that the visa requirement for Romanian citizens will be waived.
The debate on this issue was published in *Magyar Kisebbség* 1 (1999), and 2-3 (1999).


Information on the “Law on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries” (Act T/4070).

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The nationalizing politics of the national minority is implemented by the ethnic party that has a dual role, that is, it functions as a political party and also as a social organization. The ethnic party and the ethno-civil society is led and influenced by the minority political elite and by the intellectuals who set the goals of a particular national minority, and act as its representatives.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY


Can Democracy Work in Southeastern Europe? Ethnic Nationalism vs. Democratic Consolidation in Post-Communist Romania

DRAGOȘ PETRESCU

Romania’s bloody revolution contradicted the non-violent, peaceful character of other 1989 Eastern European revolutions. As J. F. Brown has argued, the Romanian revolution added to the Eastern European revolutions the missing elements of a “classic” revolution: violence, bloodshed and tyrannicide.1 Nevertheless, Romania’s unexpected and violent exit from communism contrasted sharply with its slow and painful post-communist transformation. In their attempt to find an explanation to Romania’s long and difficult transition to a democratic political system and a market economy, many scholars have argued that the legacy of Romanian national-communism was one of the most enduring communist legacies in East-Central Europe and that Romania entered the post-communist transformation with a serious handicap. Others have invoked the “civilizational incompetence” of the more backward, “Balkan” Romania and even the “national character” of the Romanians.

The present paper examines the outburst of ethnic nationalism that followed the breakdown of the communist regime in Romania, explains how the affective approach to nationhood of the majority of the Romanians hampered a rapid democratization of the country, and argues that a shift from ethnic to civic nationalism would accelerate the process of democratic consolidation and European integration.2 I explore the intricate relationship between ethnic nationalism and democratic transformation, stressing the importance of developing a political culture based on civic nationalism, and demonstrating that the political and economic transformations must reach an equilibrium. Finally, I discuss what are the major threats to democratic consolidation in Romania. The paper concludes that Romania has to surpass the “failure complex” induced by a decade of a mishandled transition to democracy and protracted economic transformation and, drawing on Ernest Gellner’s ideas, proposes a solution centered on three main issues: (1) political stability and continuity; (2) economic affluence; and (3) cultural pluralism and de-territorialization of nationalism. My argument can be summarized in the form of four statements:
1. Ethnic nationalism threatens democratic consolidation; and history is a key element on which ethnic nationalism is based;
2. De-ethnicization of the government is a major step towards a civic/democratic understanding of nationhood;
3. Economic problems tend to undermine the achievements in the field of politics; therefore, economic reform must go hand in hand with political reform; and
4. The process of democratic consolidation, although cannot be reversed, can be slowed down, if not stopped.

The first statement suggests that in Romania, as compared with Hungary, Poland, or the Czech Republic, the post-communist transformation was delayed by an outburst of ethnic nationalism. It was, in fact, a complex interplay of political and cultural-historical issues involving the Romanian majority, the Hungarian minority in Romania and the Hungarian government, that contributed to the formation of an environment less favorable for democratic transformation in the early 1990s. Therefore, the issues of national identity and loyalty towards a “unitary nation-state” received disproportionate attention and often overshadowed the issue of democratic transformation of the country. It was also due to such an approach to nationhood that Romania’s post-communist transformation has been longer and more traumatic than in most of the former communist countries of Central Europe.

Before going into details, I would like to briefly summarize the concepts and some related theoretical issues on which my analysis is based. In my opinion, one of the main goals of the process of democratic consolidation in Romania is the widespread adoption of a democratic definition of the nation. Furthermore, I relate the democratic definition of the nation with civic nationalism and the cultural definition of the nation with ethnic nationalism. As Yael Tamir puts it, a democratic definition of the nation considers the nation as synonymous with “the governed” or “the group of individuals living under the same rule.” This definition is opposed to the cultural definition of the nation, as “a community sharing a set of objective characteristics grouped under the rubric of culture and national consciousness,” from which derives Ernest Gellner’s definition of nationalism, as “a political principle which maintains that similarity of culture is the basic social bond.” From the many definitions of ethnic and, respectively, civic nationalism, Charles A. Kupchan’s are most appropriate:

*Ethnic nationalism* defines nationhood in terms of lineage. The attributes that members of an ethnically defined national grouping share include physical characteristics, culture, religion, language, and a common ances-
try. Individuals of a different ethnicity, even if they reside in and are cit-
izens of the nation-state in question, do not become part of the national
grouping. Civic nationalism defines nationhood in terms of citizenship
and political participation. Members of a national grouping that is
defined in civic terms share participation in a circumscribed political
community, common political values, a sense of belonging to the state in
which they reside, and, usually, a common language. A citizen is a nation-
al, regardless of ethnicity and lineage.6

In my interpretation, civic nationalism resembles what Tamir calls “liberal
nationalism,” that is, “a set of beliefs endorsing individual rights and lib-
erties, affirming the right of individuals to equal respect and concern, and
presuming that governments should be neutral and impartial vis-à-vis
individual interests, preferences and conceptions of the good.”7 Or, sim-
ply put, civic nationalism recognizes the right to diversity.

As many scholars have argued, the breakdown of communist
regimes in East-Central Europe was followed by the re-emergence of eth-
nic nationalism, most obviously in the former Yugoslavia and, to a much
lesser extent, in the other former communist countries. In this respect, the
bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia is in sharp contrast with the “velvet
divorce” between the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Nevertheless, even in
the more westernized countries of Central Europe, one still cannot speak
of a widespread civic understanding of nationalism. For instance, one can
recall the wall built in 1999 by the Czechs in a neighborhood in Ústí nad
Labem to separate themselves from the local Gypsy community.8 Further-
more, one should not forget that West European states have gone through
a process of nation-building that took more than two hundred years. Nev-
ertheless, the ethno-national demands of the Basques, Corsicans, South
Tyrolean Germans, and the Irish in Northern Ireland,9 or the current
resurgence of nationalistic and xenophobic political parties in Austria,
Switzerland and Italy show that the democratic definition of the nation
has its enemies in “civilized” Europe itself.

Furthermore, I would argue that ethnic nationalism did not become
a major hindrance to democratic transition in the countries of Central
Europe (i.e., Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic) not only because of
their different communist legacies, but also because of the fragmentation
of the national minorities within their boundaries and the adoption of dif-
ferent (ethno)national strategies by majorities, minorities and external
homelands. Therefore, I consider that a comprehensive analysis of demo-
cratic transformation in East-Central Europe has to take into considera-
tion the size of the ethnic minorities within the borders of the countries
under analysis. More importantly, one must look thoroughly to those
minorities’ strategies of self-affirmation and the way in which state authorities and ethnic majorities have reacted to such strategies. In order to address the Romanian case, I would propose first to take a brief look at the ethnic composition of some Central and Southeast European countries in the early 1990s.

The Czech Republic and Slovakia emerged as independent republics on 1 January 1993. In the Czech Republic, at the beginning of the 1990s, the ethnic structure of the population was the following: Czechs and Moravians 94.4%, Slovaks 3.1%, Poles 0.6%, Germans 0.5%, Silesians 0.4%, Gypsies/Roma 0.3%, and Hungarians 0.2%. The rest (0.5%) was made up of other ethnic groups (March 1991 estimate). A 1996 estimate provided the following data on Slovakia’s ethnic structure: Slovaks 85.7%, Hungarians 10.6%, Gypsies/Roma 1.6%, Czechs and Silesians 1.1%, Ruthenians and Ukrainians 0.6%, Germans 0.1%, Poles 0.1%, and others 0.2%. In the case of Hungary, 89.9% of the population was classified as ethnic Hungarian, 4% as Gypsy/Roma, 2.6% as German, 2% as Serbian, 0.8% as Slovak, and 0.7% as Romanian. In 1990, the ethnic structure of Poland was the following: Poles 97.6%, Germans 1.3%, Ukrainians 0.6%, Belorussians 0.5%. The rest was made up of smaller groups of Slovaks, Czechs, Lithuanians, Russians, Gypsies, and Jews.

At the beginning of 1990s, Romania’s ethnic structure was the following: Romanians 89.5%, Hungarians 7.1%, and Germans 0.5%, while the Gypsy/Roma community amounted to 1.8% of the total population (according to a 1992 estimate). Romania also had small minorities (under 1%) of Ukrainians, Jews, Russians, Serbs, Croats, Turks, Bulgarians, Tartars, and Slovaks. In the case of Bulgaria, according to a 1998 estimate, 83% of the population was classified as ethnic Bulgarian, 8.5% as Turkish, and 2.6% as Gypsy/Roma. The rest was made up of small groups of Armenians, Macedonians, Greeks, Tartars, etc.

The analysis of the ethnic structure of Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic on the one hand, and of Romania and Bulgaria, on the other, reveals that there were no crucial differences in terms of ethnic homogeneity between these countries. In fact, all these countries have a majority that makes up around 85% of the total population. (As shown above, 89.5% of Romania’s population was classified as ethnic Romanian, 83% of Bulgaria’s population was classified as ethnic Bulgarian and 85.7% of Slovakia’s population was classified as Slovak.) What is a major element of the differentiation is the existence of a compact and relatively large national minority within the borders of these post-communist states. In this respect, Romania and Bulgaria, as well as the Central European Slovakia had larger national minorities than Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic. In the early 1990s, Hungarians constituted 7.1% of Romania’s population and 10.6% of Slovakia’s, while the Turks constituted 8.5% of Bulgaria’s population.

Considering this, I analyze below the way in which ethnic nationalism was a major hindrance to rapid democratization in post-communist Romania. It goes without saying that this analysis is not intended to praise ethnic cleansing as a precondition for rapid democratization. In Romania, the newly-installed post-communist regime made use of ethnic nationalism in order to preserve power, and the Hungarian minority in Romania, a relatively large ethnic minority and politically organized among ethnic lines, was targeted as a threat to the unity of the Romanian state in order to divert attention from the growing social and economic problems of the transition. At the same time, the emotional attachment of both Romanians and Hungarians to the present-day Romanian province of Transylvania, a core element of their modern national identities, and the ambiguous use by the Hungarian government, in the early 1990s, of the concept of “ethnic autonomy” with regard to the Hungarians living in the neighboring countries, added a supplementary strain to the democratization process in post-communist Romania.16

A comprehensive analysis of the Romanian debates on national identity formation is beyond the scope of the present paper. However, there is a crucial element related to Romania’s recent history that explains the violent resurgence of ethnic nationalism after the breakdown of the communist regime and the way the state authorities and a major part of the ethnic majority reacted to the claims of the minorities, which needs a closer examination: the late creation of the nation.17 In my opinion, the notion of creation refers to a decisive shift in integrating large masses of the ethnic Romanian population into the imagined community of the Romanian nation, and not to the final, ultimate realization of nationhood. Here I follow Rogers Brubaker’s concept of “nationalizing state” when referring to the Romanian state. As Brubaker argues, nationalizing state refers to a dynamic political stance:

Characteristic of this stance, or set of stances, is the tendency to see the state as an “unrealized” nation-state, as a state destined to be a nation-state, the state of and for a particular nation, but not yet in fact a nation-state (at least not to a sufficient degree); and the concomitant disposition to remedy this perceived defect, to make the state what it is properly and legitimately destined to be, by promoting the language, culture, demographic position, economic flourishing, or political hegemony of the nominally state-bearing nation.18
Furthermore, as Walker Connor argues, “the nation-formation is a process, not an occurrence.” In the case of Romania, the process of turning peasants into Romanians, to paraphrase Eugen Weber, took a decisive course only under the national-communist regime of Nicolae Ceaușescu (1965-1989), in the conditions of an extensive program of centrally-planned urbanization, industrialization, increased communication and the spread of education. It is difficult, if not impossible to provide a precise date for the creation of a nation. Connor states that “the point in the process at which a sufficient portion of a people has internalized the national identity so as to cause nationalism to become an effective force for mobilizing the masses does not lend itself to precise calculation.” Nevertheless, in the case of Romania, the process of creating the nation did not come to an end in 1918, as a majority of the Romanian scholars argue. As Irina Livezeanu has shown in her work on interwar Romania, “the unification of Romanian lands in 1918 constituted a national revolution ... and this revolution initiated the turbulent nation building and civil strife that characterized the decades between the two wars.” Furthermore, Livezeanu has observed that “the union of 1918 brought into being a deeply fragmented polity, and the startling effects of centuries of political separation presented great challenges to the newly enlarged state and to the sense of national identity of its population.” Similarly, Kenneth Jowitt has argued that during the interwar period “the elites and major sectors of the population lacked meaningful, shared sentiments of community and a relatively consistent, jointly shaped set of commitments to the nation-state itself.”

My argument is that the process of Romanian nation-building was continued under the communist regime and reached a decisive phase around 1981. Or, to use Anthony D. Smith’s terms, communist Romania went through a piecemeal process of “ethnic bureaucratic incorporation” that entered its final stage in the early 1980s. Symbolically, 1981 represented a turning point because, in that year, the urban population reached 50.1% of the total population. In reality, it was a combination of economic, social and cultural factors that determined the achievement of a decisive stage in creating the nation. After 1981, the economic crisis and the ideological decay undermined to some extent the regime’s efforts to further homogenize the Romanian “socialist” nation. At the same time, the idea that the regional identities of Transylvanian- or Moldavian-Romanians melted into a Romanian identity is also supported by the fact that the Romanian nation did not follow the fate of the “unrealized” Yugoslav or Czechoslovak nations after the 1989 revolutions. Therefore, I would argue that a thorough look at the period between 1918 and 1981 is essential in order to understand the Romanian nation-building process. Since a com-
prehensive investigation of this topic goes beyond the scope of the present paper, I provide here only some elements in order to support my thesis that 1981 was indeed a turning point in the creation of the Romanian nation. According to the 1930 census, Romania’s rural population made up 78.9% of the total population, while the urban population made up only 21.1%. Between 1948 and 1981, the rural population decreased from 76.6% to 49.9%, while the urban population increased from 23.4% to 50.1%. At the same time, the rapid industrialization of the country resulted in the growth of population involved in industry, and a significant decrease in the proportion of the population involved in agriculture. Between 1950 and 1981, the population employed in agriculture decreased from 74.1% to 28.9%; conversely, during the same period, the population employed in industry increased from 12.0% to 36.1%. This process occurred in the conditions of a specific trend of socialist industrialization, that is, the concentration of large masses of workers in huge plants, built nearby urban areas. Such a significant shift in the rural-urban distribution of population, as well as the rapid increase of the population involved in industry as compared with the population involved in agriculture, determined the exposure of large masses of peasants to urban life and city culture and therefore led to their integration into the “imagined community” of the Romanian nation.

However, the integration of the rural regions could have not been achieved without a sustained program of developing a network of paved roads and, following the Leninist principle, of rural electrification. Rural electrification was accompanied by the spread of cheap radiophonic equipment that brought rural Romania out of its autarky. Interwar Romania had a deplorable network of paved roads. More than ten years after the communist takeover, in 1956, paved roads still made up only 4.8% of the total network of 76,000 km, while in 1980 paved roads made up 20.0% of the total road network. In terms of electrification, the situation was equally distressing: in 1945, only 535 villages from a total number of 15,000 were connected to the national grid; in 1965 there were already 3,034 electrified villages, while by 1970 their number rose to 10,591.

From the point-of-view of the nation-building process, the spread of education is intimately linked to industrialization and urbanization. It is true that the rate of illiteracy substantially declined between 1918 and 1948. However, the vast majority of the population did not have more than four years of primary school. The law of 1948 stated that, out of seven years of free education, four were compulsory; in 1955/1956 seven years of school became compulsory in urban areas, followed by a similar provision in 1959/1960 for rural areas. In 1961/1962 compulsory education was extended to eight years. As a result of communist educational policy,
while in 1938/1939 only 14% of the pupils went beyond the primary level, by 1965/1966 the percentage increased to 59%.

Nevertheless, it was not only the schooling of the overwhelming majority of Romania’s inhabitants, but also the content of the curricula, particularly the teaching of a “national” history, that supplemented the regime’s efforts. In fact, such a strategy was not employed only by the communist regimes. In his work on the modernization of rural France, Weber emphasizes the use of history teaching in the nation-building process. As Weber puts it, “there were no better instruments of indoctrination and patriotic conditioning than French history and geography, especially history.”\textsuperscript{31} In the Romanian case, the importance of history in creating the “socialist” nation is suggested by the centrality of the debates on the ethnic origins of the Romanians. With regard to the process of Romanian ethno-genesis, communist historiography went through three stages between 1948 and 1989. During the first stage, 1948-1958, as a result of the Russification campaign, official historiography placed a strong emphasis on the Slavs and their role in the formation of the Romanian people. The second stage, 1958-1974, was characterized by a relative ideological relaxation and a return to the theses of the interwar period, concerning the role of the Romans and their mixing with the local Dacian population in providing the Dacian-Romanian essence of the Romanians. The third stage, 1974-1989, was characterized by “Dacomania,” that is, a special emphasis on the fundamental role of the “autochthonous,” Dacian element in the formation of Romanian people.\textsuperscript{32} This last period deserves a closer look since it was crucial in establishing the idea of a national history for the overwhelming majority of present-day Romanians.

The return to the Dacian origins, i.e., the third turn of Romanian communist historiography was announced by Ceausescu’s “Theses of July 1971,” a radical attack against the cosmopolitan and pro-Western attitudes in Romanian culture.\textsuperscript{33} After the “Theses,” the regime began to place an emphasis on the importance of history-writing in building the “socialist” nation, and the most important step to be taken was to provide the party guidelines for the writing of a “national” history. Three years later, in 1974, the founding document of Romanian national-communism was issued: the Romanian Communist Party Program (RCPP).\textsuperscript{34} This official document opened with a 38-page concise history of Romania, which, in fact, became not only the blueprint for a single, compulsory textbook utilized in every school, but also the model for every historical writing published in Romania. Four main ideas, which became sacred themes of the “national” historiography, emerged from the RCPP: (1) the ancient roots of the Romanian people; (2) the continuity of the Romanians on the
actual territory from the ancient times until present; (3) the unity of the Romanian people throughout its entire history; and, (4) Romanians’ continuous struggle for independence. From that moment, history textbooks were to tell a “national” history in which Romanians were depicted as a heroic and tolerant people, forced to fight for centuries with all kinds of enemies who hampered the fulfillment of their “national” ideal of living in an united and independent state. To sum up, one of the major lessons of the national history, as taught until December 1989, was that the Romanian unitary nation-state has been continuously contested and threatened, and that it was the patriotic duty for all responsible Romanians to defend it at all costs.

The ethno-cultural idea of the nation and the idea of a national history, based on the four “pillars” mentioned above, reached the grassroots level through schooling, press, radio and television. In addition, the communist regime devised a national festival, *Cîntarea României* (Romania’s Song of Praise), which was initiated in 1976 and took place annually until 1989, and a national sport competition, *Daciada*, the name of which was a clear reference to the Dacian origins of the Romanians, that were both instrumental in achieving the regime’s cultural goals. Indeed, the national festival *Cîntarea României*, which gathered professional artists, as well as a wide range of amateurs from all over the country, was instrumental in enforcing upon the population a stronger sense of belonging to the Romanian “socialist” nation.35

In the early 1990s, Romanian society was marked by a strong tendency towards violence rooted in the “movement of rage” which overthrew the Ceausescu regime in December 1989. In order to preserve power, the newly-established regime made use of ethnic nationalism and favored the channeling of popular discontent towards the democratic opposition and the Hungarian minority. Paradoxically for a “revolutionary” regime, the authorities made use of the “rhetoric of reaction,” especially of the jeopardy argument, stating that the claims made by the Hungarian minority were a threat to Romania’s territorial integrity.36 In January 1990, Ion Iliescu, the leader of the National Salvation Front (NSF), declared that “many disquieting phenomena have been brought to our attention recently from certain Transylvanian counties in connection with separatist trends which cause tension between citizens of Romanian and Hungarian nationality.”37 Once he decided to run for presidency in the general elections on 20 May 1990, Iliescu was also prepared to use the nationalist argument and to convince the ethnic Romanian majority that the NSF was the only force capable to protect the “Nation” against the alleged territorial claims of Hungary over Transylvania and the “betrayal” of the Hungarian minority. Encouraged by such a discourse, Romanian
nationalists went further and made use of the most bizarre arguments. For instance, Radu Ceontea, a co-founder of the Romanian nationalist organization *Vatra Românească* (Romanian Hearth) declared:

> I came from a pure Romanian village in the Mureș Valley. My village suffered in every possible way under the Hungarians. My father was the village butcher, and my mother had four years of schooling. The only book I knew before my school textbooks was the Bible. Even as a small child I was told by my father not to trust Hungarians. He told me that “every single Hungarian carries a rope in his pocket.” The cord with which they would strangle Romanians.  

Such arguments were inspired in many respects by the nationalist rhetoric that accompanied the late realization of the nation and by the idea of a Romanian nation continuously contested and threatened. However, such attitudes were reinforced by what László Fey named the “anti-Romanian chauvinism of the Hungarians,” rooted in a complex of cultural superiority toward the Romanian majority. Some of the elements of such a discourse can be identified, for instance, in a fragment by Attila Sántha:

> For me, as a child, “Romanians” were an abstract notion, having to do with the virtual realm; they were the TV actors who would construct socialism. At the age of eight, this was a nice thing. Being born in a small town with an ethnic Hungarian population of over 98% (at that time), the first Romanian in the flesh I saw was the teacher of Romanian language, who was striving to teach us a language spoken only on the TV. ... As every Hungarian living in Romania, upset for having to live in a poverty-stricken country, in poverty (while the luckier Hungarians from Hungary are already joining the European Union), sometimes I really think that there must be some problems with the Romanian people itself.

The Iliescu regime did little to prevent an escalation of the ethnic conflict in Transylvania. In March 1990, a violent conflict occurred in Târgu Mureș, between Romanians and members of the Hungarian minority. Apart from the way in which the Iliescu regime treated the democratic opposition, the minorities’ issue and the violent events of Târgu Mureș led to the international isolation of Romania and the loss of the widespread international support gained in December 1989. March 1990 was a crucial moment in diverting and delaying political and economic reforms, and therefore hampering a rapid transition to democracy in Romania. This favorably changed after the general elections of November 1996, when the democratic opposition (the Democratic Convention) won the largest
number of seats in parliament and formed a governing coalition with the Social Democratic Union (SDU) and the Hungarian Democratic Union in Romania (HDUR).

The second statement reads as follows: “De-ethnicization of the government is a major step towards a civic-democratic understanding of nationhood.” In order to address this issue, I will briefly summarize the main aspects related to the process of reconciliation between Romania and Hungary. On 16 September 1996, before the elections of November, Romania and Hungary signed in Timișoara the “basic treaty” recognizing the existing borders and the rights of ethnic minorities, which created a sound basis for collaboration and political partnership. Both countries were interested in signing the treaty as a result of international pressure. With regard to the process of negotiations for signing the treaty, I would like to emphasize a significant modification of Brubaker’s model of “triadic relational nexus” composed of the national minority, nationalizing state and external national homeland. My point is that because of the bloody dissolution of Yugoslavia and the international efforts to put an end to ethnic cleansing, the “relational nexus” took a new form, which is generally applicable to cases similar to that of Romania. For the Romanian case, this new “triadic relational nexus” is composed of the nationalizing state (Romania), external national homeland (Hungary), and international organizations (UN, OECD, NATO, and the like). The national minority, represented by its party organized along ethnic lines (the Hungarian Democratic Union in Romania), occupies different positions within this new triangular relational nexus. Between 1990 and 1996, HDUR took mainly positions that placed it close to the external national homeland (Hungary) and international organizations. Nevertheless, the reconciliation process and the signing of the basic treaty forced the HDUR to take a more natural position, somewhere in the middle of the triangular relational nexus described above. Eventually, although HDUR opposed the signing of the treaty, the external national homeland (Hungary) decided to sign the treaty with the nationalizing state (Romania) under pressure of international organizations.

After the elections of November 1996, HDUR became a member of the ruling coalition. In spite of the pressure from more militant factions demanding regional and ethnic autonomy, HDUR did not withdraw from the government. In my opinion, HDUR participation in the government represented a major step towards a democratic understanding of the nation. In many respects, it constituted a cognitive dissonance and, therefore, a basis for an internal reconciliation. Nevertheless, new cognitive elements need to be added in order to change the existing stereotypes at the majority level with regard, for instance, to the loyalty of the ethnic
Hungarians towards the Romanian state. As shown above, present-day Romanian society is characterized by a cultural understanding of the nation. I would suggest that new forms of collaboration have to be established between democratic parties and the HDUR in order to create a lasting internal reconciliation and a shift from *ethnic* to *civic* nationalism. Obviously, a pre-condition for such reconciliation is that the moderate wing of the HDUR continues to control the party. At the same time, the claim put forward by some analysts that the HDUR “has no objectives for the Romanian society as a whole” and that it confines itself “exclusively to getting rights for the Hungarian minority” needs a closer examination.

In my opinion, the HDUR has to decide how to reconcile its liberal stance concerning devolution and de-centralization with the idea of collective rights and the efforts to build a sort of parallel polity for the Hungarians in Romania. Solving this inner tension would be crucial in order to avoid self-seclusion and, ultimately, the alienation of the Hungarian community in Romania, which might lead to an increased migration towards the external homeland, Hungary. Meanwhile, the Romanian 2000 elections brought back former President Ion Iliescu and his party (Party for Social Democracy in Romania) to power. The new government, led by Adrian Năstase, succeeded in establishing a fragile (legislative) compromise with the HDUR. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen if the ruling party and HDUR will be able to work together towards a civic-oriented community.

*The third statement* reads: “Economic problems tend to undermine the achievements in the field of politics; therefore, economic reform must go hand in hand with political reform.” With regard to the shift to a civic nationalism, economic recovery is crucial in order to prevent frustration from turning into violence, a situation in which the national minorities would be among the scapegoats. In the case of Romania, it was not the political, but the protracted economic transformation that frustrated large segments of the population. In fact, the economic transformation proved to be more difficult than presumed. Regarding the relationship between democracy and market economy, I follow the conceptual framework put forward by Béla Greskovits. In his analysis based on the Hungarian case, Greskovits explains why the emerging democracies of Central Europe proved to be crisis resistant:

Democracy and a market economy could be simultaneously introduced only because neither has been fully implemented. Democracy could only stabilize at the cost of some of its qualitative aspects because of the crisis and economic transformation. Economic transformation, in turn, has remained feasible only at a cost of its speed and radicalism, and its many
imperfections are due not least to the democratic framework of the change. The economic and political systems reached an equilibrium, but at lower level than is typical, for example, of the Western market democracies.50

With regard to post-communist Romania’s political transformation, the year 1996 was crucial. As Vladimir Tismăneanu puts it, “Romania’s democratic engagement as 1996 closed was firm.”51 In his analysis of Romania’s democratic transition, Tismăneanu defines the victory of the democratic opposition in the November 1996 elections as an “electoral revolution.”52 Unfortunately, the electoral revolution of November 1996 was not followed by an immediate acceleration of economic reforms. My argument is that in post-communist Romania economic transformation was left behind political transformation and that a state of relative low-level equilibrium was reached in 1999.53

Therefore, particular attention has to be given to economic transformation in order to preserve this equilibrium that would permit an acceleration of both economic and political reforms. As Fabrizio Coricelli argued, the economic performance in transition economies results “from a rather complex interaction between initial conditions (history) and changes (policy reforms).”54 The analysis of Romania’s “initial conditions,” that is, the legacy of the centrally-planned economy and the “changes” that took place during the first post-communist decade will provide support for my argument that economic transformation must keep the pace with political transformation.

In the late 1960s, in communist Romania, market-socialist reformers such as Alexandru Birădeanu, who believed in a sort of socialist market economy, lost the battle with the supporters of a centrally-planned economy following the Stalinist model.55 Consequently, the Romanian economy was conducted until the revolution of 1989 according to the rigid beliefs of economic Stalinism.56 This economic policy plunged the country into a deep crisis during the 1980s. As shown by the World Bank report, the signs of the structural economic crisis appeared already in the mid-1970s.57 In 1979, the regime introduced price increases for gasoline, electricity, natural gas and heating fuel. Food rationing measures followed and, in 1981, bread rationing was introduced in order to limit consumption. (Bread rationing was maintained over the entire period 1981-1989, except for Bucharest.) Similar measures of food rationing were introduced for other basic foodstuffs, such as cooking oil and sugar. In 1982, electricity price rose by 30%, while the price of heating fuel rose by 300%.58
Furthermore, Ceaușescu’s policy of reducing the country’s external debt, which in late 1981 amounted to $10.2 billion, resulted in a drastic reduction of imports. Consequently, beginning in 1981-1982, Romania, as a net importer of food from the West, entered a period of chronic shortages of foodstuffs and other basic items such as soap, toothpaste, and detergent. The economy was seriously affected, since the import of machines and production equipment from the West was also reduced drastically. This added more problems to the Romanian economy in the conditions of an increasing complexity of the world economy. Therefore, from the late 1970s, Romania exported mainly goods with a small added value. Moreover, the Romanian economy was based on large state enterprises and therefore was less flexible and capable of responding to international competition. In 1989, Romanian small and medium size enterprises (with less than 500 employees) contributed only 6% to the total industrial production and employed only 4% of the total workforce.

The economic crisis led to a decline in the standard of living of the population “unmatched since the famine of the postwar period.” In February 1982, after a sustained campaign in mass media, the regime introduced new prices for foodstuffs. According to the official figures, prices rose by an average of 35%. Although the private electricity consumption represented only 7.0% of the total consumption, during the 1980s, the population had to bear the burden of the energy crisis. As a consequence, the energy crisis provoked major difficulties in central heating during wintertime, with disastrous consequences for the population. In the late 1980s, for the major part of the Romanian population the conditions of life were at the lowest possible level among the countries of “real socialism.”

Therefore, after the fall of the communist regime in December 1989, Romania entered the process of economic transformation with a serious handicap. In its communiqué of 22 December 1989, the newly-established National Salvation Front promised “to restructure the whole national economy, in accordance with the criteria of profitability and efficiency, to eliminate the administrative, bureaucratic methods of centralized economic management and to promote free initiative and competence in the management of all economic sectors.” However, economic transformation was slow. Apart from the initial conditions, the changes initiated by the post-communist governments did not accelerate economic recovery after the collapse of the centrally-planned economy.

To support my argument, I provide a comparison between the post-communist economic reform strategies adopted by Romania and Poland, a country comparable to Romania in terms of size and population. In order to discuss Romania’s strategy of economic transformation, it is instructive to consider the ten measures on which the Polish model of eco-
conomic transformation was based, and then to examine how each of the ten measures has been applied in Romania. The comparison results in the following characteristics of Romania’s economic reform strategy: (1) gradual liberalization of prices; (2) soft budget constraints for state enterprises and difficult access on the market for new private companies; (3) slow pace of privatization; (4) difficulties in enforcing contracts; (5) a rudimentary, “captive” banking system; (6) readiness of the government to accept high unemployment, but unwillingness to proceed to a rapid restructuring; (7) difficulties in tax collection; (8) incompetence in making use of the advantage of not having external debts inherited from the communist regime; (9) an over-appreciated official exchange rate until 1994; and (10) a slow penetration of information technology.

In my opinion, an important aspect of Romania’s protracted economic transformation is related to a cultural syndrome, developed by the societies under “real socialism,” defined by Piotr Sztompka as “civilizational incompetence.” Sztompka argues that a developed society operates on the basis of a “less obvious, underlying cultural resource,” called “civilizational competence,” that is, “a complex set of rules, norms, and values, habits and reflexes, codes and matrices, blueprints and formats – the skillful and semi-automatic mastering of which is a prerequisite for participation in a modern civilization.” Furthermore, he identifies four sub-categories of civilizational competence: (1) enterprise culture; (2) civic culture; (3) discursive culture; and (4) everyday culture. I would argue that the lack of an enterprise culture was an essential element that hampered a rapid economic transformation in Romania. According to Sztompka, enterprise culture is essential for participating in a market economy and is characterized by “innovative push, achievement orientation, individualistic competitiveness and rational calculation.” In the case of Romania, Katherine Verdery provides an insightful analysis of the Caritas pyramid scheme that functioned between 1992 and 1994 in Cluj and attracted around 10% of Romania’s population. As Verdery shows, the success of the pyramid-schemes and other so-called “mutual-aid games” during the 1990-1994 period proved that the majority of Romania’s population had a different conception of money and value than a population living in a market economy.

To conclude, it was not only the legacy of the communist economic system that hindered a successful economic transformation in post-communist Romania. The slow pace of privatization resulted in a reduced influx of foreign capital. Furthermore, the incapacity to provide adequate responses to populist pressure was another major hindrance to a short and less painful economic transformation in Romania. Consequently, the gradual and contradictory transformation of the Romanian economy led
to fragile economic growth, beginning only in 2000. As Daniel Dăianu has convincingly argued, to pursue this positive trend, Romania needs a more active public policy and an intellectual and organizational mastering of development programs.69

The fourth statement reads as follows: “The process of democratic consolidation, although cannot be reversed, can be slowed down, if not stopped.” The social and economic problems Romania faces today deepened what Hirschman has called fracasomania, or the “failure complex,” a concept that refers to “the conviction that all attempts at solving the nation’s problems have entered in utter failure.” As Hirschman suggests, the “failure complex” impedes “the change and the perfectibility of existing institutions.”70 In such circumstances, one might witness the return of the ethnocentric radicals, whose national-populist rhetoric never lost its appeal to the “losers” of the economic transition, with disastrous consequences for the process of democratic consolidation. In fact, the argument of the “perpetual failure” to reform the economy and raise the standard of living of the population, to fight corruption and to enforce law and order, to join NATO, and to participate in the free movement of persons (Romanians are subject to humiliating procedures in order to get a visa for the Schengen space) has already been utilized in the 2000 elections by the national-populist leader of the Greater Romania Party (GRP), Corneliu Vadim Tudor, against the candidates of the democratic parties.71

Conclusions

To paraphrase a famous question, “what is to be done” to overcome the difficult and urgent problems discussed above, to avoid bloody ethnic conflicts and to ease the process of democratic consolidation in Romania? Obviously, the answer is by no means simple, and there are no quick solutions to such a question. Nevertheless, a rational analysis should prevail. The American political scientist Kenneth Jowitt argues that a solution resides in adoption: of Eastern Europe by Western Europe. It would be also useful to remember his rhetorical question: “Is there any point of leverage, critical mass of civic effort – political, cultural, and economic – that can add its weight to civic forces in Eastern Europe and check the increasing frustration, depression, fragmentation, and anger that will lead to country- and region-wide violence of a communal type in Eastern Europe?”72 However, the same author notes that the solution he proposes “would require enormous imagination, coordination, and intrusion of Western Europe’s (and, in a significant way, the United States’) part: a massive economic presence, provision for major population shifts on the European continent, and intracontinental party cooperation and action.”73
Adoption? Yes, but how to make this solution acceptable to the West, since the experience of West Germany in adopting its Eastern half proved to be more difficult and expensive than it was thought? A reasonable answer can be found in the remedies identified by Gellner for calming the ethnic conflicts: (1) political stability and continuity; (2) economic affluence; and (3) cultural pluralism and de-territorialization of nationalism.74 Taking these conditions as a starting point, I would argue that political stability and continuity favors accelerated change and reform. However, both majority and minority should avoid stances based, so to say, on a Boolean logic, that is, to operate with sets of two values, “true” and “false,” “yes” and “no.” Any maximalist claim would use a Boolean logic, and would make impossible any reasonable compromise, such as the claim for territorial autonomy for the two Szekler counties of Harghita and Covasna, where ethnic Hungarians constitute a majority, or the claim that the Hungarian minority should display an “absolute loyalty” towards the Romanian “unitary nation-state.”

There is no doubt that economic affluence heavily contributes to soothing the ethnic conflicts by lowering different forms of frustration. Therefore, economic improvement is crucial in order to prevent nurturing anti-Western, anti-capitalist and xenophobic feelings of the “losers” of the economic transition. As Tismăneanu has perceptively argued, “the growing public dissatisfaction with the effects of the half-hearted reforms ... can lead to a situation of profound despair and the rise of Peron-style social demagogues who claim to offer immediate and simple solutions to complex and intricate issues.”75

Finally, the development of cultural pluralism provides the framework for respecting the cultural and educational rights of minorities. In this respect, the Romanian government has to address the issue of establishing a Hungarian university in Romania, which is one of the main concerns of the Hungarian minority. At the same time, I consider Gellner’s ideas of “de-territorialization of nationalism” and “de-fetishisation of land” as crucial in the attempt to find a solution to the minority problem in present day Romania. As Gellner perceptively argues, “the capacity to love, say, Ruritanian folk music without absolutely insisting on exclusive sovereignty over the villages in which that music was allegedly first sung, would be eminently desirable.”76 Technology can also contribute to a “de-territorialization of nationalism,” by improving the access of minorities to cultural programs in their own language. For instance, satellite television programs such as those provided by Duna Televízió (Danube Television) might nurture the Hungarian minority culture in Hungary’s neighboring countries.

To conclude, it seems that a Kosovo-type crisis is quite unlikely to develop in Romania. However, the possibility of further outbursts of ethnic nation-
alism still exists. This can lead to significant population movements, with severe consequences on the political and economic stability in the region. Disenchantment, frustration, alienation and segregation may lead to the “exit” solution, that is, to large masses of overwhelmingly illegal emigrants heading towards the core countries of Europe, unless the “voice” of national and ethnic minorities are listened to and taken into consideration in order to provide a common ground for a minimal “loyalty.”

NOTES


2 Regarding the concepts of complete democratic transition and consolidated democracy, I follow the interpretation of Linz and Stepan: “A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure.” Respectively, a consolidated democracy is “a political situation in which ... democracy has become ‘the only game in town.’” See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 3, 5.

3 In May 1990, József Antall, the head of the first freely elected government of post-communist Hungary made his famous statement: “In my soul, I consider myself to be the Prime Minister of 15 million Hungarians.” The remark implied that the Antall government was responsible not only for Hungary’s population of 10.5 million, but also for the 3 million ethnic Hungarians living in the neighboring countries and the alleged 1.5 million Hungarians from around the world. Such a statement angered especially the governments in Bucharest and Bratislava, and seriously damaged their relations with Budapest. See Péter Kende, “The Trianon Syndrome: Hungarians and Their Neighbors,” in Béla K. Király, ed., *Lawful Revolution in Hungary, 1989-94* (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 1995), pp. 475-492.


8 Ústí nad Labem is a city of approx. 106,000 inhabitants in the northwestern part of the Czech Republic, capital of the region of North Bohemia. The local
authority had built a wall in front of a Roma housing estate; the wall eventually came down in 1999 after prolonged pressure from the Czech government, backed by the European Union, and was replaced by a “buffer zone”, with the local authority re-housing non-Roma families to areas where, it is said, they will not be affected by what they saw as “the Gypsy nuisance.” For a well-written, but emotional introduction to the “Gypsy question” in East-Central Europe, see Isabel Fonseca, *Bury Me Standing: The Gypsies and Their Journey* (New York: Vintage Books, 1996).


10 Since data provided by sources from the region tend to be contradictory concerning the ethnic structure of the countries under scrutiny, I used *The World Factbook 2000*, issued by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Czech Republic has a population of 10,272,179 (July 2000 estimate). Statistical data on Czech Republic available from http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ez.html; Internet; accessed 26 June 2001.


16 In this respect, Ignác Romsics has observed: “It cannot be denied that, at a time when all of Eastern Europe was in the midst of a total upheaval of the post-World War II order, it occurred to many Hungarians that if the outcomes of the Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences could be undone, then perhaps it might be time for the Treaty of Trianon to be invalidated or at least revised.” See Ignác Romsics, *Hungary in the Twentieth Century* (Budapest: Corvina and Osiris, 1999), p. 461. See also White, *Nationalism and Territory*, p. 107.

17 My analysis employs Benedict Anderson’s definition of the nation, that is, “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.” See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the
Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991), p. 6. Regarding the fundamental features of national identity, I followed Anthony D. Smith who proposes the following five: (1) an historic territory, or homeland; (2) common myths and historical memories; (3) a common, mass public culture; (4) common legal rights and duties for all members; and (5) a common economy with territorial mobility for members. See Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 14.


19 Connor, Ethnonationalism, p. 223.

20 This is how Weber sees the process of national integration in France: “Before the inhabitants of France could come to feel a significant community, they had to share significant experiences with each other. Roads, railroads, schools, markets, military service, and the circulation of money, goods, and printed matter provided those experiences, swept away old commitments, instilled a national view of things in regional minds and confirmed the power of that view by offering advancement to those who adopted it. The national ideology was still diffuse and amorphous around the middle of the nineteenth century. French culture became truly national only in the last years of the century.” See Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), p. 486.

21 Connor, Ethnonationalism, pp. 223-224.


24 Smith, National Identity, p. 57. Drawing on Smith’s ideas, Sorin Alexandrescu has argued that two contrasting types of nationalism coexisted in interwar Romania: liberal and modernizing economic nationalism was confronted by an anti-modern cultural nationalism, centered on the return to “traditional values.” See Sorin Alexandrescu, “Naþionalismul român în perioada interbelicã” (Romanian nationalism during the interwar period), Revista 22 593 (10-16 July 2001), pp. XIV-XV. Following Smith’s concept of ethnic bureaucratic incorporation, I argue that under the communist regime the administrative, economic and cultural revolutions converged towards the creation of a homogenous Romanian “socialist” nation.

25 I intend to provide an in-depth analysis of these issues in a larger work in progress, entitled “Building the Romanian Nation: The Romanian Nationalizing State, 1918-1981.”


30 Ronnas, *Urbanization in Romania*, p. 236.


34 See Programul Partidului Comunist Român de fâurire a societății socialiste multilateral dezvoltate și inaintare a României spre comunism (The Romanian Communist Party’s Program for establishing a multilaterally developed socialist society and Romania’s advancement towards communism) (Bucharest: Editura Politică, 1975). Regarding the teleological approach to the “national” history, see pp. 27-64.


36 Hirschman analyzes the arguments put forward by the opponents of reform during the last two hundred years and discusses three main theses: (1) “perversity” (any action intended to improve the economic and political life would exacerbate the conditions intended to be improved); (2) “futility” (*plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose*); and, (3) “jeopardy” (the reform, though desirable, would compromise the achievements already made). See Albert O. Hirschman, *The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991).


41 For more on this, see Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, *Transilvania subiectivă* (Subjective Transylvania) (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1999), pp. 136-142, and Gallagher, *Romania After Ceaușescu*, pp. 85-96.


The dispute between Romania and Hungary concerning the application of the “Law on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries,” adopted by the Hungarian Parliament on 19 June 2001, confirms the functioning of the new triangular relational nexus. Romanian authorities have refused to support the application of the law on Romanian territory, and have sent letters of protest to the European Union with regard to the adoption of the law by the Hungarian Parliament. As a consequence, the two countries have initiated consultations regarding the application of the law, and EU assistance is expected. Inside the new “triadic relational nexus,” composed of Romania, Hungary and international organizations, HDUR has placed itself very close to Hungary, the external homeland. Considering the characteristics of the process that led to the signing of the “basic treaty” in 1996, I would argue that a reasonable compromise will be reached when the relational nexus resembles an equilateral triangle, with HDUR somewhere in its central area. The English version of the “Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries” is available from http://www.htmh.hu/law.htm; Internet; accessed 2 August 2001.

Leon Festinger, professor of psychology at Stanford University, developed his “theory of cognitive dissonance” in order to analyze the possibilities of changing the attitudes detrimental to development in a given society. See Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, 1957). Albert O. Hirschman summarizes Festinger’s “theory of cognitive dissonance” as follows: “A person who for some reason, commits himself to act in a manner contrary to his beliefs, or to what he believes to be his beliefs, is in a state of dissonance. Such a state is unpleasant, and the person will attempt to reduce dissonance. Since the ‘discrepant behavior’ has already taken place and cannot be undone, while the belief can be changed, reduction of dissonance can be achieved principally by changing one’s beliefs in the direction of greater harmony with the action.” Drawing on the concept of cognitive dissonance, Hirschman observes that development can be promoted by
the means of the dissonance created by a modern type of behavior and introduces his concept of “inverted sequences,” arguing that cognitive dissonance permits a replacement of the “orderly” sequence (attitude change precedes behavioral change) by a “disorderly” one (modern attitudes are acquired as a consequence of modern behavior). See Albert O. Hirschman, *A Bias for Hope: Essays on Development and Latin America* (Yale: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 322-324.


52 Tismăneanu, “Romanian exceptionalism?” p. 404.


60 Dăianu, *În cîntro se îndreaptă þãrile postcomuniste?* pp. 202-203.


For more on the economic evolutions in post-communist Romania see Dăianu, *Încopto se îndreapta târile postcomuniste?* pp. 193-224. See also Ilie Şerbănescu, foreword to Dăianu, pp. 11-12.

The Polish model of transformation has been based on ten essential measures: (1) immediate and resolute price and trade liberalization; (2) strict budget constraints for state enterprises and easy access on the market for new private companies; (3) slow and thorough privatization of medium and large-scale enterprises and rapid privatization of small enterprises; (4) adoption of a sound commercial code and “the inheritance of a legal system capable of enforcing contracts;” (5) close supervision and regulation of the banking sector; (6) government’s readiness to accept the high unemployment that follows rapid restructuring; (7) low budget deficit of the government and the introduction of a effective tax system; (8) successful negotiations on reducing the foreign debt; (9) an exchange rate policy that provides stability to real effective exchange rates; and (10) expansion of business schools and rapid spread of information technology. See Stanislaw Gomulka, “Output: Causes of the Decline and the Recovery,” in Peter Boone, Stanislaw Gomulka and Richard Layard, eds., *Emerging from Communism: Lessons from Russia, China and Eastern Europe* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998), pp. 32-33.


Regarding Vădîm Tudor and the GRP, Tismăneanu and Kligman have written: “The real surprise of the 2000 elections was not the victory of Iliescu and PSDR, but, rather, the stunning rise of Vădîm Tudor and his GRP. A combination of antisystem nationalist caudillo and self-indulgent jester, Vădîm Tudor managed to transform a marginal political organization into a major opposition party that now controls one-fifth of Romania’s parliament and many of its specialized committees.” See Vladimir Tismăneanu and Gail Kligman, “Romania’s First Postcommunist Decade: From Iliescu to Iliescu,” *East European Constitutional Review*, vol. 10, no. 1 (Winter 2001), p. 83. For more on the results of the 2000 elections and the rise of Greater Romania Party, see the special issue of *Sfera Politicii* 87-88 (2001).


Jowitt, *New World Disorder*, p. 305.


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Can Democracy Work in Southeastern Europe?


In September 1995, in the Alpes Maritimes, the wonderful old town of Die was busy celebrating Albania for a whole week, in the framework of a cultural festival focusing on (the region formerly known as) Eastern Europe. Before 1989, the same festival was promoting French pedestrian tourism; ironically, while high-profile pundits were heralding the End of History, the organizers of the popular gathering decided to welcome Eastern Europe back to history as usual, and mark the end of brutal decades of Communist utopianism. With generous support from genuinely caring citizens, the local government, and many NGOs, dozens of Albanian writers, painters, filmmakers, musicians, academics, public intellectuals, and the like were (re)presenting their country, introducing it to eager audiences of “natives,” Paris-based Eastern Europe specialists, and a sizable cohort of fellow Eastern Europeans. As usual, the latter were still meeting mainly in the West, on Western money, to debate what Westerners thought they should debate. It was under those stereotypical auspices of the “East-West dialogue” that I have first met Balázs Trencsényi, possibly the crucial character in the short story I am about to tell.

In the Alpes Maritimes, even inordinate quantities of the local wine, the Clairette de Die, would never prepare a Romanian for the (otherwise highly symbolic) close encounter with a Hungarian. Sober by nature and habit, I was even less prepared to meet a kindred spirit. However, I understood that it was exactly what was happening to me when, after many pleas for Eastern European brother- and sisterhood had bored everybody out of any fledgling sympathy for the countries of the former Soviet bloc, Balázs stood up and, never pausing to breathe, offered the following: a sharp critique of the whole “East-West” routine; a limpid indictment of the sentimentaloid, patronizing rhetoric of the Western partners, together with a lucid scrutiny of its opportunistic counterpart “volunteered” by Easterners long trained in the langue de bois. I immediately knew it: that young Hungarian was no ordinary student. Since we instantly befriended each other, I found out he was one of Hungary’s rising academic stars nurtured by the Budapest Collegium Invisibile (a Castalian model I tried, and failed,
to establish in my native Romania; Transylvanian Hungarians half-succeed-
ed). It pleased me to discover, a few months later, during my first term as a teacher at Central European University, that Balázs was exceptional in many ways, but not singular. Beyond the intellectual promise he has been fulfilling eversince, Balázs had already, more than six years ago, an interest in matters Romanian which ran against the grain of my (standard Roman-
ian) expectations: he did not have any relatives in Transylvania; his curios-
ity encompassed the whole of Romania’s history and culture, with special attention to “Generation ‘27” (Eliade, Cioran, Noica, etc.) and its posteri-
ty; moreover, he was on his way towards studying the whole region, includ-
ing its many languages. His was a project that far exceeded the “human, all too human” limitations of a career plan, let alone the clinical credibility of someone’s scholarly agenda.

Before becoming my student at CEU, Balázs came to attend some of my classes at the University of Bucharest, to improve his Romanian language skills, and get acquainted with whatever he couldn’t find in the piles of books he was reading avidly. His Bucharest trip was also a chance for some of my Romanian students to meet him, emulate his model, teach him things he didn’t know, debate with him over cheap beer. The core group that was to launch what I consider to be the most ambitious, sophisticated, engaging emerging research community in their generation and fields was thus formed. This is how Râzvan Pârâianu, Cristina Petrescu, Dragoș Petrescu, and Marius Turda joined this voluntary experiment in common socialization, and in lively, open-minded, interactive pursuit of knowledge. Over the fol-
lowing years, moving between various universities, libraries, and research institutes, from Bucharest and Cluj/Kolozsvár to Budapest, from Istanbul and Moscow to Berlin, Oxford, London, Washington, and many other Euro-
pean and North-American cities, learning and publishing, initiating and con-
tributing to projects, the original group of friends and colleagues has kept growing. First, by including more people with similar backgrounds (i.e., Romanians from Romania, Hungarians from Hungary), then by attracting the most likely partners (i.e., Hungarians from Transylvania). Symptomati-
cally, Transylvanian Hungarians were not prepared to function as mediators between Romanians and Hungarians, for reasons that are too complex to be listed here, but surely include parochial upbringing, almost self-sufficient parallel Lebenswelten, and the atmosphere of mutual mistrust only a handful of people from both communities are willing, and able, to overcome. Fortu-
nately, learning by doing is always productive, and it only took a few months in Budapest for all these three distinct subgroups to merge. Finally, the tri-
angular collaboration proved to be working, although not entirely devoid of a Girardian dynamics of mimetic competition, and expanded into a multi-
ethnic, multi-lingual, global network of young scholars. I feel privileged and
proud to have happened to be at or closely in touch with Central European University most of this time, as our university is also their place of choice, their common alma mater. If one keeps in mind that students from Romania and Hungary make up roughly 30% of CEU’s student body, the success of this collaboration is also a measure of the graduate school’s first ten years of existence.

Scholarly cooperation between Hungarians and Romanians has a long, rich, and respectable tradition. It is not my intention to revisit it in a mere paragraph. Also, matters of academic disagreement and contention have been numerous, occasionally erupting in passionate controversies, both fueled by and fueling more mundane exchanges, from populist diatribes to government policies. Such polemics are endemic, and likely to remain a fixture of the Hungarian-Romanian exchanges. Good intentions, idealism, democratization, improbable (but not impossible) future harmonization of legislations, political cultures, societal structures, infrastructures, institutions, economies, lifestyles, all in the framework of the New Utopia, European integration, will never completely suppress bilateral tensions, let alone collective memories, the instrumentalizations of conflicting “usable pasts,” even inevitable clashes of the respective economic interests and raisons d’Etat. NGOs and individuals that may appear to be politically correct (once again, let us not forget for a second that the region has a long, amazingly resilient, practice of the langue de bois) are trying to cover up historical realities with ever more talk of multiculturalism, positive discrimination, federalism, and related notions, frequently resorting to anachronism and other categorical frauds. This self-serving discourse, even when well-intended, is at best just a variety of wishful thinking. Realists (or active pessimists, like myself) should however continue to hope and work for bridges over perennial and temporary gaps, past, present, and future. Some problems do not have solutions. Precisely because of that, we should concentrate less on (self-delusional) solutions, and more on their (tangible) second best, a sound understanding of problems.

We should achieve this goal on the basis of a commonsensical assessment of the Hungarian-Romanian predicament: Hungary and Romania are more than just neighbors. When I say this, I do not simply state the obvious, although such statements are never superfluous: the overlapping, palimpsestic, both volatile and stable demographic, linguistic, cultural, religious, social, economic, political history of Transylvania. I also mean many centuries of contact, conflict, and exchange between a variety of state formations ran by or only encompassing (fragments) of the two ethno-national communities and their other more-than-neighbors: Germans, Jews, Roma, etc. From the heights of symbolic geography to the depths of what I call ethnic ontology – the complete autochthonist meta-
physics, in which universal categories such as Time (not just history), Space (not just territory), Being (not just ethno-national character) are being indigenized, while the local categories such as Discourse (not just language) are being raised to the level of the universal –, Hungarians and Romanians share just about everything. Although Hungary proudly sits in Central Europe, while Romania is drifting between a putative Central Europe, a threatening, abominable Eastern frontier, and the dreaded Balkans, the two countries face similar challenges, and have similar resources, especially human.

By using a variety of academic idioms, by concentrating on many different topics, the young authors contributing to this pioneering volume come quite close to the perspective I have briefly sketched above. New methods, new theories, new objects of scholarly curiosity, but also a new commonality of vision distinguish this book from the bulk of what is being published in the respective mainstreams of Romanian and Hungarian historical studies. More obviously Romania, where national communism has severely impacted historical studies, and its legacy has to be “distanced” systematically by means of canonical controversies, public debates, the reform of training and research institutions, the two countries have produced mainstream historical discourses that, by their close association with ethno-national and nation-state legitimating narratives, ought to be critically reconstructed. The task is monumental, and may be doomed if undertaken as a holistic project. On the contrary, time has come for piece-meal revisions, based on groundbreaking research on details. To be sure, research on details has long been a refuge of the best historians in dürftiger Zeit. This is not the type of work I have in mind. Rather, I plead for painstaking work on relevant details (along the lines of the elusive eccezionale normale suggested by microhistorians), and also for the vitally necessary theoretical and methodological horizon that simultaneously brings antiquarian innocence to an end, and avoids the ideological and political traps that have so effectively marred the work of the best people in our profession. In other words, concentrating on the micro, while fully cognizant of the macro, and aware of the intermediate; pursuing a wertfrei research agenda, but also being able to gauge the complexities of historical discourse: narrative, epistemological, ideological, political. Breaking the mould of, subverting, “deconstructing,” and eventually replacing the existing historical vulgates in Romania and Hungary is a long-term project. Modestly, each and every of us could at least take a few steps. Major, overarching syntheses will undoubtedly follow suit.

These young authors are not alone. Some of their teachers and many of their colleagues, at universities in Hungary, Romania, and elsewhere, are already at work. And – who knows? Before we know it, a regional third
Afterword

discourse in historical studies, produced, accepted, and disseminated by both Hungarians and Romanians, may take shape. Disentangling themselves from a nexus of competing autochthonisms, (hidden) political agendas, geocultural bovarisms, geopolitical ruminations, idiosyncratic symbolic geographies (such as the cultural mythology of Central Europe, which could be seen for a while as a better choice than various chauvinistic vernacular collective identities, but was only evading the real problems) and ethnic ontologies, new voices are already audible, new ideas and visions are put forward.

Sorin Antohi
APPENDIX

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
In the modern period, Romanian and Hungarian historians have been passionately debating the overlapping pasts of their countries. The polemics between the two historiographical grand narratives have focused on the multiethnic space of Transylvania: clashing over the question of “chronological preeminence,” the status of the province within the Hungarian Kingdom and that of the Romanian population within the Transylvanian socio-political system, the situation of Romanians within “Greater Hungary” and that of the Hungarian minority within Greater Romania, the impact of the process of forced industrialization and cultural homogenization upon minority life under the communist regime, and the diplomatic relations between the two countries. These debates produced a large and heterogeneous historiographical corpus that has not yet been subject to comprehensive bibliographical research.

The political change that occurred in 1989 has created an unprecedented opportunity to transgress the narrow boundaries of previous historiographical paradigms. In this context, there have been attempts to re-conceptualize the Romanian-Hungarian relationship from a regional or global perspective, using non-teleological theoretical outlooks. At the same time, historical polemics and conflicting national mythologies have continued to characterize a significant part of the historiographical production in the two countries. The present bibliography aims to contribute to a better knowledge of the post-communist history-writing in these
countries, and to provide students of Romanian-Hungarian bilateral relations with a useful working instrument, comprising works published after 1989 by Romanian and Hungarian authors on inter-ethnic, socio-political, cultural and diplomatic relations, focusing mainly on the modern period.

In compiling the bibliography, the authors had to face the challenges of subsuming under common analytical categories two historiographical traditions and organizing linguistically divergent materials. Originally, the authors considered the possibility of publishing two separate bibliographies comprising works by Hungarian and Romanian historians on the related subjects of the history of Hungary, Romania, and Transylvania, and on the status of national minorities in the two countries. But this parallel treatment would have greatly reduced the relational and comparative aspects of the endeavor. Nevertheless, one has to face serious disproportions on various accounts. First and foremost, there is a quantitative imbalance. The treatment of the general history of Romanians in the Hungarian historiography does not equal the numerous works on the history of the Hungarians living in Romania. Currently, approximately one hundred authors are publishing in Romania historical works in Hungarian language, on the history of the Hungarian minority in Romania and, to a lesser extent, on that of Romania and Hungary. Compared to this, works by Romanian historians on the history of Hungary are considerably less numerous.

Second, the analytical focus of the two historiographies is different. Traditionally, Romanian historiography on Transylvania has been by and large ethno-centric, focusing mainly on the history of Romanians and their socio-political emancipation. It touched upon the general history of Transylvania and of Hungary only providing that, and to the extent of which, it was related to the history of Romanians. Nevertheless, in the last decade there has been a tendency to overcome parochialism and to reconsider the history of Romanians in Transylvania, by integrating it into a comprehensive regional historical framework, focusing on issues such as inter-ethnic relations in the province, the history of regionalism and the formation of regional identities. In its turn, Hungarian historiography in the last decades has been dominated by a tendency of professional and methodological self-centeredness. Furthermore, the Hungarian historical literature has not focused on the general history of Romania, but it has been concerned with certain aspects of it, which overlapped with the Hungarian national history, focusing on those geographical regions of Romania which are inhabited by ethnic Hungarians or were part of the Hungarian state in various historical periods. Although it did not lack in quality, the Hungarian research on the history of Romania or Transylvania was not marked by methodological or theoretical innovations. As for the Hungarian historiography in Transyl-
vania, 1989 has opened the space for the hitherto suppressed research on topics related to Hungarian history in Romania. The last decade has been thus marked by attempts to upgrade the scope of the research on Transylvania. In addition, compared to the general historical literature in Hungary, these works had an extremely significant impact on the public opinion and the process of identity building.

The potential convergence between the research agendas of the Romanian and Hungarian historians has thus provided a major stimulus for a unified treatment of the two bibliographies. The main aim of the present bibliography is not to present the Romanian and Hungarian historiographies as conflicting sides on the international scholarly scene. By putting them side-by-side, the authors hope to facilitate an interactive and comparative study of the two historiographic traditions, and to highlight their points of contact and convergence, as well as their divergences. In fact, having in mind the traditional Romanian-Hungarian historiographic controversies, one might ask: what is the intellectual value of these debates and where they might eventually lead, if even publications focusing on common problems cannot be arranged according to the same analytical categories?

Given the above-mentioned complexity and variety of the themes covered (further amplified by the different analytical frameworks developed in the two countries), the authors have opted for an organization in four chronological sections ranging from the early modern period to 1989, supplemented by three introductory sections focusing on the relationship between national and regional history, the Romanian-Hungarian historiographical convergences and the general history of Transylvania. Each bibliographical section is divided into Romanian and Hungarian subsections, based on the language of publication. In addition, a third subsection is added, comprising works by Romanian and Hungarian authors in foreign languages, in an effort to explore the output of the “national” historiographies on the international market.

The first sections of the bibliography focus on the divergent thematic directions of the respective national canons. The first one, on symbolic geography, explores an important intellectual venture in the region characterizing the 1980-1990s: the attempt of mapping the respective cultures in view of the European political and cultural space. Romanian historiography had to face the challenge of reconciling the ambiguous dialectic of two paradigms that seemed at times contradictory: Central-Europe and Southeast Europe (i.e. the “Balkans”). At the same time, in Hungary, one can speak of a gradual abandonment of the polemic discourse of Central Europe, so prominent in the 1980s, in favor of an attempt to localize the Hungarian historical space in a – not so ideological – regional context and,
on that basis, to integrate it into a larger comparative and analytical framework, that of the “Mid-European” historical processes.

In the second section, focusing on historiographical studies, one can also point out many divergences between the Hungarian and the Romanian materials. While in Romania the problems of historiography figured prominently on the post-communist research agenda, in Hungary the history of historiography has been a marginal topic of research. In the last decade, some of the leading Romanian historians sought to deconstruct historical mythologies, debated the relationship between politics and history-writing as well as the status of the historian in society; at the same time, historiographical debates in Hungary have been marked by more “technical” questions, such as the re-evaluation of individual oeuvres, and have not been concerned with the “fundamental” questions of historiographic narrativity. Some Hungarian historians have been, nevertheless, receptive to Romanian historiographical conceptions (e.g., the works of Lucian Boia). In contrast, except for the debate stirred by the publication of the History of Transylvania in the mid-eighties, one can speak neither of a fertile Romanian reception of Hungarian historical works, nor of a substantive Romanian-Hungarian historiographical dialogue. This section also contains some works about the other nation’s general history published in the respective countries.

The third and fourth sections include works concentrating on the common ground of the Romanian-Hungarian relations – the history of Transylvania. The third one includes general works on the province, which refer to more than one historical period. The fourth section – i.e., the first chronological one – focuses on the medieval and early modern history of Transylvania until 1867, dealing mainly with the Transylvanian Principality, and the events of 1848-49. Numerous works by Romanian authors focus on the confessional history of Romanians in Transylvania, and the role played by the Uniates in the emergence of the Romanian national movement. In view of the Hungarian material, 1848 would have been a more clear-cut dividing line, defining the Revolution as a separate unit and then one could have incorporated into one section the rather modest output on the subsequent periods up to 1918. This is also true since, in the Hungarian historiographical works, the Romanian community becomes a dominant theme only in connection with the events of 1848. But if we step out of the canon of the Hungarian nation-building process – crystallized, naturally enough, around 1848-49 – and turn to the tangible reality of the history of administration in Transylvania, then 1867 (i.e., the re-integration of Transylvania into Hungary) emerges as the fundamental watershed. The fifth section contains materials on the relations between the emerging Romanian nation-state and Austria-Hungary, and studies on
the nationality question in the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Empire. In the last two sections, one focusing on the interwar period and World War II (1918-1945), the other on the emergence, consolidation and demise of the communist regimes in Romania and Hungary (1945-1989), we sought to allocate equal weight to the interstate relations and to the history of the Hungarian minority in Romania. In the Hungarian historiographical discourse, the relationship between the two nations was perceived as basically conditioned by the situation of the Hungarian minority in Romania, while the Romanian perspective concentrated mainly on the diplomatic relations between the two countries, and on the Hungarian irredenta as a factor determining the relationship of the Hungarian minority to the Romanian state. Needless to say, these divergences cannot be resolved by a bibliography and require thorough scholarly discussions. In order to facilitate these discussions, our selection contains representative samples from both paradigms.

A word is in order at this point about the types of works included in this bibliography. The selection offers an overview of the Hungarian and Romanian historiographical works produced between 1990 and 2000 on the history of Romania, Hungary, Transylvania, the Romanians in Hungary and the Hungarian minority in Romania. Apart from some exceptional cases, it concentrates on scholarly works and does not include articles published in dailies, or interviews. Together with scholarly works, it comprises also numerous polemical writings, nationalist pamphlets and propaganda works of historical nature, themselves representative of the post-communist historiographical discourses, revealing thus an important component of the Romanian-Hungarian cultural and political relations. Special attention has been also paid to documenting the respective translations of Hungarian or Romanian works into the other language and their critical reception, as well as the works published abroad by Hungarian and Romanian scholars, thus providing the reader with a certain sample of the reception of these historiographical traditions outside of the region. According to the linguistic criteria of selection, the subsections referring to works published in Hungarian include Hungarian authors from Romania, publishing mostly in Hungarian. The bibliography also includes a certain number of translated works by foreign authors who have had an impact on the intellectual life in Romania and Hungary after 1989.

Finally, a word of warning about the scope of this selection. The bibliography is the first attempt to synthetize a vast bibliographical material, and bears unavoidable time and space limitations. The project will be further developed with annotations, works dealing with the developments in Hungarian-Romanian relations occurring after 1989, and works on the Romanian-Hungarian relations by foreign authors. At present stage, how-
However, these tasks would have defeated the energy of the authors. Including the post-1989 period, for example, would have transgressed the framework of a historical bibliography, by advancing in the fields of sociology, political science and social anthropology. Notwithstanding these limitations, it is hoped that the reader will get an insight into the differences and similarities between the historiographical discourses put forward in the two countries. The bibliography is also intended to highlight those research areas that could enhance the scholarly interaction among students of Romanian-Hungarian relations in particular, and of East-Central European history in general. The authors believe that the only way to overcome the trap of ideological debates and to reconsider our respective conceptual canons and historical narratives leads through the creation of small, but methodologically sound, interfaces of cooperation, crystallized around well-formulated “technical” questions. This bibliography is designed as a step towards this aim.

CONTENTS

I. National History in a Regional Context. Romanians, Hungarians, and Symbolic Geographies 315

II. Romanian-Hungarian Historiographical Convergences. Images of the Other 317

III. Transylvania: General History. Sources 327

IV. History of Transylvania until 1867. Romanians in the Habsburg Empire 333

V. History of Transylvania. The Romanians in Austria-Hungary between 1867-1918 347

VI. Romanian-Hungarian Interstate Relations. The Hungarians in Romania between 1918-1944 352

VII. Romanian-Hungarian Interstate Relations. The Hungarians in Romania after 1945 363
I. NATIONAL HISTORY IN A REGIONAL CONTEXT.
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During the last ten years, we have witnessed several attempts to revisit and reconsider the cultural and socio-political history of Central and Southeast Europe. The “Group for Intercultural Studies” seeks to contribute to the revision of the hegemonic canons of collective identity in the region, by giving a voice to an emerging local generation of scholars, working on similar topics, educated both in their home countries and in major universities in the West.

The aim of our group is to re-contextualize the major academic debates on and within our region, and to re-examine, with a fresh eye, the concepts of nation, state, regionalism, identity, and modernity, as well as the more recent issues of post-communism, transition or democratic consolidation. In doing so, we would like to collaborate with scholars interested in our region, seeking to reach common grounds of interpretation and mutually acceptable perspectives of research and to enhance professional intellectual communication and interaction in Central and Southeast Europe.

In the framework of our socialization process, we want to combine our academic research with its application to more practical activities, which could contribute to the formation of a milieu of intercultural dialogue, where the acts of communication are not exemplary gestures, breaking through the institutionalized silence, but feature as naturally given, on the basis of which we can turn to discuss and “negotiate” the more substantial problems.

Our projects are therefore meant to link the research on historical and cultural consciousness in the region with actually trying to have an impact on it. Having discussed for years the various, mutually exclusive narratives institutionalized in our educational and cultural systems, we focus our work on the most chronic lacunae of comparative historical thematization in our region. Considering this, we concentrate our activities on the following main directions: ethnicity and nationalism; collective memory and historiographical narrativity; comparative communist and post-communist studies; and comparative cultural studies.

It is our intention to contribute to the establishing of a student network of the major educational institutions from these countries. Furthermore, we seek to launch a program of common socialization for advanced M.A. and Ph.D. students from the region, bringing them together for workshops and conducting joint research. This would mean an important bridge between practical and academic activities, and could also create an emerging stratum of young intellectuals experienced in collaboration on an intercultural basis.

Margit Feischmidt, Constantin Iordachi, Răzvan Pârâianu, Cristina Petrescu, Dragoș Petrescu, Zsuzsa Török, Balázs Trencsényi (the founders of the group)
Map 1. Hungary and Romania, up to World War I.
Map 2. Hungary and Romania, 1918–1940.
CIVIC EDUCATION PROJECT

The Civic Education Project, an international voluntary organisation rooted in the belief that democratic society requires critically-minded and informed individuals, works to enhance the development of higher and professional education in societies engaged in political and economic transition.

CEP was started in 1991, with 15 lecturers in eight universities of Czechoslovakia. This year CEP has 200 teachers working at almost 100 universities of Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Yugoslavia.

VISITING LECTURER PROGRAM
Social science academics commit to a year of living and working at a university in Central or Eastern Europe or Eurasia. CEP attracts Visiting Lecturers from the Americas, Europe, Africa, the Far East and Australasia. By introducing critical thinking, academic writing, research and analytical skills, CEP Visiting Lecturers expose their students and faculty colleagues to a new and exciting range of materials and methodology. CEP Visiting Lecturers also bring with them books, journals and articles that they donate to their regional university libraries.

THE EASTERN SCHOLAR PROGRAM
CEP’s Eastern Scholar Program is a conscious strategy to reverse the “brain drain” from the region and help talented individuals return to their home countries. CEP assists these scholars by providing financial and institutional assistance for up to two academic years. Without CEP’s support, many of these scholars could not afford academic careers and would be forced to take additional jobs.
CEP is committed to assisting regional universities win back and retain these promising young scholars in the hope that they will revitalise departments and help reform higher education.

OUTREACH ACTIVITIES
In addition to teaching, CEP Fellows initiate a wide variety of outreach activities for both their students and department colleagues, recent examples include curriculum development, library projects, faculty training workshops, conferences, moot courts and debate forums.
FOCUS ON TEACHING AND STUDENTS
CEP stresses individual contact between Fellows and their students as a change mechanism. Many students in the region are unfamiliar with asking questions in class, having a professor provide official hours in which to discuss and clarify issues, or writing an original paper. The personal and academic guidance that CEP Fellows give their students better prepares the student for life after university.

EAST-EAST COOPERATION
CEP recognises the long-term strategic importance of increased communication and cooperation among countries in the region. CEP now regularly sponsors conferences where Eastern Scholars from Central and Eastern Europe meet their counterparts from Central Asia, the Caucasus and Siberia to exchange ideas about reform in higher education and their experience.
„A most impressive and welcome collection of original, historically informative, and theoretically compelling contributions to understanding the nature, dynamics, and tribulations of national identities in East-Central Europe. Focusing on issues related to nation-building, minorities and majorities, and regional identities in Romania and Hungary, the essays collected in this path-breaking volume should be read by all those who want to explore the complexities of national and political memories, symbols, and aspirations in the region. The authors, young scholars driven by the desire to overcome stereotypes and dogmas, have succeeded wonderfully in their ambitious and timely endeavor.”

Vladimir Tismaneanu
Professor of Government and Politics, University of Maryland
Editor, East European Politics and Societies

„An enriching collection of case studies on the modern and contemporary history of Hungary and Romania. The authors – young historians and social scientists from those countries – and their fresh, non-ideological approaches to nation-building and national identities are a sign that the post-communist transition is under way. The bibliography of the last decade of Hungarian and Romanian works on relations between the two countries is invaluable for specialists.”

Irina Livezeanu
Associate Professor of History
at the University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania